

International Conference

Feeling, Rationality and Morality: East and West

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain

Auditori Mercè Rodoreda

5-6 November 2022 (Sat. and Sun.)

Program and Abstracts

(as of 27 Sept 2022)

Keynote speech: 50 minutes for each speech and 30 minutes for discussion

Paper presentation: 30 minutes for each paper and 30 minutes for discussion for each session

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5 November 2022 (Saturday, Day 1)

Time	Content
13:00-13:30	<p style="text-align: center;">Opening Ceremony</p> <p style="text-align: center;">.....</p> <p>Opening Remarks</p> <p>Speaker: Raquel BOUSO Associate Professor, Departament d'Humanitats – Institut Universitari de Cultura, Pompeu Fabra University</p> <p>Speaker: NOE Keiichi Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy, School of Arts and Letters, Tohoku University</p> <p>Moderator: LAM Wing Keung Organizing Committee Member Faculty of International Liberal Arts, Dokkyo University</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Photo-taking</p>
13:30-14:50	<p style="text-align: center;">Keynote Speech 1</p> <p style="text-align: center;">.....</p> <p>"Heaven and earth are sentient": Omori Shozo and Nishida Kitaro</p> <p>Speaker: NOE Keiichi Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy, School of Arts and Letters, Tohoku University</p> <p>Moderator: Michiko YUSA Professor Emerita, Western Washington University</p>
14:50-15:00	Coffee Break

Time	Content
15:00-16:30	Session 1
	Moderator: Montserrat Crespín PERALES, Universitat de Barcelona
	The Primacy of Feeling in Nishida Kitarō's Moral Philosophy: On the Unpublished Material "Gedanken" LAM Wing Keung, Dokkyo University
16:30-16:45	How to Read a Book: Moderating Emotions as a Scholarly Method in Literati (儒) Philosophy Leah KALMANSON, University of North Texas
	Coffee Break

Time	Content
16:45-18:15	Session 2
	Moderator: Dobin CHOI, The University of Iowa
	Ethical Knowing in the <i>Xunzi</i> WANG Hua, National Chengchi University
16:45-18:15	The Beauty of Transience: The Ontology of Oskar Becker and the Aesthetics of Shūzo Kuki and Masakazu Nakai TAKEHANA Yosuke, Fukuoka University

6 November 2022 (Sunday, Day 2)

Time	Content
09:30-10:50	<p style="text-align: center;">Keynote Speech 2</p> <p style="text-align: center;">.....</p> <p>Encountering the true reality of things through beauty in East and West</p> <p>Speaker: Raquel BOUSO Associate Professor, Departament d'Humanitats - Institut Universitari de Cultura, Pompeu Fabra University</p> <p>Moderator: OGIHARA Satoshi Professor, Department of Philosophy, Tohoku University</p>
10:50-11:00	Coffee Break

Time	Content
11:00-12:30	<p>Session 3</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Moderator: WANG Hua, National Chengchi University</p> <p style="text-align: center;">The “Crossroads” of Philosophy</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Marcello GHILARDI, Università Degli Studi di Padova</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Sentiments of Shame and Honour in Mengzi and Hume</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Dobin CHOI, The University of Iowa</p>
12:30-14:00	Lunch Break

Time	Content
14:00-15:30	Session 4
	Moderator: Raquel BOUSO, Pompeu Fabra University
	The Place and Function of Emotions in the Buddhist and Yogic Practice of Cultivation of the Peaceful Mind Michiko YUSA, Western Washington University Ōmori Shōzō's 'Scene-emotions (<i>fūjō</i>) and Emotions' OGIHARA Satoshi, Tohoku University
15:30-15:45	Coffee Break

Time	Content
15:45-17:15	Session 5
	Moderator: TAKEHANA Yosuke, Fukuoka University
	<i>Second nature</i> in Nishida and McDowell Montserrat Crespín PERALES, Universitat de Barcelona The Concept of "Nature" in Yanagi Muneyoshi's <i>Mingei</i> Theory: An Essay for Comparison with William Morris SHIMANUKI Satoru, Tama Art University
17:15-17:30	Coffee Break

