Selected new work

Neuroeconomics

Macro and computational economics

Strategic Management

  • Manori D., R. Nagel, and J. Schmidt, Iterated Reasoning in Games  (R&R to Strategy Science, special issue).

Publications in referred journals

  • Brañas-Garza,P, A. M. Espín, B. Herrmann, P. Kujal & R. Nagel. (2016). “Editorial: Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior in Economic Games” Frontier Behavioral Neuroscience.| http://journal.frontiersin.org/researchtopic/2901/prosocial-and-antisocial-behavior-in-economic-games
  • Selten, R. and R. Nagel (2014). Werner Gueth, an early, original behavioral theorist and experimental economist. In special issue for Werner Gueth by by van Damme, Eric; Kenneth G. Binmore, Alvin E. Roth, Larry Samuelson; Eyal Winter; Gary E. Bolton,Axel Ockenfels; Martin Dufwenberg, Georg Kirchsteiger; Uri Gneezy; Martin G. Kocher, Matthias Sutter; Alan G. Sanfey;Hartmut Kliemt;Reinhard Selten,Rosemarie Nagel;Ofer H. Azar (2014) How Werner Güth’s ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 292–318.
  • Kriss, P.H., R. Nagel, R. A. Weber (2013) Implicit vs. explicit deception in ultimatum games with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, special issue Volume 93, , Pages 337–346.
  • Hortala-Vallve, R, A Llorente-Saguer, and R. Nagel (2013). The role of information in different bargaining protocols, Experimental Economics16: 88-113.
  • Cabrales, A., R. Nagel, and J.V. Rodríguez-Mora (2012). It is Hobbes, not Rousseau:An Experiment an experiment on voting and redistribution. Experimental Economics15 (2), 278-308.
  • Georganas, S and R. Nagel (2011). Auctions with toeholds: An experimental study of company takeovers, in special issue of International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29 (1), pages 34-45
  • Bosch, A., J. G. Montalvo, R. Nagel, A. Satorra (2010). Finite Mixture Analysis of Beauty-Contest Data from Multiple Samples, Experimental Economics vol. 13(4): 461-475.
  • Bosch-Domènech, A., R. Nagel, and J V Sánchez-Andrés (2010). Prosocial Capabilities in Alzheimer's Patients, J Gerontol B Psychol Sci Soc Sci, 65B(1): 119-128 published ahead of print January 1, 2009, doi:10.1093/geronb/gbp034
  • Chou, E., M. A. McConnell, R. Nagel and C. R. Plott (2009). The Control of Game Form Recognition in Experiments: Understanding Dominant Strategy Failures in a Simple Two Person Guessing Game, Experimental Economics, Volume 12, Number 2: 159-179.
  • Grosskopf, B. and R. Nagel (2008). The Two-Person Beauty Contest," Games and Economic Behavior 62: 93–99.
  • Cabrales, A., R. Nagel and R. Armenter (2007). Equilibrium Selection Through Incomplete Information in Coordination Games: An Experimental Study. Experimental Economics, Volume 10, Number 3: 221–234 3.
  • Dufwenberg, M., U. Gneezy, J Goeree, and R. Nagel (2007). Price Floors & Competition, in special issue of Economic Theory, vol. 33, issue 1: 211-224.
  • Kirchkamp, O., and R. Nagel (2007). Naive learning and cooperation in network experiments.in Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 58/2: 269-292.
  • Bosch, A., J. G. Montalvo, R. Nagel, and A. Satorra (2002). "One, Two, (Three), Infinity…: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments". Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments, American Economic Review, Vol. 92 (5): 1687-1701 Bornstein, G., R. Nagel, and U. Gneezy (2002). The Effect of Intergroup Competition on Group Coordination: An Experimental Study, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 41: 1-25.
  • Hauk, E. and R. Nagel (2001). Choice of Partners in Multiple Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Games: An Experimental Study”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45 (6): 770-793.
  • Kirchkamp, O., and R. Nagel (2001). Repeated Game Strategies in Local and Group Prisoners' Dilemmas Experiments: First Results, Homo Ökonomicus, Vol. 18.(2): 319-335 2001.
  • Vriend, N. and R. Nagel (1999). Unexperienced and Experienced Players in an Oligopolistic Market Game with Minimal Information, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 8: 41-66.
  • Vriend, N. and R. Nagel (1999). An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 9 (1): 27-65.
  • Nagel, R. and F-F. Tang (1998). An Experimental Study on the Centipede Game in Normal Form - An Investigation on Learning, in special issue of Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Vol. 42S,(2): 256- 384.
  • Duffy, J. and R. Nagel (1997). On the Robustness of Behavior in Experimental Beauty-Contest Games, Economic Journal, Vol.107: 1684-1700.

Publications in (non-referred) journals

  • Coricelli, G. and Rosemarie Nagel (2012). Las bases neuronales de la racionalidad limitada. Revista Internacional de Sociología.
  • Coricelli, G. and Rosemarie Nagel (2010). Neuroeconomics of depth of reasoning. istory of Economic Ideas, vol XVIII, 123-131. 
  • Nagel, R. and R. Harstad (2004). Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information on the Side of the Proposer: An experimental Study. Cuadernos de Economía, Vol. 27, Nº. 75: 37-74, in special issue on experimental economics. 

