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**ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY
AND THE MECHANISMS OF VOTING INTERMEDIATION ***

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Abstract: In this paper we study how some individual political attitudes might affect substantially how different citizens face the electoral process and the corresponding flow of political information, producing different types of voters and citizens. Our main question is: are critical citizens (Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999) or disaffected democrats (Torcal, 2002 and 2007) more responsible citizens, having a more active role in searching for information, obtaining more heterogeneous sources of information, and controlling better, as a result, incumbent representatives? Based on data from the Comparative National Election Project (CNEP), first, we construct three different typologies of citizens based on some of the most well know political attitudes —support for democracy, democratic satisfaction, and political disaffection— and, second, we analyse how the quantity and plurality of exposition to political intermediation are related with these typologies and the level of individual political knowledge.

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It is not possible to assume that all voters face the electoral process in the same conditions. Not all the voters are equal, individual resources and other factors influence the way voters face every single electoral process. Among these factors, the effects of political attitudes are understudied, especially those which are related to the exposure to the media and the networks of political information. Continuing with the contribution by Gunther, Montero and Torcal (2007) in the previous volume of the CNEP project, we propose in this chapter to study the effects of the attitudes that define the profile of the so called “critical citizens” (Norris, 1999) or “disaffected democrats” (Torcal 2002) on the mechanism of voting intermediation. As Beck and Gunther (in their contribution to this volume) has found: political interest and political disaffection are two of the most important individual-level factors explaining the differences in exposure to informational intermediaries. Based on that, in this chapter we intend to go one step further and study how broader set of individual political attitudes might affect substantially how different citizens face the electoral process and the corresponding flow of political information—its magnitude as much as its heterogeneity—, producing different types of voters and citizens. This is a very important topic, since as Magalhães (2007) has shown in this same preceding volume, not all informational intermediaries that connect individuals to the realm of politics are equally likely to have decisive impact on political choices and preferences.

But what are the effects of the attitudes toward democracy in general on the quantity and plurality of exposure to different informational intermediaries? Also, as Magalhães states, the net impact of intermediation biases on the vote seems to be greater in the context where partisan cues and predispositions are less relevant. Is this logic also applicable regardless of other attitudinal predispositions? Are all of the basic civic attitudes equally influential in this process? What is the influence of democratic legitimacy? What is the influence of political discontent? And finally and more importantly, what is the effect of political disaffection among those pro-democratic citizens? In other words, are critical citizens looking and using for distinctive mechanism of intermediation? Are these citizens, as a result, more exposed to the effects of biased information? Are also critical citizens more exposed to uniform or homogenous sources of political intermediation, or are they more active informational seekers, being exposed, as a result, to more heterogeneous informational intermediaries? The increasing number of critical citizens (democratic citizens with greater levels of critical attitudes toward their democratic polities) has been interpreted in traditional democracies as a conclusive sign of increasing cognitive political mobilization that produces more attentive citizens who have a more active role in controlling the government and their representatives (Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2001). But are critical citizens more responsible citizens, having a more active role in searching for information, obtaining more heterogeneous sources of information, and controlling better, as a result, incumbent representatives?

In line with the previous argumentation, the aim of this chapter is to propose an approach to study the effects of political attitudes on the *quantity* and the *plurality* of exposition to political intermediation. In the next section we present some theoretical background about the relevance and justification of the topic of political intermediation and the potential effects of the different dimensions of attitudes toward democracy. In section II, we construct three different typologies of citizens based on some of the most well know political attitudes: support for democracy, democratic satisfaction, and political disaffection. In the subsequent sections, we present the

results of the analysis of the quantity of exposition to political intermediaries in relation to the three typologies. In section IV, we conducted a similar analysis, but this time for the plurality or heterogeneity of exposition to intermediation. Section V presents an analysis of the possible association of these attitudinal typologies with the individual level of *political knowledge*. We finish with a section of preliminary conclusions.

I POLITICAL INTERMEDIATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY

The theoretical ideal of a fully illustrated citizen has been abandoned by the empirical reality of a rational informational-limited individual that employs heuristics in order to comprehend the political realm and take decisions accordingly. Moreover, not only individuals are low informed, but also the political information is not transmitted to the citizens directly, but *mediated* by other individuals, organizations, and mass media. “Inherent limitation on information processing abilities suggest that individual capacity is vulnerable to being swamped by readily available information sources in the immediate context [...] limits on individual capacities and resources make the immediate context of political choice particularly important” (Beck, et al. 2002: 57). Therefore, during political processes citizens acquire information from a series of *intermediaries* in the context. Informational intermediaries “may become increasingly important not only (or not so much) because they send messages that compel us to adopt views and opinions that will end up affecting our voting decisions, but rather because they are seen in and of themselves as trustworthy messengers whose perceived preferences can be directly used as a crucial piece of information on the basis of which one can decide which candidate or party should get our vote” (Magalhães 2007: 211).

Several studies have emphasized the importance of the social context—specifically the political intermediaries—in the flow of information and its consequences on voting behaviour. Intermediaries normally function also as a central informational shortcut, forming and directing the individual political preferences. Seeking low-cost and easy-available information for making a choice, citizens turn to their immediate context, to the informational intermediaries, with the aim of accomplish the decision making process. Political intermediaries are a very useful—to the extent to be a reliable—heuristics that help citizens to receive and evaluate information necessary to comprehend the political order and decide a path of actions. Voters with limited and/or incomplete information turn to their intermediaries for enquiring about political topics, saving themselves costs and using selection-and-processing filters of information. This phenomenon has been defined as *political intermediation*: “the varying channels and processes through which voters receive information about partisan politics during the course of election campaigns and are mobilized to support one party or another” (Gunther, Montero and Puhle, 2007: 1).

Social communication of political messages through intermediaries involves distinctive phases: individuals can dispatch and obtain information in direct transmission through face-to-face contacts; they can also use the information publicly conveyed by the mass media; and citizens can gather information indirectly just being member of formal organizations (Gunther, et al., 2007: 6). This process conforms an *informational environment*—“understood as relatively stable filters for political communication that structure all kinds of information [citizens]

acquire” (Magalhães, 2007: 205)—that almost unavoidably have an impact on political choices and behaviours. These influences are important “due to the shrinking structural ties and long-term orientations, to the limitations and biases of available information, and to the random selectivity of exposure” (Gunther, et al., 2007: 338). That is why, taking place in the general social influence, the political environment is so important—not only because it brings useful information in order to make proper decisions, but also because it might motivate an accurate decision making process.

In a consensual manner, it is possible to state that the regular political intermediaries of informational environments are interpersonal discussion networks, voluntary associations, political organizations, and mass communication media—such as newspapers, radio, television, and Internet (Beck, et al. 2002; Gunther, et al., 2007; Magalhães 2007). As it is easily to reckon, each one of them has different ways to transmit information to the citizens, they have as well different degrees of partisan biases, and subsequently they persuade the individual political behaviour in diverse manners.

