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RECSM Working Paper Number 52

April 2017

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MASS PUBLIC DECISIONS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN POLICY DISPOSITIONS

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ABSTRACT

Recent research argues that public attitudes on foreign policy matters is structured and constrained along broad foreign policy *dispositions*. Much of the scholarly literature have tested this assumption on foreign policy issues with a strong domestic component. Either of military nature or nuclear security related, these matters are *intermestic* issues. The structure of public opinion on other foreign policy matters remain underexplored. In an endeavor to fill this gap, in this article, I test whether public opinion on democracy promotion tools of *non-intermestic* nature is similarly guided by citizens' foreign policy *dispositions* with the help of unique experimental data.

Keywords: democracy promotion, public opinion, foreign policy, economic sanctions, measurement errors, survey experiments

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I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable guidance from Wiebke Weber, Anna DeCastellarnau, and Willem Saris on the methodological part of the paper. I am also thankful to Abel Escribà-Folch for the funding of my survey experiment.

INTRODUCTION

Under the rhetoric of “democracy promotion”, the United States, the most active player in advancing democracy abroad (McFaul, 2004: 147; also see Carothers, 1991; Levitsky and Way, 2010), have embarked upon military interventions (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya); imposed economic and/or diplomatic sanctions (e.g. South Africa, South Korea, the Philippines); spent billions of dollars of investment in democracy assistance programs (e.g. in Egypt, Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union countries), and financially supported opposition movements (e.g. Syria, Venezuela, Bolivia), especially since the end of the Cold War.

Some argue that the US government in its ability to advance democracy abroad depends on American public opinion (Brancati, 2014; Mueller, 2005). Paradoxically, however, US citizens do not seem to place high priority on democracy promotion (Pew Research Center, 2013), despite the latter being the “cornerstone of the US foreign policy”. Further, although the research on democracy promotion has made notable progress in (a) examining the effectiveness of different democracy promotion tools, such as foreign aid (e.g. Dunning, 2004), economic sanctions (e.g. Hufbauer et al 2007) and international wars (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2006); or (b) elucidating on the inconsistency of US democracy promotion policies toward non-democracies (e.g. Levitsky and Way, 2010; Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2015); to date, surprisingly, few studies have systematically investigated public attitudes on democracy promotion¹. How does the public shape its

¹ There are however few notable recent exceptions. Brancati (2014), for example, examines two competing theoretical arguments for public opinion on democracy promotion (normative values vs. national interests) with experimental data. She finds little empirical evidence for any of these perspectives. Christiansen, Heinrich and Peterson (2016) study whether and how mass support for foreign aid, intended for advancing democracy, hinges upon the domestic impact of the policy. Their findings show that US citizens are willing to approve of foreign aid when it promotes local firms and organizations. According to another study, the public seems to be benefits-oriented. When the repressive recipient regime

opinion towards democracy promotion? Do citizens apply systematic thinking when deciding to approve or disapprove of them? In other words, is the mass opinion on democracy promotion structured and coherent or is it disorganized and incoherent?

This paper endeavours to shed light on some of these questions. Here I investigate public support for one, widely applied democracy promotion tool, economic sanctions. More specifically (a) I examine whether mass attitudes towards democracy promotion are structured and coherent; and (b) whether these attitudes differ depending on situational factors. To guide my analysis, I draw upon two seminal frameworks. The first one posits that public opinion toward foreign policy issues are coherent and consistent. In the absence of detailed information and knowledge on foreign policy issues, citizens apply their broad foreign policy belief structures, also called “postures” (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987), or “dispositions” (Herrmann, Tetlock and Visser, 1999) in order to make their minds. The second framework is Herrmann et al. (1999) “interactionist” framework. Based on the Image theory in International Relations, and on insights from the literature on dispositions, the framework incorporates the role of strategic factors into the relationship between dispositions and foreign policy decision making.

The literature on *dispositions* posits that citizens’ foreign policy beliefs strongly predict their attitudes on foreign policy matters. However there are some shortcomings in the existing research. Of special interest to this paper is its limited focus on specific foreign policy matters. The extant literature has mostly examined mass attitudes on foreign policy issues which have a high domestic component for citizens. These are called *intermestic*, i.e. of international and domestic concern, issues in International Relations. The mostly investigated foreign policy matters are either of military nature or deal with nuclear security

also happens to be valuable to donor citizens and donor governments, citizens are discouraged from punishing the regime (Heinrich, Kobayashi and Long, 2016).

issues. Both of them are dramatic and widely publicized issues which make them unique and unrepresentative of *all* foreign policy questions. Thus a question arises: does the argument of dispositions-public opinion nexus hold true for *all* foreign policy measures? Do foreign policy dispositions constrain the mass opinion on *other* foreign policy matters in the same way and intensity as on *intermestic* and *salient* issues? Given the importance of public opinion for foreign policy decision making (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 1989; Canes-Wrone, 2006; Tomz and Weeks, 2013; Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver, 2007) and burgeoning research on this topic, there is a need to understand whether the mass opinion on foreign policy matters with little or no explicit domestic component, is similarly predictable along broad dispositions.

In an attempt to shed light on these doubts, I test the effect of three key dispositions, internationalism vs. isolationism, militarism vs. non-militarism and political ideology on public support for economic sanctions. My statistical analysis is based on uniquely designed survey experimental data from 611 voting age American citizens, conducted via an online non-probability based platform Prolific Academic. The experiment was initially designed to investigate whether US public support for democracy promotion measures differed along the strategicness of the adversary. Respondents are randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups (1 control and 2 treatment groups). I firstly measure citizens' three core dispositions with regards to foreign policy with one item-scale each. Then they read a vignette, which lays out a hypothetical situation, where a hypothetical non-democracy is systematically breaching the human rights of its citizens. There are some calls for punitive actions from international organizations. Respondents are further instructed to express their approval or disapproval for imposing economic sanctions against the country in order to promote democracy. In my vignettes, I randomly manipulate the strategicness of the adversary. The country is either an exporter of agricultural products (control group) or an oil

and gas exporter (treatment groups I&II). In addition, respondents in the treatment group II read that punishing the regime in question could have energy-related consequences for the sending country, as well as for individuals' households. Thus while the country in the first vignette does not have an explicit strategic importance for the US, the existence of oil and gas reserves adds a strategic factor to the country's image, consistent with Herrmann et al. (1999). In the third vignette, the US national and household interests are explicitly at stake.

To examine whether foreign policy dispositions anchor mass decisions on economic sanctions intended for democracy promotion, I firstly collapse the data across experimental groups and conduct a global regression analysis with structural equation modeling (SEM). Further, to investigate whether the effect of these dispositions differ along the situational factors consistent with Herrmann et al. (1999), I perform a multi-group SEM regression analysis.

My findings demonstrate that contrary to what Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) and Bennet (1964) argued that foreign policies of *less-salience* are less likely to be constrained by broad dispositions, in my experiment public attitudes on economic sanctions intended for furthering democracy, despite its *less-salience* and *non-intermestic* nature, seem to be strongly predicted by dispositions. Likewise, in line with the *interactionist* model, citizens adapt their dispositions according to differing strategic factors. These findings contribute to the burgeoning literature on the public opinion-foreign policy nexus, by making a subtle theoretical distinction between two different kinds of foreign policy matters and by investigating the structure of public support on a democracy promotion tool of *non-military* nature.

