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State orthodoxy *versus* religious freedom?:

the case for religious education

in Norway and Turkey

Diana Zavala Rojas

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1. Introduction

A current debate in political theory is structured around the contestation to liberalism as its pluralist principles do not fully respect the different identities that constitute the individuals i.e. national or ethnic identities, religious beliefs or cultural practices. Scholars argue that liberal toleration requires a specific type of community, liberal principles are contingent to it and the values needed are hardly found or are in conflict with individuals with strong attachments to particular identities.

A second problem faced by pluralism in liberal democracies is well summarize in Ahdar and Leigh (2005:37) and it is also taken as a premise in this thesis: “liberalism is the principal political foundation for law in modern liberal democracy, but not necessary for policy practice”. This essay, through analyzing the conflicted positions of the state and the individuals regarding religious education in two cases of study, Norway and Turkey, would try to build up a defence of certain principles which come from a liberal democratic perspective and which take seriously into account pluralism to guide policy practice.

Questions on the role of religiosity in liberal democracies, the accommodation of pluralism in them, and the legitimacy of state intervention in moral education converge in this essay in the question of religious education. Has the state got a legitimate mandate on offering religious education to citizens via public schooling? This essay tries to answer this normative question through the framework of liberal democratic principles in education and in the relationship between religion and the state.

At this early point, I would specify that by liberal democracy I am referring to the concept of *reasonable liberalism*, *reconsidered liberalism* or *liberalism 2₁* which considers seriously minorities groups’ concerns as part of political pluralism. In opposition, “traditional” liberalism has denied minority groups’ issues. Some scholars² have stated that the question of multinationality or multiculturalism turns out a new agenda for the liberal-democratic debate, if cultural and national differences are ignored or marginalized, minorities will not be equally treated in relation to majorities, and they would lose recognition and self-respect.

The revisionist liberalism argues that “these minorities are treated unequally even when their civil, political and social rights are guaranteed. (Thus) (...) plurinational democracies need legitimacy that recognizes values, interests and identities linked to cultural differences of collectives or specific groups” (Requejo, 2005). Framing a normative discussion in the fully respect (or to the maximum extend) of minorities in plural societies, this essay is not tackling the question of the accommodation of plurinational democracies but *pluri-religious* democracies.

¹ There is a wide plexus of excellent academic publications –with different scopes, spreads and styles— discussing about two kinds of liberalism. For a spread one see J. Gray (2001).

² See REquejo (2005) for a literature review.

Thus, a first important consideration taken as starting point is that policies in liberal democracies might not follow the same principles of the Constitutional order. A second consideration is that this essay aims to build a normative discussion on the implications of policies towards religion of two cases of study –Norway and Turkey— that might also apply to other cases. I argue here that the lack of neutrality sometimes alleged to liberalism in relation to religion is not the main threat for individuals' identities; the main problem is the established position of the state towards religiosity, or *state orthodoxy*, which might result in illegitimate intervention towards citizens' freedoms. From this premise: liberalism as the guide in Constitutional order but not necessarily in policy practice I frame the discussion of the legitimacy of state intervention in religious education in the two mentioned cases through the discussion of the models of liberal education and the relationship between religion and democracy.

This paper gives in the second section a brief justification for a normative study of the legitimacy of religious education. The third section presents the state-of-art in models of the relationship between the state and religion from a normative perspective and its implications in the concept of liberal neutrality. In Section 4 I review the models of the aim of education in a liberal democracy. Section 5 introduces the case of religious education with some words on the international legal framework that guarantees freedom of religion and freedom of choice in the countries under the European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR). In section 6 I apply the theoretical debate to two cases presented in the ECHR *Hasan and Eylem Zengin versus Turkey* and *Forguero and Others versus Norway*. Section 7 concludes.

2. Justification of thesis

As this essay builds a normative discussion on religious education (RE) in relation to two cases of study, it is appropriate to say some words on the relevance of this topic. Three main reasons justify the importance of normative research on religious education. First, it has been claimed that among the liberal/republican tradition religious pluralism is tolerated but it has not been given a status of intrinsic value. As a constitutive identity, under a reconsidered liberalism, revision has to be made on the grounds of this criticism. Ungureanu (2008) argues for the contribution of religion in the public sphere and to public debate. There is a changing trend among scholars claiming not only for a functional value of religious pluralism but a contribution to liberal democracy. Thus the question of religion, and in this case, religious education frames the discussion also of accommodation of minorities and human rights.

Second, as a matter of policy, a large number of countries in Europe intervene in religious education. Forty three out of forty six countries in the Council of Europe offer some type of RE in basic education, sometimes it is offered by religious authorities rather than by professors. In 25 countries the education is compulsory, and in the majority of them it has proven to be denominational according to the ECHR sentences even when the states have claimed in internal instances not to be. In five of these countries, Norway and Turkey included, minimal or none effective exemptions are offered. Ten countries allow exemptions. Ten other countries give the opportunity to choose another class. The rest, 21 countries offer RE courses but they are not mandatory. In this context, it is not inappropriate to ask normatively the legitimacy of a widely extended practice of the state.

Third, there is an evident radicalization of the religious and non-religious discourse in Europe. Current debates as the discussion on the ban of religious symbols –specifically the Islamic integral veil and the building of minarets— the debate on the public-sponsored assistance to religious groups and the attempts to specify in the European Constitution the Christian origin of Europe are raising in several countries. Finally, the assumed link of devote religiosity and fundamentalist practices (derived from 9/11 and other terrorist attacks) call for a reconsideration on how liberal democracies build their policies to be consistent with their constitutional guarantees on religious freedom.

3. The idea of neutrality

Liberals and their critics have formulated an idea of neutrality of the liberal state regarding “the good life”. Rawlsian influential ideas of political liberalism³ imply that we can find an arena of agreement for common life, even if we do not agree in matters of ultimate significance or transcendent meaning. A state or community which is built on that basis would sustain plurality on comprehensive views of citizens and at the same time pacific coexistence or coexistence with fair mechanisms to resolve conflicts.

Neutrality, in its relationship to religiosity, means that the state cannot coerce, not even influence citizens in adopting a specific religion or none. Neutrality regarding religion also has derived in the idea that the state should not prefer a religious view rather than a secular position (even if some scholars have found compatibility between “establishment”⁴ and liberalism, as I would discuss later).