Time	Content
17:30-18:00	<p>Roundtable Discussion</p> <p>Moderator: LAM Wing Keung, Dokkyo University</p>
18:00-18:15	<p>Closing Ceremony</p> <p>.....</p> <p>Closing remarks Speaker: OGIHARA Satoshi Professor, Department of Philosophy, School of Arts and Letters, Tohoku University</p> <p>Moderator: Raquel BOUSO Associate Professor, Departament d'Humanitats - Institut Universitari de Cultura, Pompeu Fabra University</p>

"Heaven and earth are sentient (天地有情)": Ōmori Shozō and Nishida Kitaro

(「天地有情」の哲学：大森荘蔵と西田幾多郎)

NOE Keiichi
Tohoku University

Abstract

Ōmori Shozō is a representative philosopher in postwar Japan. He initially studied physics and changed his major to philosophy after the war, in order to investigate philosophical problems based on modern physics. In 1950's he went abroad and studied Anglo-American analytic philosophy in the United States. At that time, he was impressed and influenced by Wittgenstein's lecture note "The Blue Book." After returning to Japan, Ōmori developed his own philosophy, "the Monism of Manifestation (Tachiaraware Ichigen'ron)", which intended to cross over the wall of analytic philosophy. His main target was to overcome all kinds of philosophical dualism, namely subject/object, mind/body, inside/outside, phenomena/noumena, and so on. Ōmori argued that dualistic world-views are illusion and we can get rid of them by returning to common sense. In his final essay, "Meeting myself: Consciousness is the root of all evil that separates human being from the world", Ōmori claimed that "In fact, the world itself is already emotional. The world itself can be blessed world or sorrowful world. ... Stated quite simply, the world is emotional, that is to say, heaven and earth are sentient (天地有情). While feelings and emotions are usually believed to be existed "inside the mind", Ōmori criticized that this implies a dualistic view of inside/outside of the mind. Ōmori suggested that we should emancipate our feelings and emotions from the prison of our internal mind, and return them to the world itself. According to Fujita Masakatsu, Ōmori's understanding of the world as "heaven and earth are sentient (天地有情)" is closely connected with Nishida Kitarō's idea of "pure experience." In this paper, therefore, I would like to examine how Ōmori and Nishida identify feeling and the world.

The Primacy of Feeling in Nishida Kitarō's Moral Philosophy: On the Unpublished Material “Gedanken”

LAM Wing Keung
Dokkyo University

Abstract

This paper attempts to demonstrate the primacy of feeling in Nishida Kitarō's moral philosophy and unveil its significance through the lens of moral sentimentalism, with a specific attention to an unpublished material (未公開ノート類) titled “Gedanken”. “Gedanken” is a draft written around 1920 for a talk entitled “An explanation on affection” (情意的説明) given in 1920 at the Buddhist Youth Association (仏教青年会).¹ According to Nakajima Yuta, comparing with intellect (知) and rationality (理性), Nishida emphasizes the importance of feeling (感情) for morality (道德性).² While Nishida shares the ideas of absolute free will and anticipation of an absolute end with Kant and T. H. Green respectively, he posits that they are grounded on rationality and have undermined the importance of feeling.³ In fact, starting from the first “academic” essay, “Kantian ethics” (韓国倫理学), written in 1893, Nishida has indicated his concern on feeling for morality. In the writings till the publication of *An inquiry into the good* (善の研究) in 1911, including, but not limited to, the two drafts of ethics (倫理学草案 I, II), and *A History of British ethics* (英国倫理学史), Nishida has repeatedly indicated the primacy of feeling for morality. In *An inquiry into the good*, while criticizing severely on intuitive theory, utilitarianism, deontological ethics, authority theory and so on, Nishida echoes the founder of Moral Sense School, Shaftesbury's discourse on harmony without any reservation. In this short essay, therefore, I would like to argue that Nishida is a moral sentimentalist, who highlights the primacy of feeling comparing with rationality for morality. On top of this, I would suggest that Nishida is a pioneer of virtue ethics, who highlights moral feelings long before the publication of G. E. M. Anscombe's essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” published in 1958. More importantly, by advocating the good as the actualization of personality (人格実現説) in the late 19th and early 20th century, Nishida has developed a Confucian-inspired moral sentimentalism in line with the concept of sincerity (誠), which highlights the decisive role of feeling for morality, which is far much earlier than those who reread Chinese philosophy from the perspective of virtue ethics in the last few decades.