Additionally, the methodological part of this paper makes another non-trivial contribution. In the statistical analysis of my data, I draw on the broad literature on the importance of correcting for measurement errors in survey research (Alwin, 2007;

Goldberger and Duncan, 1973; Saris and Revilla, 2015) and correct for measurement errors consistent with Saris and Gallhofer (2014). Although some scholars have already warned about the role of measurement errors in reaching flawed conclusions with respect to citizens' foreign policy attitudes (e.g. Achen, 1975), few studies have since addressed this fundamental issue. By juxtaposing and comparing two (corrected and uncorrected) models for my estimations, I demonstrate how measurement errors in the survey data may substantially alter the research conclusions.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I revisit the literature on public opinion and foreign policy. In particular, I highlight the research strand which examines citizens' foreign policy dispositions. I further develop my expectations for the effect of dispositions on public support for economic sanctions, intended for democracy promotion. Then I introduce my research design, the method of statistical analysis and subsequently the results. In the conclusion I discuss the key findings and limits of the present study.

PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY

Dispositions Framework

Earlier theoretical tradition studying the nature of public attitudes on foreign policy asserted that mass attitudes on these matters lacked consistence, coherence and organization (e.g. Almond, 1950; Lippmann, 1955; Converse, 1964). Almond (1950), for example, suggested that American public opinion on foreign policy was short of “intellectual structure and factual content” (70), because foreign policy matters “ha[d] no immediate utility or meaning” (230-32) for people. Rosenau (1961) similarly stated that citizens’ “response to foreign policy matters is less one of intellect and more one of emotion” (35). Likewise, Converse (1964) in his seminal article contended that public opinion regarding foreign policy

issues was instable and unsophisticated; and there was no underlying belief structures guiding the mass attitudes.

A growing body of recent literature, however, has rejected this argument with empirical evidence that public opinion on international matters is consistent and coherent. Citizens seem to rely upon their structured foreign belief systems, also called “postures” (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987) or “dispositions” (Herrmann et al., 1999) in order to derive conclusions for specific foreign policy issues (Holsti and Rosenau, 1993; Wittkopf, 1990; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Herrmann et al., 1999; Modigliani, 1972).

This argument builds on the assumption that American public is scantily informed and holds little factual knowledge about foreign policy issues. Therefore, people behave as “cognitive misers” (Fiske and Taylor, 1984) and use previous broad information, knowledge and experience to decrease the complexity of foreign policy matters and thus guide their decisions on these issues.

Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) identify three key dispositions that constrain American public opinion on specific foreign policy matters: internationalism versus isolationism, militarism versus accommodation and anti-communism versus communism². Their findings show that these dispositions are important determinants of citizens’ attitudes with regards to foreign policy measures³.

² In contrast to Hurwitz and Peffley (1987)’s vertical framework, a different but similarly influential strand of literature (Wittkopf, 1990,1994; Holsti and Rosenau, 1986) posits that mass opinion with regards to foreign policy matters are structured horizontally, i.e. citizens organize their views on foreign policy matters along two different forms of internationalism, namely militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism. In this strand of literature, isolationism is studied as a separate dimension, rather than one extreme of the internationalism-isolationism continuum.

³ On the top tier of their hierarchical model, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) place two “core values” which according to their model constrain people’s postural dimensions: Ethnocentrism and Americans’ beliefs about the morality of warfare.

Page and Shapiro (1992), investigating the aggregate mass opinion over time, find that public opinion is coherent and instrumentally rational. Some other scholars (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2004, Murray, 1996; Wittkopf, 1994) stress the role of the liberal-conservative disposition in mass foreign policy decision making⁴. Likewise, Herrmann et al (1999) find empirical evidence for the constraining and predicting ability of two key dispositions, such as internationalism and militarism, on public opinion.

Thus there is now a good deal of evidence in the extant literature that citizens possess structured foreign policy dispositions that guide their attitudes on more specific foreign policy issues. However, a quick look on seminal papers in this field reveal that, up to now, the prior literature examined the role of dispositions on a limited number of foreign policy decisions. The most recurring foreign policy issues tested in empirical research are military issues (either nuclear or non-nuclear matters). These matters differ substantially from other foreign policy issues; and cannot represent *all* types of foreign policy issues.

Thus a question arises: does this structure apply to *all* foreign policy measures? Is the constraining effect of foreign policy dispositions similarly applicable to *all* foreign policy issues? Or is there something unique about the tested foreign policy matters?

The examined military matters are about either the US using military force in a foreign country (Herrmann et al.1999; Verba et al. 1967), missile defense (Jenkins-Smith et al.2004), or defense spending in general (Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson, 1993; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). Nonetheless, one might speculate that military matters are unique and dramatic events that are “inherently more threatening to the public” and “generally more salient in the mass public’s mind” than other foreign policy matters (Hurwitz and Peffley,

⁴ Others however cannot find empirical evidence for this argument (Converse, 1964; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Herrmann et al., 1999).

1987:1113). Prior research has found that American public is strongly sensitive to human and financial costs of a war (e.g. Gartner, 2008; Mueller, 1973). Further, some argue that wars might trigger “rally around the flag” effect (Mueller, 1973) which could further stimulate public interest to this foreign policy tool. Due to these and beyond, wars attract wide publicity and high polarization within political leadership, and the public (Eichenberg, 2014:2). Likewise, those issues of nuclear security nature are similarly threatening and salient; and “they pose central domestic concern for mass public” (Jenkins-Smith et al.2004:290); Therefore they may consume a great amount of public attention. These specific foreign policy matters epitomize *intermestic* issues, that is, they are “simultaneously, profoundly and inseparably both domestic and international”(Manning, 1977: 309). In other words, these are foreign policy issues that contain “a strong domestic component that affect[] daily life” (Aldrich et al. 1989:124). As Aldrich et al. (1989) argue foreign policy had an important effect on electoral behavior during the elections of 1952, 1972 and 1980 (see Hess and Nelson, 1985), because in these elections the Korean and Vietnam Wars and the Iranian hostage issue were hotly-contested intermestic issues. Since military and nuclear issues due to their intermestic nature and salience are “likely...[to be] as accessible as most attitudes about domestic issues” (Aldrich et al, 1989: 126) and thus Americans may think about them more than non-salient ones, I speculate that they are more likely to be structured and strongly predicted by citizens’ abstract dispositions⁵.

However military issues do not represent *all* foreign policy issues; and not *all* foreign policy issues are high-profile ones. Some foreign policy matters are more remote and even further detached from American’s daily lives than *intermestic* matters. These foreign policy matters of non-military nature are thus less expected to “penetrate the mass public’s awareness” (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). In this paper, I call these issues as *non-intermestic*

⁵ This argument is similar to Hurwitz and Peffley (1987)’s secondary argument.

foreign policy issues. Due to uniqueness of intermestic issues (i.e. domestic component that they have), I assume that the structure and coherence widely argued in the extant literature is limited to this type of foreign policy matters. Hence I expect that those foreign policy measures which are non-intermestic and non-military to be devoid of similar organization and structure. In fact, prior research found that those specific issues related to human rights and non-military international relations such as international trade and Soviet policy, do not seem to be constrained by citizens' foreign policy belief structures (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987:1115). In the same vein, Converse and Markus (1979) show that foreign aid preferences of the public are not predicted by foreign policy beliefs, such as isolationism and internationalism. Despite these, the extant literature on dispositions have assumed that public opinion on *all* foreign policy matters is structured likewise.

Promoting democracy via non-military tools is a non-salient and non-military issue. Citizens might possess little (or no) information on tools intended for democracy promotion, and therefore they might have weak attitudes on these matters. In fact, Americans consider the democracy promotion to be at the bottom of their list of foreign policy objectives (Pew Research Center, 2013) which runs counter to the main argument in the democracy promotion literature about the primordial nature of this policy for American foreign policy.