Four models frame the relationship between the state and religion. Laborde (2005) calls the “secular core of liberalism” a combination of three principles: freedom of religion, equal respect and, state neutrality. Secularism is translated in two different interpretations. The idea of the *anti-establishment* well developed in the American constitutionalism which affirms that “in the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality” (Sandel, 1996). The second interpretation is the French republican principle of *laïcité*. In this model, the wall of separation confers all religious expressions exclusively to the private sphere. The restraint of religious demonstrations in the public sphere demanded in this model would protect religious freedom ensuring equality for all.

The American tradition has justified the separation arguing first, that it protects better individual freedom linked to the right of conscience and the right of choice. A second argument is that it protects better the interests of both, the Church and the State, conferring each one to different spheres. The French tradition assumes a more extended public sphere limiting the religious identity against the civic identity.

A third model defends that an established religion is compatible with liberal democracy (Ahdar and Leigh, 2005). A system of establishment, a religion of state, means that the state gives especial recognition and support to one religion (or more) that is not guaranteed to other Faiths. The state also regulates administrative and doctrine matters. The established Church gives justification to the authority of the state in terms of tradition, nationalism, cultural value and history. However, I argue that it does not give the state an “aura of legitimacy” as defenders of this model affirmed. Liberal democracies find

³ As one of the most influential, I concentrate here in the premises of John Rawls in Rawls J, (1993) *Political Liberalism*, New York, Columbia University Press and Rawls J, (2001) *Justice as Fairness. A Restatement* (Erin Nelly edit), Harvard University Press, Cambridge-London.

⁴ Establishment system or established Church refers in general to a state religion or a religious body or creed officially endorsed by the state.

legitimacy in their respect to fundamental rights and democratic means of exercising power, legitimacy does not come from the established Faith or other ultimate principles.

A forth model, named pluralist defends a position of neutrality recognizing the value of religion in the public sphere. It provides impartial relations with a plexo of religions in society and also implements policies that give support to them. For example: public financing to religious centres, promotion of holidays of different denominations, facilities for workers to enjoy different holidays, facilities for deductions on taxes for donations, etcetera. This model can be combined also with a secular Constitutional guarantee or in some cases with an established one (as for example when registered religions receive financing, not only the established one)

Ahdar and Leigh (2005) when defending an established system present a concept of *state orthodoxy*. They argue that the state has always an *established* position towards religion and it is far from being neutral, “religious liberty is to be realized (...) under the auspices of a state orthodoxy on religious matters”. This state position, the establishment, they argue, is unavoidable and might be “conventionally religious or not”. This argument is a key factor in answering the question stated in this essay. If the state has an established position towards religion which is non-neutral by origin, are some policies (in the case of religious education) compatible with the rights and liberties of individuals? Are they legitimate? Or which would be the principles that legitimate those actions?

Different models might be defended for different societies; all of them may offer adequate provisions to respect religious freedom. However, as the modern state has expanded its influence to many areas of life, it can be arguable that respectful principles were implemented in all policy decisions. Institutions are not necessarily a neutral arena regarding the good life where citizens resolve their conflicts, governments are also actors with a comprehensive perspective of the good and the bad or at least with a set of values that are enforced through public institutions and power. Through its policies, the state has an effect and influences the different conceptions and philosophies that individuals hold.

The key argument underlying the concept of state orthodoxy towards religion is that liberal democracies may *aim* to neutrality towards competing conceptions of the good life although, *in practice*, the state holds an orthodox position in which not all ways of life can be treated the same. When looking for the effects of policies, it has been contested that institutions do not distinguish against different conceptions of the good life, or that the effects are unbiased.

4. Models of liberal education

If the concept of neutrality in matters of religion is contested, supporters of liberal democracy that take care of pluralism have abandoned the neutrality claim in matters of education, not only for being impossible in practice, societies need values and principles to give continuity to a liberal democratic system, values that have to be minimally shared by citizens and that are transmitted by education. Two questions regarding liberal education arise: which are the principles minimally shared by members in a liberal democracy? and Who has a legitimate mandate on setting them?

On principles

Since Plato and Aristoteles statements on the discussion about a real good education have implied discussion on principles and definitions of justice and virtue, in our context those principles regard the processes in the public sphere between parents, children and the state that prevent repression and discrimination. Those principles draw the boundaries of the legitimacy and public realm of education.

Amy Gutman in *Democratic Education* (1999) states that education policy always relies in principles, implicit or explicit, and thus, it requires a political theory for explaining the choice of those principles. This political theory would answer the question of the legitimate role of the government in the education of future citizens. Liberal democratic approaches to education differ in their emphasis on the liberal or in the democratic side of the marriage. Focusing more in the democratic principle implies discussing on the values which make possible the continuity democratic procedures and elections. The liberal approach would focus more on the development of autonomy and rights.

In agreement with other theories that will be presented, Gutman establishes that a democratic theory of education is based on the prevention of then social *sumum malum*⁵, or in other words, that it has to support the canons of non-discrimination and non-repression (Gutman, 1999, pp. 14). Liberal education, then, must be guided by the principles but not necessarily the practices of a regime. Thus, if a regime has an established religion some of its practices might be compatible with some areas of public life, or if it is a secular state, some restrictions might be admissible. However, the intervention on religious education is difficult to be legitimated: 1) because it will need strong exit mechanisms to guarantee non-repression and non-discrimination, in other words, to avoid segregation of groups and ensure minorities' rights and, 2) because in practice it would be difficult to difference the transmission of knowledge and the indoctrination of people under state orthodoxy.

As Sandel (1996) would agree, liberal democratic ideals of equality and freedom require a public culture or a public conception of virtue. Creating virtuous citizens is a necessity for liberal democracy, thus the idea of neutrality

⁵ The *sumum malum* is “cruelty and the fear it inspires and the very fear of fear itself” (Shklar, 1989).

is hardly applicable, or in other words, in order to raise citizens that are able to coexist without being detached from its fundamental or comprehensive views in a plural society, education must support these bases.

