Alejandro Medina Sandín is a predoctoral researcher at the University of Verona. A graduate of UPF, he has studied at several European universities, including Bologna, Mannheim, and UB. His research focuses on health economics and industrial organization, with a specialization in competition.

His research centers on the impact of pay-for-delay agreements in the North American market. These agreements occur when a brand-name pharmaceutical company pays a generic competitor to delay market entry, artificially extending its monopoly. He specifically analyzes the agreement that delayed the entry of AndroGel® generics (testosterone replacement therapy) between 2006 and 2015.

By estimating a nested logit demand model with weekly data and simulating a counterfactual scenario without delay (introducing generics before 2015), the consumer harm is quantified. The results indicate that an earlier entry of generics would have reduced average prices by approximately 60%, especially in segments like topical drugs, highlighting the high costs and welfare losses caused by these anticompetitive agreements.