Political scientists can help politicians design institutions that can make the quality of democracies better or worse. And, of course, that has important consequences in terms of implications, of advising politicians and parliaments so that they can leverage this knowledge we generate to create institutional and political designs that improve people’s lives. The more information voters have, the more they can punish or reward corrupt politicians, the better the quality of the democracy will be, the better the outcomes the democracy will produce and, ultimately, the greater the well-being of the people.

‘Political scientists can help politicians design institutions that can make the quality of democracies better or worse.’

We need to bear in mind that voters are rationally ignorant in elections and have a limited interest in politics, as expected in representative democracies, which are based precisely on the division of labour: the people choose representatives to make decisions on their behalf and thus don’t have to think about the everyday business of political decisions. Given these characteristics, emotions play a crucial role in mobilizing voters. In a certain sense, they work as informational shortcuts so people can make decisions efficiently. Emotions are easier to convey than reasoned arguments.

‘Voters are rationally ignorant in elections and have a limited interest in politics.’

Social media have dramatically change how politics is done in terms of party strategies and the democratization of political mobilization. The election campaigns in 19^th-century democracies with censitary suffrage (only privileged individuals were entitled to vote) were based on the exchange of individualized favours or policies for votes. This mobilization was possible due to the small number of voters.

With universal suffrage and the multiplication of voters, such exchanges were no longer possible. As parties had limited resources, they needed economies of scale, i.e. policy promises included in electoral platforms, which were transmitted by the mass media (newspapers, radios and television) and stakeholders such as trade unions or the Church. Of course, the parties with the most resources, the traditional ones, had an advantage over new and small parties.

‘The advent of the Internet made it possible to return to the individualized messages and promises of the 19^th century.’

The advent of the Internet made it possible to return to the individualized messages and promises of the 19^th century. Since the Internet is free, economies of scale are no longer needed. Additionally, any party, big or small, traditional or new, can access it, so political mobilization has been democratized. Mobilization does not require a lot of resources.

The other issue related to strategic voting is when voters support their second choice, because it has a better chance of winning than their first choice, which has no chance of being part of the government. In Spain, for many elections, that was quite important in the electoral competition on the left, especially because the United Left party had no options to win seats in many districts, so a lot of its voters would support the PSOE. In recent years, such strategic voting at the district-level has also been quite important on the right, because now we have three parties – Vox, Ciudadanos [Citizens], and the People’s Party [PP] – and in many districts Vox has no options to win seats. This is the first major transformation in recent years in terms of strategic voting.

‘For many years, in Spain, the party that won the general election was automatically the one that would govern.’

Another very important aspect is strategic voting that takes into account the type of government that will be formed. For many years, in Spain, the party that won the general election was automatically the one that would govern. There was no need to form an electoral coalition, because there were always small parties, such as the Catalan parties, that would support a prime minister to create a government. Since 2015, due to the failure to form a government, this question of who can really do it has become quite important. In the last regional and municipal elections, we saw that, sure, it’s good to vote, but what types of pacts will be made afterwards matters even more.

Given the two cases of strategic voting we discussed in the previous question, we can say that Spain is being Europeanized. The increased electoral fragmentation resulting from the emergence of new parties in Spain and in Catalonia in recent years does hinder the formation of stable governments. However, this situation is the norm in any advanced European democracy, where there are many parties, a broad offer, and where forming governments and pacts are an innate part of politics. That is not a good or a bad thing; it is simply how politics works in 21^st-century Europe.

‘Multi-party systems and post-election negotiations to form a government are the norm in countries with similar institutional designs to Spain’s’

In fact, multi-party systems and post-election negotiations to form a government are the norm in countries with similar institutional designs to ours. Spain and Catalonia are now the norm as opposed to the exception, which they were for decades from a comparative perspective. In this regard, what is extraordinary is that Spain has never had a coalition government. Around 70% of the elections in countries with a proportional-representation electoral system like Spain’s have given rise to coalition governments. In short, Spain is not different because of the need to negotiate as a result of a multi-party system, but because of its difficulty finding points in common and forming coalition governments. 

On the contrary, with the emergence of Podem [We Can] and Ciudadanos, it seemed like the left/right conflict was disappearing. However, since their beginnings, both parties have clearly become parties of the left and right, respectively, and have revitalized classical ideological differences. Moreover, because the election of the prime minister in Spain has depended on post-election negotiations between the parties since the 2015 elections, the left/right axis has been reinforced. In recent times, we have seen how no centre-right or right-wing party is willing to support Pedro Sánchez, and the PSOE’s abstention in the investiture of Mariano Rajoy sparked a serious internal crisis for the Socialists. The fact that Ciudadanos does not anticipate the possibility of a pact with the PSOE, but does pact with the far-right Vox, is illustrative of the importance of the ideological conflict. The same thing is happening in Catalonia, if we change the left/right axis to the Spanish nationalist/pro-Catalan independence one. Since 2012, election outcomes have been very similar for the two blocs. That the far-left Popular Unity Candidacy [CUP] gives support (more or less) to the centre-right Junts per Catalunya [Together for Catalunya] but not to Catalunya en Comú [Catalonia in Common], for example, shows which axis matters more.