Liberal theorists of education agree that liberalism is built under a certain conception of virtue contrasting the neutrality commonly claimed; education is on these grounds a civic instruction. Even if liberals have admitted that some kind of moral education is needed, Callan (1997) argues that the debate for the principles is unsettled. The discussion goes around favouring the principles that define education as a matter of individual choice where the state only intervenes to guarantee minimum objectives and leaves more room for other agents in other spheres to shape the self.

This model exalts autonomy, the right of choice it aims to the rational maximization of individuals' benefits among the widest plexus of possible choices. This type of education would be more respectable towards rights and freedoms. However, it also can be criticized because it demands implicitly exposition to different ways of life that might be contradictory with the child's heritage, also because it alleged detachment from particular values.

The other side of the debate favours moral imperatives of liberal politics that would influence the philosophy of life, seen as necessary to support liberal democracy for the next generation. It addressed for patriotism, national construction; it affirms the republican notion of the citizen as constitutive of the being. The obvious critique to this type of principles is that it may hurt some sub-national, ethnic identities or group identities. It is an education for democratic competence and fidelity to the society

Far from extreme doctrines, both models have important elements needed in a liberal education for pluralism. Even though development of autonomy is fundamental, autonomy does not demand detachment from our constitutive entity, but a political autonomy to develop the "burdens of judgement to life in society" (Callan, 1997). Autonomy is not undermining community life; it shapes our reason to life under pluralism. Thus, liberal education would require a degree of autonomy for engaging in social decisions, in democratic deliberation and discern. Minimal autonomy (or maximum, depending on the attachments) but not necessarily enough to characterize our identity or well being would be needed to a shared life in society; otherwise without autonomy we would be equivalent to slaves.

On the authority

Different actors claim a right to drive education principles as the legitimate authority to decide on education. A first model establishes that the state has the authority to transmit values to next generation of citizens. This legitimate mandate would aim to ensure sustainability of the political agreements in a society, relating the individual good of the person with the social good. Problems raised by this position seem to be obvious in the discussion that defends liberalism 2. If the state is the only in charge of transmitting values, it is

also taking a position of transmitting a comprehensive position that might be opposed to plurality of comprehensive visions. Relating this position to religious education the scenario becomes even more complicated. If some civic values can be seen as problematic, the border between transmitting knowledge on religions and indoctrination is unclear; this position could be a threat to basic liberties.

The second model is not less problematic. It gives the families, more specifically the parents the right to influence education and decide plenty on moral issues. John Dewey's conclusions, one of the most influential theorists in education, coming from the early 1900s seem problematic. He concluded that what the best and wisest parents would want for their children can be extended to the wishes of the community. But wisdom in moral issues has several (or any) bases. Rational parents might want to isolate children to avoid exposure to ways of life or thinking that oppose their own (Gutman, 1999).

The future rights of the children as adults must be taken into account. Again, the values of non discrimination and non repression must be set to ensure continuity and stability of the plural society. Gutman refers to these values the conditions for "conscious social reproduction", that is a sufficient level of autonomy to participate in democratic deliberation on the principles that make plurality possible. Regarding religious education, the ECHR have established in its Article 2 of the First Protocol that parents have the right to raise their children in their own religious beliefs and values, but that does not mean that the children's ultimate rights belong to the parents or that they are parents' property.

Supporting without concerns the right for parents to conduct education is a risky decision. Some may say that this system respects pluralism. But some parental views would omit all tolerance to moral and specifically religious perspectives on disagreement; they do not have any incentive to estimate views that contradict their own sense of truth, thus as the right of the state to drive education, parents' right needs also balance.

A third model, accounts for the child's autonomy. In this perspective, no moral view is supported except one that allows the child to choose freely among the different ways of life. Again the model is problematic. A child cannot learn infinitely ways of lives as well as she cannot learn infinitely languages. Choices and decisions have to be taken regarding which are the options presented, and most of the time those choices are spread by professionals of education.

Thus, on setting the aim of education in preventing violence in society while respecting pluralism, it seems that none actor has the strongest argument to dictate on education. Alternatively they are all engaged in it so as permitting pluralist thinking in a society. The role of education prioritizes the value of autonomy for participating in deliberative democracy, not implying that we have to detach from all our identities when immersed in dialogue but for being reasonable and tolerant.

None actor accounts solely for legitimacy on influencing education; it is in the right of the state to transmit values, it is in the right of parents to raise children in their own values and it is in the right of the child to be grown with enough tools to participate in a plural society. Related to religious education the balance of powers needed for establish principles is problematic. From a liberal democratic perspective, the state has no right of indoctrinating, international conventions and constitutionalism protects religious freedom. But parents have also a limited right to transmit values. They cannot do that violating the principles of non-discrimination and non-repression in the future citizens and governors of society.

5. The case of religious education (RE)

So far, I am building an answer to the normative question asked in the beginning of this essay “is the state legitimate on offering religious education?” from several dimensions. The first one alleges the relationship between the state and religious groups. In the third section I addressed the dimension of state-religion relations concluding that neither secular nor established systems can sustain liberal neutrality towards religion on practice, thus due to the high risks of a state policy that increases the chances of one comprehensive view to succeed by diminishing others, it is preferable no state intervention in matters of RE.

Section four addressed the second dimension: liberal education divided in two parts. First, a discussion on the legitimate values to conduct education in liberal democracies which I discoursed as “a certain level of autonomy for living in a society based on non-repression and non-discrimination principles and practices”. Second, a revision of the different actors that claim a right to drive education principles was set to stress that nor the parents neither the state have solely a legitimate authority. This section links the theoretical framework to the cases of study and to the case-law of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).

The ECHR supports, in the margin of appreciation for the resolution on case-law, signatory states’ established positions towards religion as compatible with liberal democracy. Its jurisprudence has set the principles for that compatibility. Established systems are compatible with human rights when they have adequate mechanisms to accommodate citizens who support notions of the good life different from the state doctrine, mechanisms that guarantee the fully respect articles 9 and 14 of the convention and 2 of the First Protocol⁶.

⁶ The Articles 9, and 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the ECHR would be referred several times, thus I quote them here:

Article 9. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Article 14. Prohibition of discrimination. The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.

Article 2 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Right to education. No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions. Source: ECHR, stable URL: http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN, accessed 22 June, 2010.