However, most of the literature on this topic has not studied, to the best of our knowledge, the possibility that not all the selection of these mechanisms is not only conditioned by individual resources but also by a set of important attitudes toward democracy (one recent exception is the contribution to Beck and Gunther in this volume). Additionally, as some scholars have argued, attitudes toward democracy are not unidimensional (Dalton 2004; Gunther and Montero 2006; Torcal 2002), so their effects on the selection of those mechanisms of representation could be somewhat different. Gunther, Montero and Torcal (2007) have shown that democratic legitimacy is mostly affecting the support for anti-system parties, but are also the non-democrats more active seekers of political information or not? Where and how are they looking for the information to form these anti-party preferences? Concretely, is the kind of political information they are exposed to a reason to be mobilized for anti-system options? Also the same authors have shown how political discontent or the lack of political satisfaction is mostly related with support for the non-incumbent parties (see also Linde and Eckman 2003), so are those “non-satisfied voters” also more active seekers of political information and are using some mechanisms instead of others? Have the quantity and the heterogeneity of political information a relationship with the reasons of contestation to the government? But more importantly, these same authors and other scholars have also proposed the possibility that the attitudes of political disaffection or lack of political trust might be conditioning the way citizens are mobilized (Norris 1999 and 2006) and their levels of political information. Those are the so called “critical citizens” or “disaffected democrats”, which apparently are not related with specific party preferences but are critical to the evaluation of the functioning of institutions of representation and the main political actors of the system.

However, the effect of political disaffection could go in different ways according to the existing literature. Critical citizens could be active information seekers since they might be highly mobilized by their critical view of the institutions of representation (Dalton 2004), producing citizens not only more exposed to information but also the different sources of information and resulting in more politically knowledgeable citizens. But critical citizens can also produce more passive citizens, especially in new democracies (Torcal and Montero 2006;

Torcal and Lago 2006), so instead of active seekers, they could be passive receptors of information, more exposed to biased information and making them more ignorant about politics. In this sense, we expect political disaffection to have a stronger effect on this important element affecting the electoral process and the quality of democracy in its dimension of political accountability.

II THE DIMENSIONS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY

Based on previous works (Gunther and Montero 2006; Gunther, Montero and Torcal 2007; Montero, Gunther and Torcal 1997; Torcal and Montero 2006), attitudes toward democracy can be clearly separated in three different dimensions: *democratic support*, *political discontent*, and *political disaffection*. The first attitude concerns the “citizens’ beliefs that democratic politics and representative democratic institutions are the most appropriate (indeed, the only acceptable) framework for government. This is the key attitudinal component of regime legitimacy” (Gunther and Montero 2006: 48). Political discontent refers the citizens’ evaluations or judgements about the daily activities of politicians and the performance of governmental institutions (Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Morlino 1998). And political disaffection has been defined as the set of attitudes of “certain estrangement of members of the polity from both its core political institutions and, more generally, from politics” (Gunther and Motero 2006: 49; see also: Torcal 2002).

Derived from the latter, we have selected the attitudes of democratic legitimacy, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, and political efficacy. We analysed the first kind of attitude with the well-known question about support for democracy: the preference for the type of political regime (**demauth**), according to the theoretical proposal of Juan Linz (1978). For the second attitude, we used the single question about the individual satisfaction with the way democracy works in her or his country (**demsat**). Finally, the attitudes of disaffection has been analysed with the questions of the level of interest in politics (**inte**) and personal agreement with the following statements: “politics is too complicated” (**polcompl**), “politicians do not care about my opinion” (**dontcare**) and “no personal influence on government decisions” (**noinflu**). As we will discuss later, we consider the former two items as attitudes of internal political efficacy and the latter two items as external political efficacy.¹ We have decided to construct three different typologies of citizens according to these dimensions of political attitudes.

The first typology corresponds to the dimension of democratic legitimacy. We present in Table 1 the distributions of individuals in relation to support for democracy measured by the question about the preference of democracy. We have labelled the individuals according to their regime

¹ Before we said that the academic literature has demonstrated normally these political attitudes correspond to, at least, three different dimensions: legitimacy, discontent, and efficacy. In order to confirm the same for our analysis, we correlated these variables—results do not shown here. As expected, the variables of support for democracy and democratic satisfaction do not have an important correlation with any of the other attitudes (none of them has a correlation coefficient higher than 0.18, $p < 0.000$). And the variables of political efficacy have good correlations among them: “political inte” and “polcompol” is 0.26; “polcompl” and “dontcare” is 0.33; “polcompl” and “noinflu” is 0.36; and “dontcare” and “noinflu” is 0.42 (all of them statistical significant at $p < 0.000$). It is necessary to mention that we follow a different approach to the one done by Beck and Gunther in the first chapter of this volume. Contrary to them, we have included political interest as a component of the syndrome of political disaffection.

preference: “democrats” are those who always prefer democracy; “authoritarians” those who say that, under certain circumstance, they would prefer an authoritarian government; and “indifferent” are those for whom the type of political regime is irrelevant.

Table 1. Typology of Support for Democracy

Types of Citizens	Percentage
Indifferent	13.06
Authoritarian	9.85
Democrat	77.09

Source: CNEP merged dataset 2009.

Having in mind that our argument is that citizens who prefer democracy but are critical to the regime would be rather expose to political intermediation, for the next typologies we decided to analyse only the democratic individuals: those who in the previous typology where classified as “democrat”. We are not interested in doing further and analyse those who are not supportive for democracy, no matter how much discontent or disaffected they are.

Taking into account the latter, we analysed know the distribution of satisfaction with democracy. This variable was dichotomised between those who are “very” and “fairly satisfied” and those who are “not very” and “not at all satisfied” (**demsat2**). Based on that, we built our second typology (**satisfaction**), where the value “1” corresponds to those citizens who are *satisfied* with democracy and “0” for those who are *discontent* with democracy”. As we can see in Table 2, among democratic citizens, there is a little bit more of satisfaction with the way democracy works, close to 60%

Table 2. Typology of Democratic Satisfaction

Types of Citizens	Percentage
Discontent Democrat	41.95
Satisfied Democrat	58.08

Source: CNEP merged dataset 2009.

The following typology classifies the democratic citizens according to their attitudes of political efficacy. We have decided to do first a factor analysis with the intention of corroborate whether these four variables that normally are studied together as a same dimension behaves in that way for the CNEP dataset. The results for the factor analysis with orthogonal rotation and oblimin rotation are presented in Table 3:

**Table 3. Political Efficacy Analysis: Factor loadings
(Two rotations)**

Rotation: Orthogonal Varimax			
Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
“Politicians don’t care”	0.474	0.163	0.748
“No influence on Gov.”	0.474	0.182	0.741
“Politics is complicated”	0.408	0.321	0.730
Interest in politics	0.223	0.308	0.855
<i>Variance explained</i>	<i>0.666</i>	<i>0.258</i>	
Rotation: Orthogonal Oblimin			
Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
“Politicians don’t care”	0.495	-0.078	0.748
“No influence on Gov.”	0.505	-0.061	0.741
“Politics is complicated”	0.511	0.092	0.730
Interest in politics	0.341	0.183	0.855
<i>Variance explained</i>	<i>0.878</i>	<i>0.046</i>	

Source: Own analysis with CNEP merged dataset 2009.