The most important aspects of both election systems (electoral formula or number and size of the districts) have not changed. But other less important aspects have. In general, electoral systems (the rules of the game) only change when new parties emerge that are decisive in the formation of governments and press for electoral reform.

Electoral systems are subject to what in economics is called ‘transaction costs’ (negotiation, time, etc., costs requiring changes to the status quo). Because electoral reforms are profoundly redistributive (there is always a party that benefits from them, which means that there is necessarily also another party that is harmed), they are exceptional. Therefore, from a comparative perspective, Spain and Catalonia are not strange cases. 

Spain and Portugal are two of the few countries in the world that use closed blocked lists (i.e. lists in which voters cannot select the candidates or even change the order in which they are running). Closed and blocked lists made sense in the transition to democracy, to strengthen the organization of parties at the expense of individuals. Four decades later, that goal has been achieved. It is hard to argue that it is still valid. 

‘Open lists give voters more freedom and allow them to punish or reward individual candidates’

Open lists give voters more freedom and allow them to punish or reward individual candidates. Comparative research on the determinants of corruption, for example, shows that uninominal districts and open lists reduce corruption. The mechanism that explains this effect is that politicians are more easily controlled by voters.

It is paradoxical that the EU’s powers have increased a lot in recent decades, whilst the interest and knowledge it awakens have declined. One reason for this paradox has been the absence of an executive power elected by the people through elections to the European Parliament. However, this aspect has already changed, and I think it has gone unnoticed. In this regard, even though the EU is a commonplace, intense and continuous information campaigns are needed.

‘I think it is more important to create genuine European parties with lists of candidates at the European level, rather than national ones’

I think it is more important to create genuine European parties with lists of candidates at the European level, rather than national ones. I predict that the EU’s political future lies in that direction. In any case, the larger an electorate is and the less influential each individual’s choices in the election outcome (what happens, for example, with the 500 million citizens of the EU versus the 45 million in Spain), the lower the turnout and the political interest and knowledge.

The explanation for the rise of Vox has to do with factors in the field of supply and demand. With regard to demand, the losers of modernization and globalization and individuals who feel economically and culturally threatened are often cited in explanations of support for the far right in Europe. In the case of Vox, the conflict between Catalonia and Spain also clearly plays a role. As for supply, the electoral system (in the general election, Vox won seats in the large districts), the strategies of the PP and Ciudadanos, which have converged to a certain extent with regard to the Vox proposals, and Vox’s exaggerated media presence are all crucial factors. 

The evolution of the ‘Procés’ [literally, the ‘Process’: the Catalan drive for independence] thus far has made two things clear. First, unilateralism on the part of Catalonia, i.e. acting outside the rules of the game, is a dead end. The international community (the EU and the US) will never support the unilateral secession of Catalonia. And without international recognition, independence is a chimera. Second, the political refusal to budge and the judicialization of politics by the Spanish government will not make support for independence in Catalonia disappear. 

‘It is essential to negotiate with respect for the rules of the game and Catalonia has to advance in its self-government’

From a comparative perspective, Spain is the only country in the world that responds to differential events with homogeneity in the decentralization of political and economic power. In other words, the old slogan ‘café para todos’ [roughly, one-size-fits-all] is a typically Spanish formula. Therefore, I think there are two conclusions going forwards regarding the how and the what. It is essential to negotiate with respect for the rules of the game and Catalonia has to advance in its self-government. How much more self-government (greater autonomy, sovereignty in a federal state, or a referendum leading to independence) is what needs to be negotiated.

I don’t think there is a conflict between legality and legitimacy. The rule of law is a basic principle of contemporary representative democracies. The law is the expression of the general will and no one is above it. Any individual could appeal to legitimacy in deciding to break the law, and that would lead us to a sort of state of nature. Who decides who has legitimacy but legality itself?

‘We cannot turn our backs on changes in Catalonia because the rest of Spain has the opposite opinion.’

A separate issue is that laws are not written in stone and that, of course, they should be revised when there are alternative majorities. The crucial point is not the conflict between legitimacy and legality, but recognizing that people’s preferences change and adapting the rules to those changes. In a country such as Spain, this is particularly important insofar as political preferences vary significantly from region to region.

We cannot turn our backs on changes in Catalonia because the rest of Spain has the opposite opinion. It makes no sense for Spain to have such heterogeneous preferences yet such a homogeneous institutional design. That is the challenge lawmakers face. The rule of law is not a political weapon, but a safeguard for peaceful conflict resolution.