Marc Homedes Moradell , graduate in Law (1997) and Journalism (2000) at Pompeu Fabra University, has been head of the Directorate General for Civil Defence and of the Government of Catalonia’s 112 emergency phone for more than eight years.

Together with Patricia Plaja, head of press of the Catalan Police force, Mossos d’Esquadra (a position he had previously held), and Esther Sastre, director of communication of the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of Catalonia, were the in charge of managing crisis communication around the jihadist attack in Barcelona on 17 August, perpetrated very close to the building on la Rambla where he studied journalism.

On 9 September, the Parliament of Catalonia is to award the Medal of Honour in the gold category to the emergency services and the various law enforcement bodies in recognition of their work and handling of the attack. Today, 8 September, Barcelona City Council will be awarding the Gold Medal for Civic Merit to five groups in this area for their exemplary response.

—What is your opinion of the recognition by the institutions and society in general for the handling of the emergency during the attack?

In spite of the misfortune, the sadness and the emotional impact of the attack, both insofar as the victims, family members, or even the city, I think that the response we provided in all areas, both as regards operations and communication, was good. For me and for my colleague who is head of communication of the Mossos, Patricia Plaja, as well as for our teams, we are grateful for this acknowledgement because you always have the feeling you haven’t done enough or well enough, but objectively I think we did a good job.

—Were you prepared for such a situation?

You’re never prepared because one thing is the scenarios on paper that you can plan for, and another is when you find yourself actually in that situation. In fact, one of the easiest things that can happen in crisis communication is initial blockage: being aware that something has happened but not really knowing where to start, not doing anything for fear of doing it wrong, even though it’s stipulated. We had worked on this for quite some time, but it was a task that we hadn’t finished, we were adding new things to it, in fact we’d been working on it for years. Personally, since the Boston Marathon in 2013, and purely out of professional interest, I have, after each attack, been following the response that has been given by the emergency services and the authorities, to take note of how they did it. First to gain knowledge, to make comparisons, and then, more recently, with Patricia Plaja, of the Mossos, and with Esther Sastre, communication manager of the Ministry of Home Affairs, to see how we should act in a hypothetical scenario that could take place in Catalonia. Which best practices we considered could be applied at home, and especially to create a map of risks, the panoply of possible scenarios. And based on this, the communications response: device, communication flows and messages that we could give to the citizens. All of this with a limit and a key point: not to add new emergencies to the emergency.

—What are the basic elements of communication strategy you used?

Basically, we split it into two interconnected blocks, and working shoulder to shoulder at the one crisis centre: one police blog, which hinged around the Mossos d’Esquadra, and another major blog, which hinged around Civil Defence and encompassed everything from the affected transport and other basic services, to everything concerning the public, the wounded or fatalities. There was also a need for cross-communication with the [Catalan] Government. This meant being in agreement with the other departments, which collaborated exceptionally well, such as the department of Justice, for example, or Health, or with other authorities, such as Barcelona City Council, with which the understanding was perfect. Another basic aspect was for communication to revolve around the social networks, Twitter, essentially, because today it is the best network for emergencies. Then, as a basic sub-strategy, giving the information in different languages, which is vital for both the media and the public, as it was a global event: following the terrorist attack, world media attention was centred here within minutes.

—What criteria did you take into account when reporting?

We considered that we had to report all we could, both from the sphere of the police, with which I am not involved, and the non-police emergency services (all the wounded, the dead, affected transport, etc.). This would leave little room for rumours, the noise that intoxicates and instils fear in people, and would help the city not to suffer subsequent emergencies, not to suffer a double blockage: the one caused by the attack itself plus the one caused by the people who hurry away because they don’t know what to do and bring the roads to a standstill; or otherwise, people who don’t venture out into the street because they are afraid, or people who do not know that a certain underground line is closed... That was the scenario, the goal, we wanted to achieve, and I think that we managed.

—Were there lots of rumours?

Every emergency has its rumours, the bigger it is, the more rumours it has. Where they come from is another thing, because there are certainly some that are very snide and elaborate. But we are used to them because they happen in all emergencies, and some may turn out to be very dangerous and cause scenes of panic. And in a terrorist attack this mushrooms, because its very aim is to cause terror, and it is assumed that the terror, fear and uncertainty are already present. In this context is a lot easier that by sowing a tiny seed, a rumour will quickly grow.

—What did you do to keep them to a minimum?

What we usually do is to try to have a transversal vision, follow the conversations on the network, which is where these rumours circulate. We collaborate with VOST, digital volunteers, a highly useful tool for the Administration. One of its main tasks is to monitor the networks, seek out malicious rumours related to emergencies. This helps us to detect them, to verify if there is anything true about what they say, and if this is the case, spread the word that they are false. In addition, we must bear in mind that all you do not explain, all the space you leave for uncertainty, causes rumours to flow freely, people to believe them in good faith and share them with their inner circle. For example, in the foiled Cambrils attack, if the Administration had kept quiet, because people knew something was going on, it was very easy for it to become just any information, and for them to end up believing it. In this case it is important that the Administration should say that we know that something is happening, even if we ourselves are not quite sure what, that the police are looking into it and that we are working on it. This is a way of taking the initiative and saying: wait, when there’s more information you’ll find it here.