As I have stated from last chapter, liberal education or the educational programs in a liberal democracy are non-neutral in relation to the good life, they transmit that the good life is possibly lived in a liberal community where tolerance is an ultimate value. This lack of neutrality means that liberal education needs the transmission of values, the defence of a public philosophy of respect and democracy, a certain morality. Some countries have justified strategically the support for religious education in the public schooling programs to keep traditions, to avoid extreme religious positions or to implement pluralistic policies but that does not mean that the policy is a liberally oriented. Including religious education (RE) in the educational programs of public schools is a principled position of the state in its relationship towards religiosity. In many cases it has been proven to be confessional, it is hardly transmitting knowledge, it is most of the times indoctrinating,

Taking seriously the concept of state orthodoxy, religious education might be elucidating the strong political ties of states with one or some religions, confronting the content of the programs with the idea of liberal pluralism. But citizens in liberal democracies might accept the involvement of the State with one or some creeds. Citizens might accept policies that promote positively some influential Faiths, even in secular states or in established systems. They can accept that policies that are morally objectionable in a personal, private arena run in the country as they are part of a larger political framework that satisfies defensible conditions of legitimacy (Callan, 1997). Citizens that do not share the religious background of the majority can accept the public financing of religious education when it prevents extremism to grow in the absence of public alternatives. They can also permit it to continue the traditions in the country, to value history, and maybe in many other lines of argumentation, but they cannot accept them against the principles of non-discrimination and non-repression.

Liberal democracies need transmitting foundational values that permit the regime to continue. As I have affirmed, education policy is a principled educational policy; it is designed with a certain explicit or implicit moral content. If it is not designed through the principles of non-discrimination and non-repression other substitute principles would run. Thinking in an average public primary school, in the absence of constraints the directors of the school, the professionals of education and other authorities do not have any incentives to be attached to those principles and probably they will limit some freedoms and support some kind of comprehensive views diminishing others, resulting in a kind of oppression to groups with values different to the ones held by the majority or those who have the power of implementation and that run institutions daily.

Although, based in a certain kind of morality, liberal education should not be confused with the support of a comprehensive doctrine; its moral ties are constrained in political education, needed to participate rationally in society. Furthermore, education should help to develop a certain level of autonomy, without the need to detach the child from her constitutive values, autonomy to deliberate and probably influence the political arena of the society protecting the non-repression and non-discrimination canons, that is, without ruining diversity.

These premises for liberal education do not justify automatically the need for RE. RE may contribute to the toleration needed in liberal democracies if it is offered in an objective, critical and pluralist way (ECHR, 2010). However, scepticism might be raised about the current policies implemented by some liberal democracies: on one side, religious people have legitimate concerns in the way the state interprets issues of ultimate significance. On the other side, RE might be biased to the state orthodoxy towards religion with contents that are not objective, critical and pluralist. As the state's lack of neutrality towards religion would be emulated in the school program, I strongly agree that separation or even omission of RE helps to better protection of religious liberty. Religious minorities attending laic institutes protect their beliefs by not exposing them in an alienated arena. Opposite to its aim of promoting toleration, religious doctrines held in schools might be problematic for several groups of students.

Even when opting-out measures exist, it is problematic that the state takes as a premise that there is a real separation between *knowing* and *participating*. The borders between RE and indoctrination are difficult to be drawn. If a child is obligate to know, observe and even attend religious content of a specific denomination without *taking part* on it, how can this effectively not influence the ideas of a child? If the state raises itself as the maximum authority in divine issues, where is the divinity of the state?

As I have asserted, part of the debate of liberal education is the discussion of who has the right to shape children's mind, the debate is even more intensive when we are referring to moral education. The state in its argumentation in the cases presented to the ECHR has asked itself this right. Parents also have claimed it. The ECHR has in practice limited the state intervention and it has defined the limits of its legitimacy. The interference towards individuality might be justified or not in an overall state strategy, as it will be seen in the case in Turkey, against fundamental views that threat secularism, or as in the case of Norway, giving high value to the cultural tradition and history of the country, but surely it can violate individuals' rights.

Liberal democracies have Constitutional guarantees to support religious toleration and among the countries of the Council of Europe the ECHR through the articles 9 and 10 and 2 of the First Protocol guarantees this provision, although the implementation of the law is constrained by political relations and ties between religion and state, the state orthodoxy. The Court has accepted in its jurisprudence that a country might benefit one religion and still respect the international regulation. This decision of the Court does not legitimate state's interventions in freedom of religion. The political role of the Court is pragmatic in relation to the protection of human rights, not fundamentally based in liberal democratic principles.

States are not breaking their ties with religions, thus the Court supports policies that are not objective critical or pluralist when there are provisions to protect minorities, but it does not mean that the policies are legitimate. This solution is paradoxically and confronts to the nature of pluralism. The Court is taking care

of the provisions, but the state may not only be favouring a specific perspective but also discriminating against others.

There are normative implications of the Court's jurisprudence. Ungureanu (2008) has described the *double view* of the social life as the "the existing institutional and non-institutional practices which make possible the egalitarian effects occurring in the democratic public sphere" and "the non-egalitarian power dynamics which undermine the principles of publicity and inclusiveness which are normatively definitional to the public sphere." (p. 408).

The defence of liberalism against RE, takes into account this dichotomous nature of the public sphere implying that liberal democratic principles do not defend poorly the different individual identities that build a society. Minorities are threatening by specific political dynamics; the judiciary is not the arena of solution of conflicts between different citizens' comprehensive views. It is another actor with a comprehensive view (in the cases analyzed here, towards religion) that might conflict groups. The political ties with a specific type of religion will undermine others' liberty. In this context, religious education policy in schools would have a high probability to be biased towards the promotion of a specific philosophy of life leaving citizens unprotected and favouring one view of life. Internal state instances, in these cases, are not a proper space for the solution of conflicts between actors but a new actor with own interests.

With this position I am not discrediting the value of religion for liberal democratic life, neither supporting unconditionally a secular state. What I am proposing is that the state should implement other creative mechanisms to support religiosity rather than RE sponsored in public schools; it might be a poor mechanism which has high risks to interfere with individuals' rights.

As the ideal of liberal neutrality regarding the good life is impossible in education policy, it has to be designed to develop a certain level of autonomy, not one that asks the individual to detach herself from its heritage or comprehensive view, but one that promotes the principles of non-discrimination and non-repression, in this light the policy of religious education is an intervention that it is hardly defensible to be legitimate.

