Miguel Ángel Sebastián

 Miguel’s talk sought to account for phenomenal experience in terms of perspectival information. Phenomenal content is perspectival, i.e., self-locating content, meaning that the information we gain from phenomenal experience allows us not only to identify which world we are in, but also who we are within that world.

But this idea raises a question: what functional difference does this perspectival information make? In particular, can it play an explanatory role that is not already accounted for by the dominant alternative, the doctrine of egocentric encoding? The rest of Miguel’s talk went on to address this question.

Egocentric encoding encodes contents of the form R(X,A), asserting a (typically spatial) relation R between an object X and some bodily anchor A: the body itself, one of its limbs, the retinal surface, etc. Egocentric encoding readily explains such phenomena as motor affordances, rapid spatial updating, cross-modal sensorimotor integration, and action inventory. In general terms, egocentric encoding provides a “complete egocentric map” of the subject and its surroundings.

However, argues Miguel, this framework still misses something. Complete egocentric maps do not self-locate. In other words, we can map the spatial relations of each object X to each functional anchor A, but this still leaves open where the subject is in relation to these anchors.

Miguel then went on to develop this point in terms of five suggested advantages for his theory of perspectival information over pure egocentric encoding frameworks.

1. It can account for situated action. Egocentric encoding can guide action—it can tell us what body A can do—but it does not tell us whether these action-possibilities are mine.
2. It can account for cross-system integration under a unified subject, whereby diverse states are unified that do not share a single “spatial code,” which would be needed for integration via egocentric encoding.
3. It can account for agent-anchored deliberation (practical deliberation in the first person), whereas egocentric encoding must posit “brute architectural facts” and “hard-wired rules” to produce a semblance of such first-personal deliberation.
4. It can account for flexibility in what is considered “mine”. The range of things potentially relevant to first-personal deliberation—my arm, my promise, my turn, my fault—exceeds what egocentric encoding can represent.
5. It can account for responsible agency. To be responsible for one’s action, one must know what one is doing. Egocentric encoding can, at most, explain our knowledge of what some thing that happens to be identical to ourselves is doing.

WATCH THE TALK HERE

Matheus Valente

 Matheus’s talk defended Russellian Absolutism about de se attitudes against two rival views: Relativism and Guise Absolutism.

Relativism, as exemplified by David Lewis’s theory of centered propositions, seeks to account for de se attitudes by adding extra structure to propositions, so that they are not simply true or false relative to a world, but also relative to a subject and/or time. Guise Absolutism, as exemplified by John Perry’s views, preserves absolute propositions but adds guises to the theory of attitudes, making attitudes into a three-place relation between a subject, a content, and a guise. On Guise Absolutism, attitudes of the same type can differ even if their contents are the same.

By contrast, the Russellian Absolutism defended by Matheus denies that a subject can entertain singular propositions about objects other than those the subject is directly acquainted with. De se attitudes, on this view, are relations to singular propositions (about the subject herself or her occurrent conscious experience), but non-de se attitudes are not relations to singular propositions at all, but general, descriptive ones. They thus have contents distinct from their de se counterparts.

The virtue of Russellian Absolutism over its rivals is that it meets two desiderata that these other views fail to meet. On one hand, Perry cases, where two subjects agree on all factual matters yet differ in behavior (such as in Perry’s bear attack case), ought not to involve incompatible contents. Relativism fails this desideratum. Guise Absolutism can accommodate it, but only at the cost of failing the second desideratum. There are cases of irreducibly de se ignorance—ignorance that is not resolvable in principle by third-personal information, in which resolution of ignorance depends only on acquiring new de se attitudes. Such cases should, argues Matheus, be treated distinct from Perry cases: In Perry cases, we have a solely practical, psychological difference, not an epistemic one. Yet to account for irreducibly de se ignorance, the guise absolutist must insist that a difference in guise makes an epistemic difference.

Russellian Absolutism, Matheus argues, has the virtue of meeting both these desiderata. With regard to the first desideratum, the subjects in Perry cases simply know different propositions: One subject knows a de se proposition, a singular proposition about themselves; the other a descriptive one. The subjects do not hold attitudes towards incompatible contents. With regard to the second desideratum, what is learned in cases of irreducibly de se ignorance is simply a singular proposition about oneself that one didn’t know previously. Matheus ended the talk by discussing some challenges to Russellian Absolutism.

WATCH THE TALK HERE

Discussion

Much of the discussion afterward concerned clarification of different aspects of the rich pictures offered by the authors. They included the following: Is "I" referential or involve a persistent bearer of experience? Can perspectival information play a role in referring to oneself or only so in combination with egocentrinc encoding? What is the connection betwee perspectival information and physicalism? What is the connection between perspectival information, multisensory interaction, responsible agency? What is the connection between acquaintance and the notion of guises or modes of presentation,  token-reflexivity, or phenomenal concepts? What is the role of shareability in the account of Perry cases or Lewis (ignorance) cases, and in particular communication and disagreement?

Work produced with the support of a 2025 Leonardo Grant for Scientific Research and Cultural Creation, BBVA Foundation. The Foundation takes no responsibility for the opinions, statements and contents of this project, which are entirely the responsibility of its authors.