Thus building on the assumption that public opinion on foreign policy issues of non-intermestic type is *unlikely* to be structured along foreign policy dispositions due to the absence of domestic component that affect citizens' lives, I expect that mass attitudes towards economic sanctions, intended for promoting democracy, will *not* be structured along foreign policy dispositions, if these measures do not have explicit implications for the individual. In other words, I predict that whether the public favors or disfavors a democracy promotion tool will *not* vary along her beliefs, if this tool does not have an explicit domestic effect. When this foreign policy tool has an explicit national and/or individual impact, and the citizens are

informed of them, this converts this issue to an intermestic one and thus we would see the same dispositions to constrain the public approval or disapproval on these matters.

Interactionist Framework

Another framework I build on for my analysis is the *interactionist* framework proposed by Herrmann et al. (1999). Building on the literature on the role of dispositions on foreign policy attitudes, Herrmann and his colleagues (1999:554) propose a framework where they examine “how different types of people [i.e. whether internationalist, militarist, etc.] perceive, interpret and weight options in different types of situations”. Their framework encompasses the taxonomies of personal dispositional differences with taxonomies of strategic situational factors. By manipulating the features of strategic situations, Herrmann and the associates (1999) search for patterns of interaction between dispositional cleavages and situational factors. Their findings suggest that in some cases situational factors interact with personal dispositions in citizens’ calculations. For example, when U.S. interests are at risk, militarist Americans seem to be more supportive of using a military force than accommodative ones. On the contrary, this difference decreases when U.S. interests are not at stake. Interests also seem to interact with citizens’ political ideology. Citizens of conservative ideology appear to favor the use of force when the American interests are involved. Building on this literature, I expect that the effect of dispositional factors on the support for economic sanctions to vary along strategic situational factors.

SANCTIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION

Economic Sanctions

Foreign policy tools aimed at promoting democracy vary along their efficacy and success (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2006; Dunning, 2004; Escribà-Folch and Wright,

2015; Scott and Steele, 2011), whether they are unilateral or multilateral, or the extent they are coercive (see Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2015). This toolset contains democracy promotion instruments ranging from the most coercive and violent one, military intervention to less coercive economic sanctions, foreign aid conditionality, and to different types of diplomatic pressure. In this paper I examine public support for a non-military democracy promotion tool, economic sanctions.

Economic sanctions, i.e. the act of cutting trade, restricting relations, or freezing assets, in spite of their argued ineffectiveness and low success rate (e.g. Pape, 1997; Hufbauer, et al., 2008)⁶, are an extensively applied instrument by the United States, European Union, and other states and multilateral institutions. As Escribà-Folch and Wright (2015:118) report, “since the mid-1970s, nearly two-third of sanctions” were imposed with an aim of promoting democracy where the “United States has been one of the most active senders in targeting autocracies: 87 percent of targets were dictatorships when the US is one of the senders; in 81 percent of the cases in which the US was the sole sender, the target was a dictatorship”. As of 2015, the US had 28 different sanction programs against 50 countries of the world (US Office of Foreign Assets Control, cited in Heinrich, Kobayashi and Peterson, 2016), whereas the European Union held around 40 sanction regimes (Dreyer and Luengo-Cabrera, 2015).

Despite its wide usage, the general view in the scholarship is the apparent failure of economic sanctions to extract political concessions. Sanctions imposed against Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, and those against Burma’s military dictatorships are notorious examples. But if economic sanctions are so ineffective, then why the greatest superpowers continue imposing them? Some attribute this to the *symbolic* use of economic sanctions

⁶ Others argue that they may be effective only against democracies and less likely to achieve something when targeted at non-democracies (Lektzian and Souva, 2007).

(Whang, 2011; Nincic and Wallensteen, 1983). Domestic citizens expect some kind of action from their leaders in response to an international conflict and the leaders choose to show their competence by sanctioning the target state. As the argument goes, “sanctions can show their symbolic power by satisfying a domestic audience” (Whang, 2011:789). Whang (2011), for example, find that policymakers benefit from sanctions because imposing them augments their domestic support. Thus some suggest that the design and imposition of economic sanctions are driven by policy preferences of domestic actors, such as voters and interest groups (McLean and Whang, 2014; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1988). But how can the variance in public support for economic sanctions be explained? How does the public agree to approve or disapprove of economic sanctions? Does public rely upon their broad foreign policy dispositions when deciding?

Hypotheses

In this article, I examine three widely identified foreign policy dispositions in the extant literature. The first disposition is citizens’ preferences with regards to the U.S. involvement in world affairs, i.e. whether a citizen is an internationalist or an isolationist (Wittkopf, 1990). Here, consistent with McClosky (1967), Russett (1960) and others, I perceive this dimension as one continuum, having internationalists and isolationists in each extreme of the scale. Thus, building on the assumption that due to less-salient and non-military character, economic sanctions intended for promoting democracy, are less likely to be structured in the public’s mind (Bennett, 1974; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987) and most people are less likely to have “well thought out, firmly-held, or consistent views” (Bennett, 1974:732) on these matters, I expect whether a person is internationalist or isolationist will *not* have a systematic effect on her support for economic sanctions (H1).

The second disposition is defined as peoples' association with either militarist and assertive or non-militarist and peaceful views (Wittkopf, 1990; Herrmann et al. 1999). The extant literature on foreign policy attitudes would argue that whether Americans approve or disapprove of economic sanctions would hinge upon the person's identification with either militarism or non-militarism. Again, here I expect the support for democracy promotion *not* to be constrained by this disposition. To put differently, I predict that support for economic sanctions will *not* differ along the militarism-nonmilitarism continuum (H2).

Consistent with Herrmann et al. (1999) I identify citizens' domestic political ideology as the third disposition. The extant literature holds two contradictory findings for the constraining effect of this disposition on public attitudes. Some argue about the role of liberal-conservatism cleavage in determining the public attitudes towards foreign policy measures (Wittkopf, 1994; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004), while others fail to find an empirical evidence for this argument (Converse, 1964; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Herrmann et al., 1999). Here, consistent with my main argument, I expect mass support for economic sanctions *not* to vary along citizens' political ideology (H3).

In some cases, non-intermestic issues might acquire a domestic component, for example, by increasing the national and individual costs of the foreign policy tool. In this paper, I put forth an argument that when citizens are aware of the fact that a foreign policy tool explicitly *touches* their domestic life, for example, by increasing insecurity or by incurring some kind of costs, they behave as they would have behaved with domestic or intermestic issues. They rely upon their broad dispositions to make sense of the International Relations. Benefiting from the interactionist framework proposed by Herrmann et al. (1999), I predict that U.S. citizens in my experiments will adapt their dispositions on economic sanctions depending on different features of the situation. I argue here that whether U.S. or individual interests are at risk or not, will influence the strength of the relationship between

the dispositions and the support for economic sanctions (H4). By having a component that identifies the direct and indirect effects of foreign policy matters to individuals, once non-intermestic issues convert to intermestic ones. For example, by explicitly mentioning that imposing economic sanctions could entail domestic costs to sending country and the citizens might augment the importance of this measure for individuals and add a domestic dimension of this measure.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In May 2016 I fielded an online survey experiment to investigate whether American public opinion on foreign policy measures against autocracies differed along the strategicness of the foreign adversary (Muradova, 2016). The sample consisted of 611 voting age American participants recruited using an opt-in, non-probability based platform especially tailored for research, Prolific Academic (ProA). ProA was created in 2014 as a software incubator company by several students from Oxford and Sheffield Universities. ProA population is biased towards male (60%) and Caucasian (70%) citizens, whereas about half of its participants are students (Peer et al. 2017). Participants in my sample, 50,52% of whom identified as female, and 49, 12% as having a higher education degree or above (bachelor, master, phd), ranged in age from 18-65. Platforms similar to ProA, such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk, CrowdFlower, are currently extensively used to recruit online human subjects for research purposes within Behavioral Sciences (Paolacci and Chandler, 2014; Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, Acquisti, 2017) . Similar to MTurk, a popular research tool for social scientists, the biggest advantage of this platform is its low cost and feasibility in terms of conducting experiments. However, ProA, is argued to have more diverse population when it comes to geographical location, ethnicity, etc. than MTurk and CrowdFlower and its data quality is higher than that of other platforms (Peer et al., 2017). It is also found to accommodate respondents who are less dishonest and more naïve (ibid). Further ProA has a

fair wage norm, which makes the platform ethics-wise more appealing. Likewise, it is not overused as other platforms and thus the “habitual responding” might be of less an issue (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2011)⁷.

