

Human Rights Prosecutions and Autocratic Survival

Abel Escribà-Folch

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Joseph Wright*

Pennsylvania State University

Appendix

October 9, 2013

Abstract

Do human rights prosecutions deter dictatorships from relinquishing power? Advances in the study of human rights show that prosecutions reduce repression in transition countries. However, prosecuting officials for past crimes may jeopardize the prospects of regime change in countries that have not transitioned, namely dictatorships. The creation of the International Criminal Court has further revitalized this debate. This paper assesses how human rights prosecutions influence autocratic regime change in neighboring dictatorships. We argue that when a dictator and his elite supporters can preserve their interests after a regime transition, human rights prosecutions are less likely to deter them from leaving power. Using personalist dictatorship as a proxy for weak institutional guarantees of post-transition power, the evidence indicates that these regimes are less likely to democratize when their neighbors prosecute human rights abusers. In other dictatorships, however, neighbor prosecutions do not deter regimes from democratizing.

*The authors thank two reviewers, the editor, Xun Cao, Jeff Colgan, Courtenay Conrad, Sarah Croco, Yoshi Kobayashi, James Morrow, Jessica Weeks, and participants at the Rice University Workshop on “The International Politics of Autocracies” (May 2012) and an EPSA (June 2012) panel for excellent feedback and helpful conversations. We thank Drew Linzer and Jeffrey Staton for sharing their data on judicial independence. This research is supported by NSF-BCS #0904478. Emails: abel.escriba@upf.edu and josephwright@gmail.com (corresponding author).

Supplementary Material (online appendices)

	Summary Statistics & Data Sources	p. 38
	Sample Autocratic regimes, 1977-2006	p. 39
Table A-1	Correlated RE	p. 41
Table A-2	No unit fixed effects	p. 42
Table A-3	Autocratic leader failure	p. 43
Table A-4	Non-violent regime transitions	p. 44
Table A-5	Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) democratic transitions	p. 45
Table A-6	Alternative specifications for modeling calendar time trends	p. 46
Table A-7	Alternative lags for the HRP variable	p. 47
Table A-8	Religious neighbors	p. 48
Figure A-1	Weighted neighbor prosecutions index	p. 49
Figure A-2	Regional neighbor prosecutions and democratization	p. 50
Figure A-3	Conditional logit simulation	p. 51
Figure A-4	Interaction term, by distance cut points.	p. 52

Summary Statistics and Data Sources

Variable	N×T	Mean	StDev	Min	Max	Source
Regime Failure	2304	0.05	0.22	0	1	updated Geddes (2003)
Democratic Transition	2304	0.03	0.16	0	1	updated Geddes (2003)
Non-violent Transition	2304	0.03	0.17	0	1	updated Geddes (2003)
Regime Duration	2304	22.1	17.9	1	88	updated Geddes (2003)
Personalist Dictatorship	2304	0.29	0.45	0	1	updated Geddes (2003)
HRP	2304	0.11	0.23	0	1.64	Kim & Sikkink (2010)
Neighbor Democratization	2304	0.68	0.63	0	2.30	updated Geddes (2003)
Neighbor Civil war	2304	0.69	0.69	0	2.40	Gleditsch et al. (2002)
Log(GDPpc) _{t-1}	2303	7.58	0.92	5.33	10.23	Maddison (2010)
Log(Population) _{t-1}	2303	9.23	1.37	6.28	14.08	Maddison (2010)
Civil War _{t-1}	2304	0.28	0.60	0	2	Gleditsch et al. (2002)
Previous Democracy	2304	0.17	0.38	0	1	updated Geddes (2003)
Judicial Independence _{t-1,t-2}	2295	0.21	0.12	.02	0.66	Linzer & Staton (2012)

