

Dictators in Exile:
Explaining the Destinations of Ex-Rulers

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Online Appendix for our *Journal of Politics* article

Table 1: List of exiled dictators and their destinations, 1946-2012

Dictator	Country (year of ouster)	Exile destination(s)
Fulgencio Batista	Cuba (1959)	Portugal and Spain
Élie Lescot	Haiti (1946)	Canada
Paul Magloire	Haiti (1956)	United States
Jean-Claude Duvalier	Haiti (1986)	France
Prosper Avril	Haiti (1990)	United States
Raoul Cédras	Haiti (1994)	Panama
Jean-Bertrand Aristide	Haiti (2004)	South Africa
Joaquín Balaguer	Dominican Republic (1962)	United States
Carlos Salinas de Gortari	Mexico (1994)	Ireland
Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes	Guatemala (1963)	El Salvador
Lucas García	Guatemala (1982)	Venezuela
Jorge Serrano Elías	Guatemala (1993)	Fled to El Salvador, settled in Panama
Julio Lozano Díaz	Honduras (1956)	United States
Manuel de Jesús Córdova	El Salvador (1949)	United States
José María Lemus	El Salvador (1960)	Fled to Guatemala, settled in Costa Rica
Carlos H. Romero Mena	El Salvador (1979)	Guatemala (might be currently living in US)
Adolfo A. Majano Ramos	El Salvador (1980)	Mexico
Anastasio Somoza Debayle	Nicaragua (1979)	Paraguay (where he was assassinated)
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla	Colombia (1957)	Spain
Marcos Pérez Jiménez	Venezuela (1958)	US and Spain
José M. Velasco Ibarra	Ecuador (1947)	Argentina
Ramon Castro	Ecuador (1966)	Brazil
José M. Velasco Ibarra	Ecuador (1972)	Argentina
Manuel A. Odría	Peru (1956)	United States
Alberto Fujimori	Peru (2000)	Japan
Mamerto Urriolagoita	Bolivia (1951)	Chile
Hugo Ballivián Rojas	Bolivia (1952)	Chile
Víctor Paz Estenssoro	Bolivia (1964)	Peru
Alfredo Ovando Candía	Bolivia (1970)	Argentinian embassy
Juan J. Torres	Bolivia (1971)	Peru and Argentina
Hugo Bánzer	Bolivia (1978)	Argentina
Luis García Meza Tejada	Bolivia (1981)	Argentina
Juan Natalicio González	Paraguay (1949)	Fled to Argentina, settled in Mexico
Alfredo Stroessner	Paraguay (1989)	Brazil
Juan D. Perón	Argentina (1966)	Venezuela, Dominican Republic, and Spain
Marcelo Caetano	Portugal (1974)	Brazil
Mátyás Rákosi	Hungary (1956)	Soviet Union
Zviad Gamsakhurdia	Georgia (1992)	Russia and Armenia
Ayaz Mutalibov	Azerbaijan (1992)	Russia
Joao B. Vieira	Guinea-Bissau (1999)	Portugal
Dawda Jawara	Gambia (1994)	Senegal and UK
Sidi Ahmed Taya	Mauritania (2005)	Qatar
Konan Bedie	Ivory Coast (1999)	Togo and France
Robert Guéi	Ivory Coast (2000)	Benin
Moussa Dadis Camara	Guinea (2009)	Burkina Faso
Charles Taylor	Liberia (2003)	Nigeria
Joseph Saidu Momoh	Sierra Leone (1992)	Guinea
Valentine Strasser	Sierra Leone (1996)	UK

