Núria Mas is a Catalan economist specialized in health economics and a professor at IESE Business School, where she holds the Jaime Grego Chair in Healthcare Management and serves on the Executive Committee. She earned her degree in Economics from Pompeu Fabra University and received her PhD in Economics from Harvard University. Her research focuses on the organization and financing of health care systems, the evaluation of public policies, and incentives in the health sector, with publications in leading international journals. She has also served as a board member of the Bank of Spain and as an advisor to public and health care institutions.

Abstract:

Most nations in the world have side-by-side private and public health care systems. Policymakers worry that “dual practice” across sectors might reduce care to the public sector. This concern led regions in Spain to offer “exclusivity bonuses” to physicians who practice exclusively in the public sector. We show theoretically that the impact of these bonuses on the public sector is ambiguous. We demonstrate empirically that the bonuses backfired: they did increase exclusive participation in the public sector, but significantly reduced hours of work. When regions added offsetting bonuses for dual practice, they were largely ineffective.

https://www.nber.org/papers/w34433