—What was the role of Twitter in the crisis?

Twitter is really useful emergencies because it can be updated constantly, directly and provides instant communication through short messages that force you to stick to 140 characters, short headlines, besides its virality and the ability to attach photos and videos. Twitter is a social network that seems to be permanently in crisis, but it works in cases like this. I’ve been tracking our Civil Defence tweets and they were used in the news of the Washington Post and dozens of other media around the world, pasted to the page. It’s a useful tool, even as a graphic representation.

—Does Twitter allows the media and the general public to receive information in real time?

The social networks put everyone on the same level when it comes to receiving information. We have four main types of Twitter followers: the general public, the media, personnel linked to the emergency services (police, firefighters, civil defence, medical emergencies service, etc.) and finally the authorities, whether individuals or institutions, and all of them receive the information at the same time. Journalists are there (which is a good thing) because Twitter is an open source of information. From our standpoint, we use social networks “also” to inform journalists, but above all, to inform the public. In any case, we have continued to work as a traditional press office, answering the phone or sending press releases.

—Is the handling of information very important?

As far as it concerns me, in emergencies information is open, when we have it, we give it. As soon as advice is available, it must be given. Mossos has other connotations, but for my part, the information had to be handled well, in the sense that it was substantiated, proven, we didn’t have to rectify at any time. Regarding the information that may be more newsworthy, what we did try to do during the crisis was to speed up the process so that not too much time passed between the different messages. We also provided information on the process, which may not be that relevant to the public (for example, that a team of forensic scientists were performing autopsies), but it gives an idea that work is being done, and for journalists, this is information.

—Did the 112 emergency telephone number play a key role after the attacks?

112 plays a key role as the first contact of the entire emergency system with the events that have taken place. I seem to remember it was 16:53, the exact time the attack took place: in a few seconds, the first call had already been received from Plaça Catalunya, followed by the string of calls that involved all the events, also later in Cambrils. The first news brought to the knowledge of the whole emergency system, both police and medical emergency services or civil defence, is via 112, which is the only way possible for a citizen to report directly. In fact, the European Union legally enforces promoting 112 (in Spain, the autonomous communities are responsible for their management). It is obligatory that the people should know it.

—As for the ethics of information, what considerations did you take into account?

About the victims, the information given to the media and the society was general, but obviously the families received all of the information necessary, especially with regard to fatalities. In fact, the first information that was given was along the lines of “a person of X nationality”, not mentioning gender or age. Even, in cases that had drawn the most media attention, we spoke to the respective consulates that were supporting the families to explain what was being said in the media, or if they had some specific requirements. But especially the request not to divulge images of the victims, out of respect and because it may have legal consequences, and to provide the basic information, because the public has a right to know if there are ten fatalities or sixteen, and their nationalities. The Administration as such is not obliged to give too many details about the fatalities or the injured so as not to affect their privacy. We already had previous experience with the Germanwings accident. In that case, the families unanimously asked us at Civil Defence to tell the media not to use the social network profile images of their dead relatives.

—How do you rate the reaction by the public?

Great! We can Tweet whatever and write the best tweets in the world with accurate information in time, but if this information is not circulating, there is no conversation, it doesn’t go viral, then it’s pointless. It is not the first time that the public has responded, but in this respect, it was unbeatable. And also we have all learned that there are rumours, that not everything must be believed; it is better, according to what information you get, before forwarding it to all your contacts on WhatsApp, to ask, as several citizens did “I have received this, is it true?”, or check whether it has already been debunked.

—Have you considered what aspects could be improved?

We still haven’t had either the time or the necessary perspective to analyse it calmly. You do see aspects and processes of communication that could be improved, things that could have gone wrong and that went well, and it would be good to make sure of them somehow. In fact, just as we have taken note of other cases, they are not examples that can be exported because we have seen things were well done elsewhere but haven’t been of use to us. All emergencies are similar but none are the same, you have to look at it from this perspective.

—You graduated at UPF, first in Law, and then in Journalism. Has this complementarity helped you over the course of your career?

A lot, especially in the early years, when I worked in the media, doing political or international journalism. Working in a medium, despite the background you may have, in constitutional law or administrative law, in my case, is very useful. Having specific expertise in a subject gives you experience and a greater predisposition than a workmate who does not. For me, journalism is a vocation, there is a part of training as a journalist, but there’s another important part related to understanding the issue, having greater, more grounded knowledge, which can ensure the making of a better product.

—What memories do you have of your time spent at Pompeu Fabra?

Brilliant! I have very fond memories of the friends I made and still have, with both classmates and lecturers including Carles Castro or Carles Pont, who I collaborate with for work. I spent six years here, four doing Law and two doing Journalism, that’s quite a few years. Although I am 43, it is one of the most important periods of my life. It made me the person I am and helped me fly the nest, to some extent. It is a unique period of knowledge, both academically and personally. The University and UPF are some of the best memories I have. I can say that I was happy at Pompeu Fabra, and still am when I remember my time there.