

# COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY: REGIMES, CONFLICT, AND DEVELOPMENT

Abel Escribà-Folch  
[abel.escriba@upf.edu](mailto:abel.escriba@upf.edu)  
Office 20.1E20  
Master of Research in Political Science  
Universitat Pompeu Fabra

## 1. Overview of the course

This course is designed to provide an overview of the literature on Comparative Political Economy. In particular, the course focuses on the mechanisms by which political institutions affect economic performance and policies, how economic conditions (domestic and international) and institutions influence a number of key political events, and how political institutions emerge and are sustained. It does so by surveying the leading contemporary research on the main topics in the field of comparative politics and political economy. The main goal of the course is to think critically about a set of substantive questions regarding the mutual effects existing between institutions and politics and the economy. This course requires substantial reading, student discussion and presentations, and a written assignment.

The course is organized in three different sections, each addressing a different general topic: the emergence and institutional configurations of political regimes; the impact of regimes on economic performance; and the political economy of conflict and development. The underlying question we aim at answering is: what are the determinants that make some countries fall into a trap of poverty and violent conflict whereas others are able to reach a superior equilibrium made of development and political stability?

## 2. Prerequisites

Written and spoken English is required. Students should be numerate and able to interpret quantitative data. Students should also have some basic knowledge of game theory as well as some familiarity with statistical methods for the social sciences.

## 3. Competences-skills

The course is aimed at providing students with knowledge of the major topics related to comparative political economy and comparative politics. Through reading of current research, writing of a review paper, and active seminar participation, students will develop the relevant analytical skills to understand the relationship between political and economic institutions and to find avenues for further research. In particular, students are expected to develop and improve the following skills:

### *Instrumental competences*

Ability to analyze and synthesize

Planning and management of time  
Basic knowledge of the area of study  
Knowledge of a second language

*Interpersonal competences*

Critical and self-critical ability  
Ability to communicate with people that are not experts in the subject

*Systemic competences*

Research abilities  
Ability to learn  
Ability to generate new ideas (creativity)  
Design and management of projects

#### **4. Assessment**

The course grade will be based on the following assignments:

+Class participation (20%): Students are expected to come to class having read the assigned materials and prepared to discuss them. While reading an article, students should consider the following questions:

- What is the main research question? Do you agree with the framing and the approach adopted?
- What are the key arguments advanced and the hypotheses suggested? Are there factors or alternative explanations overlooked by the author? What are causal mechanisms proposed?
- What is the research design used to test the argument? Is the evidence reported convincing? Does it support the argument? What are additional tests that could be done to further provide support?
- To what extent do the readings for the week support or contradict each other?

+Class presentations (20%): Each week, there will be one or two student presentations of the readings and on questions that are posed on the syllabus. Topics will be assigned on the first day of class. The presentations should be 20-25 minutes each. Each student must at least present once during the course.

Poor presentations are those in which the readings are just summarized (thanks, but we can read the abstracts). Hence, students' presentations are actually expected to:

- Discuss the key conceptual issues involved in the papers and the operationalization of such concepts.
- Discuss the central arguments/debates and the causal mechanisms proposed in the papers. State the most important substantive implication of the finding for the literature on the topic, and how this relates to the arguments and findings from either other relevant papers in the literature and the other papers required and recommended for that session.
- Show, discuss and evaluate the appropriateness of the empirical strategy used to test the hypotheses and theories proposed in the articles/chapters.
- Provide a critical assessment, suggestions for improvement, and propose pathways for future research.
- Suggest questions for the debate.