¹ Nakajima Yuta 中嶋優太, 「Gedanken」 思索ノート (C04) について」 Ishikawa Nishida Kitaro Museum of Philosophy, ed. *Documenting the study of Nishida Kitarō's unpublished notes*, vol. 5 (『西田幾多郎未公開ノート類研究資料化 報告 5』. Ishikawa: Maeda Printing, 2021, p. 81.

² Ibid., pp. 82-83.

³ Ibid..

Ethical Knowing in the *Xunzi*

Ellie Hua WANG

National Chengchi University

Abstract

This paper explores the nature of ethical knowing and its expression in ethical judgment in the *Xunzi*.

Scholars have recognized that this knowledge is embodied knowledge, and the practice of ritual 禮 plays a crucial role in its formation. As I have argued elsewhere, according to *Xunzi*, ritual practices and learning transform one's nature. A better way of understanding this is that they transform the manifestation of one's nature 性, including that of one's fundamental dispositions, including cognitive, affective, and motivational ones. Building on top of this view, the point I would like to defend in this paper is that this sort of also knowing involves a skill of analogical inference, which, I argue, is significantly different from the Aristotelian constitutive reasoning – countering Hutton's view in his 2002 paper. More specifically, I argue that this skill of analogical inference involves perceptual knowledge that is of two important characteristics: it is embedded in a particular salience landscape (ren 仁 and yi 義) and also has a unique character of connectedness (tong 通). The fact that ethical knowing involves these two characteristics, I further argue, shows that ethical knowledge results from the interplay between rationality and feelings, nature and culture, and self and the world, at least according to *Xunzi*. I also discuss a possible tension between these two characteristics with some consideration of *Xunzi*'s emphasis on three epistemic virtues: openness 虛, unity 壹, and stillness 靜.

**How to Read a Book:
Moderating Emotions as a Scholarly Method in Literati (儒) Philosophy**

Leah KALMANSON
University of North Texas

Abstract

Western philosophy has long debated the relation of emotion to reason: Should reason lead emotions, as Plato and many others agree? Or, does emotion inevitably guide reasoning, as some philosophers such as Hume contend? Despite such debates, little attention is paid to the role of emotions in conducting scholarship. In contrast, in Asian contexts, regulating emotions was seen as important for scholarship and employed as a philosophical methodology in its own right. This presentation will review the *qi*-based theory of emotions in East Asian traditions, which correlates emotional reactions to energetic disruptions in the balance of the mind-body complex. From there, we look at Literati or Ruist practices for regulating and harmonizing the emotions. As we see, this is a crucial step that a scholar must take before studying, reading texts, or conducting research of any kind. As scholars such as Zhu Xi and others tell us, the mind cannot read and learn unless it attains a clear and tranquil state, which is only possible after settling the emotions. Hence, emotion-regulation techniques, as scholarly methods, are necessary research practices. Perhaps a similar dynamic plays out in contemporary academic philosophy—for example, the objective perspective required to conduct moral reasoning, or the attitude of “suspending prejudices” expressed by hermeneuticists such as Gadamer, or the presumed neutrality of the “view from nowhere” prized by analytic philosophers. However, no practices are explicitly employed to cultivate these various states of mind in academics. This obscures the fact that objectivity and neutrality are not default attitudes and certainly not easy to acquire—they necessitate training and practice to develop. East Asian traditions have long recognized this. Hence, scholarly methods like those taught by Zhu Xi are relevant to philosophers today and deserve to be considered as part of our core curriculum and professional training.