As we see, these four variables are much correlated among themselves. As expected, the variables of external political efficacy (**dontcare** and **noinflu**) contribute mostly to the first factor, and the variables of internal political efficacy (**polcompl** and **inte**) construct the second factor.² These results confirm the theoretical proposition that citizens distinguish between dimensions of political disaffection, opening the possibility of analysing two sub-dimensions partially independent: *institutional disaffection* and *political disengagement*. The first, also known as external efficacy “consists of beliefs about the lack of responsiveness of political authorities and institutions, and citizens’ lack of confidence in the political institutions”. Political disengagement, on the contrary, “comprises a cluster of attitudes related to a general distrust of politics and to the [citizen’s] lack of engagement with the political process” (Torcal and Montero 2006: 7; see also: Torcal 2002 and 2006).

Founded on that, and taking only the “democrat” citizens again, we have split the individuals according to whether they agree (1) or disagree (0) with the statements of external efficacy and internal efficacy, creating three new dichotomous variables (**dontcare2**, **noinflu2**, and **polcompl2**). Also we have dichotomised the variable of political interest: “0” when the individual are not and not very much interested and “1” when he or she is somewhat and very interested (**inte2**).

These new variables allow us constructing a typology where the citizens would be classified according to whether they express a feeling of institutional disaffection or political disengagement, neither or both. We have clustered the individuals according to six possible situations. The first two correspond to the extremes. On the one hand, those who have a value “0” in all the variables, that we call the “full disaffected”; on the other hand, those who have value “1” in all the variables, the “full engaged” citizen. Then we grouped the intermediate

² It is possible to say that in the factor analyses (without and with rotation) political interest had the lowest factor loadings and highest uniqueness.

situations. To begin with, those who have not internal efficacy but a lot of external efficacy, we call them “disengaged” citizens because they show no institutional disaffection, but political disengagement. Second, we group those individuals who have some external efficacy but not internal efficacy. We labelled them “institutional critical” because, no matter they have some engagement, they feel a lack of responsiveness of the political regime. Third, we have put together individuals with some internal efficacy but not external efficacy and we called them “engaged”: they generally express the ability to understand and connect to politics, but his level of interest is very low. Finally, we found some individuals who have political interest, but neither internal efficacy nor any external efficacy, which are named here as “interested” citizens. We present in Table 4 the distribution of this typology of individuals:

Table 4. Typology of Political Efficacy

Types of Citizens	Percentage
Full Disaffected	23.69
Disengaged	5.95
Interested	25.85
Institutional Critical	21.77
Engaged	9.85
Full Engaged	12.89

Source: CNEP merged dataset 2009.

As we can see, an important part of the individuals are “interested” citizens (25%), showing political interest but not very much of the other attitudes. Then, there are individuals (23%) grouped as “full disaffected”: they express both political disengagement and institutional disaffection. On the other extreme, the “full engaged” citizens are a smaller group (13%). The group of “institutional critical” citizens (21%)—those with internal efficacy, but not external—is the third important type of citizens. The smallest groups are those citizens with only external efficacy, the “disengaged” (6%), and those with internal efficacy but not political interest, the “engaged” (9%).

With the aim of doing a more precise study, we have analysed also the distribution of these three typologies of citizens for each one of the countries included in the CNEP.³ Again for the sake of brevity, we do not present the results (available upon request), but we just make some comments about the general patterns and the peculiarities.

As we have said, the majority of individuals are classified as “democratic citizens” because most of them support democracy as a political regime. Even though this is the general picture in all the countries, there are important differences cross-nationally. On the one hand, in some countries only a little bit more than 60% of individuals prefer democracy above other political regimes. These countries are Bulgaria, Chile, Hungary, Mexico, and Taiwan. On the other hand, there are

³ There is no available data for all the typologies in each country, as a result sometime we obtain missing case in China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Italy and the United Kingdom.

cases where the indisputable majority show their support to democracy. In Greece, Italy, Spain, the USA, and Uruguay more than 80%, sometimes even more than 90%, of individuals were classified as “democrats”.⁴ And there are countries (Argentina, Mozambique, and South Africa) in an intermediate situation, around 70% of the citizens support democracy.

For the typology of democratic discontent, the variation across countries is larger. In one extreme, there are cases where only 20% of the individuals is the type of discontent democrats: Mozambique, South Africa, and the USA. In the other extreme, in some countries more than half of the individuals are these discontent democrats. This is the case of Chile, Indonesia, Italy, and especially Bulgaria and Greece (where more than 70% of individuals are dissatisfied with democracy). However, in the majority of countries around 40% of individuals are discontent citizen. These countries are Argentina, Hong Kong, Hungary, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Taiwan, and Uruguay.

Finally, the typology of disaffection shows also cross-nationally differences, forming interesting clusters of countries. On the one hand, there are countries where the majority of its citizens were classified as “full disaffected”, some countries with more than 40% (Argentina, Chile, and Hong Kong) and some other close to 30% (China, Hungary, and South Africa). A group of countries come together because they have a majority of “interested” democrats, more than 30%: Greece, Mexico (with more than 50%), Spain, and Taiwan. These countries have also an important amount of “institutional critical” citizens, between 20 and 30%. There are also countries with more particular distributions, different from the others. In Portugal almost the same quantity of individuals (30%) was grouped as “full disaffected” and “interested” democrats. On the contrary, Uruguay has the same distribution of “disengaged” and “institutional critical” citizens (also 30% each). Bulgaria is the country with the larger type of “institutional critical” individuals (41%), followed by the type of “interested” (30%). Finally, the USA is the only case where the majority of democratic citizens were clustered as “full engaged” (33%) and “institutional critical” (30%).

All this could mean different types of individuals according to the type of democracy. For instance, the only consolidated post-industrial democracy, the United States, has the higher amounts of democrats, satisfied, full engaged citizens. Then, the South American countries—with the exception of Uruguay—concentrated the majority of full disaffected citizens. This situation is shared by the Asian countries, but not in Taiwan. The South European countries have also a comparable pattern among themselves: high amount of democrats, many of them discontent with democracy, and balanced clusters of full disaffected and full engaged citizens.

To sum up, in this section we have built different typologies of citizens according to three dimensions of political attitudes: support for democracy, democratic discontent, and political disaffection. We have shown that these typologies differentiate well among citizens, and also that these typologies varies cross-nationally with interesting clusters of countries.

⁴ It is important to mention that China is an interesting case, because in there more than 80% of individuals prefer democracy as the best political regime as much as they are satisfied with the way democracy works. However, we have decided not to include it in the analysis for being an outlier.

I. POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND QUANTITY OF EXPOSITION TO POLITICAL INTERMEDIARIES

In this part we aim to demonstrate that the quantity of exposition to political intermediaries is related with the attitudes toward the democratic regimes. We will show the differences between the three typologies constructed in the previous section and its relationship with the intermediaries of political information. In order to do this, we have done a simple bivariate analysis: a cross tabulation analysis and present several tables of contingency describing the conditional distribution of the frequency of use of each political intermediary (internet, magazines, newspapers, radio, television, first-mentioned discussant, second-mentioned discussant, and spouse) according to the three typologies. We decided to do this because at the moment we are not able to state the direction of causality between attitudes and intermediation—this will be a task for the next version of this chapter. We are merely concerned now on the relationship of these two the mechanism of voting behaviour.