+Literature review/Research proposal (60%): students are expected to write a literature review on a selected topic (10-15 pages including bibliography). I am aware that writing a whole research paper given the time constraints is difficult. This is why this assignment consists of just writing the first part of a paper. In particular, this “half-paper” should include: First, an introduction stating the relevance of the topic and the students proposed improvements. Second, a comprehensive literature review of the selected topic (going beyond the readings in the syllabus). Students may pick any of the topics covered in the course or some other topic within the field of comparative political economy. This review should also be critical and identify the main shortcomings of the existing literature and point to potential avenues for further research. Third, the proposal should identify a specific question or puzzle (“dependent variable”), discuss how you would try to answer that question (preliminary argument, hypotheses, and research design), lay out the necessary steps of the project, and suggest how this project would advance the literature.

## 5. Methodology

Each class will involve or consist of the following three elements/sections: A short introduction/lecture by the professor (one hour approximately). Then, students will do their presentations of the assigned readings. Finally, there will be a discussion: The key element here is debate and participation. Students should bring a willingness to challenge themselves and their classmates.

## 6. Course outline

### **Week 1: Introduction and key concepts**

*The key concepts and topics of comparative political economy. Analytical approaches to underdevelopment. The mechanics of growth. Methodological challenges and caveats in comparative politics.*

Required readings:

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006. “Paths of Economic and Political Development.” In Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 673-692.

### **Week 2: The (rivaling) primary causes of development: The impact of institutions on economic development and their origins**

*What are the primary causes of development? The problem of endogeneity in estimating the impact of institutions. Explaining economic divergence among world countries. The role of institutions, culture and geography in shaping current economic performance. Can institutions be the primary cause of development? Historical sources of critical junctures, diverging institutional paths and economic outcomes.*

Required readings:

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson. 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117 (4): 1231-1294.

Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development." *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9 (2): 131-165.

Przeworski, Adam. 2004. "The Last Instance: Are Institutions the Primary Cause of Economic Development?" *European Journal of Sociology*, 45 (2): 165-188.

Recommended readings:

Sachs, Jeffrey. 2000. "Tropical Underdevelopment." CID Working Paper No.57.

Olsson, Ola and Douglas A. Hibbs. 2005. "Biogeography and Long-run Economic Development." *European Economic Review*, 49: 909-938.

Comin, Diego, William Easterly, and Erick Gong. 2006. "Was the Wealth of Nations Determined in 1000 B.C.?" NBER Working Paper 12657.

Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9 (3): 271-303.

Sokoloff, Kenneth L. and Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 14 (3): 217-232.

Blaydes, Lisa and Eric Chaney. 2013. "The Feudal Revolution and Europe's Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE." *American Political Science Review*, 107 (1): 16-34.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2005. "The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth." *American Economic Review*, 95 (3): 546-579.

Nunn, Nathan. 2008. "The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123 (1): 139-176.

### **Week 3: Economic institutions, inefficient policies, and growth: Private incentives versus government interests**

*The analysis of economic institutions. Incentives and constraints to investment and technological innovation. Government choices and policies as the main source of distortions and disincentives. Economic vs. political incentives.*

Required readings:

Rodrik, Dani. 2007. *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 2 and 5.

Collier, Paul and Stephen A. O'Connell. 2008. "Opportunities and Choices." In Ndulu Benno J., Stephen A. O'Connell, Robert H. Bates, Paul Collier, Chukwuma C. Soludo (eds), *The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa 1960–2000*. (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail: Origins of Power, Poverty and Prosperity*. New York: Crown Publishers. Chapter 3.

Recommended readings:

Bates, Robert H. 1981. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Introduction and Chapter 1.

Bates, Robert H. 2008. "Domestic Interests and Control Regimes." In Ndulu Benno J., Stephen A. O'Connell, Robert H. Bates, Paul Collier, Chukwuma C. Soludo (eds), *The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa 1960–2000*. (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp.175-201.

Collier, Paul and Willem Gunning. 2008. "Sacrificing the Future: Intertemporal Strategies and Their Implications for Growth." In Ndulu Benno J., Stephen A. O'Connell, Robert H. Bates, Paul Collier, Chukwuma C. Soludo (eds), *The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa 1960–2000*. (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp.202-224.