The “Crossroads” of Philosophy

Marcello GHILARDI

Università di Padova

Abstract

Usually, we think about philosophy as a peculiar practice, distinct from literature, art, religion, and science. It is so indeed, but it could be also argued that it has something in common with all those experiences. We normally tend to define by exclusion ($A \neq B$, or C, or D...), i.e. stressing the differences more than explicating the similarities. The specificity of philosophy is generally understood as relying on rational argumentation and a sort of “brain power”, leaving what is connected to feeling and to the moral dimension to art, poetry and ethics. On the contrary, we could say that philosophy is a sort of crossroads in which just intertwine, overlap and foster each other different dimensions, such as reason, emotion, feeling, morality, even spirituality. The genitive of this talk’s title is a subjective one, not an objective genitive: philosophy itself is a “crossroads”, where different paths or domains gather. In Europe, a long tradition gave to us the habit of considering reason and feeling, or theory and practice, not only distinct operation but even separated aspects of our “inner” life. But if we plunge deep into the roots of both Western and Eastern philosophical currents, we can find or re-discover the common implications and the strong connections among them: there is no real morality without thinking, thought and feeling complement each other, the education of feelings has effects on thoughts and behaviours. Spanning from Plato, Confucius and Mencius to Nishida, Heidegger, and Foucault, we can trace a different approach to philosophy, where its identity is linked to the possibility of better understanding and enhancing our feeling and our acting, because philosophy is at the same time a form of theory and a form of practice.

Sentiments of Shame and Honour in Mengzi and Hume

Dobin CHOI

The University of Iowa

Abstract

In this paper, I investigate the self-regarding moral sentiments of pride, shame, and honor in the discussions of Mengzi (BCE 372-289) and David Hume (1711–1776). Since both philosophers emphasize the moral significance of cultivating self-regarding virtues—which culminate in Mengzi’s “flood-like *qi* (*haoran zhi qi*)” and Hume’s “Greatness of Mind”—this investigation will enable us to understand the characteristics of the virtues that originate from self-regarding sentiments. Mengzi demonstrates that all humans have “the heart of shame and disdain” by appealing to a case that even a beggar would not receive the food given with contempt (*Mengzi* 6A10). This heart of shame can be interpreted as an indication of our *naturally* aroused sentiment that represents such concepts as moral dignity, pride, and honor. Focusing on pride, a similar passion to shame, Hume reveals its merit as virtue when it is “well-regulated” by our reflective thinking. However, he admits that our sentiment of honor and pride could be artificially planted in our minds. People “inculcate on their children ... to regard the observance of those rules ... as worthy and honourable By this means the sentiments of honour may take root in their tender minds” (T 3.2.1.5). In short, this self-regarding sentiment can be aroused toward artificially imposed objects, such as conventional rules of conducts, including rituals (*li*). This contrast shows that one’s sentiments of shame and pride are as *natural* as other-regarding sentiments, but unlike compassion, artificially manageable. This contrast also means that we need to determine whether or not our self-regarding sentiments are appropriate, for which our reflective reasoning should be involved. Mengzi is well aware of this requirement, as indicated in *Mengzi* 4A17. By examining the necessary tensions related to self-regarding virtues between natural sentiments, artificial rules, and reasoning in Mengzi and Hume, I argue that both philosophers rely on natural moral sentiments as the fundamental norm for ethical reasoning, but differently regard the artificial invention of virtues, which demonstrates the contrast between ancient hierarchical and modern civil perspectives.