61 of 174 (or 35%) sample regimes are personalist

post-1999, 31 of 73 (or 42%) regimes are personalist

Sample Autocracies, 1977-2006

Afghanistan	1977 - 1978	Congo-Brz	1977 - 1991	Korea South	1977 - 1987	Poland	1977 - 1989
Afghanistan	1979 - 1992	Congo-Brz	1998 - 2006	Kuwait	1977 - 2006	Romania	1977 - 1989
Afghanistan	1997 - 2001	Cuba	1977 - 2006	Kyrgyzstan	1992 - 2005	Russia	1994 - 2006
Albania	1977 - 1991	Czechoslovakia	1977 - 1989	Kyrgyzstan	2006 - 2006	Rwanda	1977 - 1994
Algeria	1977 - 1992	Dominican Rep	1977 - 1978	Laos	1977 - 2006	Rwanda	1995 - 2006
Algeria	1993 - 2006	Ecuador	1977 - 1979	Lesotho	1977 - 1986	Saudi Arabia	1977 - 2006
Angola	1977 - 2006	Egypt	1977 - 2006	Lesotho	1987 - 1993	Senegal	1977 - 2000
Argentina	1977 - 1983	El Salvador	1977 - 1982	Liberia	1977 - 1980	Sierra Leone	1977 - 1992
Armenia	1996 - 1998	El Salvador	1983 - 1994	Liberia	1981 - 1990	Sierra Leone	1993 - 1996
Armenia	1999 - 2006	Ethiopia	1977 - 1991	Liberia	1998 - 2003	Sierra Leone	1998 - 1998
Azerbaijan	1992 - 1992	Ethiopia	1992 - 2006	Libya	1977 - 2006	Singapore	1977 - 2006
Azerbaijan	1994 - 2006	Gabon	1977 - 2006	Madagascar	1977 - 1993	Somalia	1977 - 1991
Bangladesh	1977 - 1982	Gambia	1977 - 1994	Malawi	1977 - 1994	South Africa	1977 - 1994
Bangladesh	1983 - 1990	Gambia	1995 - 2006	Malaysia	1977 - 2006	Soviet Union	1977 - 1991
Belarus	1992 - 1994	Georgia	1992 - 1992	Mali	1977 - 1991	Sri Lanka	1979 - 1994
Belarus	1995 - 2006	Georgia	1993 - 2003	Mauritania	1977 - 1978	Sudan	1977 - 1985
Benin	1977 - 1990	Ghana	1977 - 1979	Mauritania	1979 - 2005	Sudan	1986 - 1986
Bolivia	1977 - 1979	Ghana	1982 - 2000	Mauritania	2006 - 2006	Sudan	1990 - 2006
Bolivia	1981 - 1982	Guatemala	1977 - 1985	Mexico	1977 - 2000	Swaziland	1977 - 2006
Botswana	1977 - 2006	Guatemala	1986 - 1995	Mongolia	1977 - 1993	Syria	1977 - 2006
Brazil	1977 - 1985	Guinea Bissau	1977 - 1980	Morocco	1977 - 2006	Taiwan	1977 - 2000
Bulgaria	1977 - 1990	Guinea Bissau	1981 - 1999	Mozambique	1977 - 2006	Tajikistan	1992 - 2006
Burkina Faso	1977 - 1980	Guinea Bissau	2003 - 2003	Myanmar	1977 - 1988	Tanzania	1977 - 2006
Burkina Faso	1981 - 1982	Guinea	1977 - 1984	Myanmar	1989 - 2006	Thailand	1977 - 1988
Burkina Faso	1983 - 1987	Guinea	1985 - 2006	Namibia	1991 - 2006	Thailand	1992 - 1992
Burkina Faso	1988 - 2006	Haiti	1977 - 1986	Nepal	1977 - 1991	Togo	1977 - 2006
Burundi	1977 - 1987	Haiti	1987 - 1988	Nepal	2003 - 2006	Tunisia	1977 - 2006
Burundi	1988 - 1993	Haiti	1989 - 1990	Nicaragua	1977 - 1979	Turkey	1981 - 1983
Burundi	1997 - 2003	Haiti	1992 - 1994	Nicaragua	1980 - 1990	Turkmenistan	1992 - 2006
Cambodia	1977 - 1979	Haiti	2000 - 2004	Niger	1977 - 1991	UAE	1977 - 2006
Cambodia	1980 - 2006	Honduras	1977 - 1981	Niger	1997 - 1999	Uganda	1977 - 1979
Cameroon	1977 - 1983	Hungary	1977 - 1990	Nigeria	1977 - 1979	Uganda	1981 - 1985
Cameroon	1984 - 2006	Indonesia	1977 - 1999	Nigeria	1984 - 1993	Uganda	1987 - 2006
Cen African Rep	1977 - 1979	Iran	1977 - 1979	Nigeria	1994 - 1999	Uruguay	1977 - 1984
Cen African Rep	1980 - 1981	Iran	1980 - 2006	Oman	1977 - 2006	Uzbekistan	1992 - 2006
Cen African Rep	1982 - 1993	Iraq	1977 - 1979	Pakistan	1977 - 1977	Vietnam	1977 - 2006
Cen African Rep	2004 - 2006	Iraq	1980 - 2003	Pakistan	1978 - 1988	Yemen	1977 - 1978
Chad	1977 - 1979	Ivory Coast	1977 - 1999	Pakistan	2000 - 2006	Yemen	1979 - 2006
Chad	1983 - 1990	Ivory Coast	2000 - 2000	Panama	1977 - 1982	Yugoslavia	1977 - 1990
Chad	1991 - 2006	Ivory Coast	2001 - 2006	Panama	1983 - 1989	Zambia	1977 - 1991
Chile	1977 - 1989	Jordan	1977 - 2006	Paraguay	1977 - 1993	Zambia	1997 - 2006
China	1977 - 2006	Kazakhstan	1992 - 2006	Peru	1977 - 1980	Zimbabwe	1981 - 2006
Congo/Zaire	1977 - 1997	Kenya	1977 - 2002	Peru	1993 - 2000		
Congo/Zaire	1998 - 2006	Korea North	1977 - 2006	Philippines	1977 - 1986		