I first screened participants by citizenship (U.S. only) and then by age (18-65). I further limited my sample to those who did not participate in my pilot experiment. I published a study in ProA and all respondents were paid £ 0.70 for a task of 5 minutes. After accepting the study participants were directed to the link in Qualtrics to take the survey experiment. Respondents were randomly assigned either to a control group (vignette I) or to one of two treatment groups (vignette II & vignette III). First, they were told that the study was about a situation the US could face in the future and that the situation was general and hypothetical. I adapted this introductory text from Tomz and Weeks (2013). Before exposing the respondents to the experiment, I measured respondents’ three key dispositions, “internationalism versus isolationism”, “militarism versus accommodation” and “political ideology”.

For the first disposition, similar to Watts and Free (1978) and dissimilar to Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), I assumed a single isolationist-internationalist dimension. Following Tomz and Weeks (2013, 2015) and Fjelstul et al. (2015) I asked the respondents to show the extent they agree or disagree with the following statement: “The United States needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world”. The response had 6-point scale going from “Agree strongly” to “Disagree strongly”. I further recoded the variable, by reversing its scales for an ease in interpretation. I define isolationists as those who disagree and internationalists as those who agree with this statement. The statement to tap the militarism

⁷ Some respondents might take many surveys which could augment “the potential for cross-experiment stimuli contamination” (Transue, Lee and Aldrich, 2009).

disposition is as follows: “The use of military force only makes problems worse” (Tomz and Weeks, 2013; 2015). The respondents chose from a response scale of 6 points, with 1 denoting “Agree Strongly” and 6 “Disagree strongly”. Political ideology was measured with a self-placement on 7-point scale, the “1” being “extremely liberal” and the “7” “extremely conservative”. Appendix A presents the questionnaire used in my experiments.

After having responded the questions on dispositions, respondents were introduced to the experiment. The experiment consisted of a short vignette which described how human rights situation in a hypothetical country had deteriorated for the last couple of years. They were further instructed to express their support or disapproval of economic sanctions (and other two foreign policy measures) against this country in order to promote democracy and respect for human rights. Those in the control group read that the country was an exporter of agricultural products, while in the treatment groups I & II the country exported oil and gas. The treatment group II augmented the strategicness of this country, by explicitly describing potential energy costs of foreign policy measures against the Country X for a sending party, i.e. the U.S., should the latter decides to impose them (Muradova, 2016).

I also controlled for some other variables, such as sex, age, education, employment, income, political partisanship, and interest in foreign news. The decision was based on the insights from previous research. Prior research demonstrated that public opinion on different democracy promotion instruments differed along demographic groups (e.g. Brancati, 2014). Women are found to be more unwilling to support foreign engagement than men (Eichenberg, 2003). Interest in foreign news is argued to strongly predict the willingness to take an action in foreign policy (Putnam and Shapiro, 2013). Likewise, I expect the public opinion to vary along citizens’ political partisanship.

To circumvent the problems of inattentiveness and satisficing in surveys, in my experiment I carried out Instructional Manipulation Check (IMC) (Oppenheimer, Meyvis and Davidenko, 2009), in my survey experiments.⁸ Finally, I conducted a post-treatment manipulation check to test if the treatment worked properly. It consisted of two questions: (a) if respondents thought the country in question was democratic or non-democratic; and (b) if the country was exporting oil and gas.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Statistical Analysis

For my global models, I firstly examine the predicting ability of citizens' dispositions on their support for economic sanctions (*dispositions* framework), collapsing across the manipulations, but controlling for the treatment variable. I perform a regression analysis with SEM, with standardized coefficients. I first run a model with uncorrected data, and further correct it for measurement errors. I run a goodness of fit analysis to see if my model fits the data well without and further with correction for measurement errors. The section on findings report the coefficients as well as the goodness of fit statistics.

Secondly, I test whether this relationship holds stable or varies along my treatment groups, by performing a multi-group regression analysis with SEM without and with correction for measurement errors.

Correction for measurement errors

Public opinion research largely hinges upon survey data. However, the survey data almost always is contaminated with mismeasured variables. Prior abundant literature (Saris

⁸ I asked the public to indicate the chosen response "somewhat approve", and 99.05% of respondents got it right. As recommended by Anduiza and Galais (2016) I have not disregarded data from inattentive respondents for my analysis.

and Gallhofer, 2007, 2014; Alwin, 2007; Goldberger and Duncan, 1973; Saris and Revilla, 2015) has well demonstrated that most concepts we are interested in are usually measured improperly, i.e. the variables we observe have measurement errors. It is based on the assumption that how the question is framed and expressed could stimulate different kind of responses. This denotes that in some cases we have no idea what “the true values of the variables we want to measure are” (Saris and Revilla, 2015:1006). Alwin (2007), for example, argues that 50 per cent of the variance of observed variables in survey research are due to measurement errors. Therefore, as argued by Alwin (2007: xi), the reliability of measurement should be an indispensable condition of any empirical science.

Specific to the literature on mass foreign policy preferences, Achen (1975) revises the seminal work by Converse (1964) and argues that Converse’s argument on the inconsistency of public opinion with regards to foreign policy was erroneous due to the improper measurement of the variables of interest. “The variation in [citizens’] responses”, as he argues, “represents errors of observation by the researchers” (Achen, 1975:1221), rather than the inconsistency of mass opinion. Since “the size of correlation would depend on how vague the questions and response categories are (variation owing to the objects of choice) and on how unstable the respondent’s views are (variation owing to the subject)”, this variation in respondents’ positions should be ascribed to these variability, instead of the inconsistency of the public opinion (Achen, 1975: 1220). Similarly, Erikson (1979: 113), referring to the same study contends that “about half the variance in the observed scores is variance in true opinions and about half is error variance”.

Hence the argument that the survey data is contaminated with measurement errors which should be corrected for, is not new. Neither is it for the literature on mass foreign policy attitudes. But as Alwin (2007:xii) eloquently puts in the preface of his seminal book on margins of error, “Errors of measurement [...] are a bit like what Mark Twain reportedly said

about the weather: 'Everybody talks about the subject, but nobody does anything about it"', despite widespread acknowledgement of measurement errors in survey data, the number of papers correcting for these errors is still scarce. For example, a recent research shows that only 17 out of 184 articles that used survey research in six leading social science journals in 2011 corrected for measurement errors (Saris and Revilla, 2015:1007). The main reason for the reluctance to correct for measurement errors seems to be the complexity and expensiveness of extant procedures (for a review see Saris and Revilla, 2015). To overcome this hardship, a simpler procedure for correcting for measurement errors has been proposed by Saris and Gallhofer (2014). Consistent with this procedure, I firstly need to have the estimates of the size of measurement errors or alternatively the quality of the questions I used in my survey.