Encountering the true reality of things through beauty in East and West

Raquel Bouso
Pompeu Fabra University

Abstract

Greek philosophy, and in particular the Platonic tradition, has bequeathed to us a close link between the Ideas (or Forms) of the True, the Good and the Beautiful, as well as rich speculations on the ways to access them. As is well known, the coincidence between the beautiful and the good, illustrated by the Greek term *kalokagathía* (meaning beauty-goodness), is grounded on the Pythagorean-Platonic concept of measure (and hence, order and proportion). Scholars of Platonism such as Giovanni Reale and Hans-Georg Gadamer have reflected on the inability of contemporary culture to discover this link and appreciate the beauty of forms. For instance, the former speaks of the diffusion of the in-form and the de-form (Reale 1995), and the latter, of the misery of symbols that would correspond to the growing disfigurement and impersonality of the world in which we live (Gadamer 1967).

While Nishitani Keiji would surely share the diagnosis of disconnection with traditional moral and spiritual values in modernity, both East and West, he characterizes Japanese culture by a unity of religion, reason and natural life prior to the separation between the True, the Good and the Beauty (1940). I will therefore examine Nishitani's characterization, along with other considerations of Western and Asian cultural forms by Japanese philosophers such as Nishida Kitarō, Ueda Shizuteru, and Ōhashi Ryosuke, in order to problematize the relationship between form and feeling, reason, or morality.

Second nature in Nishida and McDowell

Montserrat Crespín PERALES

University of Barcelona

Abstract

One of the most salient dualisms in western modern thinking is that of a division between nature and culture. We can say that modernity detached nature and culture as a resonance of the gap between two ontological orders, say humankind and [external] world. In Antiquity, we have a preeminence of the ontological problems over epistemological ones. A -non-pejoratively- naive conception of knowledge (Cassirer, 1993, p. 13) was defined as the process of raising consciousness that reproduces an existing, ordered, and structured reality. And, in consequence, the gap between nature and culture or, as Welsch (2022, p. 206) puts it, between “art” (techne) and “nature” (physis), was not so accentuated as would be in modern times. The “gap” was solved by mediations or, as Welsch put it, by reconciliation formulas as, for instance, the Aristotelian “techne” that imitates nature. The point of view, then, was more symbiotic than dissociative. This is especially important in the moral sphere and in Aristotle’s definition of habit: “Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them and are made perfect by habit.” (Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, II 1, 1103a). What is called habit (*êthos*) was later known as “second nature”. Nowadays, contemporary philosophy has recovered this notion, “second nature”, from the oblivion, as we can see in John McDowell’s *Mind and World* (1994, 1996). There McDowell tries to explain how our “second nature”, our normative reasons, derived from our animal-being: “Exercises of spontaneity belong to our mode of living. And our mode of living is our way of actualizing ourselves as animals. So, we can rephrase the thought by saying: exercises of spontaneity belong to our way of actualizing ourselves as animals.” (1996, p. 78). From his side, and some decades before McDowell’s discussion, Nishida Kitarō dealt with the same concept, “second nature” (*daini no shizen*) but transmuting the “secondary” quality to a “primary one” through his theorization of “historical nature”. In his “The Standpoint of Active Intuition” (1935), Nishida affirms: “So we can conceive biological nature in the negative direction of such creative nature, and in its positive direction we can conceive the world of so-called second nature [historical nature], the world of custom.” (2012, p. 131). What I propose is to put into dialogue, and check confluences and divergences, between McDowell’s ethical naturalism and Nishida’s normative/historical naturalism as a way to operate in the current ecological thought.

The Place and Function of Emotions in the Buddhist and Yogic Practice of Cultivation of the Peaceful Mind

(安穩の心を養う仏教やヨガの教えにおける感情の位置)

Michiko YUSA
Western Washington University

Abstract

Buddhism, a path of spiritual liberation from suffering, emphasizes the cultivation of the mind, which is aimed at the attainment of the mental state of equanimity. This teaching is buttressed by the observation into the "structure of the mind or consciousness (*citta*)," on account of which the transforming one's mental state is put into motion.

