Coloquio TSA, sesión inaugural
Time: 14:30–19:40
Format: hybrid
Location: room 24.112 , Mercè Rodoreda Building, Campus Ciutadella
Or join online. Please register to obtain the link.
Speakers:
- Elisabeth Pacherie (CNRS, Institut Jean Nicod)
- Krisztina Orbán (Universität Tübingen)
- Stephan Torre (University of Aberdeen)
- Hong Yu Wong (Universität Tübingen)
Everyone welcome. To register, email tsa.co[email protected]
Program
14:30 - Introduction
14:40–15:50 - Elisabeth Pacherie
15:50–17:00 - Hong Yu Wong
17:00–17:20 - coffee break
17:20–18:30 - Stephan Torre
18:30–19:40 - Krisztina Orbán
19:40 - Wrap-up
Abstracts
Elisabeth Pacherie – Skilled joint action
To act together skillfully, agents should be skilled not just at doing their own part in a joint action, they should also be skilled at coordination. There are three complementary forms of skill at coordination linked to coordination at different levels: sensorimotor, situational, strategic. I will argue that while experts and novices do not use fundamentally different mechanisms, they are important differences in how they apply these mechanisms. In particular, experts apply them with higher resolution, allowing for predictions that are more accurate and more finely tuned. They apply them more pro-actively, being better at anticipating uncertainties and reducing them through verbal and non-verbal communication. They rely more on agent-neutral cues, signals and representations. They are better able to adapt to the idiosyncrasies of their partners thanks to an established history of interaction and joint practice.
Krisztina Orbán – On referring - the beginning
When does referential behavior emerge in ontogeny and phylogeny? The standard answer is that referring requires language. A different answer is that referring already appears in non-human animal communication. I argue that referential behavior is uniquely human but that it emerges prior to the development of language, both in ontogeny and in phylogeny.
I argue that infants between 9 and 15 months of age already demonstrate referential behavior through their use of referential pointing (Tomasello et al. 2007; Liszkowski & Tomasello 2011; Carpenter et al. 1998; Liszkowski et al. 2007; Tomasello 2010; Leavens et al. 1996; Shatz & O’Reilly 1990; Leavens et al. 2005; Shwe & Markman 1997; Orbán 2025). By this stage, infants are capable of employing pointing gestures to express themselves. In the literature, referential pointing is often treated merely as proto-referential behavior rather than as genuine referring, or else referring itself is treated as exclusively linguistic behavior (cf. Davidson 1977, 1979; Bates et al. 1975; Strawson 1959). Referential pointing, in particular, involves joint attention to indicate a referent, either declaratively (e.g., “This is interesting”) or imperatively (e.g., “Give me that”). An incorrect response typically prompts corrective behavior from the signaller until the intended action occurs. I employ several strategies to argue that referential pointing qualifies as genuine referring, including showing that it passes the standard tests for reference.
Stephan Torre – De se attitudes and action explanation: Clarifying the connection
De se exceptionalists hold that considerations about first-person thought require a revision to the Traditional Theory of Attitudes. One main argument for de se exceptionalism comes from the role of first-person thoughts in action explanation. Many de se exceptionalists claim that first-person thoughts are necessary for or essential to action explanation. The purpose of this talk is to examine the nature of these modal claims: in what sense are first-person thoughts necessary for or essential to action explanation? I argue that they are abductively necessary. I note that existing objections to arguments for de se exceptionalism based on action explanation fail when the modal claim is understood in this way. I discuss what I call ‘Known Distinct Predicament’ (KDP) cases and argue that the best explanation of action in such cases involves rejecting the Traditional Theory of Attitudes and endorsing de se exceptionalism.
Hong Yu Wong – What hangs on whether there are group minds?
In this talk I will pursue the question of whether there could be a generalised theory of mentality that applies to both individuals and groups, what hangs on it, and how we could possibly address this question in a significant way. Theorists are often sharply divided on this question, with some saying obviously yes, and others saying obviously no. This question is very often approached through functional or biological or hermeneutic ways and seen as a purely theoretical or abstract question to be decided by the downstream consequences of the views. I will explore and contrast the different functional, biological and hermeneutic approaches to this question, in an attempt to locate different potential anchor points for addressing these issues. The resolution of these questions has an impact on other live questions in comparative cognition, such as the viability of artificial cognition, plant cognition and other forms of minimal cognition.
Work produced with the support of a 2025 Leonardo Grant for Scientific Research and Cultural Creation, BBVA Foundation. The Foundation takes no responsibility for the opinions, statements and contents of this project, which are entirely the responsibility of its authors.