The quality of a question (q^2) is understood as the strength of the relationship between our latent variable, i.e. the variable we want to measure and the observed variable, i.e. the response to the survey question we ask. It is calculated by a multiplication of the validity (v^2) and the reliability of a question (r^2). The reliability is defined as the strength of the relationship between the observed variable and the true score of the variable and equals to "1-the proportion of random error variance". That signifies that the more random error we have, the smaller is the reliability. As to the validity, it is defined as 1 minus the method error variance, i.e. the more the reactions to the method differ, the smaller the validity will be. Validity, reliability, as well as the measurement quality can be obtained using the software, Survey Quality Predictor (SQP) (Saris, 2013), based on the attributes of the question, such as its characteristics, wording, and the context. The SQP 2.1. contains quality predictions for more than 13000 questions. For those questions inexistent in the software, one has to introduce and code them. The coding involves defining the theme, context, structure, the response choices etc. of the question. Since the variables measuring internationalism,

militarism, the political ideology and the interest in foreign news were inexistent in the SQP 2.1, I coded them following the procedure (see Figure B1 in Appendix B).

For background variables such as age, education, employment, income, as well as the partisanship I attained the reliability of measurement from Alwin (2007) which equals the measurement quality, q^2 . Table 1 presents the measurement quality estimates obtained from SQP 2.1. software and Alwin (2007). For the variable sex, I could not find any reliability in Alwin (2007) and considering that it is often not an “unreliable” variable, I kept the q^2 to 1.

Table 1. Measurement Quality Estimates

| Variables | Quality (q^2) | Source |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Sanctions | 0.568 | SQP 2.1 Survey Quality Predictor |
| Militarism | 0.588 | SQP 2.1 Survey Quality Predictor |
| Internationalism | 0.568 | SQP 2.1 Survey Quality Predictor |
| Political Ideology | 0.679 | Alwin (2007:357, var: 9062) |
| Age | 0.997 | Alwin (2007:327, var: 9123) |
| Education | 0.948 | Alwin (2007:328, var: 8032) |
| Employment | 0.827 | Alwin (2007:328, var: 7022) |
| Income | 0.917 | Alwin (2007:328, var: 5035) |
| Partisanship | 0.95 | Alwin (2007:355, var: 5109) |
| Foreignnews | 0.602 | SQP 2.1 Survey Quality Predictor |

Note: They can be accessed via the software SQP 2.1 under the study named “Foreign policy US”.

As it can be seen from the Table 1 for none of the variables the quality equals 1, i.e. is perfect. The difference to 1 is the measurement error. Once we have all of the quality estimates of the variables of interest, we proceed to correcting for measurement errors, consistent with the procedure described by DeCastellarnau and Saris (2015). Appendix B briefly presents the applied procedure.

FINDINGS

Descriptive Statistics

Here I firstly examine the descriptive statistics (Table 2). For the sake of ease of interpretation, I generated two new dichotomous variables for internationalism and militarism, collapsing six points into 2 categories. I recoded the first three responses (disagree strongly, disagree and disagree somewhat) to a statement “the United States needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world” into a category “isolationist” and the last three (agree somewhat, agree, and agree strongly) into “internationalist” one. For the variable “militarism” I did the same: those who agreed with the statement “ the use of military force only makes problems worse” were categorized as “non-militarists” and those who disagreed as “militarists”. Further, recall that the liberal-conservative continuum variable has a 7 points scale. I generated a new variable, collapsing three response points into “conservative” (extremely conservative, conservative and slightly conservative), and other three points (extremely liberal, liberal and slightly liberal) into “liberalist” category, maintaining the middle point as a separate category (moderate, middle of the road). Similarly, I collapsed the categories in the variables education, income and foreign news. As Table 2 illustrates, internationalists constitute some 47.3 % of my sample, whereas non-militarists seem to substantially outnumber the militarists (75 %). Liberals make up almost 63 % of my sample.

Table 2. Descriptive Demographics in %

| Internationalism | | Militarism | |
|--------------------------------|-------|---------------------|-------|
| internationalist | 47.37 | Militarists | 25.16 |
| isolationist | 52.62 | non-militarists | 74.84 |
| Age | | Sex | |
| 18-35 | 75.21 | Male | 49.42 |
| 36-65 | 24.79 | Female | 50.58 |
| Income in USD thousands | | Foreign News | |
| less than 30 | 34.43 | Yearly | 9.34 |
| 30-60 | 33.44 | Monthly | 26.07 |
| 60-90 | 17.7 | Weekly | 49.02 |
| over 90 | 14.43 | Daily | 15.57 |
| Political Ideology | | Education | |
| liberal | 62.85 | no-degree | 50.82 |
| middle of the road | 21.77 | Degree | 49.12 |

| | | | |
|--------------|-------|---------------------|-------------------|
| conservative | 15.38 | | |
| | | Partisanship | Employment |
| Republican | 11.11 | Employed | 47.3 |
| Independent | 37.31 | self-employed | 20.13 |
| democrat | 47.1 | Unemployed | 8.84 |
| another | 4.48 | Student | 18.99 |

Regression Analysis: Dispositions Framework

Here I analyze the existence or absence of systematic effect of foreign policy dispositions on the support for economic sanctions, by collapsing across experimental groups. With the help of a SEM analysis, I regress the support for economic sanctions on three dispositional variables (internationalism, militarism and political ideology) with and without correction for measurement errors. Here I use the original (not recorded) variables. Table 3 reports standardized coefficients for these two models.

Table 3. Global Regression Analysis


| | Before Correction for Measurement Errors | | After Correction for Measurement Errors | |
|------------------|--|------------|---|------------|
| militarism | 0.001 | (0.044) | -0.531 | (0.068)*** |
| internationalism | 0.249 | (0.042)*** | 0.822 | (0.057)*** |
| ideology | -0.031 | (0.049) | 0.391 | (0.068)*** |
| treatment | 0.027 | (0.038) | 0.066 | (0.024)** |
| age | 0.090 | (0.041)* | 0.041 | (0.027) |
| sex | -0.027 | (0.040) | 0.018 | (0.025) |
| education | 0.044 | (0.040) | -0.005 | (0.026) |
| employment | -0.032 | (0.041) | -0.067 | (0.029)* |
| income | 0.099 | (0.039)* | 0.041 | (0.026) |
| partisanship | -0.048 | (0.046) | 0.110 | (0.040)** |
| foreignnews | 0.130 | (0.039)*** | 0.220 | (0.032)*** |
| chi2 | 0 | | 0 | |
| R2 | 0.13 | | 0.4 | |
| N | 611 | | 611 | |

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

The table also reports the explained variance, R-squared, for both of the models. Comparing the two models, one can observe that after correcting for measurement errors the model explains 27% more of the variance more than the model without correction.

Figure 1. Coefficient Plot of the Effect of Dispositions on Support for Sanctions (without and with correction for measurement errors).




Further, as Figure 1 visually demonstrates and Table 3 shows, regression coefficients between my variables of interest become substantively stronger after correcting for measurement errors. Prior to the correction, the variable measuring respondents' posture on militarism does not predict her willingness to impose sanctions on a foreign country. After the correction, we observe that the more the person associates herself with militarist views, the more likely she is to support economic sanctions. The effect, apart from being substantively important, acquires a statistical significance with $p < 0.001$. The correction also causes the regression coefficient of internationalism on support for sanctions to drastically increase from 0.25 to 0.82. The results show that the less international the person is, the less likely she is to endorse sanctions. Alternatively, the more international the respondent is, the more willing she is to support sanctions.

