COMPASS PROJECT
Working Paper #4

On compassion

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2022

COMPASS

upf. Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona

COMPASS: LOBBYING AND COMPASSION. INTEREST GROUPS, DISCOURSE AND NONHUMAN ANIMALS IN SPAIN

COMPASS participants: Núria Almiron, Olatz Aranceta-Reboredo, Estela Díaz, Catia Faria, Fabiola Leyton, David Martín, Antonio Núñez, Eze Paez, Miquel Rodrigo-Alsina, Laura Fernández, Jose A. Moreno, Daniela Romero Waldhorn.

Image: Alexas Fotos from Pexels

Working paper for internal discussion only

This work has been supported by the Spanish State Research Agency (Agencia Estatal de Investigación, AEI) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) under grant PID2020-118926RB-I00.

Departament de Comunicació
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Roc Boronat 138 – Barcelona (Spain)

https://www.upf.edu/web/compass

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Defining compassion

Compassion can be defined as "the feeling that arises in witnessing another's suffering and that motivates a subsequent desire to help" (Goetz et al. 2010, p. 351). Compassion can also be defined as "an intentional sensitivity to the suffering, with a motivation and commitment to try to relieve it, which can have a positive impact on individuals' emotional and psychological well-being" (Cunha et al. 2017). Our interest in compassion lies in its associated feelings "of concern and warmth, linked to the motivation to help" (Preckel et al. 2018, 1), which are driven by an altruistic motivation (Chierchia & Singer 2017, 250).

"Compassion is controversial. Within studies of morality, theoretical claims about compassion reach contrasting conclusions: Some theorists consider compassion to be an unreliable guide to judgments about right and wrong, whereas others view compassion as a source of principled moral judgment (Haidt, 2003; Nussbaum, 1996, 2001). Within debates about the nature of altruism, researchers have sought to document that a brief state such as compassion is a proximal determinant of prosocial behavior (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Hoffman, 1981). Within evolutionist thought, controversies have swirled around whether compassion and sympathy are the products of evolutionary processes, as Darwin assumed, or tendencies too costly for the self to be aligned with the tenets of evolutionary theory (Cronin, 1991). These debates highlight the question that motivates the present review: What is compassion? Ironically, despite pervasive theoretical claims and numerous studies of a state like episode of compassion, it is largely absent from traditional emotion taxonomies and research (e.g., Boucher & Brandt, 1981; Ekman et al, 1972; Izard, 1977; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tomkins, 1984; for an exception, see Lazarus, 1991). Instead, compassion has been described as a vicarious experience of another's distress (e.g., Ekman, 2003; Hoffman, 1981), a blend of sadness and love (e.g., Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987), or a subtype or variant of love (e.g., Post, 2002; Sprecher & Fehr, 2005; Underwood, 2002). Although recent authors have treated compassion as an emotion (e.g., Batson, 1991; Haidt, 2003; Sober & Wilson, 1998), there has yet to be an integrative review of the evidence relevant to the question 'What is compassion?' (Goetz et al. 2010, 351). See Goetz et al. (2010) for a review of the controversies on compassion.

Strauss et al. (2016) reviewed several definitions of compassion and argued: "In summary, in all these definitions compassion is seen as awareness of someone's suffering, being moved by it (emotionally and, according to some definitions, cognitively), and acting or feeling motivated to help. Several definitions emphasize that, although one is moved by suffering, compassion also involves being able to tolerate uncomfortable feelings that arise in oneself as a result of seeing suffering, including tolerating feelings of distaste, frustration or anger that might be elicited by that suffering. There is also a suggestion in several definitions that compassion involves recognizing a commonality with the sufferer, acknowledging that as a fellow being we too could find ourselves in a similar position" (17–18). Strauss et al. (2016) propose, following consolidation of existing definitions, that "compassion consists of five elements: recognizing suffering, understanding the universality of human suffering, feeling for the person suffering, tolerating uncomfortable feelings, and motivation to act/acting to alleviate suffering" (Strauss et al. 2016, 15).

Martha Nussbaum has made a compelling argument against the common understanding of compassion as an irrational emotion. The US philosopher argues that emotions are highly discriminating responses to what is of value and importance and are, therefore, suffused with intelligence and discernment (Nussbaum 1996, 2001). For Nussbaum, there cannot be adequate ethical theory without an adequate theory of emotional experience and meaning in which compassion plays a very relevant role. In her words: "Compassion is not the entirety of justice; but it both contains a powerful, if partial, vision of just distribution and provides imperfect citizens with an essential bridge from self-interest to just conduct" (Nussbaum, 1996: 57). Elaborating from Aristotle, Nussbaum has developed why compassion is concerned with value: "It involves the recognition that the situation matters for the flourishing of the person in question. Intuitively we see this quite clearly. We do not go around pitying someone who has lost a trivial item, such as a toothbrush or a paper clip, ... In fact, internal to our emotional response itself is the judgment that what is at issue is indeed serious" (Nussbaum, 2001: 316). Compassion, on Nussbaum's account, is one of the distinctively moral emotions, an essential element in any theory of justice—a moral compass, in her words.

Compassion is therefore an emotion that consists of identifying and fully appreciating someone's suffering along with a desire to alleviate it. It differs from other moral emotions (e.g., empathy) in that it is not limited to understanding or feeling the suffering of others, but involves an active willingness to change their situation, i.e., it motivates us to help them. It is a moral emotion that, in its valence, points to an attitude (with its three components: cognitive, affective, and behavioural), which has to do with solidarity, ethics, and justice.

This project departs from an affirmative view of compassion—not as an irrational emotion but as a moral one; a prosocial behaviour; a response to the suffering of others; and a willingness to alleviate it. As a prosocial mind-set and proactive behaviour against suffering, cultivating compassion can be seen as progress toward a more ethical society. Accordingly, blocking compassion is certainly problematic. By compassionate action we mean both passive action (not contributing to any action that may interfere with the well-being of other animals) and active action (actively contributing to increase the well-being of other animals).

2. Differences from related concepts

The concept of compassion, like all concepts, is subject to interpretation. Compassion is generally considered not to be the same as empathy, pity, or sympathy. However, many people do not distinguish one term from another and use them synonymously or arbitrarily. In the history of Western thought, the term has also been used in radically different ways—for example, from Schopenhauer's viewpoint to that of Nietzsche. While for the former compassion is the very essence of all love and solidarity among humans, for the latter compassion is a depressive feeling and a feeling of the weak. However, there are dozens of examples of human characters who demonstrate that compassion is not a sign of weakness but, on the contrary, of strength, because of its capacity to confront the reality of suffering and generate the desire to act to help overcome it. Although much remains to be clarified and understood about Nietzsche's critique of compassion, everything seems to indicate that this author was confusing disabling and condescending Christian pity with the proactive moral attitude that is compassion. In this work, we aim to leave aside the dualisms and historical deviations that the concept has undergone and

to focus on the moral value of compassion, which has ethical utility. For a more developed analysis of compassion in comparison with other concepts, see Pommier's PhD thesis (Pommier 2010).