6. Case studies

The recommendation 1984 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2009) regarding cultural education stated that it must favour the development of mutual respect, understanding and toleration and the value of diversity through a positive and constructive dialogue. Previous recommendation 1396 (1999) supports states to “promote education *about* religions”, as a set of values to develop discerning approach, promoting history of religions and avoiding conflict between the state approach and the religions of families. The scholar curricula, according to the recommendation, should promote a better understanding on the various religions as part of the history, culture and philosophy of humankind. It does not support confessional education.

Finally, Recommendation 1720 states that “education is essential for combating ignorance, stereotypes and misunderstanding of religions”. Governments should “foster education on religions, to encourage dialogue with and between religions and to promote the cultural and social expression of religions”. The recommendation establishes the principles for education about religions at the primary and secondary level, it has to give knowledge on different denominations with impartiality, also, it must not “overstep the board line between the realms of culture and worship” even in a country with a establish system and it has to be given by teachers with specific training.

These recommendations in addition to the ECHR articles 9 and 14 and 2 of the First Protocol give the legal framework which member states of the Council of Europe should follow. From it, governments have built some assumptions about the legitimacy of RE: 1) the recommendations of the CE are assuming that *teaching* about religion is *teaching* about tolerance and understanding. That is, that the moral education that the state should transmit can be transmitted as knowledge on religions, even if I do not oppose to the aims, I oppose to the pretended automatic implication. An analogous example could be that teaching about human races can avoid racism. My claim here is that creative ways of the state should be found in order to transmit moral education the equivalence between RE and tolerance teaching is a risky jump, not because the claim is not legitimate, but because actors implementing schooling programs take strong moral positions that in practice might favour one religion or antireligious practices violating fundamental rights.

Assumption number 2) is that RE is legitimate unless it is not offered as confessional. I totally agree with the legitimate aims in promoting RE as if it would contribute to promote tolerance. However, the recommendations and the legal framework on the ECHR jurisprudence prevent the state indoctrination. In light of this assumption, a critical assessment of the current curricula in many European countries urges attention. Forty three out of forty six countries in the Council of Europe offer some type of RE in basic education, sometimes offer by religious authorities rather than professors. In 25 countries the education is compulsory, and in the majority of them it has proven to be denominational, as ECHR shows even when the state has claimed in internal instances not to be.

In five of these countries, Norway and Turkey included, minimal effective exemptions or none are offered. Ten countries allow them. Ten other countries give the opportunity to choose another class. The rest, 21 countries offer RE courses but they are not mandatory (Grand Chamber, Judgement from 09 October, 2007, ECHR).

To prevent rights' violation when the assumptions failed, my suggestion here is that education programs in public schools should be kept apart from RE as there is non guarantee that the state would not behave as an actor offering an objective, critical and pluralistic program, as it would be analyzed in the following cases. In a normative arena the state should not be indoctrinating, but it is. RE has proven to be confessional and sectarian in many countries and exemption mechanisms to protect minorities are emerging. My defence will be that the absence of this intervention does not reduce the social toleration, as it is only an assumption, on the opposite, it might be a way in which religious groups flourish and also manifest in the public and private spheres.

The ECHR has not sentenced the discretionary behaviour of the state on offering confessional education; it has only adjusted the mechanisms to protect minorities in case of indoctrination. From the revision of different models of state-religion interaction, and the aims and principles of liberal democratic education I found that compatibility between liberal democracy and a established religion is possible but this relationship should stay apart of the educational program. A justification on the grounds of tradition, cultural and history of the country and unavoidable political ties with one or some denominations might be found, but even if those justifications permit a strategic behaviour of the state regarding religion, they are not justified principles for a liberal democratic education that takes pluralism seriously. Once it is concluded that some kind of justification can be found for the state on intervening in religious life or on having ties with religions, it does not seem necessary true that all policies to support this linkage are legitimate or correspond to the aim of promoting tolerance.

I have also found that the state has legitimacy on offering some moral education by transmitting values necessary for democratic deliberation and development of *some* degree of autonomy; the assumption that this morality would be transmitted through RE is arguable as the borders between transmitting knowledge and indoctrinating are really difficult to draw, in practice states behave as actors, not as an arena for the resolution of conflicts between citizens, thus the programs have a high probability of being biased.

Arguing in favour of an intrinsic value of religion for public life, does not imply necessarily that it has to be translated in RE. Other arenas rather than schools might serve as deliberation spaces for the positive relationship between religion and state, education serves to a logic of principles, cost of opportunity and scarcity of resources. The state actually implements other policies that help to improve the pluralism in society regarding religion: such as financing religious centres, supporting holidays for different denominations, avoiding repression of religious symbols.

Finally, secular education, meaning without a religious program helps better the protection and flourishing of religious minorities and also devote religious majorities. Ad hoc worships, biased programs or imposition of curricula help little to build tolerance, all the opposite, the risks for violating the principles of nonrepression and non discrimination are enormous. On the light of presenting a defence against RE, the next section presents the case of *Folgero and Others v. Norway* and the case of *Hasan and Eyem Zengin v. Turkey* appealed to the ECHR which decisions favoured the citizens against the state exemplifying the lack of legitimacy of some policies regarding the relationship state-religion.

Two clarifying points: in the analysis of the cases I am not answering a valid question that Turkey opens on fundamentalism, how should a liberal democratic state prevent it without illegitimate interventions on human rights? By claiming here that RE is not the best channel to promote the legitimate aim of broader toleration I am not supporting the idea that some cultural and religious practices do not have to be ban in a liberal democratic state. Cliterodomy, polygamy, physical punishment and other practices must be fought, what remains as a valid question is if RE is the best channel to achieve that.

Norway opens also a valid question that I am neither answering. The heritage of liberal democracy from Christianity cannot be neglected, neither the need of education in values, however in practice any attempt of persuasion looks as violation of rights, in addition, the role of establishment is being questioned, the role of tradition raises doubts on if a country must continue valuing the past and not the current composition of society.