The two estimators employed in the main text are a conditional logit and a linear model with country fixed-effects. A conditional logit model drops roughly half of the regimes from the sample that do not transition to democracy between 1977 and 2006,¹ while a linear model assumes unbounded values for the dependent variable, which is binary.

Readers may prefer to see the results from an approach that circumvents each of these issues. We therefore use a limited dependent variable model, but condition the estimates on the unit means of both the explanatory and the dependent variables.² Note that a linear fixed effects model does the exact same data transformation, but with a different (i.e. linear) link function.

$$Pr(Y_t = 1 | Y_{t-1} = 0) = \alpha_{j[i]} + \beta X_{i,t-1} + \theta \bar{X}_i + \vartheta \bar{Y}_i + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

When unit random effects are added to this model, Wooldridge 2002, 487 calls this approach “Chamberlain’s random effects probit” to distinguish it from the traditional random effects probit (with no unit means). Appendix Table A-1 reports the estimates from this model with an additional set of parameters for the year-means of each variable to “mimic” year fixed effects:

$$Pr(Y_t = 1 | Y_{t-1} = 0) = \alpha_{j[i]} + \beta X_{i,t-1} + \theta \bar{X}_i + \vartheta \bar{Y}_i + \phi \bar{X}_t + \varphi \bar{Y}_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}; \quad \alpha_j \sim N(\mu_\alpha, \sigma_\alpha^2); \quad \varepsilon_{i,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_y^2) \quad (2)$$

We estimate this model in Stata version 12 with the `gllamm` package which allows us to include unit random effects as well as cluster the errors on units (the `xtprobit` command does not allow simultaneous random effects and clustered errors). The estimates are substantively the same as those reported in the main text, with the exception that the estimate for the *HRP* coefficient is now positive and statistically different from zero.³

¹83 of 174, or 48 percent, of regimes in the sample are in countries that do not have a democratic transition during the sample period.

²Note that the estimates of the parameters of interest, β , are the same irrespective of whether we use demeaned variables or not. Whether the time-varying information is demeaned or not will, however, affect the estimates of θ .