Empathy

"On the one hand, there is broad agreement that empathy and compassion are distinct phenomena. Empathy (more precisely, affective empathy) is often thought to involve one person sharing or matching another's emotion or mood, or at least what they imagine the other person's emotion or mood to be (Darwall 1998; Maibom 2014; Coplan 2011a; 2011b). Hence, one can empathize with another's sorrow or distress, but also with their joy, their gratitude, or their admiration. Compassion, in contrast, is usually (if not universally) taken to be a response to another's suffering; and it is generally assumed to be a distressing emotion. Moreover, unlike empathy, compassion implies a concern for the sufferer and hence a desire or wish to help them. Nevertheless, even if compassion and empathy are not the same, it might be suggested that compassion does at least require empathy. This suggestion has been the source of some debate in the philosophical literature on compassion, and it bears on a number of further questions. One of these questions concerns the nature of the distress experienced by the compassionate subject. It is sometimes suggested that the compassionate subject suffers with the sufferer: they feel what they imagine the sufferer to feel. However, some theorists have denied this: in compassion, the thought goes, one suffers for the other person, but one does not suffer what they suffer. A second question concerns how compassion presents the situation—its intentional content. Nancy Snow (1991, 197) argues that when we experience compassion, we recognize that the other's suffering is of a kind that we too might undergo. In contrast, Martha Nussbaum (2001, 317–20) denies that this recognition is strictly necessary for compassion, though she concedes that, in practice, it is often what allows us to appreciate that another's distress is important for us. A third question concerns the scope or reach of compassion. If compassion requires empathy, this might be taken to imply that people will be unable to feel compassion for beings very different to themselves—non-human animals, for example. (See Abbate, this volume.) As Karsten Struhl (this volume) explains, Buddhist thought offers a rather different perspective on the relationship between compassion and empathy. For in Buddhist thought, compassion is not to be understood as an emotional response elicited by the suffering of some particular individual, but as a response to the suffering of all sentient beings. It arises, not from one person's ability to empathize with another's distress—a notion that presupposes a distinction between self and other—but from the recognition that there is no such distinction. Hence universal compassion, as Buddhists understand it, does not require empathy; rather, it implies overcoming our attachment to the illusion of self (Struhl, this volume)." (Caouette & Price 2018, 1)

In terms of the etymological root of the term, the word compassion has its origin in the Latin *cum-passio* (which refers to the suffering shared with another and the need to alleviate it, as if it were one's own). While the etymological root of empathy (*en pathos*) refers to a state of emotional affectation that allows one to sympathise/understand the suffering of others, compassion (*con pathos*) goes a step further, empathising with that suffering and wanting to alleviate it.

Compassion towards other humans has been researched for social and individual well-being purposes, yet social psychology has focused mostly on the concept of empathy.

According to Hodges and Myers in the *Encyclopaedia of Social Psychology* (2007), social psychology categorizes empathy as an emotional or cognitive response. The first one, emotional empathy, consists of three separate components: feeling the same emotion as another person; feelings of distress in response to perceiving another's plight; and feeling compassion for another person (the latter is the one most frequently associated with the study of empathy in psychology, according to these authors). Therefore, if the third component is not present, empathy is not the same as compassion. With empathy alone we join the suffering of others who suffer, but we may stop short of actually helping; that is, empathy alone may not promote sociality. As Singer and Klimecki state (2014), empathically suffering with others does not necessarily motivate us to help them, neither conceptually nor empirically. To fill this gap, a tradition in social psychology has highlighted the role of empathic concern or compassion, and developments in social neuroscience have made this proposal increasingly clear.

Compassion implies embracing otherness and, at the same time, union/communion/connection with that person. It entails "being with" and "feeling with," putting oneself in their skin, understanding them. For this it is necessary to pay attention, to listen, to observe cognitively, emotionally, and spiritually. Trying to understand how they see the world and what they need; avoiding judging them or imposing my mental models on them; holding back the urge to give an easy solution or to deny their experience. It involves listening (not only with the ears) to his or her experience of pain or suffering—physical and psychological—and the absence of happiness (in the sense of fulfilment, peace, well-being, good life) in order to find a way to reduce it, alleviate it, or make it disappear. The concrete action that accompanies feeling and sharing with the other will depend on many factors (e.g., circumstances) but cannot remain mere empathy or "feeling with"; it entails doing something (or not doing something) to shed light/hope and to bring the person back to a state of well-being or to accompany them in the task of recognising their path to the good life.

Compassion is a feeling and practice that goes a step beyond empathy, because it implies connecting with the situation and/or emotions that the other person (human or nonhuman) is experiencing—and not doing so from how one would act oneself *if* one were in their place, but from how that person is concretely in that particular "place" and experience. In that sense, compassion is a feeling of understanding and connection with the other in themselves, without judgement and letting be, respecting their particularity, difference, and concrete circumstances; and it is, at the same time, a feeling that drives caring and caring action. Compassion is conscious attention to the other (or self), interdependence put into practice.

From a psychological point of view, compassion refers to a desire, intention, and behaviour—congruent with each other—to alleviate the suffering, pain, and stress of sentient beings, as well as their right to enjoy life. It goes beyond empathy, in the sense that intention is not enough.

For an analysis of empathy and compassion from a Confucian perspective, see Yee Chan (2019), and for a development of the discussion on empathy and compassion see Caouette & Price (2018).

Sympathy

"The relationships between compassion, sympathy, and pity have also prompted some discussion. It is often suggested that compassion differs from sympathy in that it is a response only to serious suffering (Nussbaum 2001, 302; Snow 1991). Trudy Govier and David Boutland (this volume) endorse this suggestion, adding that compassion, but not sympathy, characteristically motivates action. In contrast, Alfred Archer (this volume) draws the distinction differently, suggesting that compassion, but not sympathy, implies empathy". (Caouette & Price 2018, x–xi)

"Wispe (1991) defines sympathy in a way that sounds similar to compassion suggesting that in sympathy suffering is recognized as something to be alleviated. Further, methodologically sympathy has often been measured as a function of emotion adjectives that includes compassion in its checklist (e.g. Batson et al., 1997; Batson & Morron, 1999; Batson & Ahmad 2001; Cialdini & al., 1987; Harmon-Jones et al., 2003; Irwin et al., 2008; Oswald, 1996)." (Pommier 2010, 39)

"Compassion is used to describe and define sympathy as if the two terms were synonymous. Wispe's (1986) definition of sympathy is virtually indistinguishable from a general definition of compassion. He indicates that sympathy is an emotion where suffering is recognized and seen as something to be alleviated. Sympathy, as defined by Eisenberg is an emotion characterized by sadness and concern. While in compassion there is a recognition of suffering, the process does not end there but positive other-focused feelings motivate an individual to wish for the alleviation of suffering of another. Therefore, sympathy may have more of an emphasis on sadness than compassion. In fact, it is possible that the way that Hoffman (1982) suggests that empathy and sympathy have a developmental link, sympathy and compassion may as well. Gilbert (2005, p. 42) reports that "sympathy may be a key competency for compassion." Sympathy may end with a sense of sadness or concern for another and compassion begin with these sentiments and develop into an other-focused wish for the alleviation of suffering." (Pommier 2010, 43)