6.1 Norwegian case

Norway has an established religion lasting several centuries, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Norway. The constitutional head of the Church is the King of Norway who is himself a Lutheran. The Church of Norway receives financing and its subject of legislation; it also receives some benefits not guaranteed to other denominations. Other religious communities might receive financial support from the state if they are registered. Independently of being an established system, religious freedom is protected by the constitution as well as international norms, including the ECHR. Approximate figures account for 81-86% of the population belonging to the Church of Norway; 1% report to be Pentecostal; 1%, Roman Catholic, other Christian denominations list for 2.4%. Muslims account for 1.8% and, other denominations 8.1% including a 1.67% of the Norwegian Humanist Association and 6.7% formally not practicing any religion or affiliation (CIA, 2010; US Department of State, 2008).

RE on the Christian faith was in the school curricula since 1739 and from 1889 partial or full exemptions to members of other religious or non-religious communities were allowed. Since 1969 RE was separated from baptismal instruction, only “knowledge” on Christianity was supposed to be given in the program. However, the “Christian object clause” gives RE a confessional

starting point as it states that “primary school shall, with the understanding and cooperation of the home, assist in giving pupils a Christian and moral education and in developing their abilities, spiritual as well physical (...)” (Grand Chamber, Judgement from 29 June, 2007, ECHR). Educational reforms from 1993 to 1997 introduced the mandatory subject Christian Knowledge and Religious and Ethical Information (KRL) annulling the exemptions for children of other religious groups and supporting *differentiated education* and keeping the Christian object clause.

The program of the course aims to review world religions and philosophy to promote tolerance and respect for all religious beliefs. However, it has a quantitative weight on Christianity linked to Lutheran Faith and it also, the Court sentenced on a qualitative bias to it. On special grounds, students might be exempted from participating in specific religious acts, such as Church services, worship or singing hymns, but they are not exempted of knowing the content of the activities. The argumentation of the state relied heavily in the assumption that the separation between knowledge and practice is clearly established and that its understanding is broadly shared by teachers, parents and children.

Thus, the Court in the case of *Folguero and Others v. Norway* sentenced on favour of a group of parents of non-Christian, but humanist, denomination for the right of total exemption of the subject. In internal instances the Norwegian state has sentenced against the parents, neglecting the total exemption. The Court admitted that the contents of the course were not objective, critical and pluralist, thus, they had a qualitative preference for Christianity under the Lutheran Faith. The Court also said that the partial exemptions mechanisms through differentiated education were not adequate to respect Article 2 of the First Protocol of the ECHR.

Analyzing the arguments of both parents and the state, a conclusion can be built about the legitimacy of intervening in moral education through RE, defining as legitimate actions those that take respect seriously pluralism in a liberal democracy. As it was concluded on previous sections, the state has a legitimate right of influencing moral education: to promote *some* level of autonomy for participate in society and to promote the values for principles of non-discrimination and non repression. Thus, the aims of Norway are legitimate and correspond to this principles of moral education in a liberal democratic state, what is not in correspondence of this principles is try to achieve them through RE.

The Christian clause asks for discrimination in a first moment. It obligates educational centres to help on the Christian and moral education of pupils with the cooperation and understanding of the family, then it requires a non-preaching method that separates RE from confessional instruction. The state is asking the neutrality itself lacks to parents and teachers. How and who might assemble clear distinctions among impartiality in a daily tasks in school? The state, supporting its established system through education is violating his liberal commitment to neutrality to the good life, but at the same time, it is asking the educators to offer a bias through a higher discernment as “educated-queens or

kings” in a platonic way (Gutman, 1999). It asks for a specific interpretation and implementation of the clause, but it does not provide the guidelines to do this work. How can moral education take Christianity as a moral starting point and at the same time being non-confessional? The answer given by the state is a burden on professors, parents and students. It is asking them to take an impartial position in a non-neutral principle of the state.

In practice, the teachers and schooling authorities have an advantage power position as there is incomplete information for parents in the methods and daily-punctual contents of the courses to ask for exemption. Teachers that might or might not hold a neutral position towards the interpretation of the Christianity clause might impose their positions even unconsciously. Once the partial exemption is given, the student is not effectively separated from the activity; she receives a differentiated education that again presupposes agreement in the understanding of schools and parents. Institutions, far away to help the resolution of conflicts among citizens with different confessional backgrounds, are design with strong attachments towards religiosity.

Partial exemption is not an adequate mechanism to solve conflicts between the state’s position and parents’ position as in practice it is very difficult to implement. In its resolution, the state is assuming perfect information and a share understanding of the differences between knowledge and practice. Insisting that this program of RE contributes “significant(ly) for the communication of a common foundation of knowledge, values and culture in (...) school” (Grand Chamber, ECHR, Judgement from 29 June, 2007 paragraph 42) only reflects the position of the state as an actor, not as a representative arena for problem solving. The aim of the ECHR is guaranteeing rights practical and effective not theoretical ones.

Full exemption, in this case, neither gives the state legitimacy to state founded indoctrination in religious grounds, under the principles of a liberal democracy that respects seriously pluralism, but at least would improve the solution of conflicts benefitting the minorities. What it is at stake here is that the state violates its liberal commitment, the grounds on which their legal frameworks are built. Procedural mechanisms as the ones in the Court help to protect rights assuming that it is protecting effective not theoretical rights as the state is not the agreement on society to live on pluralism of comprehensive perspectives. It protects human rights against a comprehensive moral position of the state. The margin of appreciation of these cases given to the state, justifies its behaviour in accordance to a superiority of tradition, culture, overall strategies or programs and unavoidable political ties with the established Church, but not in the basis of a liberal democratic authority that takes seriously into account pluralism.

Liberal democratic education supports a non-neutral position of the state regarding moral education, but it does not equate a particular religion to the values needed for developing a deliberative arena. Norway argues that Christianity’s values are equivalent to humanist values of mutual respect, toleration, solidarity and human rights, and even this being true, presenting them from a particular religious perspective is not justified as a principle of

education in a reconsidered liberalism. Appealing again to Ammy Gutman, the principles that the liberal education should look for, are not necessarily the right ones, as no one is in the position to allege them, but the ones that are deliberated.