Azam, Jean-Paul. 2008. "The Political Geography of Redistribution." In Ndulu Benno J., Stephen A. O'Connell, Robert H. Bates, Paul Collier, Chukwuma C. Soludo (eds), *The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa 1960–2000*. (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp.225-248.

Fosu, Augustin Kwasi. 2008. "Anti-growth syndromes in Africa: A Synthesis of the Case Studies." In Ndulu Benno J., Stephen A. O'Connell, Robert H. Bates, Paul Collier, Chukwuma C. Soludo (eds), *The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa 1960–2000*. (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 137-172.

#### **Week 4: The political economy of regime types (I): Democracies**

*Institutional varieties of democratic regimes. Presidentialism, parliamentarism and mixed regimes. The economic consequences of electoral systems. Electoral rules. The consequences of alternative forms of democratic government: Regime stability, responsiveness, and political accountability.*

Required readings:

Samuels, David J. and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 2003. "Presidentialism, Elections and Representation." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 15 (1): 33-60.

Hellwig, Timothy and David J. Samuels. 2008. "Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes." *British Journal of Political Science*, 38 (1): 65-90.

Linz, Juan. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy*, 1 (1): 51-69.

Cheibub, Jose A. 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2 and 6.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2003. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapter 2.

Recommended readings:

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce et al. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapter 2.

Mainwaring, Scott. 1993. "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination." *Comparative Political Studies*, 26 (2): 198-228.

Adserà, Alícia and Carles Boix. 2008. "Constitutions and Democratic Breakdowns", in José M. Maravall and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca (eds.), *Controlling Governments: Voters, Institutions, and Accountability*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 8, pp. 247-301.

Persson, Torsten, Gérard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." *Journal of Political Economy*, 108 (6): 1121-1161.

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapter 7.

### **Week 5: The political economy of regime types (II): Autocracies**

*The importance of autocratic institutions. The role of legislatures and parties under dictatorship. Explaining the creation of institutions in autocratic regimes: Incentives, resources and constraints. The logic of authoritarian bargains and instruments of political survival.*

Required readings:

Boix, Carles and Milan Svoblik. 2013. "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships." *Journal of Politics*, 75 (2): 300-316.

Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2006. "Cooptation, Cooperation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships." *Economics & Politics*, 18 (1): 1-26.

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2: 115-144.

Haber, Stephen. 2006. "Authoritarian Government." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman, 693-707. New York: Oxford University Press.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies*, 41 (4-5): 715-741.

Recommended readings:

Pepinsky, Thomas. 2014. "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism." *British Journal of Political Science*, 44 (3): 631-653.

Gehlbach, Scott and Philip Keefer. 2011. "Investment without Democracy: Ruling-party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies." *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 39: 123-139.

Escribà-Folch, Abel. 2013. "Accountable for What? Regime types, Performance, and the Fate of Outgoing Dictators, 1946–2004." *Democratization*, 20 (1): 160-185.

Desai, Raj M., Anders Olofsgård, and Tarik M. Yousef. 2009. "The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains." *Economics & Politics*, 21 (1): 93-125.

Conrad, Courtenay R. 2011. "Constrained Concessions: Beneficent Dictatorial Responses to the Domestic Political Opposition." *International Studies Quarterly*, 55 (4): 1167-1187.

Svolik, Milan. 2009. "Power-sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science*, 53 (2): 477-494.

Wintrobe, Ronald. 1990. "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship." *American Political Science Review*, 84 (3): 849-872.

Escribà-Folch, Abel. 2003. "Legislatures in Authoritarian Regimes." Estudio/Working Paper 2003/196. Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Juan March Institute.

Geddes, Barbara. 2006. "Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?" Manuscript.

Gandhi, Jennifer and Ellen Lust-Okar. 2009. "Elections under Authoritarianism." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12: 403-422.