Pity

"The distinction between compassion and pity is perhaps the least controversial: pity is standardly thought to imply a condescending attitude to the sufferer, something that is not present in compassion. Nancy Snow (1991) argues that this is because pity does not involve empathy: it does not involve recognizing that one is capable of suffering in the same way" (Caouette & Price 2018, xi)

"The story tells us a lot about compassion. Pity requires an object whereas compassion requires a subject. The object of pity is innocent, a "pure" victim, without subjectivity. Compassion, in contrast, does not require innocence. The object of pity exists primarily within the realm of the imaginary; it is an impossible condition – a pure, helpless, innocent being. The closest we come to it is the suffering animal. Hence no doubt the peculiarly British capacity to feel so much towards mistreated animals as opposed to our own street sleepers and drug users. In contrast, compassion remains steady even when the "object of pity" becomes difficult, starts to complain, becomes unmanageable, does things which seem to put him or her in a bad light, lacking in virtue. Perhaps, then, compassion can even be felt towards the suicide bomber." (Hogget 2006, 154)

"So, whereas pity is subject to rapid fatigue, compassion is more enduring (indeed still endures or can be revived after conflict with the other). To say that it endures is not to say that it is a constant – patience snaps, sympathy curdles – but it is to say that it does not die simply because the generous impulse behind it meets with rebuff. It follows that, whereas pity is made manifest in the spontaneous gesture (the donation, the teddy bear through the post, the commemorative flowers), compassion, because it endures, is manifest in action." (Hogget 2006, 156)

"Pity has often been defined and used synonymously with compassion because both constructs imply an emotional response to another where suffering is recognized (Cassell, 2002). In fact, Nussbaum (1996) indicates that historically it wasn't until the Victorian era that pity began to take on connotations of condescension in response to the sufferer. Kornfield (1988) reports that pity is called the near enemy of compassion in Buddhism because it can appear to be the same in some instances. However, there is a difference and the main distinction is that there is a sense of superiority in pity that is absent in compassion (Blum, 1980; Cassell, 2002; Dalai Lama, 2002c; Fox, 1990; Glaser, 2005; Kornfield, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994; Rinpoche, 1992; Wachhotlz & Pearce, 2007). Pity can result in a downward comparison of the sufferer (e.g. Cassell, 2002; Dalai Lama, 2002c) that suggests that the sufferer is not worthy of concern (Lazarus, 1991). The individual who pities another sees the sufferer as separate and different (Kornfield, 1988). This view helps to drive a wedge further between the conceptualization of the self and individual that is suffering. In contrast, compassion is open to pain and does not build up boundaries between the self and the sufferer (Fox, 1990; Neff, 2003a; 2003b). It fails to assume the inferiority of the individual who suffers (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). Common humanity is the function that creates a sense of equality between the sufferer and the self because it recognizes the pain of others as something that the self is also prone to experience. Individuals experiencing common humanity recognize that everyone deserves compassion for the sole reason that they are in pain (Blum, 1980). Pity fails to observe this common ground. One way that pity can function is to disassociate through blame. The individual who is suffering is viewed as culpable for their misfortune and the individual who pities assumes that they could never be in such a predicament (Blum, 1980; Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). It may be assumed that the sufferer is weak and brought on their own failure (von Dietze & Orb, 2000; Wachholtz & Pearce, 2007). Further, it is suggested that pity in general does not provide the motivation to reduce the suffering of others (Blum, 1980; Wachholtz & Pearce, 2007) while in compassion the motivation to act is considered imperative (Dalai Lama, 2002b).[…] There is a sense of closeness in compassion while in pity there is only a sense of distance (Glaser, 2005). In compassion an individual feels concern (Dalai Lama, 2002c) but in contrast, the feeling in pity consists of distain and contempt (Lazarus, 1 991). Pity lacks respect (Dalai Lama, 2002c; Glaser, 2005) and strips dignity from the sufferer (von Dietze & Orb, 2000). This is why in some instances pity is responded to as an insult and is rejected (Cassell, 2002). Thus, compassion consists of a kind response while pity is a cold reaction to the suffering of others" (Pommier 2010, 60–62).

Altruism

"What might the value of compassion be? One obvious reason for valuing the emotion of compassion is as a source of altruistic motivation: as we have seen, it is widely assumed that compassion characteristically implies a desire or wish to relieve the other's suffering. Sentimentalist moral theorists, such as David Hume (1978 [1739]), Adam Smith (2007

[1759]), and Arthur Schopenhauer (1965 [1840]) have supposed that emotions such as sympathy and compassion are necessary in order to motivate people to behave altruistically. In contrast, Lawrence Blum (1980b) allows that altruistic actions can sometimes be motivated by considerations of duty alone: he argues, rather, that actions motivated by compassion have a particular value, arising from the expressive qualities of compassionate action." (Caouette & Price 2018, xii).

"Altruism perhaps lent itself as a topic for study because it included behavior that could be observed and presumably measured. However, it soon became evident that altruism consists not only of behavior but it also implies selfless motivation to help others. Thus, helping behavior that was presumed to be altruistic may not always be so because the motivation may stem from other factors (Eisenberg, 1983; Hoffman, 1981; Krebs, 1975). In further investigation, some of those other factors became evident and examples include: moral principles, guilt, fear of punishment, hedonistic concerns, need for approval (Eisenberg, 1983; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a) to obtain rewards, to alleviate one's own personal distress, feelings of responsibility, social expectation or approval, and to avoid conflict (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987a). With this recognition, the term, prosocial behavior began to be used in research to avoid the trap of designating a subjective intention. Thus, prosocial behavior could be used in place of altruism to talk about helping behavior without having to specify the motivation. In addition to the problem of motivational intent that is implied in the meaning of altruism, altruism research has struggled to sort out if any behavior can truly be altruistic (Eisenberg, 2000a; Einoff, 2008). Establishing that there are purely altruistic intentions may prove to be too difficult a task to undertake. In fact, Krebs (1975) indicates that it is impossible to prove because he suggests that it requires proving the null hypothesis. He suggests that altruism can only be substantiated through establishing the lack of expectation for return or reward after an act of giving. Batson (1997) tackles the question by indicating that an individual can have altruistic and other motivations simultaneously. Therefore, in other words, Batson is not a purist in terms of his view on the functioning of altruism. Thus, this suggests a complexity that may make it difficult to ever sort out if any behavior is clearly associated with altruism due to the co-occurrence of other motivations. However, at the same time, it also circumvents the question of whether altruism exists or not. It is less difficult to suggest that altruism co-exists with other motivations than to establish that any act is purely and singularly related to altruism." (Pommier 2010, 32–33).