The aims of offering moral education in Norway –as well as in Turkey, as would be seen in the next section— were in accordance with liberal democratic education that takes seriously into account pluralism: “combating prejudice and discrimination” but these objectives are not reached through RE, or at least the correspondence is not straightforward. The state argued that the course gives knowledge and that differences in comprehensive philosophies do not justify ignorance. It is built on the grounds that the courses transfer essential knowledge and that exemption means that institutionalised education would be impossible. The Norwegian government is giving itself the mandate for conducting education, annulling any possible deliberation with parents, children or professors.

Exempted children would still have to know the significance and content of Christian hymns, be present in worship or services but not participating in them, observe and know the functions of the liturgy in relation to the whole, but not praying there. Is this burden in children justified? Does this knowledge contribute automatically with the tolerance for what is aimed? Are the costs for families and teachers and the probable feeling of segregation justified as essential for tolerance or is an over-interference of the state without bases to be relied of legitimate moral education for non-discrimination. The aim of promoting tolerance was legitimate, but there is not a direct link that this tolerance is produced by RE. RE is serving other objectives such as guaranteeing tradition, history and political ties with the established Church.

In other words, the interference of the state in moral education tried to achieve a legitimate aim, but the aim is not necessarily in correspondence with the means employed. The state, for example, could opt on a 10-year program on human rights or history of discrimination on not only religious but ethnic or nationalistic grounds. A program on RE that has a quantitative and qualitative biased towards Lutheran Christianity does not prevent discrimination, even if the principles of Lutheranism rightly prevent discrimination. In the grounds that Lutheranism was the right moral bases for liberal democratic principles, there is no legitimate action in its imposition from the state as it is cancelling pluralism, of other comprehensive views that may also share the rightness in values.

6.2 Turkish case

Since the foundation of the modern republic, in 1923 which abolished the establishment of Islam, Turkey has followed the model of French *laïcité* republicanism. However it has implemented even more strict prohibitions and regulation on religion: in addition to ban public demonstrations of Faith, including religious symbols in public organisms, Turkish laicism also regulates heavily religion issues, prohibiting religious private schools, controlling the content of the praying in mosques, as imams are public servants, and guiding a

“secular principled” mandatory religious education (RE) in public schools, among other decisions. There are no reliable statistics of how many members of each religious are (as Turkey does not ask it). However the government has reported that more than 99% of the population is Muslim. Some estimations report that the majority of Turkish Muslims are Sunnis (70-80%), Alevis (15-30%) and other Islamic denominations account for around 2-3%. Christians and Jews are 0.2% of the population (US Department of State, 2008).

Even if the Constitution guarantees religious freedom and has signed addition to international treaties, the extremely strict regulation to protect the secular state has raised doubts about Turkey’s respect for religious freedom. The established position of the state regarding religion seems to be against it, rather than neutral to it. The government does not interfere with the content of other non-Muslim denominations. In practice, the implementation of religious policy has also affected other Islamic denominations different from moderate Hanafi Sunnis, by establishing controls to different Islamic roots the state has proved to be qualitative biased to that denomination.

The strict control of religion responds to the long political battle between the Kemalists and the military, including the Judiciary power, versus religious groups. This conflict lasts since the early 1920’s with the foundation of the modern Republic and has been translated in military coups aiming to defend a secular republic against an Islamic republic seen in Arab-Islamic countries. Through this position Turkey has established itself as the reference for a secular country with an overwhelming Muslim population. However, the legitimate implementation of secular principles, defined by Turkey as freedom of religion, conscience, thought and expression (Grand Chamber, Judgment from October 9, 2007) has sometimes being translated as illegitimate interference from the state and in favoring the official supported Muslim doctrine. This preference for a moderate Islamic doctrine (Hanafism Sunnis) has affected citizens in their fundamental rights through provisions hold by the dominant group in the state.

The arguments of Turkey to control religious education and moral instruction focus on the need to make it compatible with the principles of the secular state. By religious education the state tries to promote “a culture of peace” in a context of tolerance due to the intercultural influence that makes necessary to know about “other religions”. This argument has a problematic starting point as it assumes Turkey’s Islamism as a matter of state. Turkey suffers here a paradox that initiates the conflict with religion: it presupposes that controlling RE is a better response to Turkish Muslim reality which contains a threaten seed of fundamentalism.

In the case of Hasan and Eylem Sengin *versus* Turkey, the Turkish government in all internal instances including the Supreme Court neglected full exemption from the compulsory courses on “religious culture and ethics” to the applicants which professed a different doctrine of Islam than Sunni Hanafism, Alevism, on the grounds that moral education is regulated by the state from the Constitution principles, and implicitly mandatory to all Muslim denominations including

Alevis. The judgment sentence proved that the contents of the program were not objective, critical and plural biased to one school of Islam, and that it does not have adequate mechanisms to protect rights of children and parents from other roots.

It was proven to be an indoctrinating program which supports a specific interpretation of Islam mandatory for all Muslims with some exemptions only to Christians and Jews. Even if in the country other moderate doctrines or philosophies of life are well developed, Turkey neglects them. Compulsory RE has exemption mechanisms to Turkish students from some specific non-muslim denominations, Christians and Jews. This provision violates the non-discrimination principle as Muslims from denominations different from Sunni Hanafi doctrine, atheists and other denominations find difficulties to exempt their children. They are assumed to need the indoctrination of the state. It also violates the principle of non-repression of liberal democratic education, as it prevents the display of other denominations that are not necessarily fundamentalists and that have, as Sunni Hanafi might, a great respect for human rights and tolerance.

Total exemptions from mandatory RE, according to Turkish government would interfere with the discretionary right of the state to conduct education. The state is arguing that exemptions bring the risk of making institutionalized education impossible. The state insists also that the programs of RE offered are neutral, critical and plural. As the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) stressed in its 2005's report on Turkey and as the sentence of the Court also supported if the contents of the program were designed and implemented as a source of knowledge on religions, there was no need to make exemptions for minority religions, on the other side, if it was a program favoring one interpretation of Islam, the course should not be compulsory to preserve children's and parents' rights.

As in the case of Norway, Turkish government is holding a strong position through its state orthodoxy: it stands itself as the unique legitimate actor with mandate on education and with broad powers to influence moral education. This has been arguable through the revision of liberal education models, this position is not liberal, neither democratic at all. The state has the right to influence in moral education, but it is not straightforward that this influence is in corresponds to RE, given the indoctrinating policy. In this case, it is not only imposing values from a specific interpretation of reality, it is dictating on the contents of good and evil from an ontological position, from a comprehensive view not for the minimal requirements to permit societal participation on the decisions.