### **Week 6: Economic Performance and Political Regimes**

*The economic impact of political regimes: democracies and dictatorships. Democratic and autocratic varieties and their economic performance. Problems in estimating the economic impact of institutions. Are all dictatorships bad for growth?*

Required readings:

Wright, Joseph. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment." *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(2): 322-343.

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5.

Besley, Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2007. "Making Autocracy Work." CEPR Discussion Papers 6371.

Gerring, John, Strom C. Thacker and Carola Moreno. 2009. "Are Parliamentary Systems Better?" *Comparative Political Studies*, 42 (3): 327-359.

Knutsen, Carl Henrik. 2011. "Which Democracies Prosper? Electoral Rules, Form of Government and Economic Growth." *Electoral Studies*, 30 (1): 83-90.

Knutsen, Carl Henrik. 2015. "Why Democracies Outgrow Autocracies in the Long Run: Civil Liberties, Information Flows and Technological Change." *Kyklos*, 68 (3): 357-384.

#### Recommended readings:

Jensen, Nathan M., Edmund Malesky, and Stephen Weymouth. 2014. "Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk." *British Journal of Political Science*, 44 (3): 655-684.

Wilson, Matthew C. and Joseph Wright. 2015. "Autocratic Legislatures and Expropriation Risk." *British Journal of Political Science*, FirstView.

Knutsen, Carl Henrik and Hanne Fjelde. 2013. "Property Rights in Dictatorships: Kings Protect Property better than Generals or Party Bosses." *Contemporary Politics*, 19 (1): 94-114.

Easterly, William. 2011. "Benevolent Autocrats." Manuscript.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2003. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapter 7.

Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 7 (3): 51-69.

Przeworski, Adam et al. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.

Persson, Torsten. 2005. "Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development." NBER Working Paper 11171.

Escribà-Folch, Abel. 2011. "Group Strength, Accountability and Growth under Dictatorship." *International Political Science Review*, 32 (1): 5-22.



### **Week 7: Civil wars: Institutional, social, and economic causes**

*Defining civil war and conflict. The causes and motivations of civil war onset: Grievances, resources, and feasibility. Ethnicity and conflict: Polarization vs. fractionalization. Political institutions and the onset of civil war. The changing nature of intrastate conflict. International causes and dimensions of civil war.*

#### Required readings:

Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner. 2009. "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers*, 61 (1): 1-27.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Nils B. Weidmann. 2011. "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison." *American Political Science Review* 105 (3): 478-495.

Montalvo, José G. and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2005. "Ethnic polarization, Potential Conflict and Civil War." *American Economic Review*, 95 (3): 796-816.

Kalyvas, Stathis and Laia Balcells. 2010. "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict." *American Political Science Review*, 104 (3): 415-29.

Gleditsch, Kristian S. 2007. "Transnational Dimensions of Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research*, 44 (3): 293-309.

#### Recommended readings:

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56 (4): 563-95.

Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002. "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46 (1): 29-54.

Ross, Michael. 2004. "What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 41 (3): 337-356.

Fearon, James and David Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review*, 97 (1): 75-90.

Boix, Carles. 2008. "Civil Wars and Guerrilla Warfare in the Contemporary World: Toward a Joint Theory of Motivations." In Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud, eds., *Order, Conflict, and Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 197-218.

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. "The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52 (3): 401-425.

Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach." *Journal of Political Economy*, 112 (41): 725-53.

Hegre, Håvard and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50 (4): 508-35.

Balcells, Laia and Stathis Kalyvas. 2014. "Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58 (8): 1390-1418.

**Week 8: The political economy of natural resources: The resource curse?**

*The multiple consequences of natural resources: The resource curse. Measuring natural resources availability and dependence. Natural resources and economic growth: Mechanisms of influence. Evaluating impact of natural resources on civil conflict. How natural resources shape political institutions and affects regime survival.*

Required readings:

Collier, Paul and Benedikt Goderis. 2007. "Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Natural Resource Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum." University of Oxford, CSAE WPS/2007-15.

Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics*, 53 (3): 325-361.

Ross, Michael. 2006. "A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9: 265-300.

Wright, Joseph, Erika Frantz, and Barbara Geddes. 2015. "Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival." *British Journal of Political Science*, 45 (2): 287-306.

Andersen, Jørgen J. and Michael L. Ross. 2014. "The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber–Menaldo Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies*, 47 (7): 993-1021.

Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1, pp. 1-36.

Recommended readings:

Ross, Michael. 1999. "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse." *World Politics*, 51 (2): 297-322.

Colgan, Jeff D. 2015. "Oil, Domestic Conflict, and Opportunities for Democratization." *Journal of Peace Research*, 52 (1): 3-16.

Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo. 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse." *American Political Science Review*, 105 (1): 1-26.

Wiens, David, Paul Poast, and Willian R. Clark. 2014. "The Political Resource Curse: An Empirical Re-evaluation." *Political Research Quarterly*, 67 (4): 783-794.

Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew M. Warner. 2001. "Natural Resources and Economic Development: The Curse of Natural Resources." *European Economic Review*, 45 (4-6): 827-838.

Tsui, Kevin. 2011. "More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries." *The Economic Journal*, 121 (551): 89-115.

Arezki, Rabah and Markus Brückner. 2011. "Oil Rents, Corruption, and State Stability: Evidence from Panel Data Regressions." *European Economic Review*, 55 (7): 955-963.

Gurses, Mehmet. 2011. "Elites, Oil, and Democratization: A Survival Analysis." *Social Science Quarterly*, 92 (1): 164-184.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2010. "Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Finance." *American Journal of Political Science*, 54 (4): 936-950.

Ross, Michael. 2008. "Oil, Islam and Women." *American Political Science Review*, 102 (1): 107-123.

Morrison, Kevin. 2009. "Oil, Non-Tax Revenue, and the Redistributive Foundations of Regime Stability." *International Organization*, 63 (1): 107-138.

Ongba, Luc D. 2009. "On the Duration of Political Power in Africa: The Role of Oil Rents." *Comparative Political Studies*, 42 (3): 416-436.

Ulfelder, Jay. 2007. "Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy." *Comparative Political Studies*, 40 (8): 995-1018.

Smith, Benjamin. 2004. "Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World: 1960-1999." *American Journal of Political Science*, 48 (2): 232-246.

### **Week 9: Interstate wars: Rationalist approaches and institutional explanations**

*Defining and measuring interstate war and conflict. The true causes of interstate wars: Information and bargaining. Domestic institutions and the initiation of conflicts: Selectorate theory and audience costs. The role of leaders and their motivations in explaining international conflict.*

#### Required readings:

Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization*, 49 (3): 379-414.

Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." *International Organization*, 53 (2): 233-266.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review*, 93 (4): 791-808.

Chiozza, Giacomo and H. E. Goemans. 2011. *Leaders and International Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2.

Recommended readings:

Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve." *International Organization*, 62 (1): 35-64.

Lektzian, David and Mark Souva. 2009. "A Comparative Theory Test of Democratic Peace Arguments, 1946-2000." *Journal of Peace Research*, 46 (1): 17-37.

Weeks, Jessica L. 2012. "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review*, 106 (2): 326-347.

Colgan Jeff D. 2013. "Domestic Revolutionary Leaders and International Conflict." *World Politics*, 65 (4): 656-690.

Colgan, Jeff D. 2014. "Oil, Domestic Politics, and International Conflict." *Energy Research & Social Science*, 1: 198-205.

Gartzke, Erik and Quan Li. 2003. "War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization." *International Studies Quarterly*, 47 (4): 561-586.

### **Week 10: Individual tutorial sessions**

Students must discuss and consult the progress of his/her paper with the professor in an individual tutorial session in his office.