Our analysis showed that ideological trust in “wider abstract systems and ideas” (Tait 2011, 160), such as the state, the market, technocracy, or technological optimism, has a vital influence on counter-expertise and the degree of politicisation of nuclear policy and debate, yet the influence is highly context-dependent. Strong ideological trust in the state provided a fertile breeding ground for constructive mistrust in France and Germany but hampered its development in Finland. In Spain, weak trust in the state has kept counter-expertise underdeveloped.

Ideological trust as a foundation for institutional (mis)trust

Interest in the role of trust in policymaking has concentrated on the so-called institutional trust – citizens’ trust in public and private institutions, such as nuclear safety regulators, industry, and government regulation. Little attention has been given to the ideological dimensions of trust, which interact with the institutional and interpersonal types of trust.

In our article, we studied how ideological trust has shaped and helps to explain the historical development of “mistrustful civic vigilance” in the Finnish, French, German, and Spanish nuclear sector. We looked in particular at non-governmental counter-expertise organisations that independently monitor the health and environmental impacts of nuclear installations and critically examine the role of nuclear in energy policy.

Trust in institutions: the high-, medium- and low-trust societies

Our four case study countries display great variation in terms of institutional and interpersonal trust. Finland stands out as a high-trust society, whereas Spain and France have been described as “societies of distrust”, with generally low trust figures across the board. Germany lies in between the two extremes, with trust levels close to European average (Eurofound 2018). Nuclear-sector surveys show similar patterns (IRSN 2020; Finnish Energy 2019; Eurobarometer 2010; Lehtonen et al. 2020; CSN 2015).

Citizens’ trust is affected by the historical and country-specific nuclear-sector legacies. Reference to these legacies in public debate, in turn, serves as a tool for building or undermining trust in the technology and its promoters. All four countries were early adopters of nuclear energy, but only in France did nuclear power develop as a spin-off of nuclear weapons industry. Finland and France are currently building new reactors, and have advanced high-level waste (HLW) repository projects. By contrast, Germany and Spain are phasing out nuclear, and their HLW management plans are at an incipient stage.

We started from two assumptions. First, we postulated that civic vigilance is fostered by politicisation – that is, opening up of nuclear policy debate to a broad range of publics and perspectives. Depoliticization – the delegation of policymaking to narrow circles of experts – would in turn undermine counter-expertise. Second, we expected to find that (de)politicisation and civic vigilance are conditioned by the historically shaped ideological trust.

Against this background, we explored

1. the implications of politicisation and depoliticization for the development of counter-expertise, and
2. the role of ideological trust in shaping the emergence of such civic vigilance.

Data and methods: semi-structured interviews as the starting point for document analysis

As a starting point for our analysis, we used semi-structured interviews 27 communication and public engagement specialists in key nuclear-sector organisations in the four case study countries. We then interrogated the material in light of trust and mistrust, relying on earlier academic literature, including notably our recent work within the History of Nuclear Energy and Society (HoNESt) project.

Ideological trust in the state spurred mistrustful civic vigilance in France and Germany

In France and Germany, counter-expertise organisations emerged and prospered from the 1970s onwards, spurred by the disillusionment when citizens found the state institutions to be untrustworthy. Key events included the violent confrontation between opponents and the police in Germany in the mid-1970s, and the miserably failed communication by the state authorities in the days and weeks following the Chernobyl disaster in France. Counter-expertise prospered precisely because the institutions failed to live up to the citizens’ high expectations.

In France, the disillusionment grew against the background of ideological trust in the state as the sole legitimate guardian of the public interest and in the nuclear sector as the key pillar of the country’s post-War modernisation. For German citizens, disappointment emerged from ideological trust in an open, representative democracy and concomitant mistrust of state authoritarianism and technocracy. Especially the German youth viewed the nuclear policy as lacking democratic transparency, and the violent police repression of protests as a symbol of authoritarianism.

Underdeveloped civic vigilance in Finland and Spain – for distinct reasons

In Finland and Spain, counter-expertise has remained underdeveloped, but not for the same reasons. In Finland, the solid ideological trust in state bureaucracy and the image of an honest, rational, and pragmatic “engineering nation” never turned into disappointment. The demand for counter-expertise has remained weak, in the absence of significant nuclear incidents, steadily advancing spent fuel repository project, the exceptionally strong trust in the nuclear safety authority, and relatively weak trust in the competence of NGOs in energy questions. In Spain, deep institutional mistrust of state institutions, together with the instrumentalisation of nuclear issues for political purposes, narrowed down the space for fact-based expert argumentation. Expectations towards state institutions in Spain are low, citizens harbour little trust in either the regional or central governments, and resignment and frustration have seldom translated into concrete manifestations of civic vigilance.

The Finnish and Spanish exceptions – depoliticization and “nuclearisation of politics”

Politicisation and depoliticization can take various forms, and politicisation does not always foster civic vigilance. Nuclear debates were highly politicised – but in distinct ways – in Spain and Germany. If highly principled – and according to nuclear critics, fact-based – standpoints dominated political debates in Germany, in Spain, nuclear debates were subordinate to political convictions, principles, and strategic manoeuvring, including those concerning regional identities. Nuclear policy questions have been turned into yet another tool in battles between the central and regional governments, with politicians shifting their positions on nuclear according to political constellations. This “nuclearisation of politics” has left little room for mistrustful counter-expertise, as nuclear-related arguments have been employed opportunistically to serve broader political aims.

Where Spain stands out for its particular “nuclearisation of politics”, Finland distinguishes itself through the strong depoliticization. Trust in engineering-led technocracy has eroded since the 1970s in the three other countries, but not in Finland. The political parties are internally split on the nuclear issue, and decision-making and vigilance are delegated to the trusted state institutions. Ideological trust in a rational and pragmatic “engineering nation” continues to bolster depoliticization.

Source:

References

CSN (Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear). 2015. Estudio demoscópico correspondiente a la cuarta recomendación. Madrid: CSN. 

Eurobarometer. 2010. Europeans and Nuclear Safety. Special Eurobarometer 324. Brussels: European Commission. 

Eurofound. 2018. Supplementary analysis – Societal change and trust in institutions. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.

Finnish Energy. 2019. Suomalaisten Energia-asenteet 2019 [Energy attitudes of the Finns 2019].

IRSN 2020. Baromètre IRSN. Baromètre IRSN: La perception des risques et de la sécurité par les Français. Fontenay-aux-Roses: Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire.

Lehtonen, M., M. Kojo, T. Jartti, T. Litmanen, and M. Kari. 2020. The roles of the state and social licence to operate? Lessons from nuclear waste management in Finland, France, and Sweden. Energy Research and Social Science 61.

Tait, M. 2011. “Trust and the public interest in the micropolitics of planning practice.” Journal of Planning Education and Research 31(2): 157-171.