“Tomorrow was pledged every year for the 27 years of these COP meetings. An entire generation has been born and grown to adulthood. And yet, tomorrow has not come.”
(Alliance of Small Island States, COP27)

In recent years, there has been a growing international recognition of the urgency of addressing climate change and the need to take immediate action to mitigate and adapt to its effects. This has led to a partial shift in the temporal framing of climate change, with greater emphasis on the urgency of the crisis, as evidenced by discourses stressing the existential threat of rising sea levels in small tropical islands. But despite the rise of such “climate apocalypse” imaginary, international climate action remains today largely insufficient as greenhouse gas emissions keep increasing.

AsI write this, some countries are undergoing a climate apocalypse and demanding urgent mitigation, adaptation and compensation measures (e.g., Small Island Developing States). Meanwhile, other countries, such as EU members and the United States, continue to postpone ambitious climate action and fail to take climate justice issues seriously, as shown by a recent study revealing insufficient and uneven climate finance efforts from the Global North to address the needs of most climate-vulnerable countries, mostly located in the Global South.

My undergraduate research on climate change temporal discourses in COP26 and COP27 (the UN Climate Conferences of 2021 and 2022) suggests an explanation for the lack of rapid international climate action. I argue that temporal framings of climate change (linear vs apocalyptic or ‘eschatological’) depend on how vulnerable countries are to climate impacts. In turn, temporal framings affect the level of urgency and ambition of much-needed transformative actions.

Simply put, temporality matters for global climate action because it shapes how we perceive climate change (as an imminent or an ongoing danger?), and how we respond to it (with present or future actions?). And since current temporal framings of climate change are not leading to sufficient policy efforts, I propose we look at existing dominant temporalities, question them, and uncover (subaltern) alternative possibilities.

1. Temporal framings of climate change

According to sociological theories, time is not an evident, objective dimension of reality, but rather a socially constructed symbol that serves as a tool for human orientation in the flow of changes. To make sense of the complex phenomenon of the climate crisis, international actors have largely relied on a linear temporality (reflected in future-oriented sustainability plans) and an eschatological temporality (associated with a discourse of urgency stressing the need to act now).

Linear temporality can be condensed in the image (cf. ‘figuration’) of a continuous and homogeneous line of empty moments following a specific direction. This temporality began to spread around the world during the Modern period through colonialism, the global expansion of capitalism, and the widespread use of clocks in all areas of life. In turn, these socio-technical processes led to the birth of an ‘open’ and ‘empty’ futurity, in which the future is colonisable by rational human governance, but also blind to the long-term environmental impacts of human actions (e.g., polluting activities).

Linear understandings of climate change identify future scenarios we are moving towards and delineate the mitigation and adaptation policies necessary to prevent and prepare for those projections. Two clear examples of such linear temporal framing of climate change are the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and net zero emissions targets (usually proposed for 2050). These future-oriented approaches to climate policy have been criticised within academia for suppressing transformative actions in the present by systematically postponing climate action until an abstract future.

Similar to linear temporality, eschatological temporality departs from a linear notion of time that moves from a starting point (t0: creation) towards a final event (t1: the end or ‘eschaton’). Originally, this conception of time was linked to the Christian idea of apocalypse and the belief in an imminent cataclysmic intervention by God in history. However, a secular version of eschatological temporality is now being reproduced by contemporary discourses stressing the finitude of time due to a climate-driven rupture—such as rising sea and temperature levels leading to ecosystem collapse.

How do these two temporalities interlink? Contemporary discourses on climate change share a narrative of progress (linear temporality) and a common orientation towards the threat of the end of time (eschatological temporality), and they do so in three different ways.

First, eco-catastrophism highlights the imminence of ecological collapse and calculates the time we have left to prevent it. Second, eco-modernism views climate change as an opportunity to move towards an optimistic future of sustainable economic growth thanks to scientific and technological advances. Third, planetary realism assumes that the worst climate impacts are already being felt, thus abandoning hope of continued progress while embracing uncertainty through adaptation and resilience to the new climate reality.

2. Climate (in)justice

Climate change is a phenomenon unfolding with uneven severity across the world. This raises questions as to which countries are most vulnerable to climate impacts and which should be responsible for repairing and compensating for climate-related damages. For the moment, climate change is having the most severe effects on those who are least responsible for causing it (namely Global South nations), leading to unequal exposure, susceptibility and ability to cope and recover—both within and across countries. 