Further, in my first model, the coefficient for the political ideology is negative, i.e. the more conservative the person is, the less she is likely to support economic sanctions. However the coefficient is not different from zero, meaning that at first sight the political ideology does not seem to matter for Americans' decisions to impose sanctions. That would have corroborated the findings by Converse (1964), Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), and Herrmann et al (1999). However, when I reanalyze the data after correcting for measurement errors, I get drastically different results. Political ideology seems to systematically and significantly constrain Americans' foreign policy decisions. The more conservative the respondent is, the more likely she is to support economic sanctions. These findings demonstrate how measurement errors in survey data could substantially bias the results and lead to erroneous conclusions. Similarly, in sharp contrast to the coefficients in the first model, the variables of treatment, employment and partisanship acquire statistical significance, while the variable age and income lose it once corrected for measurement errors.

Multi-group regression analysis: Interactionist Framework

Now I proceed to examining whether the effect of foreign policy dispositions on the support for sanctions varies across experimental groups. Recall that I had three experimental groups, where I manipulated the strategicness of a foreign adversary for the United States. The non-democratic adversary in the control group relied on the export of agricultural products for its main income. In the treatment group I instead of an exporter of agricultural products, the country in question exports oil and gas. In the treatment group II, in addition Americans are explicitly informed that any punitive measures against the human rights violating country would have energy-related costs to the United States. Applying the *interactionist* framework suggested by Herrmann et al. (1999) here I examine whether the effect of dispositions differs along strategic manipulations.

Figure 2. Distribution of support for economic sanctions by groups



As the Figure 2. reports, there seems to be some difference in support for economic sanctions across experimental groups, especially between the control group and the treatment group I. In order to test if the effects of dispositions (militarism, internationalism and political ideology) on the support for sanctions differ along groups, I perform a multiple group analysis without and with correction for measurement errors. Table 4 reports these two models. The reported coefficients are unstandardized ones, since with standardized coefficients it is more difficult to distinguish whether two estimates are equal or different across experimental groups. In these models, I constrain my control variables, i.e. age, education, sex, employment and political partisanship, to be equal across groups. For the sake of clarity, in the table below I do not present coefficients for constrained variables.

Table 4. Multi-group Regression Analysis

| | Before correction for Measurement Errors | After correction for Measurement Errors |
|---------------------------------|---|--|
| control#c.militarism | 0.011 (0.089) | -0.438 (0.11)*** |
| treatment I#c.militarism | 0.088 (0.077) | -0.267 (0.115)* |
| treatment II#c.militarism | - 0.139 (0.085) | -1.135 (0.089)*** |
| control#c.internationalism | 0.285 (0.072)*** | 0.761 (0.082)*** |
| treatment I#c.internationalism | 0.236 (0.069)*** | 0.707 (0.102)*** |
| treatment II#c.internationalism | 0.25 (0.070)*** | 1.054 (0.064)*** |
| control#c.ideology | 0.01 (0.062) | 0.173 (0.062) ** |
| treatment I#c.ideology | 0.161 (0.062) *** | 0.224 (0.072)*** |
| treatment II#c.ideology | 0.068 (0.054) | 0.504 (0.046)*** |
| R2 (1st group) | 0.10 | 0.35 |
| R2 (2nd group) | 0.14 | 0.34 |
| R2 (3rd group) | 0.10 | 0.62 |
| N | 611 | 611 |
| Standard errors in parentheses | | |
| * p<0.05 | ** p<0.01 | *** p<0.001" |

Table 4 reports the explained variance R-squared, for three separate groups, as well as unstandardized regression coefficients per experimental group. Correcting for measurement errors improves the explained variance dramatically. The R-squared changes from 0.10 to 0.35 for the first experimental group, from 0.14 to 0.34 for the second experimental group and from 0.10 to 0.62 for the last group . Hence after having corrected for measurement errors, the model seems to explain the dependent variable far better than without correction.

Further, post-correction we observe that the direction of the effect between militarism and economic sanctions seem to differ. While prior to correction, the direction of the relationship between militarism and support for sanctions varied along experimental groups, i.e. depending if the autocracy was an oil autocracy or not, and whether there were energy

interests at stake, after correction the militarism seems to negatively and systematically affect the support for sanctions. The more militarist the person is, the less likely she is to sanction a non-democracy. This coefficient is even bigger when more US interests are at stake, i.e. when the non-democracy is an oil and gas exporter and punishing the country in question could have negative national and household energy consequences, militarists in my experiments to be less keener on supporting economic sanctions.

As to liberalism-conservatism continuum, strategic factors similarly affect the influence of political ideology on approval or disapproval of sanctions. The size of the regression coefficient of political ideology increases, as the strategicness of the non-democracy augments. The more conservative the participants is in my experiments, the more she is likely to endorse economic sanctions, especially when national and household energy interests are at stake.

CONCLUSION

Does public have organized and consistent attitudes towards foreign policy issues that have no or little domestic component? Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) and Bennett (1974) argued that foreign policy issues which are less-salient and non-military are less likely to be constrained by foreign policy dispositions. In this paper, I have made a similar suggestion, by differentiating between two kinds of foreign policy issues: *intermestic* (with strong domestic component) and *non-intermestic* (all others). Building on the theoretical framework on *dispositions* and Herrmann et al. (1999) *interactionist* framework, I analyzed the effect of three key foreign policy dispositions, internationalism vs. isolationism, militarism vs. non-militarism and political ideology on citizens' support for a *non-intermestic* democracy promotion tool, economic sanctions, with survey experimental data from 611 American citizens.

My findings reveal that the US citizens in my experiments possess foreign policy dispositions which strongly predict their attitudes on even *non-intermestic* foreign policy matters. Internationalism and militarism seem to affect how Americans decide upon approving or disapproving economic sanctions. Further, contrary to Hurwitz and Peffley (1987:1100) who stated that political ideology is “typically poor predictor(...) of foreign policy attitudes”, my findings suggest that it is quite the contrary. In my sample, political ideology appears to anchor well the mass opinion with regards to democracy promotion tools of non-military nature.

Moreover, consistent with Herrmann et al. (1999), my findings suggest that situational strategic matters are similarly important. For example, we have also observed that when the US national and household energy interests are at stake, the effects of militarism, internationalism and political ideology increase substantively. Citing Herrmann and associates (1999:569) this could suggest that “to understand decision making on foreign policy by the mass public, we need to combine our knowledge of types with types of situations and to explore the combinatorial rules of thumb by which citizens make choices”.

Nonetheless, there are several potential limitations of this research which deserve special attention. Critics might argue that my experimental sample is not probability-based. Indeed, my sample over-represents younger, more liberal and better educated citizens, who may contain greater knowledge and “interconnectedness on political attitudes” (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). Some could argue that its being a convenience sample might bias the external validity of my results. Prior research, however, demonstrates quite the contrary. Mullinex, Leeper, Druckman and Freese (2016) compare treatment effects obtained from convenience samples to those of population samples. Their results display a large similarity between many treatment effects from convenience and representative samples. Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012), on the other hand, find that online opt-in experiments, conducted via a similar

platform such as MTurk, are usually more representative of American population than convenience samples. Nonetheless, by replicating these results with a representative sample, the future research could cast light on existing doubts.

Moreover, critics might suggest that the US citizens in my experiments might have been influenced by elite cues, as the latter are found to be significant in mass decision-making. This research by no means denies the role of elite influence on mass opinion on foreign policy issues. However, in my survey experiment the targeted country was hypothetical; and in the beginning I explicitly mentioned that this situation was hypothetical and not about any country in the news today (consistent with Tomz and Weeks, 2013). This way, I tried to limit citizens' perceptions about specific countries and situations.