Support for Democracy and Political Intermediation

For the typology of support for democracy, we present the nominal typology of individuals according to the item of preference for democracy over authoritarianism. We show that the analysis turns to be very interesting, because the differences in quantity of exposition to some intermediaries are not between those who prefer democracy and those who do not, but between those who prefer either democracy (democrats) or authoritarianism (authoritarians) and those for whom the type of regime is irrelevant (indifferent). As it was demonstrated in other work (Recabarren and Maldonado 2009), the distinction between non democratic citizens is theoretically and empirically possible and, as we will show here, has relevant consequences.

Table 5. Quantity of Exposition to Media according to the Typology of Support for Democracy (Percentages)

Support for Democracy	Internet use frequency				Total
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily	
Indifferent	85.85	6.50	4.49	3.17	100.00
Authoritarian	80.13	7.31	5.90	6.67	100.00
Democrat	80.48	6.44	6.79	6.32	100.00
Total	81.14	6.52	6.40	5.94	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (6)	33.4853	Pr = 0.000			

Support for Democracy	Magazine use frequency				Total
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily	
Indifferent	88.20	6.27	4.32	1.21	100.00
Authoritarian	79.49	10.57	6.56	3.37	100.00
Democrat	81.96	8.82	7.23	1.98	100.00
Total	82.78	8.59	6.60	2.03	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (6)	51.4147	Pr = 0.000			

Support for Democracy	Newspaper use frequency				Total
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily	
Indifferent	63.81	10.39	12.70	13.10	100.00
Authoritarian	52.74	12.76	13.95	20.56	100.00
Democrat	47.11	10.44	19.55	22.90	100.00
Total	50.04	10.68	18.00	21.28	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (6)	238.358	Pr = 0.000			

Support for Democracy	Radio use frequency				Total
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily	
Indifferent	56.66	11.17	12.17	20.00	100.00
Authoritarian	47.87	11.77	14.43	25.93	100.00
Democrat	46.54	10.31	15.94	27.21	100.00
Total	48.11	10.58	15.25	26.06	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (6)	89.5506	Pr = 0.000			

Support for Democracy	Television use frequency				Total
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily	
Indifferent	26.24	11.65	21.02	41.08	100.00
Authoritarian	24.71	9.08	17.90	48.31	100.00
Democrat	17.25	6.69	20.82	55.24	100.00
Total	19.24	7.61	20.55	52.59	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (6)	240.6376	Pr = 0.000			

Source: CNEP merged dataset 2009

Table 6. Quantity of Exposition to Political Discussion according to the Typology of Support for Democracy (Percentages)

Support for Democracy	1 st Discussant, frequency of conversation				Total
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	
Indifferent	22.97	29.83	29.95	17.24	100.00
Authoritarian	12.79	27.03	38.95	21.22	100.00
Democrat	11.21	21.48	37.46	29.85	100.00
Total	12.73	22.98	36.73	27.56	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (6)	344.6943	Pr = 0.000			

Support for Democracy	2 nd Discussant, frequency of conversation				Total
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	
Indifferent	23.32	27.32	33.76	15.59	100.00
Authoritarian	14.79	30.45	37.97	16.79	100.00

Democrat	11.41	26.35	39.29	22.95	100.00
Total	13.03	26.90	38.56	21.51	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (6)	113.0435	Pr = 0.000			

Support for Democracy	Spouse, frequency of conversation				Total
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	
Indifferent	32.36	32.72	21.02	13.89	100.00
Authoritarian	18.34	30.76	30.46	20.43	100.00
Democrat	16.33	24.94	31.52	27.21	100.00
Total	18.53	26.50	30.11	24.87	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (6)	403.0261	Pr = 0.000			

Source: CNEP merged dataset 2009

As we mentioned before, these results are appealing because for the majority of intermediaries, the relevant differences correspond to the individuals for whom the type of regime is irrelevant. The distinction, as some literature would expect, is not those who support democracy and those who do not support overtly the democratic regime. This situation is particularly clear for the frequency of use of the internet, newspapers, radio, the first-mentioned discussant and the spouse. Nevertheless, Democrat citizens tend to be rather informed or exposed than non democrat citizens. The differences according to support for democracy are also helpful discriminating the quantity of exposition to the three interpersonal discussants. Those who are supportive to democracy have more political discussions than those who are not.

It is important to mention that the differences according to the typologies of support for democracy are more distinctive for the extreme situations of quantity of exposition: either when the individual frequency is “never” or it is “daily/often”.

Democratic Discontent and Political Intermediation

The following analysis correspond to the second typology, distinguishing only for the democrat citizens those who are satisfied or discontent with the way democracy works in their own countries. As in the previous part we do cross tabulation for each political intermediary. Theoretically, we expect that discontent democrats will be rather exposed to informational intermediaries.

Table 7. Quantity of Exposition to Media according to the Typology of Satisfaction with Democracy (Percentages)

Democratic Discontent	Internet use frequency				Total
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily	
Discontent Democrat	84.53	5.47	4.88	5.13	100.00
Satisfied Democrat	80.95	6.66	6.60	5.79	100.00
Total	82.19	6.25	6.00	5.56	100.00

Pearson Chi ² (3) 20.1257 Pr = 0.000					
Democratic Discontent	Magazines use frequency				Total
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily	
Discontent Democrat	85.29	8.80	4.01	1.90	100.00
Satisfied Democrat	85.21	7.89	5.02	1.87	100.00
Total	85.52	8.34	4.53	1.89	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (3) 6.1869 Pr = 0.103					
Democratic Discontent	Newspaper use frequency				Total
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily	
Discontent Democrat	44.82	13.04	19.80	22.34	100.00
Satisfied Democrat	44.96	12.41	20.81	21.82	100.00
Total	44.90	12.68	20.37	22.05	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (3) 3.7134 Pr = 0.294					
Democratic Discontent	Radio use frequency				Total
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily	
Discontent Democrat	51.84	11.73	12.75	23.68	100.00
Satisfied Democrat	46.01	11.92	15.89	26.18	100.00
Total	48.56	11.84	14.51	25.09	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (3) 63.2751 Pr = 0.000					
Democratic Discontent	Television use frequency				Total
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily	
Discontent Democrat	13.24	8.08	21.30	57.38	100.00
Satisfied Democrat	15.51	6.44	20.70	57.35	100.00
Total	14.53	7.15	20.96	57.36	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (3) 30.6014 Pr = 0.000					

Source: CNEP merged dataset 2009

Table 8. Quantity of Exposition to Political Discussion according to the Typology of Satisfaction with Democracy (Percentages)

Democratic Discontent	1 st Discussant, frequency of conversation				Total
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	
Discontent Democrat	10.47	20.85	38.08	30.60	100.00
Satisfied Democrat	12.25	21.59	38.65	27.50	100.00
Total	11.53	21.29	38.42	28.76	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (3) 23.9356 Pr = 0.000					
Democratic Discontent	2 nd Discussant, frequency of conversation				Total

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	
Discontent Democrat	10.21	22.68	40.12	26.99	100.00
Satisfied Democrat	12.28	26.38	40.41	20.93	100.00
Total	11.44	24.89	40.29	32.37	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (3)	49.4151	Pr = 0.000			

Democratic Discontent	Spouse, frequency of conversation				Total
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	
Discontent Democrat	16.29	25.07	32.11	26.53	100.00
Satisfied Democrat	19.06	23.94	31.36	25.63	100.00
Total	17.93	24.41	31.67	26.00	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (3)	16.1037	Pr = 0.001			

Source: CNEP merged dataset 2009

Contrary to what would be expected for some literature about satisfaction with democracy, this political attitude has not an effect on the use of informational intermediaries. As it was seen, these differences are not substantial. The discontent or dissatisfaction with democracy does not seem to be an important variable discriminating the quantity of exposition to political intermediation. We demonstrate that discontent democrats are not rather exposed to political information through these intermediaries.