Publications in Books

  • Mitzkewitz and Nagel (2019) Reinhard Selten's early work on bounded rationality in “The Beginnings of Behavioral Economics. “ Roger Frantz, Elsevier, 2019. Handbook of Behavioral Economics. London: Routledge.
  • Nagel, R., A. Bayona, R. Kheirandish, and S. Mousavi (2016). Reinhard Selten, the Dualist. Routledge Handbook of Behavioral Economics, edited by R. Frantz, S.H. Chen, K. Dopfer, F. Heukelom, S. Mousavi.
  • Coricelli, Giorgio, and Rosemarie Nagel (2015).Responses from the body: an introduction to neuro economics. in P. Brañas and A. Cabrales (eds.), Experimental Economics (Vol I). Palgrave Macmillan. (first published in Spanish, A. Bosch (ed.)
  • Bugnyar, Thomas, Robert Boyd, Benjamin Bossan, Simon Gächter, Thomas Griffiths, Peter Hammerstein, Keith Jensen, Thomas Mussweiler, Rosemarie Nagel, and Felix Warneken (2012).  "Evolutionary Perspectives on Social Cognition", in P. Hammerstein and J. R. Stevens (eds), MIT Press.
  • Coricelli, Giorgio, and Rosemarie Nagel (2011). Respuestas desde el cuerpo: una introducción a la neuroeconomía" in Economía Experimental y del Comportamiento", Barcelona: Antoni Bosch Editor, 401 pages.
  • Coricelli, Giorgio, and Rosemarie Nagel (2010).Walking with Reinhard Selten and the Guessing Game: From the Origin to the Brain of the Guessing Game, in The Selten School of Behavioral Economics A Collection of Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. Ockenfels, Axel; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim (Eds.) 1st Edition XV, Springer Verlag.
  • Attanasi, G. and R. Nagel (2008). A survey on Psychological Games: Theoretical Findings and Experimental Evidence. In “Games, Rationality and Behaviour: Essays on Behavioural Game Theory and Experiments.”  Eds: Alessandro Innocenti and Patrizia Sbriglia. Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, (2008).
  • Nagel, R. (2004) “How to Improve Reasoning in Experimental Beauty-Contest Games: A Survey. In Economics Lab: An Intensive Course on Experimental Economics. – Lessons from the Trento Summer School in Experimental Economics.” Eds: Dan Friedman and Alexandra Cassar Publisher: Routledge.
  • Nagel, R. (2008). Experimental Beauty-Contest Games: Levels of Reasoning and Convergence to Equilibrium. In Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Eds: Ch.R. Plott and V.L. Smith. Publisher: Elsevier, Amsterdam (2008).
  • Nagel. R. (1998). A Survey on Experimental “Beauty-Contest Games:” Bounded Rationality and Learning. In Games and Human Behavior, Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport. Eds. D. Budescu, I. Erev, and R.Zwick. Publisher: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., New Jersey : 105-142.

Other publications

In newspapers and magazines (with experiments run with the readers of the newspapers)

 
  • “1000 DM zu gewinnen,” (with R. Selten). In Spektrum der Wissenschaft (German issue of Scientific American), Nov. 1997.
  • “Das Zahlenwahlspiel - Hintergruende und Ergebnisse” (with R. Selten). In Spektrum der Wissenschaft, Febr. 1998, p16-22. Also in “Kooperation und Konkurrenz”, Digest 7(1/1998), special issue of Spektrum der Wissenschaft”.
  • “Cómo se el da la bolsa,” (with A. Bosch). In Expansión, June 4, 1997, p 40.
  • “El juego de adivinar el numero X: una explicación y la proclamación del vencedor,” (with A. Bosch). In Expansión, June 16, 1997, pp 42-43.
  • “Guess the Number: Comparing the FT's and Expansion's Results,” (with A. Bosch). In Financial Times, Section Mastering Finance 8, June 30, 1997, p 14.
  • “Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit – die Ergebnisse” (with Antonio Cabrales) May 2003, Spektrum der Wissenschaft. 
  • "Spieltheorie und menschliches Verhalten - Dokumentation des Sommerkurses der Deutschen  SchülerAkademie" (“Game Theory and Human Behavior – Documentation of the summer school of the German Student Academia” with Christoph Poeppe). In Spektrum der Wissenschaft (German issue of Scientific American) Spezial Wissenschaft online.
  • “Preisausschreibung. Spektrum der Wissenschaft lädt Sie ein, an einem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichenExperiment teilzunehmen” (with Miguel Costa Gomes and Vince Crawford). In Spektrum der Wissenschaft July 2007, p. 96, 97.
  • Ergebnisse zum Preisausschreiben“ (with Miguel Costa Gomes and Vince Crawford). In Spektrum der Wissenschaft February 2008, p. 76-80.
 

Comments

  • Nagel. R. "Rationality and Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining: Comment", Annales D' Économie et de Statistique. 2001, No. 61 pp. 33-39.

Recent working papers or work in progress

  • "Bidding with coordination risk” (with Timo Ehrig and Juergen Jost), submitted.
  • “Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in a Trust Game” (with Giuseppe Attanasi, Pierpaolo Battigalli), Working Paper n. 506 Bocconi, submitted.
  • A historical note on the beauty contest (with C Büren, B Frank), Joint discussion paper series in economics 2012.
  • “Survey-experiment: ESA Executive Committee Composition Guessing Game” (with Humberto Llavador, and Mechthild Nagel).
  • “Building Trust with Secondary Markets” (with Fernando Broner, Alberto Martin, and Jaume Ventura).
  • “De-framing Rules and (De)-anchoring Beliefs in Keynesian Beauty Contests” (with John Benhabib, and John Duffy).
  • “Playing against the Field Makes Mixed Strategies Observable” (with S. Zamir and Ingrid Rohde).