I will look into the Buddhist teaching concerning the emotions in the context of the mental transformation. Generally speaking, emotions are distinguished into positive and negative, and the negative emotions must be "tamed" and "brought under control," in order to progress in the path of spiritual liberation from "suffering."

Yogacara Buddhists especially developed their observation into the various strata (or layers) of consciousness. At around the same historical period, Patañjali compiled his *Yoga Sūtras*. Scholars consider these religious traditions to have developed out of the Indic reservoir of the wisdom of contemplation, which centered on the body-mind relationship that hinged on the nature and the effect of breathing.

Thus, in my paper, I will study both Patañjali *Yoga Sūtras*, and for the Yogacara thought, I chose Asanga's *Mahāyanasamgraha*.

Thus far, in my preliminary study focused on the place of emotion in early Indian Buddhist and Yogic traditions, I realized that it is not really the negative "emotions" that are considered the obstruction in their religious practice, but it is the sense of "ego" (ego-consciousness) that gets tied with negative emotions that play havoc.

Thus, I will discuss how the sense of ego gets mixed in with negative emotions, and why the tradition upholds that the mind must be "tamed" (as it is impossible to "eradicate" it), and negative emotions are to be diminished. Here, of course, the mental activity of "discrimination" that discerns the positive from the negative plays a key role.

In order to make this process of analysis more enjoyable, I chose the traditional Tibetan Buddhist graphic depiction that explains the process of spiritual progress in stages. It is very similar to the *Ten Ox-herding Pictures* (or *Six Ox-herding Pictures*) that became popular in Zen (and Chan) practice in China and Japan. I'm not sure which came first, although I suspect that the Tibetan version is older.

In this "Elephant-taming pictures," the black elephant gradually becomes luminous. It is my view that these pictorial representations—explained in 9 stages, but sometimes 10 or 11 stages—do not refer to the transformation of "emotions," but rather to the presence of the residue of "ego-consciousness" in the practitioner. By understanding thus, I can now see how positive emotions—friendliness, compassion, joy (for the happiness of the others), and "rising above" the external positive and negative

"vibes" and sensual data, succinctly summarized as 慈悲喜捨—are *not* abandoned even in the most liberated (e.g., enlightened) individuals, such as the Dalai Lama.

The sense of indignation for social injustice, for instance, when *unmixed* with one's ego, can actually become the source of one's social engagement. So, "anger" (mixed with ego) is extremely harmful an emotion, indignation (unmixed with ego) can play a positive role in the Buddhist and Yogic practice.

I am also of the opinion that "reason" (ratio, intellect) and "emotions" are not opposed to one another. A careless statement such as "men are rational, while women are emotional" is sometimes mentioned as a truism, but it is a highly one-sided wrong view borne out of very limited observations. In my personal experience, I need both—the rational analytical mind and highly "pathos-ridden" heart—in order to engage in any creative work. The two seem to need each other and work in tandem.

This, then, is the gist of my present understanding on the topic of "feelings, rationality, and morality."

<Appendix A>

passage from *Dhammapada*, ch. 17

"Forsake anger, give up pride. Sorrow cannot touch the person who is not in the bondage of anything, who owns nothing.


"He who can control his rising anger as a coachman controls his carriage at full speed, this man I call a good driver: others merely hold the reins.

"Overcome anger by peacefulness; overcome evil by good. Overcome the mean by generosity; and the man who lies by truth.

"Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks: these three steps lead you to the gods."