³In an earlier version of this paper, we showed that the results using this approach are robust to all the specification changes contained Tables A-3 to A-8 in this Appendix.

Table A-1: Unit- and Year-means probit model

	(1)	(2)
HRP	0.417 (0.44)	1.112+ (0.59)
HRP \times Pers.		-2.470** (0.81)
Personalist	-1.324* (0.59)	-0.882 (0.59)
Nbr democratic transitions	0.391* (0.18)	0.404* (0.17)
Nbr post-civil war transitions	-0.167 (0.20)	-0.159 (0.21)
Prior democracy	0.035 (0.38)	0.023 (0.38)
Constant	-3.598** (0.92)	-4.070** (1.11)
$\beta_{HRP} + \beta_{HRP \times Pers}$		-1.357** (0.52)
Unit means	yes	yes
Calendar time means	yes	yes

+ $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$. Dependent variable is democratic transition. Probit with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Unit- and year-means for all explanatory variables (and the dependent variable), and duration time polynomials (3) included in all models but not reported. 174 regimes in 108 countries from 1977-2006. $N \times T = 2304$.

Table A-2: No unit fixed effects

	Probit	RE Probit
	(1)	(2)
HRP	0.589* (0.29)	0.489+ (0.28)
HRP \times Pers.	-1.283** (0.46)	-1.091* (0.45)
Personalist	-0.117 (0.17)	-0.107 (0.17)
Nbr democratic transitions	0.122 (0.13)	0.079 (0.11)
Nbr post-civil war transitions	-0.424** (0.11)	-0.401** (0.10)
Prior democracy	0.715** (0.15)	0.687** (0.15)
Constant	-5.917** (0.19)	-2.199** (0.24)
$\beta_{HRP} + \beta_{HRP \times Pers}$	-0.694+ (0.41)	-0.602+ (0.36)
Country RE	no	yes
Calendar time	year FE	period FE
Observations	2118	2304

+ $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration time polynomials (3) in all models but not reported. Year FE are calendar year dummies; period FE are dummies for 5-year periods.

The models in this table drop unit means or fixed-effects. The first column reports a standard probit model with year fixed-effects; the second reports a random effects probit with controls for five-year periods because the estimation does not converge with random effects and year fixed-effects. Both results are similar to those reported in the main text.

Table A-3: Leader exits

	LPM	Conditional Logit
	(1)	(2)
HRP	0.103* (0.05)	1.318* (0.66)
HRP \times Pers.	-0.238** (0.07)	-3.631** (1.13)
Personalist	-0.060 (0.05)	-0.677 (0.46)
Nbr democratic transitions	0.022 (0.01)	0.332+ (0.19)
Nbr post-civil war transitions	-0.027+ (0.01)	-0.466* (0.23)
Prior democracy	0.042 (0.05)	0.115 (0.46)
Log GDP per capita	-0.020 (0.03)	-0.350 (0.54)
Log population	-0.212** (0.07)	-3.735** (1.25)
Civil war	0.037* (0.02)	0.450* (0.19)
Judicial independence	0.725** (0.16)	9.340** (2.02)
$\beta_{HRP} + \beta_{HRP \times Pers}$	-0.135** (0.05)	-2.312* (1.02)
Country FE	yes	
Year FE	yes	yes
Observations	2180	1582

+ $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration time polynomials (3) or duration dummies included in all models but not reported. Natural death and term limited exits are treated as right-censored.

Table A-4: Non-violent regime transitions

	LPM	Conditional Logit
	(1)	(2)
HRP	0.082+ (0.04)	1.777 (1.50)
HRP \times Pers.	-0.170** (0.05)	-4.854* (1.95)
Personalist	-0.043 (0.04)	-2.253* (1.02)
Nbr democratic transitions	0.006 (0.01)	0.255 (0.46)
Nbr post-civil war transitions	-0.005 (0.01)	0.732 (0.53)
Prior democracy	0.014 (0.03)	0.404 (0.94)
Log GDP per capita	-0.021 (0.02)	1.717 (1.43)
Log population	-0.125* (0.05)	-30.470** (8.96)
Civil war	0.018+ (0.01)	1.102* (0.53)
Judicial independence	0.446** (0.12)	16.346** (4.15)
$\beta_{HRP} + \beta_{HRP \times Pers}$	-0.088** (0.03)	-3.077+ (1.84)
Country FE	yes	
Year FE	yes	yes
Observations	2294	950

+ $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration time polynomials (3) or duration dummies included in all models but not reported.