Political Disaffection and Political Intermediation

In this section we present the results of the typology of political disaffection only for the democratic citizens. As some studies have proposed, the critical posture of citizens toward the democratic regime is not a matter of evaluation or satisfaction, but of beliefs and feelings of lack of responsiveness from the system and inability to get engaged. Again we tabulate the distribution of frequency of use for each intermediary according to the types of citizens in terms of political disaffection.

Table 9. Quantity of Exposition to Media according to the Typology of Political Efficacy (Percentages)

Political Efficacy	Internet use frequency				Total
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily	
Full Disaffected	93.20	3.04	2.18	1.58	100.00
Disengaged	86.79	6.37	4.25	2.59	100.00
Interested	85.62	6.46	4.47	3.45	100.00
Institutional Critical	73.98	8.09	8.79	9.14	100.00
Engaged	86.45	3.53	5.30	4.71	100.00
Full Engaged	68.16	7.99	11.78	12.06	100.00

	Total	81.45	6.26	6.35	5.94	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (15)	487.3886	Pr = 0.000				

Political Efficacy	Magazine use frequency				Total	
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily		
Full Disaffected	91.40	3.90	4.27	0.43	100.00	
Disengaged	86.32	6.17	7.13	0.39	100.00	
Interested	85.54	7.36	5.78	1.31	100.00	
Institutional Critical	80.35	8.87	8.34	2.43	100.00	
Engaged	86.52	7.86	5.20	0.42	100.00	
Full Engaged	74.84	10.40	11.18	3.57	100.00	
	Total	85.20	7.04	6.42	1.34	100.00

Pearson Chi ² (15)	173.9458	Pr = 0.000				
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Political Efficacy	Newspaper use frequency				Total	
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily		
Full Disaffected	62.93	11.46	14.14	11.46	100.00	
Disengaged	54.87	11.00	18.50	15.63	100.00	
Interested	43.95	11.69	21.89	22.47	100.00	
Institutional Critical	28.41	9.09	25.98	36.52	100.00	
Engaged	52.09	11.96	19.96	15.99	100.00	
Full Engaged	23.72	10.19	28.54	37.55	100.00	
	Total	43.04	10.83	21.71	24.42	100.00

Pearson Chi ² (15)	1.5E+03	Pr = 0.000				
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Political Efficacy	Radio use frequency				Total	
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily		
Full Disaffected	62.86	8.56	11.81	16.78	100.00	
Disengaged	59.18	11.24	12.61	16.98	100.00	
Interested	49.93	10.00	15.50	24.58	100.00	
Institutional Critical	39.35	9.76	15.51	35.38	100.00	
Engaged	52.12	10.69	14.38	22.80	100.00	
Full Engaged	32.59	10.36	20.32	36.74	100.00	
	Total	48.62	9.82	15.10	24.46	100.00

Pearson Chi ² (15)	734.6461	Pr = 0.000				
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Political Efficacy	Television use frequency				Total
	Never	Less freq.	1-4 days	Daily	
Full Disaffected	23.44	8.54	23.35	44.67	100.00
Disengaged	22.30	10.55	23.30	44.85	100.00

Interested	8.59	4.63	23.31	63.46	100.00
Institutional Critical	6.06	3.41	20.99	69.54	100.00
Engaged	16.70	7.77	25.70	49.83	100.00
Full Engaged	4.17	4.21	19.57	72.05	100.00
Total	11.93	5.70	22.41	59.96	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (15)	1.2E+03	Pr = 0.000			

Source: CNEP merged dataset 2009

Table 10. Quantity of Exposition to Political Discussion according to the Typology of Political Efficacy (Percentages)

Political Efficacy	1 st Discussant, frequency of conversation				Total
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	
Full Disaffected	27.98	32.73	29.45	9.84	100.00
Disengaged	23.13	29.06	36.25	11.57	100.00
Interested	10.76	21.58	42.04	25.62	100.00
Institutional Critical	5.97	14.84	39.13	40.06	100.00
Engaged	17.51	35.18	32.25	15.06	100.00
Full Engaged	3.98	13.51	42.04	40.47	100.00
Total	13.60	22.86	37.44	26.11	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (15)	2.1E+03	Pr = 0.000			

Political Efficacy	2 nd Discussant, frequency of conversation				Total
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	
Full Disaffected	27.04	34.95	28.91	9.10	100.00
Disengaged	20.58	33.85	35.18	10.40	100.00
Interested	12.22	24.57	42.37	20.84	100.00
Institutional Critical	5.13	19.02	44.50	31.34	100.00
Engaged	16.74	35.01	35.56	12.69	100.00
Full Engaged	4.41	19.81	46.29	29.48	100.00
Total	13.73	26.55	39.27	20.44	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (15)	873.8497	Pr = 0.000			

Political Efficacy	Spouse, frequency of conversation				Total
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	
Full Disaffected	33.23	33.50	25.14	8.13	100.00
Disengaged	30.55	31.51	28.14	9.81	100.00
Interested	17.08	24.77	33.70	24.44	100.00

Institutional Critical	10.50	16.97	34.33	38.19	100.00
Engaged	25.21	33.76	27.87	13.16	100.00
Full Engaged	8.70	14.71	33.08	43.51	100.00
Total	19.85	25.06	30.91	24.18	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (15)=	1.6E+03	Pr = 0.000			

Source: CNEP merged dataset 2009

We demonstrate that, especially in the extremes of the frequency of exposition, those citizens who are completely disaffected to the body polity tend to being less informed through political intermediaries. Therefore, as expected, efficacy or disaffection has a clear relationship with political intermediation. Among mass media intermediaries, the differences between the types of citizens are very strong, principally for the internet, newspapers, and television. It is possible to mention that, given the fact that the typology allows us to differentiate between those who are more or less interested in politics and those who have more or less internal political efficacy, the type of “interested” citizen does not show by itself that the higher the political interest, the greater the quantity of exposition to political intermediation. Those who comparatively have more exposition to political information are the types of citizens with internal efficacy in general (engaged as well as full engaged), not only political interest. For the three interpersonal discussants, the analysis shows that full disaffected citizens have less political conversation with their peers. In the same manner, the individuals classified as full engaged are those with the higher quantity of political conversations. Summarising, our analysis proves that political efficacy or democratic disaffection is a very important variable for the quantity of exposition to political intermediation, either for mass media intermediaries or interpersonal discussants.

II. POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND PLURALITY OF EXPOSITION TO POLITICAL INTERMEDIARIES

As we stated in the beginning of this chapter, we are interested in analyse not only the quantity of exposition to political intermediation but the plurality of this exposition, and whether this are related with the typologies of political attitudes we developed. In order to that, first, we constructed a variable measuring the degree of plurality or heterogeneity of political intermediation and, second, we contrast it with the three typologies of citizens’ attitudes.

The heterogeneity or plurality of exposition attempts to analyse whether the perceived partisan biases in the political intermediaries correspond or not to the partisan preferences of the individual. In other words, we want to know if the citizen looks for intermediaries different from his or her political preferences, and how much disagreement or heterogeneity this citizen stand. We have operated this concept using two items: on the one hand, the declared vote choose in the last general election and, on the other hand, whether the individual has perceived a bias in the information he or she received from the intermediaries and to which party or candidate this information is biased. First, we have selected the individuals that perceived an informational bias in the media. Then, we have created a dichotomised variable with these values: “0” for those cases where the partisan bias is similar to the individual political preference (when there is not disagreement), and “1” for those cases where the informational bias and the individual

preference do not coincided (when there is indeed disagreement). We have created dichotomous variables for all the media intermediaries with available data: newspapers, radio, and television.⁵ The CNEP allows us to get data from ten possible mass media intermediaries, the first and the second mention of: newspapers; radio stations; talk shows in radio; television broadcasts; and talk shows in television.

Afterwards, we have created a new variable adding the number of mass media in disagreement; in other words, we measured the degree of plurality or heterogeneity of the exposition to media intermediaries (**het_media**). As expected, the great majority of cases do not mention an informational bias in the media nor did they perceive a difference in political preferences. Based on that, we present only the results for those individuals having at least one intermediary in disagreement:

Table 11. Plurality of Exposition to Mass Media

Number of media intermediaries in disagreement	Percentage
1	67.96
2	22.39
3	6.34
4	2.23
5	0.66
6	0.29
7	0.10
8	0.02

Source: CNEP dataset 2009

The degree of plurality/heterogeneity is not very large. In fact, the great majority of individuals mentioned just one intermediary in disagreement, and having two discrepant intermediaries summed up 90% of the individuals.⁶

We have done a similar procedure in order to found the degree of plurality of exposition through political conversation. First, we created the dichotomised variables for each discussant according to the citizen's declared vote choose and the perceived vote preference of his or her discussant. After that, we built a new variable adding the number of personal discussants in disagreement (**het_disc**). These results are presented again only for those who mention at least one discussant with different partisan preferences.

⁵ In the dataset there is no information about the perceived partisan biases in magazines and Internet.

⁶ In the future version, we need to analyse whether those who mention more than four or five discordant intermediaries are a consequence of measurement error or not.

Table 12. Plurality of Exposition to Political Discussion

Number of personal intermediaries in disagreement	Percentage
1	76.62
2	20.14
3	3.25

Source: CNEP dataset 2009

In general terms, the level of disagreement with discussants is smaller than with media. Again, the great majority of individuals just mention one discussant in disagreement in partisan preferences.

Having constructed our variable of the plurality of exposition to political intermediaries, we conducted the analysis of the relationship between these variables and the typologies of individuals. First, we present the results for the media intermediaries and, second, for the interpersonal discussant.

Table 13. Plurality of Exposition to Media according to the Typology of Support for Democracy (Percentages)

Number of media intermediaries in disagreement	Support for Democracy			Total
	Indifferent	Authoritarian	Democrat	
0	90.82	83.77	80.72	82.38
1	6.05	9.71	12.31	11.21
2	2.19	4.32	4.42	4.11
3	0.83	1.40	1.57	1.46
4	0.0	0.47	0.67	0.56
5	0.05	0.33	0.19	0.19
6	0.05	0.0	0.08	0.07
7	0.0	0.0	0.04	0.03
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson χ^2 (14) = 126.8310 Pr = 0.000

Source: CNEP dataset 2009

Table 14. Plurality of Exposition to Media according to the Typology of Satisfaction with Democracy (Percentages)

Number of media intermediaries in disagreement	Democratic Discontent		
	Discontent	Satisfied	Total
0	82.81	83.88	83.42
1	10.65	10.87	10.77
2	4.21	3.37	3.73
3	1.54	1.17	1.33
4	0.56	0.46	0.50
5	0.15	0.15	0.15
6	0.07	0.06	0.07
7	0.01	0.04	0.03
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi² (7) = 14.7712 Pr = 0.039

Source: CNEP dataset 2009

Table 15. Plurality of Exposition to Media according to the Typology of Political Efficacy (Percentages)

Political Efficacy	Number of media intermediaries in disagreement								Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Full Disaffected	92.31	5.43	1.54	0.41	0.25	0.06	0.0	0.0	100.00
Disengaged	87.99	7.96	2.91	0.25	0.51	0.38	0.0	0.0	100.00
Interested	81.90	12.16	4.09	1.21	0.44	0.05	0.10	0.05	100.00
Institutional Critical	74.25	15.87	6.04	2.67	0.62	0.39	0.11	0.06	100.00
Engaged	87.43	7.85	2.80	0.98	0.53	0.08	0.23	0.0	100.00
Full Engaged	72.12	16.98	6.79	2.41	1.42	0.24	0.0	0.05	100.00
Total	81.72	11.70	4.21	1.48	0.59	0.18	0.07	0.03	100.00

Pearson Chi² (35) = 609.3970 Pr = 0.000

Source: CNEP merged dataset 2009

Based on these results, we can say first that the typologies of support for democracy do not have a strong discriminating relationship with the degree of plurality of political intermediation. In other words, those who prefer democracy have not a higher number of heterogeneous media intermediaries. Second, the typology of democratic discontent does not condition the heterogeneity of political intermediation. Therefore, we did not find that discontent democrats are better seekers of political diverse sources of information. Contrary to the latter finds the typology of political disaffection indeed has an effect on the degree of plurality of exposition to media intermediaries. On the one hand, 90% of “full disaffected” citizens do not have any intermediary in political disagreement; but, this situation occurs only in 72% of the “full

engaged” individuals. On the other hand, the “institutional critical” and “full engaged” citizens comparatively tend to have more heterogeneous media intermediaries.

Now we present the same sort of analysis for the interpersonal discussants.