<Appendix B>

Tibetan "Elephant-taming" Pictures



Ōmori Shōzō's 'Scene-emotions (*fūjō*) and Emotions

Satoshi OGIHARA

Tohoku University

Abstract

In this paper I introduce and consider the Japanese philosopher Ōmori Shōzō's (1921-97) view on emotions or feelings presented in 'Scene-emotions (*fūjō*) and Emotions' (「風情と感情」), first published in *Gendaishisō* (『現代思想』, Seidosha) July 1990 and included in his *Time and I* (『時間と自我』, Seidosha, 1992 [pp. 236-266]). His main thesis in this paper is that emotion is a form of cognition. To present his idea, he introduced the term '*fūjō*' (風情). This had been an infrequently used Japanese word (although the same combination of Chinese characters had been and is rather commonly used if read as *fuzei*), and he gave '*fūjō*' a specific meaning as 'an emotion that a scene or landscape (風景 [*fūkei*]) has' or more generally 'an emotion as the feel or atmosphere (風情 *fuzei*) of something'. Scenes or landscapes have, rather than evoke, emotions that we simply perceive. This perception of scene-emotions is, for Ōmori, a 'second-order' perception, first-order perceptions being of forms and colors (in the case of vision), sounds (in hearing), tastes (in taste), etc. He says, 'The moving of our heart vis-à-vis a scene (or landscape) is not an emotional response that may or may not take place depending on our mood; rather, the scene presses itself on us with the, so to speak, compulsory passivity that perception has' (from the second paragraph of section 1 of 'Sense-emotions and Emotions'). When we appreciate a painting, a piece of music, or a poem, we are perceiving their scene-emotions. When we fear, we are perceiving the fearfulness of the scene in front of us. His approach to emotion exemplifies his general project of eliminating 'consciousness' or 'subject' that is idly spoken of in everyday conceptions and traditional philosophical accounts of various phenomena. I intend to defend Ōmori's view on emotion from a few possible objections.

**The Beauty of Transience:
The Ontology of Oskar Becker and the Aesthetics of Shūzo Kuki and Masakazu Nakai**

TAKEHANA Yōsuke
Fukuoka University

Abstract

If we can define our unique emotion toward the fleeting and the vanishing as transience, this emotion seems to have an ontological meaning. For, the yearning for an eternal and unchanging existence traditionally named *idea* or substance, or even God, is thought to originate from this emotion of transience. Furthermore, we can easily find out a cultural difference of Japan from the as to how one thinks about the relationship between the changeable and the unchangeable. That is to say, in the West, values have traditionally been placed on the existence beyond transience, whereas in Japan, values, especially aesthetic values, have been found in transience itself.

However, it is not the purpose of this presentation to consider aesthetic values such as impermanence and *mono no aware*, which have been discussed in various ways within the framework of Japanese culture. What I would like to clarify here is the question about why something transient can be called beautiful, based on the ideas of two modern Japanese philosophers, Shūzo Kuki (1888-1941) and Masakazu Nakai (1900-1952), who developed unique aesthetic speculations.

If we remove the framework of comparative cultural theory for a moment, the first person who comes to mind when we hear of the beauty of transience is Oskar Becker (1889-1964), who proposed his own ontology under the influence of Martin Heidegger. In fact, he had an article entitled “On the transience of beauty and the adventurous character of the artist” (“Von der Hinfälligkeit des Schönen und der Abenteuerlichkeit des Künstlers”, 1927), in which he discussed the transience of beauty ontologically. Both Kuki and Nakai are well aware of the significance of Becker's unique ontological consideration of beauty and refer to it in the core of their discussions. Therefore, this presentation will examine the aesthetics of both Kuki and Nakai by examining how they accept Becker's aesthetic and ontological philosophy. More concretely speaking, the relationship between the present or the now and eternity will be examined in Kuki's theory of retrospective time and Nakai's film theory and sports theory.