The logic of our argument should also apply to non-violent regime transitions. Examining democratic as well as non-violent transitions should increase our confidence in the findings because they measure slightly different conceptualizations of a transition where the incumbent relinquishes power. Unsurprisingly, there is a large overlap between the two variables. Roughly two-thirds of democratic transitions are non-violent and a similar share of non-violent transitions are also democratic. The democratic transition in Poland, for example, was not violent even though it entailed mass demonstrations against the Communist regime. In contrast, the Romanian transition to democracy was marked by both mass demonstrations and violence. In this case, the dictator and his wife were executed. Non-violent transitions in the data set from Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014 are defined as the absence of deaths through the use of violent force during the regime transition event. The threat of violent force can be used during a transition event without resulting in deaths. For example, the ouster of the military junta in Haiti in 1994 by U.S. military forces entailed threats but no deaths from the use of violent force.

Table A-5: Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010)
democratic transitions

	LPM	Conditional Logit
	(1)	(2)
HRP	0.006 (0.02)	1.059 (1.93)
HRP \times Pers.	-0.056+ (0.03)	-8.617* (3.52)
Personalist	-0.005 (0.02)	-1.874 (2.93)
Nbr democratic transitions	0.013+ (0.01)	0.379 (0.47)
Nbr post-civil war transitions	-0.014* (0.01)	-1.303 (1.00)
Prior dem	-0.025 (0.02)	0.517 (1.76)
Log GDP per capita	-0.005 (0.01)	-5.285 (3.41)
Log population	-0.076* (0.03)	4.024 (6.16)
Civil war	0.014+ (0.01)	0.496 (0.79)
Judicial independence	0.212** (0.07)	39.217** (8.22)
$\beta_{HRP} + \beta_{HRP \times Pers}$	-0.0497* (0.03)	-7.558* (2.99)
Country FE	yes	
Year FE	yes	no
Period FE	no	yes
Observations	2205	528

+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration time polynomials (3) or duration dummies included in all models but not reported.

Table A-6: Alternative time-trend specifications

Time trend	Region-specific		Global HRP trend	
	LPM	Conditional Logit	LPM	Conditional Logit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
HRP	-0.012 (0.04)	0.102 (1.27)	0.058 (0.04)	1.064 (1.08)
HRP \times Pers.	-0.125* (0.05)	-10.874** (3.75)	-0.110* (0.05)	-4.087* (1.79)
Personalist	-0.056* (0.03)	-4.545** (1.37)	-0.041 (0.03)	-3.234** (0.97)
Nbr democratic transitions	0.018* (0.01)	0.847* (0.38)	0.020** (0.01)	0.960** (0.32)
Nbr post-civil war transitions	-0.011+ (0.01)	0.040 (0.59)	-0.018** (0.01)	-0.843+ (0.49)
Prior dem	-0.020 (0.04)	-0.832 (0.93)	0.001 (0.04)	-1.833* (0.91)
$\beta_{HRP} + \beta_{HRP \times Pers}$	-0.137**+ (0.04)	-10.771** (3.63)	-0.053** (0.03)	-3.023* (1.50)
Country FE	yes		yes	
Region time trend	yes	yes	no	no
Global HRP trend	no	no	yes	yes
Observations	2304	861	2304	861

+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Duration time polynomials (3) or duration dummies included in all models
but not reported.