Table 16. Plurality of Exposition to Political Discussion according to the Typology of Support for Democracy (Percentages)

Number of personal intermediaries in disagreement	Support for Democracy			Total
	Indifferent	Authoritarian	Democrat	
0	87.75	83.70	84.73	85.03
1	9.54	12.57	12.26	11.93
2	2.35	3.13	2.59	2.61
3	0.36	0.60	0.41	0.42
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi² (6) = 16.1807 Pr = 0.013

Source: CNEP dataset 2009

Table 17. Plurality of Exposition to Political Discussion according to the Typology of Satisfaction with Democracy (Percentages)

Number of personal intermediaries in disagreement	Democratic Discontent		
	Discontent	Satisfied	Total
0	85.41	83.38	84.26
1	10.43	13.04	11.92
2	3.35	3.03	3.17
3	0.80	0.55	0.66
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi² (3) = 30.1862 Pr = 0.039

Source: CNEP dataset 2009

Table 18. Plurality of Exposition to Political Discussion according to the Typology of Political Efficacy (Percentages)

Political Efficacy	Number of personal intermediaries in disagreement				Total
	0	1	2	3	
Full Disaffected	86.98	9.22	3.07	0.72	100.00
Disengaged	87.23	9.36	2.91	0.51	100.00
Interested	82.81	13.32	3.13	0.74	100.00

Institutional Critical	77.76	12.27	4.10	0.87	100.00
Engaged	81.76	11.88	5.30	1.06	100.00
Full Engaged	79.76	15.38	4.20	0.66	100.00
Total	82.21	13.34	3.68	0.77	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (15) =	145.0633		Pr = 0.000		

Source: CNEP dataset 2009

The latter analyses demonstrate that support for democracy has not a relationship with the degree of plurality of exposition to personal intermediaries (the analysis is not statistical significant). In the same sense, the typology of discontent does not discriminate either the level of heterogeneity of interpersonal discussants. However, the typology of disaffection seems to have some differentiating effect on the degree of plurality of exposition to personal intermediaries. Again, the types of “institutional critical” and “full engaged” citizens have a relatively higher number of interpersonal discussants with different political preferences. Therefore, plurality of exposition to informational intermediation (either mass media or interpersonal discussants) is highly related with political engagement and the feeling of lack of system receptiveness.

III. POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

Finally, with the purpose to analyse the association between political attitudes and intermediation, it is also necessary to analyse the effect of our attitudinal typologies on the actual level of individual political knowledge. We want to know whether democratic citizens, discontent with the functioning of democracy and disaffected with the political order have a higher level of political information. We measure the individual political knowledge with a series of questions included in the CNEP that adds the number of correct answers to short quiz about domestic politicians. What we do is to present the distribution of this degree of political knowledge according to the three typologies, considering two different situations: one when the individual is not exposed to the political intermediary (value “0” in the variables of frequency) and the other where the quantity of exposition to the same intermediary is the highest (value “3” of frequency). In order to make a brief analysis, we only do the results only for three intermediaries: newspaper, television, and the first-mentioned discussant. We start with the newspapers:

Table 19. Level of Political Knowledge according to the Typology of Support for Democracy and Newspaper Reading (Percentages)

For those who say “NEVER” read NEWSPAPER:				
Number of correct answers	Support for Democracy			Total
	Indifferent	Authoritarian	Democrat	
0	44.78	34.10	28.38	31.88
1	22.99	21.29	18.63	19.69
2	18.24	20.08	20.02	19.72
3	9.75	17.92	26.89	22.91
4	3.90	5.12	5.64	5.28
5	0.34	1.48	0.44	0.53

Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (10) =	243.1858	Pr = 0.000		

For those who say “ALWAYS” read NEWSPAPER

Number of correct answers	Support for Democracy			Total
	Indifferent	Authoritarian	Democrat	
0	14.80	10.75	7.83	8.71
1	20.00	9.68	8.59	9.68
2	24.80	16.49	16.93	17.56
3	24.00	29.75	42.23	39.46
4	15.60	24.01	21.56	21.28
5	0.80	9.32	2.86	3.31
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (10) =	120.6664	Pr = 0.000		

Source: CNEP dataset 2009

Table 20. Level of Political Knowledge according to the Typology of Support for Democracy and Political Discussion (Percentages)

For those who say “NEVER” have conversations with 1st DISCUSSANT:

Number of correct answers	Support for Democracy			Total
	Indifferent	Authoritarian	Democrat	
0	41.53	33.04	26.69	31.24
1	26.69	25.89	23.22	24.43
2	20.76	25.89	24.61	23.78
3	8.47	9.82	19.41	15.46
4	2.12	5.36	5.89	4.86
5	0.42	0.00	0.17	0.22
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (10) =	35.4547	Pr = 0.000		

For those who say “OFTEN” have conversations with 1st DISCUSSANT:

Number of correct answers	Support for Democracy			Total
	Indifferent	Authoritarian	Democrat	
0	28.57	18.00	17.37	18.34
1	12.44	8.50	9.91	10.01
2	25.81	16.50	16.46	17.24
3	17.51	28.50	33.15	31.51
4	15.67	21.50	20.71	20.36
5	0.0	7.00	2.40	2.55
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (10) =	35.4547	Pr = 0.000		

Source: CNEP dataset 2009

For the typology of support for democracy, we found again that those for whom the kind of political regimen is irrelevant have comparatively a lower level of political knowledge; whilst democrats and authoritarians are more similar, they have a little bit more political knowledge, especially more for those citizens who are supportive to democracy. We see also that the exposure to certain intermediaries modify this distribution. On the one hand, the proportion of those citizens with more political knowledge is higher when they are exposed than when they are not exposed at all. On the other hand, not to all informational intermediaries behaves similarly: the differences among types of citizens according to support to democracy are more pronounced for newspaper and the first-mentioned discussant than for the television. Therefore, the attitude of support for democracy have a clear relationship with the level of political knowledge—democrats seem to have more knowledge—and the strength of this relationship is conditioned by the quantity of exposure to informational intermediaries.

Table 21. Level of Political Knowledge according to the Typology of Satisfaction with Democracy and Newspaper Reading (Percentages)

For those who say “NEVER” read NEWSPAPER:			
Number of correct answers	Democratic Discontent		
	Discontent	Satisfied	Total
0	38.36	32.15	34.71
1	16.92	18.39	17.79
2	17.89	18.65	18.34
3	20.43	25.89	23.64
4	5.56	4.86	5.15
5	0.84	0.06	0.38
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (5) =	59.2326	Pr = 0.000	
For those who say “ALWAYS” read NEWSPAPER:			
Number of correct answers	Democratic Discontent		
	Discontent	Satisfied	Total
0	11.95	10.57	11.16
1	10.20	9.14	9.59
2	17.65	16.17	16.80
3	34.28	40.79	38.02
4	19.30	22.51	21.14
5	6.62	0.82	3.29
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (5) =	76.4630	Pr = 0.000	

Source: CNEP dataset 2009

Table 22. Level of Political Knowledge according to the Typology of Satisfaction with Democracy and Political Discussion (Percentages)

For those who say "NEVER" have conversations with 1 st DISCUSSANT:			
Number of correct answers	Democratic Discontent		
	Discontent	Satisfied	Total
0	37.38	29.77	33.30
1	19.29	22.59	21.06
2	20.00	21.77	20.95
3	19.05	20.53	19.85
4	3.81	5.34	4.63
5	0.48	0.0	0.22
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (5) =	9.1310	Pr = 0.104	
For those who say "OFTEN" have conversations with 1 st DISCUSSANT:			
Number of correct answers	Democratic Discontent		
	Discontent	Satisfied	Total
0	20.37	21.03	20.76
1	11.11	11.07	11.09
2	15.98	16.22	16.12
3	29.24	32.56	31.22
4	18.32	18.33	18.32
5	4.97	0.79	2.48
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (5) =	45.4759	Pr = 0.000	

Source: CNEP dataset 2009

The typology of democratic discontent apparently does not have a great effect on political knowledge. Being satisfied or discontent with the way democracy works have not a strong relationship with individual knowledge. However, similarly to previous typology, this relationship is conditioned by the quantity of exposure to political intermediation. When the individual does not use the newspaper or the television, democratic discontent makes no difference in political knowledge; but when the individual has the highest exposure to those intermediaries, and then those who are satisfied have a little bit more of political knowledge.