はかなさの美しさ

——オスカー・ベッカーの存在論と九鬼周造と中井正一の美学——

竹花洋佑

福岡大学

概要

うつろいやすいもの・消え去ってゆくものに対する私たち固有の感情のあり方をはかなさと特徴づけることができるならば、この感情は独特の存在論的な意味を持っているように思われる。なぜなら、アイデアあるいは実体、さらには神と名付けられた永遠不変の存在への憧憬は、このはかなさという感情を起点としていと考えられるからである。さらにここに、西洋と日本の文化的差異を重ね合わせることも容易に可能である。すなわち、西洋においては伝統的に、はかなさを超えた存在に価値が置かれてきたのに対して、日本においてはまさにはかなさそのもののの中に、価値が、特に美的価値が見出されてきたと言える。

ただし、日本文化論という枠組みで様々な仕方で語られてきた無常やもののあわれといった美的価値を取り上げるのが本発表の目的ではない。ここで論じたいと考えているのは、そもそもなぜはかなきものが美しいと言えるのか、この問いを、美的なものについて独特の思索を展開した二人の近代日本の哲学者、九鬼周造（1888-1941 年）と中井正一（1900-1952 年）の思想を手がかりに考察することである。

比較文化論的な考察の枠組みを一旦外すならば、はかなさの美と聞いて真っ先に念頭に浮かぶのは、ハイデガーの影響下で独自の存在論を提唱したオスカー・ベッカー（Oskar Becker, 1889-1964）であろう。実際、彼には美のはかなさ

を存在論的に論じた、「美のはかなさと芸術家の冒険的性格について」(Von der Hinfälligkeit des Schönen und der Abenteuerlichkeit des Künstlers, 1927) という論文がある。九鬼も中井もベッカーの美についての独特な存在論的考察の意義を十分承知していて、自らの主張の核心部分においてそれを参照している。したがって、本発表では九鬼と中井がベッカーの議論をどのように受容しているかを検討することを通して、両者の美学を考察していく。具体的には、現在ないしは今と永遠との関係性が、九鬼においては彼の回帰的時間論において、中井においては彼の映画論ならびにスポーツ論において考察されることになる。

The Concept of “Nature” in Yanagi Muneyoshi 's *Mingei* Theory:
An Essay for Comparison with William Morris
(柳宗悦の民藝論における「自然」概念：ウィリアム・モリスとの比較のための試論)

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Abstract

Yanagi Muneyoshi (1889-1961), founder of the Japan Folk Crafts Museum, was a Japanese philosopher who led a movement to revive handicrafts, known as the *Mingei* movement. In his theory of craftsmanship, Yanagi examined the mystery of how crafts of supreme beauty could be produced by the hands of nameless artisans, and argued that when artisans worked in mindlessness (mu-shin 無心), the “Other Power” of nature (shizen 自然) was at work. Yanagi, who idealized beauty that comes from mindlessness, encouraged craftspeople to follow tradition and to abandon artificiality in their craftsmanship. Thus, Yanagi's ideal craftsman is the opposite of one who actively uses rationality. Yanagi's arguments are strongly connected to Buddhist thought, particularly Pure Land Buddhism (Jōdo-kyō 浄土教). While some have accepted Yanagi's religious view of man as positive, others have seen his interpretation of the ideal craftsman as a “human machine” that is denied individuality. In this paper, we will examine the meaning of the concept of “nature” in Yanagi's theory of craftsmanship to see how we can understand Yanagi's theory of production through mindlessness. We then compare Yanagi's ideas with those of William Morris (1834-1896), a 19th-century British designer and leader of the Arts and Crafts movement. Morris, too, examined the wonder of beauty in crafts made by ordinary people, and in his arguments, he stressed the importance of the craftsman's harmony with “nature”. At first glance, Morris' arguments seem similar to those of Yanagi. However, Morris believed that even if the crafts were everyday objects of people, human intelligence needed to be expressed in them for the crafts to be beautiful. This idea differs from Yanagi's assertion that mindlessness in production is ideal. This paper analyzes the concept of “nature” in Morris's theory and compares it with Yanagi's, in order to examine the roots of the similarities and differences in their claims.