"One of the most obvious differences between compassion and altruism is that altruism includes an act or a behavior. Thus, it distinguishes itself from compassion and other internal subjective states such as empathy and sympathy. However, as previously noted, altruism conveys a meaning that is not just a behavior, but a particular type of behavior that is tied to an internal states characterized by giving without expectation of personal return. Thus, altruism shares an other-focused element also theorized to be part of sympathy and compassion. Thus, altruism straddles between behavior and motivation and is inclusive of both." (Pommier 2010, 45).

3. Social psychology

Social psychology studies argue that empathy and compassion are both directly correlated with prosocial behaviours, i.e., actions intended to improve the situation of the help-recipient. Different fields and traditions have also conceptualised prosocial behaviours in terms of altruism or solidarity (Bierhoff 2005).

A distinction needs to be made between compassion in an emotional sense and compassion in a cognitive sense. In the first case, we refer to a capacity to (a) experience certain negative emotions that are caused by the fact that another individual or individuals are feeling them and (b) act on those emotions in order to improve the situation of the individual or individuals because of whom we feel that way. In the second case, we refer to a capacity to (a) understand that an individual(s) is being negatively affected in their well-being and (b) act on that belief in order to improve the situation of that individual(s).

Given the limited and arbitrary nature of our capacity for emotional compassion, it seems that the cultivation of cognitive compassion is more important. That is, feeling motivated to help others because we know they need it, regardless of whether or not we are able to feel their need with them. Cognitive compassion is also important as a disposition to cultivate towards nonhuman animals. Insofar as they are morally considerable individuals, they are legitimate recipients of our help, and we should therefore be motivated to help them in appropriate circumstances.

Specifically, compassion and empathy towards nonhuman animals correlate with human–human empathy and prosocial behaviours (Angantyr et al. 2011), while animal cruelty and abuse are associated with anti-social behaviours (Ascione 1992; Ascione & Weber 1996; Taylor & Signal 2005; Signal & Taylor 2007; Gullone 2011; Caviola et al. 2019). Positive correlations have also been found between speciesism and prejudicial attitudes such as racism, sexism, and homophobia, along with ideological constructs associated with prejudice, including social dominance orientation, system justification, and right-wing authoritarianism (Caviola et al. 2019). People generally tend to perceive speciesist prejudice as an extension of prejudiced attitudes such as racism, sexism, and homophobia (Everett et al. 2019). Previous studies have pointed to a higher propensity for aggression in people working in the animal exploitation industries, such as farmers and meatworkers, their scores for levels of aggression being similar to those reported for incarcerated populations of both genders (Richards et al. 2013, 407). Furthermore, slaughterhouses have a unique and insidious effect on the surrounding community, employment in slaughterhouses being linked to increasing rates of violent crimes, rape, and sex offences (Fitzgerald et al. 2009).

Certain psychological mechanisms need to be considered when approaching compassionate and prosocial behaviours, precisely because of how they could interfere with and limit said behaviours. For instance, minority influence theory (Moscovici et al. 1985) explains how minorities in society—such as animal advocates—have difficulties getting their messages heard, while the theory of psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm 1981) sheds light on how people tend to reject persuasive messages and frequently perceive them as a threat to their individual choice. Also, the do-gooder derogation (Minson & Monin 2012) and the rejection of moral rebels (Monin et al. 2008) show how people put down morally motivated others, which becomes a barrier to change towards more compassionate and prosocial behaviour. Finally, cognitive dissonance theory

(Festinger 1962) proves extremely relevant in explaining the psychological imbalances between a person's beliefs and behaviours and the subsequent actions employed to avoid such dissonance. This theory has been thoroughly studied in psychology with regard to human attitudes towards other animals, especially in relation to the "meat paradox" (Joy 2010; Bratanova et al. 2011; Bastian & Loughnan 2016; McGrath 2017).

4. Neuroscience of compassion

The neuroscience of compassion considers compassion to be the altruistic outcome of empathising with others, and that personal distress can be an egoistic and negative consequence of empathy (Singer & Klimecki 2014; Chierchia & Singer 2017). In fact, empathy and compassion have "different affective, motivational, and neural fingerprints" (Chierchia & Singer 2017, 255). Moreover, compassion can be trained, and studies have demonstrated how "training on beneficial qualities such as loving kindness and compassion could affect behaviour and brain structure in the long run" (Chierchia & Singer 2017, 255). The practices of meditation, mindfulness, and perspective-taking have proved to be highly effective exercises in cultivating compassion (Goleman & Davidson 2017). Tania Singer and her team have also designed and tested different training exercises to increase compassion—this being known as cognitive and affective training—and the results point to both being effective in emotion regulation, where the cultivation of positive affect and compassion can specifically decrease avoidance of difficult emotions (Hildebrant et al. 2019). Studies have not only shown that ethical feelings and behaviours such as compassion and prosociality have positive implications for the recipient of the altruistic action, but also underlined their positive benefits for the compassionate individual. These include physical health, cognitive and psychological well-being, emotion regulation, the reduction of emotional distress, and the strengthening of positive relationships with others (Lay & Hoppmann 2015). Thus, research clearly shows that compassion helps promote cooperation, trust, and tolerance (Chierchia & Singer 2017).

5. (Animal) Ethics

For a discussion of compassion as a moral value or as a virtue, see Caouette & Price (2018).

In more philosophical terms, one could say that compassion entails the acceptance of two fundamental moral principles: the principle of non-maleficence ("do no harm") and the principle of benevolence ("do good"), according to which we should act so as not to cause harm to others and, whenever possible, act for their benefit, promoting their well-being.

Compassion is a form of ethics with a fairly universal scope, involving an ambiguity of stance (domination/equality):

- It is a relational position that is rooted in an emotion, which may have an instinctive basis (and thus is subject to cultural manipulation): perceiving the signs of another's suffering or well-being and being sensitive to it.
- It is ambiguous because it involves a form of homology and equality: to empathise, it involves identifying, feeling like the other and therefore feeling the

other; but it also carries a latent notion of condescending pity: it is the sentiment that inspires Christian charity.

And it carries a paradoxically subversive potential in a cultural and political context marked by patriarchy:

- It is the emotional foundation of the ethic of care, an alternative ethic to the abstract and androcentric ethic of justice—and a "feminine" alternative.
- As religion can become the primitive form of contestation of the oppressed creature (Marx), compassion is a primitive and endogenous form of regulation of an oppressive society, even if it may not be the only way to full emancipation.