Finally, this research has another methodologically non-trivial contribution. By correcting for measurement errors in the survey dataset and comparing it with uncorrected regression results, I demonstrate how not accounting for the problem of measurement errors could bias substantially our research results. Therefore I join the team of scholars who accentuate the importance of correcting for measurement errors in survey data.

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Appendix A.

Questionnaire

Questions measuring dispositions:

1. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with these statements:

1.1. “The use of military force only makes problems worse”

- Agree strongly (1)
- Agree (2)
- Agree somewhat (3)
- Disagree somewhat (4)
- Disagree (5)
- Disagree strongly (6)

1.2. “The United States needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world”

- Agree strongly (1)
- Agree (2)
- Agree somewhat (3)
- Disagree somewhat (4)
- Disagree (5)
- Disagree strongly (6)

2. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as:

- Extremely liberal (1)
- Liberal (2)
- Slightly liberal (3)
- Moderate, middle of the road (4)
- Slightly conservative (5)
- Conservative (6)
- Extremely conservative (7)

Introductory Text to All Respondents

We are going to describe a situation the United States could face in the future. For scientific validity, the situation is general and hypothetical; it does not refer to a specific country in the news today. Please read the situation and the questions carefully and indicate what course of action, if any, you think the U.S. government should take to promote democracy and respect for human rights in this situation.

Vignettes

Control Group

Excerpts from a U.S. diplomatic report state: "...The human rights situation in Country X has deteriorated for the last couple of years. Government authorities of the country have imprisoned many citizens because of their beliefs. The regime is implicated in forced disappearances, torture and killings of regime opponents, journalists and human rights lawyers...Its economy is still heavily reliant on the export of agricultural products...There have been some calls for punitive measures..."

Treatment Group I

Excerpts from a U.S. diplomatic report state: "...The human rights situation in Country X has deteriorated for the last couple of years. Government authorities of the country have imprisoned many citizens because of their beliefs. The regime is implicated in forced disappearances, torture and killings of regime opponents, journalists and human rights lawyers...Its economy is still heavily reliant on oil and gas exports...There have been some calls for punitive measures..."

Treatment Group II

Excerpts from a U.S. diplomatic report states: "...The human rights situation in Country X has deteriorated for the last couple of years. Government authorities of the country have imprisoned many citizens because of their beliefs. The regime is implicated in forced disappearances, torture and killings of regime opponents, journalists and human rights lawyers....Its economy is still heavily reliant on oil and gas exports...There have been some calls for punitive measures...Energy pundits predict that if the US government punishes the Country X, the latter could temporarily restrict fuel exports, destabilize energy markets, and thus result in an increase in household energy prices..."

The question measuring the DV

Do you approve of the U.S. Government imposing economic sanctions (e.g. cutting trade, restricting financial relations, freezing assets, etc.) on the Country X in order to promote democracy and respect for human rights?

- Strongly approve (1)
- Approve (2)
- Somewhat approve (3)
- Somewhat disapprove (4)
- Disapprove (5)
- Strongly disapprove (6)

Questions measuring control variables

Now we will ask you some questions about your background.

How old are you?

- 18-25 (1)
- 26-35 (2)
- 36-45 (3)
- 46-55 (4)
- 56-65 (5)

What is your sex?

- Male (1)
- Female (2)

Your employment Status. Are you currently...?

- Employed for wages (1)
- Self-employed (2)
- Out of work and looking for work (3)
- Out of work but not currently looking for work (4)
- Homemaker (5)
- Student (6)
- Retired (7)
- Other (8)

What is your total household income?

- Less than \$10,000 (1)
- \$10,000 - \$19,999 (2)
- \$20,000 - \$29,999 (3)
- \$30,000 - \$39,999 (4)
- \$40,000 - \$49,999 (5)
- \$50,000 - \$59,999 (6)
- \$60,000 - \$69,999 (7)
- \$70,000 - \$79,999 (8)
- \$80,000 - \$89,999 (9)
- \$90,000 - \$99,999 (10)
- \$100,000 - \$149,999 (11)
- More than \$150,000 (12)

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat or Independent?

- Republican (1)
- Independent (2)
- Democrat (3)
- Another party (4)

How often do you watch news about foreign countries on TV or on internet?

- once a year (1)
- 2-3 times a year (2)
- once a month (3)
- 2-3 times a month (4)
- once a week (5)
- 2-3 times a week (6)
- daily (7)

Appendix B.

Simple procedure on correction for measurement errors.

(an adapted version of instructions by DeCastellarnau and Saris, 2014)

1. Estimation of the measurement quality of survey questions

As stated in the section on the correction for measurement errors, I firstly obtained predictions about the measurement quality of my questions from Survey Quality Predictor 2.1 (with an exception of some background variables and the question on the political ideology and partisanship). For the purpose of illustration, Figure B1 shows a screenshot of the question measuring my dependent variable, together with its characteristics, from SQP 2.1 .

Figure B1. SQP 2.1 screenshot on the coding of the question measuring “support for economic sanctions”

SQP
Survey
Quality
Predictor

Home
Questions
Studies
FAQ
Limits
About us

Home > All Questions > Question Foreign Policy US / DV2 / sanction / United States > My Coding

Question

DV2 / sanction / punitive measures
Foreign Policy US United States - English

Introduction Text:
We are going to describe a situation the United States could face in the future. For scientific validity, the situation is general and hypothetical; it does not refer to a specific country in the news today. Please read the situation and the questions carefully and indicate what course of action, if any, you think the U.S. government should take to promote democracy and respect for human rights in this situation.

Answer options:

- Strongly approve (1)
- Approve (2)
- Somewhat approve (3)
- Somewhat disapprove (4)
- Disapprove (5)
- Strongly disapprove (6)

Request for Answer Text:
Do you approve of the U.S. Government imposing economic sanctions (e.g. cutting trade, restricting financial relations, freezing assets, etc.) on the Country X in order to promote democracy and respect for human rights?

Edit Question

Your Quality Prediction for this Question

View a prediction of the quality of this question based on the choices made for each characteristic.

View Quality Prediction >

| Characteristic | Choice | Code |
|--|---|------|
| Domain | International politics | 2 |
| Domain: international politics | Other | 9 |
| Concept | Evaluative belief | 1 |
| Social Desirability | Not present | 0 |
| Centrality | A bit central | 1 |
| Reference period | Future | 1 |
| Formulation of the request for an answer: basic choice | Indirect requests | 1 |
| WH word used in the request | Request without WH word | 0 |
| Request for an answer type | Interrogative | 1 |
| Use of gradation | No gradation used | 0 |
| Balance of the request | Unbalanced | 1 |
| Presence of encouragement to answer | No particular encouragement present | 0 |
| Emphasis on subjective opinion in request | No emphasis on opinion present | 0 |
| Information about the opinion of other people | No information about opinions of others | 0 |
| Use of stimulus or statement in the request | No stimulus or statement | 0 |
| Absolute or comparative judgment | An absolute judgement | 0 |
| Response scale: basic choice | More than 2 categories scales | 0 |
| Number of categories | 6 | 6 |
| Labels of categories | Fully labelled | 3 |
| Labels with short text or complete sentences | Short text | 0 |
| Order of the labels | First label positive | 2 |

2. Correction for measurement errors in the correlation matrix for standardized solution

I firstly obtained the correlation matrix of my observed variables (see Figure B2). Later I multiplied the correlations by quality estimates (see Table 1 for measurement quality estimates). I put the quality on the diagonal and asked the Stata (StataCorps, 2013) to transform the covariance matrix into a correlation one.