Table 23. Level of Political Knowledge according to the Typology of Political Efficacy and Newspaper Reading (Percentages)

For those who say “NEVER” read NEWSPAPER:							
Political Efficacy	Number of correct answers						Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	
Full Disaffected	36.36	24.09	18.99	17.08	3.47	0.0	100.00
Disengaged	28.42	21.58	26.23	16.67	7.10	0.0	100.00
Interested	36.44	16.45	18.40	25.78	2.74	0.18	100.00
Institutional Critical	27.14	13.29	16.10	34.01	8.00	1.46	100.00
Engaged	25.90	23.80	20.21	19.61	9.73	0.75	100.00
Full Engaged	13.90	11.39	20.05	41.69	12.76	0.23	100.00
Total	31.51	19.06	19.06	24.45	5.64	0.38	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (25) =	453.5230		Pr = 0.000				

For those who say “ALWAYS” read NEWSPAPER:							
Political Efficacy	Number of correct answers						Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	
Full Disaffected	17.17	21.21	22.56	25.93	12.46	0.67	100.00
Disengaged	9.26	13.89	20.37	35.19	21.30	0.0	100.00
Interested	15.85	8.27	19.07	40.39	14.17	2.24	100.00
Institutional Critical	8.24	7.64	13.97	40.60	24.72	4.82	100.00
Engaged	8.29	18.65	24.87	27.98	20.21	0.0	100.00
Full Engaged	3.02	7.05	13.76	43.79	29.36	3.02	100.00
Total	9.99	10.03	17.02	38.66	21.40	2.89	100.00
Pearson Chi ² (25) =	265.7204		Pr = 0.000				

Source: CNEP merged dataset 2009

Table 24. Level of Political Knowledge according to the Typology of Political Efficacy and Political Discussion (Percentages)

For those who say “NEVER” have conversations with 1 st DISCUSSANT:							
Political Efficacy	Number of correct answers						Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	
Full Disaffected	37.77	25.98	20.96	12.66	2.62	0.0	100.00
Disengaged	20.20	23.23	30.30	21.21	5.05	0.0	100.00
Interested	26.37	24.73	19.23	24.73	4.40	0.55	100.00
Institutional Critical	26.67	13.33	14.44	35.56	8.89	1.11	100.00
Engaged	32.28	22.05	21.26	18.90	5.51	0.0	100.00
Full Engaged	18.18	30.30	15.15	21.21	15.15	0.0	100.00

	Total	31.55	23.96	20.83	18.91	4.55	0.20	100.00
	Pearson Chi ² (25) =	74.8164		Pr = 0.000				
For those who say “NEVER” have conversations with 1 st DISCUSSANT:								
Political Efficacy		Number of correct answers					Total	
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
Full Disaffected		28.34	20.32	21.93	23.53	5.88	0.0	100.00
Disengaged		15.52	32.76	17.24	17.24	17.24	0.0	100.00
Interested		32.45	9.56	16.77	28.68	10.34	2.19	100.00
Institutional Critical		14.82	8.32	14.39	35.18	23.24	4.05	100.00
Engaged		13.99	20.28	24.48	25.17	16.08	0.0	100.00
Full Engaged		6.63	7.21	14.04	37.82	32.16	2.14	100.00
	Total	18.65	10.58	16.15	32.18	19.90		100.00
	Pearson Chi ² (25) =	336.7293		Pr = 0.000				

Source: CNEP merged dataset 2009

Finally, the typology of political disaffection has a clear relationship with the level of political knowledge. Generally speaking, in one side the “full disaffected” citizens tend to have lower level of information; on the opposite, the “full engaged” are much more knowledgeable citizens. Moreover, those individuals with an attitude of internal political efficacy, the “institutional critical” and the “interested”, have more information than those with only external efficacy or the disengaged citizens. Therefore, the higher the feelings of political disaffection, the lower the level of political knowledge.

As expected, these relationships are affected by the quantity of exposure to political intermediation and the kind of intermediary. On the one hand, the association between the typologies of political disaffection and the number of correct answer tend to be stronger when the individual is the situation of the highest quantity of exposure to intermediation. On the other hand, however, this situation does not hold for different intermediary. In the cases we studied, this is true only for the newspapers and the first-mentioned discussant; nonetheless, when the citizens have no exposure to television the differences between types of individuals seem to be weaker.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

As we have shown in this chapter, there are important differences between intermediaries of political information and the attitudes with which the citizens face the process of intermediation. Based on the theoretical proposition of the multidimensionality of political attitudes, we constructed three different typologies of citizens that help us very to classify them. As expected, not all attitudes toward democracy equally influential in political intermediation. The first typology organised the individuals according to their support for democracy. In our analysis, we found that this attitude has a relationship with the quantity of exposition. In particular we show that the type of individuals for whom the type of political regime is irrelevant differentiates from the democrat citizens in the sense they are less exposed to intermediaries. This disparity is

especially clear for some intermediaries: newspapers, internet, radio, and spouse as discussant. Afterwards, we focus only on the democrat citizens.

Hence, the second typology divided these individuals according their satisfaction with the way democracy works. However, contrary to the expectations of some literature, this typology has not a relevant association with any of the analysed variables of intermediation, neither with the quantity of exposition nor with its plurality. In other words, those citizens who are supportive to democracy but are discontent with its current functioning are not different in terms of intermediation from those who are satisfied. They are not more exposed to political intermediation and do not seek for more politically plural sources of information.

Our third typology classifies the citizens according to the dimensions of institutional disaffection (or external efficacy) and political disengagement (internal efficacy). Contrary to the previous situation, we discover that these attitudes have a strong relationship with the quantity of exposition as much as with the degree of plurality or heterogeneity of intermediation. In terms of frequency of exposition, we found that those citizens with a feeling of engagement to the political realm are the ones who tend to be more exposed to political information. This association is particularly strong for some intermediaries: newspapers, internet, magazines, spouse, and the first-mentioned discussant. For the plurality of exposition, those citizens who are more engaged or interested tend to be better seekers of heterogeneous sources of political information. On the other hand, citizens with a high level of political disaffection of disengagement have lower levels of quantity and plurality of exposition to informational intermediaries.

Finally, we have show that some of our attitudinal typologies of citizens are related with the level of individual political knowledge. Support for democracy and, especially, political efficacy (but not democratic discontent) have a positive effect on individual knowledge. In addition, this relationship is qualified by the quantity of exposition to intermediation and the kind of political intermediary. When there is exposure to intermediaries, the relationships tend to be stronger.

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