As for animal ethics, in the 18th century philosopher Jeremy Bentham stated that the question regarding nonhuman animals was not "Can they reason?" or "Can they talk?", but "Can they suffer?" (Bentham 2007/1781). Back then, Bentham already argued that nonhuman animal sentience should be morally relevant. Later, in 1970, psychologist Richard Ryder (1970/2010) coined the concept of *speciesism* to refer to species-based discrimination, while a year later Roslind Godlovitch (1971) published the article "Animals and morals," where she presented one of the first philosophical defences of moral rights for nonhuman animals. Since then, animal ethicists have studied the ethical implications of animal sentience and cognition and have argued for the moral consideration of nonhuman animals and the arbitrariness of speciesism from various philosophical theories and traditions, including utilitarianism (Singer 1990), deontology (Regan 1983), neo-Kantianism (Korsgaard 2018), contractualism (Rowlands 2012), egalitarianism (Horta 2013), virtue ethics (Nussbaum 2004), and care ethics (Donovan & Adams 2007). Care ethicists and ecofeminists have particularly insisted on the importance of care, empathy, and compassion: how they can be directed beyond humanity (Gruen 2015) and how their rejection in animal ethics is a reflection and consequence of androcentric bias (Donovan & Adams 2007; Kheel 2008). It is no coincidence that they have been pioneers in revealing the damage caused by the human/animal binary structuring the Western world and have advocated for interconnectedness and holistic explanations for the present entangled environmental, interspecies, and social problems (Gaard 1993). In 2012, a prominent international group of cognitive neuroscientists, neuropharmacologists, neurophysiologists, neuroanatomists, and computational neuroscientists signed the *Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness* to reassess the neurobiological substrates of conscious experience and related behaviours in human and nonhuman animals (Low et al. 2012). Cognitive research has underlined not only the sentience of nonhuman animals but also their emotional world (Bekoff 2007) and their moral behaviour patterns (Bekoff & Pierce 2009). This evidence reinforces the social need to advance and promote compassion and ethical behaviours towards sentient nonhuman animals.

From ecofeminism and feminist care ethics: "ecofeminist theory will recognize sympathy and compassion as a fundamental feature of any inclusive, liberatory theory. An inclusive ecofeminist theory suggests that compassion is crucial to undoing oppression in both theory and practice. "Others" are not only marginalized by contemporary cultural practices, but negated by the process of defining a powerful "self."" (Gaard 1993, 80)

"From ecofeminist guidelines developed by myself, Marti Kheel, and others, I would define an ethical position most simply as this: acting to the best of one's ability from a

sensibility that simultaneously knows and values oneself as an individual; is compassionate through identification with human and nonhuman others and caring about others' lives and wellbeing; and is creative, undergoing self-transformation through cultivating a relation to collectives ranging from human families to the planetary community" (Gaard 1993, 111)

"Women therefore have a natural capacity for compassion and sympathy which inclines them toward acts of benevolence. In contrast, men are more drawn toward the noble and sublime, allowing them to act out of duty rather than mere inclination. Although, as Mason Cash notes, Kant does not deny that women have the capacity for reason, he does argue that they lack the ability to conquer their animal emotions and follow the dictates of duty." (Kheel 2008, 54–55)

"Gilligan developed Chodorow's thesis that the process by which boys separate from the mother figure has served to produce men who have a fear of intimacy and attachment to others, as well as an inclination toward the ideals of abstract reasoning and individual autonomy. By contrast, since girl children do not have to dissociate themselves from their mothers, they are able to develop empathy and compassion, based on a sense of self that is defined through its embeddedness in relationships." (Kheel 2008, 55)

"Rolston elevates ethical principles and guidelines for the treatment of other-than-human animals over empathy and compassion for their plight. His formulation of the homologous functions that humans and animals share shows little appreciation for the analogous nature of human and animal experience, especially suffering" (Kheel 2008, 152)

"The natural rights theory and the utilitarian theory both "unite in their rationalist rejection of emotion or sympathy as a legitimate base for ethical theory about animal treatment. Many feminists have urged just the opposite, claiming that sympathy, compassion, and caring are the ground upon which theory about human treatment of animals should be constructed […] I will argue that the terms of what constitutes the ethical must be shifted. Like many other feminists, I contend that the dominant strain in contemporary ethics reflects a male bias toward rationality, defined as the construction of abstract universals that elide not just the personal, the contextual, and the emotional, but also the political components of an ethical issue. Like other feminists, particularly those in the "caring" tradition, I believe that an alternative epistemology and ontology may be derived from women's historical social, economic, and political practice." (Donovan 1996, 81). In this paper, Donovan argues about the concept of "attentive love," aligned with the feminist care tradition.

"They have proposed that care and compassion is a practice that can and should be applied universally—a categorical imperative, if you will—to all animals (human and non). As I argue below in furthering this contention, knowledge of one's immediate animal entourage, as well as one's own experience of suffering, provides a point of reference to which the reactions of remote others may be compared and analogized on the principle of homology" (Donovan 2006, 310).

See also Bekoff's *The Animal Manifesto: Six reasons for expanding our compassion footprint* (2010), which includes both ethological and ethical arguments for the inclusion of nonhuman animals in our compassionate action.

6. Buddhism

"Although it has been long neglected in Western psychology, Eastern traditions have viewed compassion as central to liberating our minds from the power of destructive emotions such as fear, anger, envy and vengeance" (Goleman 2003 in Gilbert 2005, 1).

"Within Buddhism, compassion is seen not only as an emotional response but also as a response founded on reason and wisdom which is embedded in an ethical framework concerned with the selfless intention of freeing others from suffering." (Strauss et al. 2016, 17).

The universal compassion that is at the core of Buddhism in general, but especially of Mahayana Buddhism—with the Bodhisattva ideal that cultivates *bodhicitta*, the moral emotion that anticipates empathic suffering and constructs all life action as ethical action aimed at relieving all sentient beings from suffering—can also be useful. The Sanskrit concept for compassion, *karuṇā*, means sympathy in action. The duality between emotion and reason that places compassion on the side of emotion in the West also disappears in the Buddhist view, where *karuṇā* (compassion) and *prajñā* (wisdom) feed each other. Understanding or wisdom gives rise to the emergence of compassion, and compassion is essential to the development of understanding.

"This form of loving is not linked to 'desire' for the other or seeking attachments. Salzberg (1995) says that metta comes from two words meaning 'gentle' and 'friend' (p. 24). Compassion (which is an element of loving-kindness) involves being open to the suffering of self and others, in a non-defensive and nonjudgemental way. Compassion also involves a desire to relieve suffering, cognitions related to understanding the causes of suffering, and behaviours – acting with compassion. Hence, it is from a combination of motives, emotions, thoughts and behaviours that compassion emerges. The great insights of the Buddha were basic observations on life and are illuminated in the four noble truths (Walpola Sri Rahula, 1959/1997). These are that life is full of threats and suffering (or dukkha – sometimes translated as dis-ease). All sentient beings seek to be free of suffering (dukkha). However, many of our ways of trying to reduce threats and relieve ourselves of suffering and distress, such as seeking the love/approval of other humans, fame, glory, sex or wealth, may offer only temporary comforts (all things are impermanent). Moreover, they can leave us worse off because we can come to crave these things, fear their loss, and in pursuing them we can distort our sense of self and create envy and suffering for others. The Buddha argued that to 'become enlightened' and create an inner state of 'being at peaceful happiness' was to come to see through these 'illusions or afflictions' by training the mind. Cultivating loving-kindness and compassion for self and others was a path to the release from suffering for all." (Gilbert 2005, 1)

"Continuing with Buddhist terms for a moment, this tradition holds that wisdom and compassion are the same thing, just viewed from two sides. Without wisdom, compassion is easily misguided. Compassion requires wisdom concerning the true causes of suffering. Conversely, without compassion, wisdom is coldly analytical. Compassion involves a fusing of judgment and feeling about such important life situations." (Curtin 2014, 72)