Accordingly, international discussions around climate justice issues have focused on how the costs and benefits related to climate change are distributed across societies, and which (non-)economic mechanisms should be established to address uneven burdens. In past climate conferences, some justice mechanisms have become prominent, such as the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, or the more recent COP27 Loss and Damage Fund—which aims to provide financial assistance to nations most vulnerable and impacted by the effects of climate change.

3. States’ temporal framings of climate change in COP26 and COP27

How do linear and eschatological temporalities relate to states’ perceptions and responses to climate change? How do these temporal approaches intersect with states’ vulnerability to climate change impacts? After critically examining 14 speeches from five international actors delivered at COP26 and COP27, I have found an association between 1) the unequal distribution of climate impacts among countries (most vs less vulnerable nations), 2) states’ conflicting temporal framings of climate change (linear vs eschatological), and 3) the urgency and ambition of their climate policies.

“Climate disasters are now the perennial experience that small island developing states suffer”
(AOSIS, COP26)

First, I have found that states who perceive climate change as an ongoing apocalypse and are highly vulnerable to climate impacts, respond to climate change with a discourse of urgency. This is the case of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), a coalition of countries for whom climate disasters have become an integral part of their daily existence. Based on the historical responsibility of Western countries in causing climate change, these countries insist that developed states must take immediate climate action and provide prompt climate finance to fund adaptation and compensation for loss and damage to developing countries.

“We are living in an era where many developing countries are already witnessing unprecedented devastating impacts of climate change, though they have contributed little to it” (G77 + China, COP27)

The second group of countries I identified was formed by the African Group and the Group of 77 + China. These countries are highly vulnerable to climate impacts and suffer their consequences daily, which explains their eschatological framing of climate change as an ongoing threat that is significantly affecting their socioeconomic systems and livelihoods. The apocalyptic framing of climate change, together with remarks about the unequal responsibility for causing climate change and bearing its effects, serves to justify demands that developed states increase their climate commitments. 

“We have identified mitigation actions as a means of attainment of our aspirations, while advancing investment with the purpose of creating alternative source of livelihoods, jobs and reducing poverty” (African Group, COP27)

However, these two state coalitions also view economic development (together with mitigation and adaptation) as a top priority. This leads to the mobilisation of a linear temporality in their demands for climate finance and poverty reduction. 

“Climate change threatens our survival. [...] Our time to act is short. But it is not too late”
(European Union, COP26)

“We’re planning for both short-term sprint to 2030 that will keep 1.5 degrees Celsius in reach and for a marathon that will take us to the finish line and transform the largest economy in the world into a thriving, innovative, equitable, and just clean-energy engine for a net-zero world” (United States, COP26)

Third and lastly, less climate-vulnerable states (for now), namely EU countries and the United States, perceive climate change as an imminent threat whose worst consequences are yet to come. Given their belief that “there is still some time left to prevent a major climate catastrophe”, these actors put forward policy plans and financial promises that situate action in the future rather than the present (a central feature of linear temporality). Together with this future-oriented approach to climate policy, these Global North countries maintain a discourse of continued economic growth, which, again, follows a linear temporal logic.

Conclusion

While virtually all states view climate change through an eschatological temporal lens (either as an imminent or an ongoing threat), most of them propose future-oriented plans for climate action and finance that do not match the pressing need for urgent and ambitious coordinated global action—something small island developing states have been demanding for years.

From a practical viewpoint, paying attention to the plural temporal framings of climate change of diverse actors (not only individual countries and state coalitions, but also social movements and lobbies, which were not part of my research) will contribute to building momentum for ambitious international action, prioritising the needs and voices of most vulnerable communities. This would be especially important in climate finance, a policy area where the recipients are usually developing countries whose worlds are ending the fastest, but whose urgent needs are often approached by developed states through a linear temporality that fails to deliver prompt actions.

All in all, I trust that by critically looking at the conflicting temporalities in climate discussions, we will be in a position to question the assumption that linear-eschatological temporalities are the only possible way of making sense of climate change. This, in turn, will open up the way for alternative and (potentially) more desirable temporal framings of climate change to arise, leading to urgent transformations in a radical now.

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Note: This reflection is based on the final bachelor’s thesis that C. Marín Morcillo conducted within the Philosophy, Politics and Economics degree from UPF/UAB/UAM/UC3M (2019-2023). Marín won the first prize for the Best Bachelor’s Thesis in Planetary Wellbeing with their thesis “The temporalisation of global climate change discourse: A critical analysis of temporality and climate justice in COP26 and COP27”. You can access the complete thesis here. Author contact: [email protected].

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