If we defend that the state as an actor with an own strong moral position needs negotiation and deliberation with other sectors of society, it has the mandate to decide on some educational contents, but regarding morality and obviously religion, it has not an absolute mandate; its interests have to be balanced with individuals'. Turkey has argued from an established position in a starting point that regulating RE and morality instruction prevents abuses that lead to

fundamentalism however the content of the program is far from being a secular class on different religions.

Turkish government has stressed as a second principle that through RE the state promotes understanding, tolerance and respect. The state does need to promote understanding, tolerance and respect through some kind of principled education. However, the link that this aim is automatically achieved through religious education is unclear. The issue at stake here is that equalizing RE as an adequate channel to increase toleration is a risky step. I have affirmed through this thesis that liberal education needs some basic morality to be taught, in the form of promoting some degree of autonomy for democratic deliberation, while respecting the principles of non-discrimination and non-repression. Assuming that RE would automatically fulfill this need is certainly limited from the state. Worse, claiming this implication as true agrees with the arguments of the state's instances to support their own strongly attached moral positions, linked to ruling governments, as actors and not as impartial arenas for the resolution of conflicts.

Turkey also takes as a principle that worship can be done by daily activities and that higher moral standards and worshipping are equivalent. It states that worship means love and solidarity. Many non-religious people could claim that there is not a clear connection of how secular principles can be promoted through a RE that states worship as a higher moral activity. Even worse, the list of principles to justify RE includes also learning Mohamed's morality and the idea that Islam is not a myth but a rational and universal religion.

Fair enough, the claim for objectivity, neutrality and plurality of the principles stated above cannot be defended. The state has none liberal democratic legitimacy on offering RE, given the big risks of indoctrination. Its justification corresponds to a given value to cultural heritage, to unavoidable political relations between religion and the state, to real or imaginary fundamentalist risks, and to a moral position of the state as an actor. Under these reasons, sometimes –and most of the time— citizens do not oppose to this lack of neutrality of the state when it offers impartial channels to accommodate differences and does not try to impose its position.

The Court recognized the right of the state to conduct objective, critical and plural education, that is on the bases of a liberal democratic morality, but, the Court has also recognized the state a right to offer education which is not objective, critical and plural, ergo an indoctrination of a certain morality that might or not correspond to liberal democratic principles, when mechanisms to accommodate citizens that do not share the doctrine of the state exist. Exemptions to Christians and Jews implicitly mean that the contents can be in conflict with some philosophical or religious views. There is no legitimacy in claiming the mandate for indoctrination of all Muslims as any religion is a solely block but a dynamical institution with multiple variants. In the case of Turkey, the Court is asking for extending exemptions to all members of denominations or non-religious individuals, including Muslims.

In the Turkish case, it is arguable that all the principles for justifying RE are frame in a reconsidered liberal democracy then it is even more arguable to justify the contents of study as they were not objective, critical and pluralist as they favored qualitatively one doctrine of Islam, Hanafi Sunni. As Norway was overestimating one type of Christian doctrine, the contents of the program in Turkey were strengthening a certain type of Islam. From a liberal democratic perspective that takes seriously into account pluralism, the state is not in a position to dictate on the legitimacy of a specific religious creed.

7. Conclusions

Both Norway and Turkey failed in promoting legitimate aims of moral education because they both interpret that the best way to transmit principles of liberal education (whether in different models of state-religion relations) is by offering RE.

There are other ways in which governments might promote tolerance. Regarding RE, the risks of indoctrination are large. This raises doubts about the content of the schooling programs of religious education widely extended in Europe. Recall the situation of RE mentioned before is appropriate in this conclusion. Forty three out of forty six countries in the Council of Europe offer some type of RE in basic education. In 25 countries the education is compulsory, and in the majority of them it has proven to be denominational, as ECHR shows even when the state has claimed in internal instances not to be. In five of these countries, Norway and Turkey included, minimal effective exemptions or none are offered. Ten countries allow them. Ten other countries give the opportunity to choose another class. The rest, 21 countries offer RE courses but they are not mandatory.

To prevent indoctrination, a suggestion built from this essay is contrary to the policy being implemented in Europe, optional RE can transmit important signals of safeness to majority groups and some recognized minorities, but it contribute little to a real development of deliberation and tolerance. Worse, it can easily violate the principles of nondiscrimination and non repression that a liberal democracy might want to support on scholar programs to conscious social reproduction.

In both cases, the debate on who has the legitimate mandate on influencing moral education goes from parents to the state. Both claim to take better care the required autonomy of the child. I strongly sustain that in the absence of RE, risks of indoctrination decrease and it is better for religious people of the majority or the minority. But if the need of negotiation with powerful religious elites persist, it is better to be optional. What is important from a normative perspective is that the state needs more creative ways to transmit moral education, because through RE it would probably violate individual liberties.

The legitimate interference in moral education as stated here is one which contributes to the development of enough autonomy for deliberation, the one that helps the child to grow on the premises of non-discrimination and non repression to reproduce a liberal democratic system that takes seriously into account pluralism. It is not automatically inferred that RE contributes to this aim, the least when it is compulsory and conflicts directly with minority or dissident groups from the state position. Thus, a serious evaluation of the legitimacy of public funding RE has to be raised. Maybe it can be legitimated on traditional-nationalistic arguments, even in unavoidable ties with official churches but less with a even true devote parents.

As far, I have criticized the Norwegian and the Turkish policies for being repressive on the religious liberty through RE; and for taking strong moral positions based on huge attachments. However both cases open valid questions on pluralism. Turkey opens a question on fundamentalism and on practices, cultural or religious, that violate basic rights and that need bans in a liberal democratic state. Female mutilation, polygamy, physical punishment must be fought; the question is if RE is the best channel to achieve that. A conclusion from this analysis is that it is not

Norway opens also a valid question. The heritage of liberal democracy from Christianity cannot be neglected, neither the need of education in values, however in practice any attempt of persuasion looks as violation of rights, in addition, the role of establishment is being questioned now in some developed societies with this system. Admitting the value or role of tradition in society raises doubts on a country which continue valuing the past and not the current composition of society.

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