7. Strategic communication

The field of strategic communication has shed light on the ways in which communication can limit or help the promotion of compassionate, ethical relations with other animals and the planet. In the case of speciesism, several works have pointed to graphic visuals of nonhuman animals as a way of raising awareness and raising the moral standards of people's attitudes towards nonhuman animals through moral shocks, a cognitive and emotional process that encourages participation (Jasper & Poulsen 1995). Moral shocks generated by graphic visuals have proved an effective strategy in promoting a reduction in people's speciesist attitudes (Fernández 2021) and increasing compassion towards nonhuman animals. However, the moral shock triggers "negative" emotions such as sadness, anger, and disgust, which may also produce a backlash in audiences. Other approaches beyond suffering are therefore needed to avoid alienating audiences, detrimentally affecting nonhuman animals' agency, and allowing their commodification (Aaltola 2014). There is also evidence that an empathic perspective-taking approach to images of suffering (such as the well-known polar bear case) is effective in promoting compassion and altruism, even among less environmentally committed audiences (Swim & Bloodhard 2015). The blurring and crossing of symbolic boundaries between human/nonhuman animals—or between animal individuals from species considered differently in cultural and moral terms (such as dogs and chickens, for instance)—have been highlighted as an argument for communication and persuasion to contest and rethink the perception of species difference (Cherry 2010). That being said, however, those nonhuman animals who look and behave similarly to humans tend to receive more empathic responses (Huddy & Gunnthorsdottir 2000; Westbury & Neumann 2008). Critical animal and media studies scholars have researched the representation of nonhuman animals in conventional media and popular culture and their material destructive or reparative consequences for actual animal individuals and the planet (Molloy 2011; Almiron, Cole & Freeman 2016). Relevant research has also been undertaken by communication and social movements scholars regarding how animal advocacy organizations and their main leaders frame their messages of respect, compassion, and justice towards nonhuman animals (Freeman 2014, 2021).

8. Defining compassion towards nonhuman animals and its implications

Compassion is the moral obligation to understand nonhuman animals' needs and interests and, second, the moral obligation to adapt our actions so that they do not cause them harm or suffering, and even bring them welfare.

Applied to nonhuman animals, compassion thus consists of redirecting one's attention towards full awareness of nonhuman needs, desires, and interests and a willingness to prevent the harm they suffer and to help them whenever we can to realise their welfare. This would be premised on two things:

a) Human animals must recognise that they are human animals. Animality has become what separates us when it is what unites us: living animal beings.
b) Both human animals and nonhuman animals are worthy of compassion.

And compassion comes from identifying with the suffering of others:

- Recognising the other as a subject, becoming aware of their existence and their needs, of their potential to live a full life.

- Observing, paying attention, actively listening to how they feel, how they are, what they need. This phase involves forgetting oneself "to be with."

- Putting myself in their shoes: sharing the pain/suffering/absence of a full life. Imagining yourself in its place, feeling with the animal.

- Acting, making decisions driven by the intention to help them reduce, avoid, or eliminate their pain/suffering... and, in the best case, helping them to regain their good life.

It is emphasised that this is not about humanising nonhuman animals, because that would be to propose that only what is human is worthy of compassion—we would fall into anthropocentrism. Rather, it is a matter of broadening the focus so that this "someone" includes both human and nonhuman animals.

Applied to nonhuman animals, compassion can work as a bridge or tool to "overcome" the species barrier. Compassion can therefore complement and support rational arguments, so as to avoid inaction or a rational stance that is emotionally deficient. For cases where projecting ourselves into the situation of a nonhuman animal may be more difficult, compassion does not need a strong similarity between subjects to occur. The key to compassion is that there is a being with whom one can identify; it is therefore a question of constructing otherness. In this respect, it must be said that the dehumanisation of the other is often denounced as an obstacle to compassion.

Compassion is a value that challenges enlightened rationality and its world-transforming technical praxis. This anthropocentric Enlightenment praxis permeates the logic of industries that exploit animals in various fields. From this logic, compassion as a virtue and a value element has often been associated with a lack of rationality—an excess of "sentimentality"—and has been vilified as a defect. For this reason, to appeal to compassion is to claim one's own space to exercise empathy towards other animals, to decapitalise them, and to vindicate them outside the instrumental logic that subjugates them.

"Compassion for animals can be explained by examining several modes of connection between humans and other animals. The connections encompass modes of identification between humans and other animals, for example: imaginative reconstructions of their subjective experiences, beliefs about humans and other animals, including beliefs about similarities between species, other emotions toward animals, such as kinship feelings, and outlooks or ways of life that reflect value judgments about and attitudes toward nonhuman animals. To feel compassion for animals is to be connected with them in an especially complex way." (Snow 1993)

"Cheryl Abbate considers the importance of compassion in the philosophy of animal rights. Debates about animal rights, she suggests, have standardly focused on the demand for justice, rather than the need for empathy or compassion. Indeed, Abbate agrees that there are good reasons for theorists of animal rights to doubt that empathy has an important role to play in animal liberation theory: this is because people's capacity to empathize with non-human animals is likely to be limited and biased in important ways.

However, she suggests, compassion differs from empathy in important respects: it is connected in important ways to our beliefs; moreover, she suggests (in opposition to Archer), it does not involve suffering with, but suffering for another. Compassion, she argues, has an important role to play in counteracting the societal influences that hinder people from acting on their reasoned moral beliefs about the rights of animals. If so, she says, we have a duty to cultivate compassion, and she makes some practical proposals for how this might be done". (Caouette & Price 2018, xv–xvi). See Abbate (2018) for the full discussion in her chapter.

"Ecofeminists share an assumption that the care/empathy/compassion approach to ethics, one that highlights the centrality of affect, is somehow more fundamental than an abstract ethic of rights. An ethic of care is certainly more inclusive since it values the diverse ways that women and men tend to organize their moral experience. Also, since it does not begin with the assumption that ethics should be built on a feature that is uniquely human—human reason—it is less anthropocentric." (Curtin 2014, 62).

Deane Curtin discusses the contrast between negative rights and compassion, arguing that compassion is basic: "It is the fundamental way in which we relate to other beings in the moral sphere of our lives. Rights have their place, but they are secondary" (Curtin 2014, 65).

"Desde luego, la compasión siempre alude a un pathos o a un sentimiento o a un sentido compartido. Este pathos, lo que nos une con los animales en el punto de partida de la ética, es el dolor. Pero no basta con este primer despertar de los sentimientos que, de nuevo, son condición necesaria del despertar de la conciencia ética. Se exige que sobre esta sensación se configure la sensibilidad moral (Hoyos y Vargas, 2002, p. 229). Esta, a su vez, se extiende como un sentido y un sentir comunes (sensus communis) (Gadamer, 2003, pp. 48-61). El pathos —que aparece primero como ratio cordis— tiene que llegar a ser presentado en sus motivos y razones. Hacer claridad sobre estos es la reconfiguración de la responsabilidad como ética de la compasión." (Arbeláez Cardona & Vargas Guillén 2015, 83)

For a review of the concept of compassion towards nonhuman animals in ethics, see Seligmann-Sliva (2014).

