Ennuschat, Pia
Contact Information
Available for interviews at
European Job Market for Economists (EEA)
Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA)
CV Job Market Paper
Research Interests
Microeconomic Theory, Information Design, Industrial Organization, Mechanism Design
Placement Officer
Edouard Schaal
[email protected]
References
Antonio Penta
[email protected]
Alexander Frug
[email protected]
Massimo Motta
[email protected]
Research
Targeted Information Design: Shaping Monopolistic Markets with Heterogeneous Consumers (Job Market Paper).
This paper studies information provision by platforms in monopolistic markets. Prior to interacting with the platform consumers obtain information from some other sources. The platform then decides how much additional information to provide to consumers abd cab condition her information provision on both her knowledge of consumers preferences and the information they hold at the outset. When this outside information is monotone non-overlapping, solving a relaxed problem featuring stochastic dominance constraints on posterior mean distributions is sufficient to characterize the set of all welfare outcomes. In this setting, efficiency turns out to be highest when information is designed in a buyer optimal way.