Kwame Nkrumah	Ghana (1966)	Guinea
Nicolas Grunitzky	Togo (1967)	Ivory Coast
Ahmadou Ahidjo	Cameroon (1982)	France and Senegal
Yakubu Gowon	Nigeria (1975)	UK
Jean-Bédél Bokassa	CAR (1979)	Ivory Coast and France
Félix Malloum	Chad (1979)	Nigeria
Hissène Habré	Chad (1990)	Senegal
Mobutu Sese Seko	Zaire-DRC (1997)	Morocco
Milton Obote	Uganda (1971)	Tanzania
Idi Amin	Uganda (1979)	Libya and Saudi Arabia
Milton Obote	Uganda (1985)	Zambia
King Mwambutsa IV	Burundi (1966)	Switzerland
Michel Micombero	Burundi (1976)	Somalia
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza	Burundi (1987)	Libya
Siad Barre	Somalia (1991)	Nigeria
Mengistu Marriam	Ethiopia (1991)	Zimbabwe
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali	Tunisia (2011)	Saudi Arabia
King Idris I	Libya (1969)	Egypt
Gaafar Nimeiry	Sudan (1985)	Egypt
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi	Iran (1951)	Italy
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi	Iran (1979)	Egypt (after many short stays elsewhere)
Abdul Rahman Arif	Iraq (1968)	Turkey
King Farouk I	Egypt (1952)	Italy
Adib Shishakli	Syria (1954)	Brazil
King Saud	Saudi Arabia (1963)	Greece and Egypt
Abdullah al-Sallal	Yemen AR (1967)	Iraq
Abdul Rahman al-Iryani	Yemen AR (1974)	Syria
Abdul Fattah Ismail	South Yemen (1980)	Soviet Union
Ali Nasir Muhammad	South Yemen (1986)	North Yemen and Syria
Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah	Kuwait (1990)	Saudi Arabia
Said bin Taimur	Oman (1970)	UK
Mohammed Zahir Shah	Afghanistan (1973)	Italy
Babrak Karmal	Afghanistan (1986)	Soviet Union
Mohammad Najibullah	Afghanistan (1992)	UN compound in Kabul
Askar Akayev	Kyrgyzstan (2005)	Russia
Kurmanbek Bakiyev	Kyrgyzstan (2010)	Belarus
Yumjaagiin Tsendenbal	Mongolia (1984)	Soviet Union
Syngman Rhee	South Korea (1960)	United States
Pervez Musharraf	Pakistan (2008)	UK
Mohan Shumsher JB Rana	Nepal (1951)	India
Pridi Panomyong	Thailand (1946)	China and France
Thawan Thamrongnawasawat	Thailand (1947)	Hong Kong (UK)
Luang Pibul Songgram	Thailand (1957)	Japan
Thanon Kittakachorn	Thailand (1973)	Singapore
Norodom Sihanouk	Cambodia (1970)	China
Lon Nol	Cambodia (1975)	United States
Norodom Ranariddh	Cambodia (1997)	Thailand
Duong Van Minh	South Vietnam (1964)	Thailand
Nguyen Van Thieu	South Vietnam (1975)	Taiwan, UK, and US
Ferdinand Marcos	Philippines (1986)	United States

Table 2: Including secondary and tertiary destinations: The dependent variable in these models is coded 1 for all countries where an ex-dictator stayed (i.e., not only the primary destination included in the main results). When modeling additional destinations, values of the independent variables are from the year the dictator left office even though the leader may have switched to a secondary or tertiary destination years after his ouster.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Transnational relations</u>				
Alliance	1.65**	1.34**	1.22**	1.10**
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.25)
Colony	4.29**	3.34**	3.00**	2.66**
	(0.35)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.43)
Trade interdependence		0.27**	0.20**	0.18**
		(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.056)
<u>Distance</u>				
Distance	-0.70**	-0.59**	-0.72**	-0.80**
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)
<u>Destination characteristics</u>				
Major power			1.21**	1.32**
			(0.33)	(0.33)
Democracy			-0.66**	
			(0.21)	
Dictator previously hosted			0.62*	0.45+
			(0.25)	(0.25)
ICC member			-0.81	-0.62
			(0.50)	(0.50)
Civil war			-0.81*	-0.94**
			(0.34)	(0.35)
Interstate war			-0.29	-0.13
			(0.48)	(0.47)
Personalist regime				-0.17
				(0.45)
Military regime				0.80*
				(0.37)
Party-based regime				0.41+
				(0.23)
Monarchy				-0.13
				(0.62)
Constant	0.095	-0.94	0.33	0.52
	(0.90)	(1.03)	(0.96)	(0.89)
<i>N</i>	13093	8922	8832	7987
<i>AIC</i>	1011.9	896.7	872.5	771.6
<i>BIC</i>	1041.8	932.2	950.5	869.4