REFERENCES

Note: *This list may contain minor inaccuracies and is subject to possible correction.*

Abbate, Cheryl. 2018. "Compassion and Animals: How to Foster Respect for Other Animals in a World without Justice." A *The Moral Psychology of Compassion*, ed. Carolyn Price and Justin Caouette, 33–48. New York and London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Aaltola, Elisa. 2018. *Varieties of Empathy. Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Angantyr, Malin, Jakob Eklund, and Eric M. Hansen. 2011. "A Comparison of Empathy for Humans and Empathy for Animals." *Anthrozoös* 24 (4): 369–377. https://doi.org/10.2752/175303711X13159027359764.

Ascione, Frank R. 1992**.** "Enhancing Children's Attitudes about the Humane Treatment of Animals: Generalization to Human-Directed Empathy." *Anthrozoös* 5 (3): 176–191. https://doi.org/10.2752/089279392787011421.

Ascione, Frank R., and Chip E. Weber. 1996**.** "Battered Women's Reports of Their Partners' and Their Children's Cruelty to Animals." *Journal of Emotional Abuse* 1 (1): 119–133. https://doi.org/10.1300/J135v01n01_07.

Bastian, Brock, and Steve Loughnan. 2017. "Resolving the Meat-Paradox: A Motivational Account of Morally Troublesome Behavior and Its Maintenance." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 21 (3): 278–299. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868316647562.

Bekoff, Marc. 2010. *The Animal Manifesto: Six Reasons for Expanding Our Compassion Footprint*. Novato, CA: New World Library.

Bekoff, Marc, and Jessica Pierce. 2009. *Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bierhoff, Hans-Werner. 2005. "The Psychology of Compassion and Prosocial Behaviour." A *Compassion. Conceptualisations, Research and Use in Psychotherapy*, ed. Paul Gilbert, 148–167. London and New York: Routledge.

Boucher, Jerry D., and Mary E. Brandt. 1981. Judgment of emotions, American and Malay antecedents. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 12, 272-283.

Bratanova, Boyka, Steve Loughnan, and Brock Bastian. 2011. "The Effect of Categorization as Food on the Perceived Moral Standing of Animals." *Appetite* 57 (1): 193–196. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2011.04.020.

Caviola, Lucius, Jim A. C. Everett, and Nadira S. Faber. 2019. "The Moral Standing of Animals: Towards a Psychology of Speciesism." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 116 (6): 1011–1029. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000182.

Cherry, Elizabeth. 2010. *Culture and Activism: Animal Rights in France and the United States*. London: Routledge. (Citada per línia d'argument; comprova ed./capítol si cal.)

Chierchia, Gabriele, and Tania Singer. 2017. "The Neuroscience of Compassion and Empathy and Their Link to Prosocial Motivation and Behavior." A *Decision Neuroscience*, 247–257. Amsterdam: Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-805308-9.00020-8.

Cohen, Stanley. 2011. *States of Denial. Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Corman, Leesa F. 2017. "Beyond Suffering: (re)Presenting Animal Agency in Visual Culture." A *Critical Animal and Media Studies: Communication for Nonhuman Animal Advocacy*, ed. Núria Almiron, Matthew Cole and Carrie P. Freeman, 142–158. New York: Routledge.

Cronin, Helena. 1991. *The Ant and the Peacock: Altruism and Sexual Selection from Darwin to Today.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cunha, M., C. Rodrigues, M. Matos, A. Galhardo, and M. Couto. 2017. "Compassionate Attributes and Action Scale for Adolescents: Adaptation and Validation." *European Psychiatry* 41 (S1): S434–S434. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2017.01.423.

Curtin, Deane. 2014. "Compassion and Being Human." A *Ecofeminism: Feminist Intersections with Other Animals and The Earth*, ed. Carol J. Adams and Lori Gruen, 62–84. New York, London, New Delhi and Sydney: Bloomsbury.

Donovan, Josephine. 1996. "Attention to Suffering: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 27 (1): 81–102. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1996.tb00228.x.

Donovan, Josephine. 2006. "Feminism and the Treatment of Animals: From Care to Dialogue." *Signs* 31: 305–329.

Donovan, Josephine, and Carol J. Adams, eds. 2007. *The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Everett, Jim A. C., Lucius Caviola, Julian Savulescu, and Nadira S. Faber. 2019. "Speciesism, Generalized Prejudice, and Perceptions of Prejudiced Others." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 22 (6): 785–803. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430218816962.

Ekman, Paul. 2003. *Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life.* New York: Times Book.

Ekman, Paul, & Wallace V. Friesen, Phoebe Ellsworth, W. V. 1972. *Emotion in the human face*. New York: Pergamon.

Fernández, Laura. 2021. "Images That Liberate: Moral Shock and Strategic Visual Communication in Animal Liberation Activism." *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 45 (2): 138–158. https://doi.org/10.1177/0196859920932881.

Festinger, Leon. 1962. *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Vol. 2. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Fitzgerald, Amy J., Linda Kalof, and Thomas Dietz. 2009. "Slaughterhouses and Increased Crime Rates: An Empirical Analysis of the Spillover from 'The Jungle' into the Surrounding Community." *Organization & Environment* 22 (2): 158-184. https://doi.org/10.1177/1086026609338164.

Freeman, Carrie P. 2021. *The Human Animal Earthling Identity: Shared Values Unifying Human Rights, Animal Rights, & Environmental Movements*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.

Gaard, Greta, ed. 1993. *Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Gilbert, Paul. 2005. "Compassion: Conceptualisations, Research and Use in Psychotherapy." London and New York: Routledge. (Vol col·lectiu citat al text.)

Gilmour, Michael J. 2020. *Creative Compassion, Literature and Animal Welfare*. Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55430-9.

Goetz, Jennifer L., Dacher Keltner, and Emiliana Simon-Thomas. 2010. "Compassion: An Evolutionary Analysis and Empirical Review." *Psychological Bulletin* 136 (3): 351–374. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018807.

Goleman, Daniel, and Richard J. Davidson. 2017. *Altered Traits: Science Reveals How Meditation Changes Your Mind, Brain, and Body*. New York: Avery.

Gruen, Lori. 2015. *Entangled Empathy: An Alternative Ethic for Our Relationships with Animals.* New York: Lantern Books.

Gullone, Eleonora. 2011. "Conceptualising Animal Abuse with an Antisocial Behaviour Framework." *Animals* 1 (1): 144–160. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani1010144.

Harrison, Ruth. 2013. *Animal Machines*. Wallingford, UK: CABI.

Hildebrandt, Lea K., Cade McCall, and Tania Singer. 2019. "Socioaffective versus Sociocognitive Mental Trainings Differentially Affect Emotion Regulation Strategies." *Emotion* 19 (8): 1329–1342. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000518.