Table A-7: Alternative HRP lags

	2-year lag		4-year lag	
	LPM	Conditional Logit	LPM	Conditional Logit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
HRP	0.051 (0.05)	0.523 (1.50)	0.041 (0.04)	0.648 (1.48)
HRP \times Pers.	-0.125* (0.06)	-7.492* (3.17)	-0.095* (0.04)	-5.942* (2.49)
Personalist	-0.039 (0.03)	-3.628* (1.44)	-0.037 (0.03)	-3.078* (1.51)
Nbr democratic transitions	0.009 (0.01)	0.766 (0.49)	0.009 (0.01)	0.738 (0.51)
Nbr post-civil war transitions	-0.006 (0.01)	1.453* (0.73)	-0.006 (0.01)	1.381+ (0.72)
Prior democracy	-0.001 (0.03)	-1.254 (1.12)	-0.000 (0.03)	-1.294 (1.14)
Log GDP per capita	-0.016 (0.02)	-2.134 (2.08)	-0.016 (0.02)	-2.132 (2.07)
Log population	-0.136** (0.05)	-27.301** (9.48)	-0.135** (0.05)	-27.363** (9.64)
Civil war	0.004 (0.01)	0.806 (0.66)	0.004 (0.01)	0.805 (0.65)
Judicial independence	0.373** (0.11)	20.734** (6.40)	0.372** (0.11)	21.921** (6.59)
$\beta_{HRP} + \beta_{HRP \times Pers}$	-0.0740+ (0.04)	-6.968* (2.86)	-0.055+ (0.03)	-5.294* (2.17)
Country FE	yes		yes	
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	2294	845	2294	845

+ $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration time polynomials (3) or duration dummies included in all models but not reported.

Table A-8: Religious neighbors

	LPM	Conditional Logit
	(1)	(2)
HRP	0.173* (0.07)	1.207 (1.92)
HRP \times Pers.	-0.196* (0.08)	-6.031** (2.18)
Personalist	-0.033 (0.05)	0.160 (1.94)
Nbr democratic transitions	0.008 (0.01)	0.575 (0.58)
Nbr post-civil war transitions	-0.008 (0.01)	0.042 (0.81)
Prior democracy	-0.022 (0.04)	-6.808** (2.39)
Log GDP per capita	-0.019 (0.02)	-6.321* (2.88)
Log population	-0.136** (0.04)	-20.190 (13.00)
Civil war	0.007 (0.01)	0.109 (0.75)
Judicial independence	0.380** (0.13)	33.875** (10.67)
$\beta_{HRP} + \beta_{HRP \times Pers}$	-0.022 (0.04)	-4.824** (1.71)
Country FE	yes	
Year FE	yes	yes
Observations	2018	715

+ $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration time polynomials (3) or duration dummies included in all models but not reported.




Figure A-1: *Weighted neighbor prosecutions index*. The vertical axis shows the values for the minimum distance-weighted measure of neighbor prosecutions. The horizontal axis shows the values for the number of neighbor country prosecutions using a 500 km minimum distance threshold, which is the threshold employed in Gleditsch and Ward (2006) to define ‘neighboring country.’




Figure A-2: *Regional neighbor prosecutions and democratization.* Horizontal axis is the democratization rate for dictatorships in a particular geographic region. Vertical axis is the mean level of the neighboring country prosecutions index, by geographic region.




Figure A-3: *Conditional logit simulation*. Simulated predicted risk of democratic transition, from model estimates reported in column (2) of Table 1, except time period dummies were used instead of year fixed effects. All explanatory variables set at mean or median. The horizontal axis depicts a range of values for the weighted HRP variable, up to roughly one standard deviation above the mean. The absolute value of the estimates should not be interpreted literally because the conditional logit sample drops countries that do not democratize and therefore biases the baseline probability of democratic transition upwards.




Figure A-4: *Interaction term, by distance cut points.* Estimated interaction coefficients ($HRP \times Personal$) for the linear probability model in Table 1, column 5. Instead of using the weighted distance measure, these models use a binary cut-point for which all neighbor prosecutions below various cut-points (displayed on horizontal axis) are counted and weighted equally. Minimum distance data from Gleditsch and Ward (2006); they employ a 500 km minimum distance threshold.

References

- Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2014. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set.” *Perspectives on Politics* 14:forthcoming.
- Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.