Figure B2 . Correlation Matrix

| | sanctions | militarism | internationalism | ideology | treatment | age | sex | education | employment | income | partisanship | foreignnews |
|------------------|-----------|------------|------------------|----------|-----------|---------|---------|-----------|------------|---------|--------------|-------------|
| sanctions | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| militarism | 0.0991 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| internationalism | 0.2809 | 0.3513 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| ideology | -0.0003 | 0.3505 | -0.0242 | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| treatment | 0.0128 | 0.0256 | -0.0356 | -0.0184 | 1 | | | | | | | |
| age | 0.1342 | 0.1173 | 0.0712 | 0.1353 | 0.025 | 1 | | | | | | |
| sex | -0.0484 | -0.0846 | -0.0567 | -0.1398 | 0.0384 | 0.1524 | 1 | | | | | |
| education | 0.0938 | -0.109 | 0.0169 | -0.0703 | -0.0291 | 0.1533 | 0.0985 | 1 | | | | |
| employment | -0.0751 | -0.0154 | 0.0239 | -0.0894 | 0.0095 | -0.2903 | 0.024 | -0.2235 | 1 | | | |
| income | 0.1677 | 0.027 | 0.1639 | -0.0453 | -0.048 | -0.0116 | -0.0622 | 0.1518 | -0.074 | 1 | | |
| partisanship | -0.0518 | -0.1985 | -0.0433 | -0.5675 | -0.0065 | -0.059 | 0.137 | 0.0451 | 0.0729 | -0.0149 | 1 | |
| foreignnews | 0.1747 | -0.0032 | 0.0449 | -0.018 | -0.0067 | 0.1271 | -0.132 | 0.102 | -0.0365 | 0.134 | 0.0096 | 1 |

3. Regression analysis with and without correction for measurement errors

I further run a regression analysis without and later with correction for measurement errors.

The only thing that differs in the command of this analysis is the correlation matrix. You can find the results of this analysis in Table 3.

4. Correction for measurement errors in the covariance matrix for the unstandardized solution

For multi-group analysis with unstandardized coefficients, I asked the Stata for covariance matrices per experimental groups (StataCorps, 2013: 107-108) and multiplied the quality estimates (Table 1) by covariance on the diagonal. Figure B3 shows uncorrected covariance matrix for a multi-group analysis.

Figure B3. Covariance Matrices per Experimental Groups

Control Group

| | sanctions | militarism | internationalism | ideology | age | sex | education | employment | income | partisanship | foreignnews |
|------------------|-----------|------------|------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|----------|--------------|-------------|
| sanctions | 1.76472 | | | | | | | | | | |
| militarism | 0.116739 | 1.20919 | | | | | | | | | |
| internationalism | 0.507292 | 0.473175 | 1.636 | | | | | | | | |
| ideology | -0.063771 | 0.527947 | -0.05387 | 2.17836 | | | | | | | |
| age | 0.221724 | -0.006755 | 0.073209 | -0.003975 | 1.11871 | | | | | | |
| sex | -0.066381 | -0.063235 | 0.017778 | -0.177486 | 0.118739 | 0.251183 | | | | | |
| education | 0.133029 | -0.285227 | -0.010535 | -0.180852 | 0.324026 | 0.011584 | 1.61176 | | | | |
| employment | -0.271302 | 0.021826 | -0.023777 | -0.153221 | -0.589133 | 0.050724 | -0.573697 | 3.9542 | | | |
| income | 0.519412 | 0.050676 | 0.628323 | -0.178315 | 0.035653 | -0.153953 | 0.363142 | -0.87475 | 9.72614 | | |
| partisanship | -0.086329 | -0.171707 | -0.071477 | -0.635444 | 0.103643 | 0.10001 | 0.046896 | -0.006267 | -0.16878 | 0.57694 | |
| foreignnews | 0.461762 | -0.226869 | -0.112496 | -0.068966 | 0.117788 | -0.141857 | 0.266132 | -0.166098 | 0.616934 | 0.004097 | 2.53875 |

Treatment Group I

| | sanctions | militarism | internationalism | ideology | age | sex | education | employment | income | partisanship | foreignnews |
|------------------|-----------|------------|------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|--------------|-------------|
| sanctions | 1.50674 | | | | | | | | | | |
| militarism | 0.30744 | 1.50667 | | | | | | | | | |
| internationalism | 0.476542 | 0.594293 | 1.59691 | | | | | | | | |
| ideology | 0.027791 | 0.507589 | -0.152823 | 1.93675 | | | | | | | |
| age | 0.245962 | 0.170512 | 0.093447 | 0.156207 | 1.07914 | | | | | | |
| sex | -0.010921 | -0.040763 | -0.033687 | -0.085064 | 0.074296 | 0.251038 | | | | | |
| education | 0.057735 | -0.114341 | 0.025227 | 0.001025 | 0.037379 | 0.056914 | 1.38584 | | | | |
| employment | -0.304671 | -0.227939 | -0.091294 | -0.402374 | -0.703969 | -0.028457 | -0.415423 | 4.09181 | | | |
| income | 0.81126 | 0.402861 | 0.708814 | 0.096908 | -0.383941 | -0.088602 | 0.636825 | 0.092755 | 9.70281 | | |
| partisanship | -0.003076 | -0.119905 | -0.005307 | -0.566144 | -0.106368 | 0.019382 | 0.014459 | 0.218659 | -0.004153 | 0.552146 | |
| foreignnews | 0.144029 | 0.149618 | 0.147054 | -0.075117 | 0.215044 | -0.16136 | 0.147259 | -0.283444 | 0.383018 | 0.014459 | 2.42137 |

Treatment Group II

| | sanctions | militarism | internationalism | ideology | age | sex | education | employment | income | partisanship | foreignnews |
|------------------|-----------|------------|------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|------------|----------|--------------|-------------|
| sanctions | 1.35395 | | | | | | | | | | |
| militarism | 0.020779 | 1.12759 | | | | | | | | | |
| internationalism | 0.411566 | 0.416694 | 1.4062 | | | | | | | | |
| ideology | 0.051679 | 0.670472 | 0.008015 | 2.47906 | | | | | | | |
| age | 0.078935 | 0.200723 | 0.07772 | 0.390841 | 1.19748 | | | | | | |
| sex | -0.017811 | -0.040911 | -0.095261 | -0.046416 | 0.051166 | 0.249352 | | | | | |
| education | 0.25448 | -0.027526 | 0.039427 | -0.128319 | 0.293097 | 0.093534 | 1.4409 | | | | |
| employment | -0.04585 | 0.122652 | 0.384904 | -0.280629 | -0.594991 | 0.05856 | -0.695758 | 3.9769 | | | |
| income | 0.724066 | -0.234348 | 0.510363 | -0.575318 | 0.254804 | -0.03797 | 0.664427 | -0.469263 | 9.56245 | | |
| partisanship | -0.034272 | -0.209089 | -0.050572 | -0.667125 | -0.134499 | 0.031898 | 0.041883 | 0.113315 | 0.084845 | 0.541019 | |
| foreignnews | 0.411404 | 0.080716 | 0.286485 | -0.001403 | 0.330932 | 0.000756 | 0.284974 | 0.133069 | 0.979194 | 0.056536 | 2.70051 |

5. Regression Analysis with and without correction for measurement errors

Similar to the step 3, I run a multi-group (StataCorps, 2013: 250-255) analysis without and with correction or measurement errors. I constrain all other parameters to be equal across groups (StataCorps, 2013:269-274).