Hodges, Sara D., and Michael W. Myers. 2007. "Empathy." A *Encyclopaedia of Social Psychology*, ed. Roy F. Baumeister and Kathleen D. Vohs, 297–298. New York: Sage. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412956253.

Hoffman, Martin L. 1981. "Is Altruism Part of Human Nature?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40 (1): 121–137. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.40.1.121

Hoggett, Paul. 2006. "Pity, Compassion, Solidarity." A *Emotion, Politics and Society*, ed. Simon Clarke, Paul Hoggett and Simon Thompson, 145–161. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Huddy, Leonie, and Anna H. Gunnthorsdottir. 2000. "The Persuasive Effects of Emotive Visual Imagery: Superficial Manipulation or the Product of Passionate Reason?" *Political Psychology* 21 (4): 745–778. https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00215.

Izard, Carroll E. 1977. *Human Emotions.* New York: Plenum Press.

Joy, Melanie. 2010. *Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows: An Introduction to Carnism.* San Francisco: Conari Press.

Kheel, Marti. 2008. *Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

King, Barbara J. 2021. *Animals' Best Friends: Putting Compassion to Work for Animals in Captivity and in the Wild*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Lay, Jennifer, and Christiane A. Hoppmann. 2017. "Altruism and Prosocial Behavior." In *Encyclopedia of Geropsychology*, edited by Nancy A. Pachana. Singapore: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-082-7_69.

Lazarus, Richard S. 1991. *Emotion and Adaptation.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Lazarus, Richard S., and Bernice N. Lazarus. 1994. *Passion and Reason: Making Sense of Our Emotions.* New York: Oxford University Press.

López Tello, Alejandro, Raquel Mondragón Gómez, and Ana Beatriz Moreno Coutiño. 2021. "Propiedades psicométricas de una Escala de Compasión Hacia los Animales (ECA)." *Psicología Iberoamericana* 29 (2): e292412. https://doi.org/10.48102/pi.v29i2.412.

Low, Philip, Christof Koch, David Edelman, Bruno Van Swinderen, Christof Koch, and others. 2012. *The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness*. Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge.

Maree, Jacobus (Kobus) G., and Annamaria Di Fabio. 2020. "Compassion." A *The Wiley Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences: Personality Processes and Individual Differences*, vol. 3, 67–71. Wiley-Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119547174.ch188.

McGrath, April. 2017. "Dealing with Dissonance: A Review of Cognitive Dissonance Reduction." *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 11 (12): e12362. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12362.

Miralles, Aurélien, Michael Raymond, and Guillaume Lecointre. 2019. "Empathy and Compassion toward Other Species Decrease with Evolutionary Divergence Time." *Scientific Reports* 9 (19555): 1–8.

Nussbaum, Martha C. 1996. "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion." *Social Philosophy and Policy* 13 (1): 27–58.

———. 2001. *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Phelps, Norm. 2004. *The Great Compassion: Buddhism and Animal Rights*. New York: Lantern.

Pohlmann, Attila. 2022. "The Taste of Compassion: Influencing Meat Attitudes with Interhuman and Interspecies Moral Appeals." *Appetite* 168: 105661.

Pommier, Elisabeth Ann. 2010. "The Compassion Scale." PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin.

Post, Stephen G. 2002. *The Moral Challenge of Alzheimer Disease: Ethical Issues from Diagnosis to Dying.* 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Preckel, Katrin, Philipp Kanske, and Tania Singer. 2018. "On the Interaction of Social Affect and Cognition: Empathy, Compassion and Theory of Mind." *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences* 19: 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.07.010.

Price, Carolyn, and Justin Caouette. 2018. "Introduction." A *The Moral Psychology of Compassion*, ed. Justin Caouette i Carolyn Price, ix–xviii. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Richards, Emma, Tania Signal, and Nik Taylor. 2013. "A Different Cut? Comparing Attitudes toward Animals and Propensity for Aggression within Two Primary Industry Cohorts—Farmers and Meatworkers." *Society & Animals* 21 (4): 395–413. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685306-12341284.

Seligmann-Silva, Marcio. 2014. "Animal Compassion." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 45 (1): 49–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2014.915644.

Shaver, Phillip R., Judith Schwartz, Donald Kirson, and Cary O'Connor. 1987. "Emotion Knowledge: Further Exploration of a Prototype Approach." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 52 (6): 1061–1086. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.52.6.1061.

Signal, Tania D., and Nicola Taylor. 2007. "Attitude to Animals and Empathy: Comparing Animal Protection and General Community Samples." *Anthrozoös* 20 (2): 125–130. https://doi.org/10.2752/175303707X207918.

Singer, Tania, and Olga M. Klimecki. 2014. "Empathy and Compassion." *Current Biology* 24 (18): R875–R878. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.06.054.

Smith, Craig A., and Phoebe C. Ellsworth. 1985. "Patterns of Cognitive Appraisal in Emotion." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 48 (4): 813–838. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.48.4.813.

Snow, Nancy. 1991. "Compassion." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 28 (3): 195–205.

———. 1993. “Compassion for Nonhuman Animals.” *Between the Species* 9 (2): 61–66.

Sober, Elliott, and David Sloan Wilson. 1998**.** *Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior.*Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Stevens, Larry and C. Chad Woodruff. 2018. *The Neuroscience of Empathy, Compassion and Self-Compassion*. London: Academic Press.

Strauss, Clara, Billie Lever Taylor, Jenny Gu, Willem Kuyken, Ruth Baer, Fergal Jones, and Kate Cavanagh. 2016. “What Is Compassion and How Can We Measure It? A Review of Definitions and Measures.” *Clinical Psychology Review* 47: 15–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2016.05.004.

Swim, Janet K., and Brittany Bloodhart. 2015. “Portraying the Perils to Polar Bears: The Role of Empathic and Objective Perspective-Taking Toward Animals in Climate Change Communication.” *Environmental Communication* 9 (4): 446–468. https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2014.987304.

Taylor, N., and T. D. Signal. 2005. “Empathy and Attitudes to Animals.” *Anthrozoös* 18 (1): 18–27. https://doi.org/10.2752/089279305785594342.

Underwood, Lynn G. 2002. “The Human Experience of Altruism: A Theoretical and Empirical Approach.” In *Altruism and Altruistic Love: Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Dialogue*, edited by Stephen G. Post, Lynn G. Underwood, Jeffrey P. Schloss, and William B. Hurlbut, 72–88. New York: Oxford University Press.

Westbury, H. Rae, and David L. Neumann. 2008. “Empathy-Related Responses to Moving Film Stimuli Depicting Human and Non-Human Animal Targets in Negative Circumstances.” *Biological Psychology* 78 (1): 66–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2007.12.009.

Weng, Helen, Andrew Fox, Alexander Shackman, Diane Stodola, Jessica Caldwell, Matthew Olson, Gregory Rogers, and Richard Davidson. 2013. “Compassion Training Alters Altruism and Neural Responses to Suffering.” *Psychological Science* 24 (7): 1171–1180. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612469537.

Westbury, H. Rae, and David L. Neumann. 2008. (duplicat ja inclòs amunt; comprovat).