Standard errors clustered by country of origin in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Exploring interaction effects: Model 1 interacts distance with whether the dictator was ousted via a coup. Data on coups are from Powell and Thyne (2011). Model 2 interacts major power status with alliances. Model 3 interacts democracy with whether the dictator presided over state-sponsored mass killing. Data on mass killings are from the Early Warning Project (2015). The relevant linear combinations are reported near the bottom of the table.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Alliance	1.119** (0.265)	0.907** (0.347)	1.140** (0.270)
Colony	2.608** (0.411)	2.770** (0.414)	2.643** (0.418)
Trade interdependence	0.200** (0.057)	0.178** (0.060)	0.196** (0.056)
Distance	-0.649** (0.141)	-0.796** (0.117)	-0.744** (0.112)
Coup	1.404 (1.308)		
Distance*Coup	-0.179 (0.176)		
Major power	1.317** (0.334)	0.921** (0.348)	1.315** (0.335)
Major power*Alliance		0.900 (0.600)	
Democracy	-0.507* (0.210)	-0.501* (0.216)	-0.177 (0.302)
Mass killing			0.322 (0.236)
Democracy*Mass killing			-0.824+ (0.443)
Dictator previously hosted	0.609* (0.260)	0.650* (0.264)	0.616* (0.261)
ICC member	-0.626 (0.491)	-0.542 (0.486)	-0.738 (0.524)
Civil war	-0.883* (0.364)	-0.834* (0.365)	-0.850* (0.372)
Interstate war	-0.130 (0.461)	-0.158 (0.449)	-0.191 (0.475)
Constant	-0.429 (1.122)	0.825 (0.942)	0.173 (0.896)
β Distance + β Distance*Coup	-0.827** (.135)		
β Major power + β Major power*Alliance		1.821** (.557)	
β Democracy + β Democracy*Mass killing			-1.000** (.309)
<i>N</i>	8832	8832	8832
<i>AIC</i>	792.56	788.87	790.31
<i>BIC</i>	884.68	873.90	882.43

Standard errors clustered by country of origin in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Alternative samples of cases: Model 1 only includes dictators who were ousted by civil wars or revolts according to Svobik (2012). Model 2 only includes dictators who presided over state-sponsored mass-killing during their tenures. Data on mass killings are from the Early Warning Project (2015). Models 3 and 4 only include leaders who went into exile after the end of the Cold War (post-1990) and after the signing of the ICC’s Rome Statute (post-1997), respectively. Note that some variables are dropped from the models as they predict the outcome perfectly.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Transnational relations</u>				
Alliance	1.20** (0.45)	1.30** (0.32)	1.30* (0.57)	2.96* (1.25)
Colony	3.32** (0.69)	3.43** (0.70)	4.81** (0.86)	5.90** (2.00)
Trade interdependence	0.092 (0.12)	0.14 (0.089)	0.042 (0.085)	0.027 (0.17)
<u>Distance</u>				
Distance	-0.70** (0.20)	-0.74** (0.16)	-0.66** (0.23)	0.49 (0.58)
<u>Destination characteristics</u>				
Major power	1.59** (0.45)	1.51** (0.50)	0.96 (0.67)	0.77 (1.65)
Democracy	-0.49 (0.38)	-1.09** (0.36)	-0.46 (0.52)	-0.10 (1.02)
Dictator previously hosted	0.51 (0.51)	0.32 (0.38)	0.71 (0.54)	0.12 (1.17)
Civil war	-0.60 (0.55)	-0.95 ⁺ (0.57)	-1.19* (0.56)	-1.33 ⁺ (0.70)
Interstate war	0.17 (0.97)	0.23 (0.64)		
ICC member		0.69** (0.20)	-0.57 (0.77)	-0.63 (1.31)
Constant	0.063 (1.57)	0.51 (1.24)	-0.61 (1.49)	-10.3* (4.25)
<i>N</i>	2537	3733	2813	1318
<i>AIC</i>	229.2	337.1	185.0	80.6
<i>BIC</i>	287.6	399.3	244.4	116.9

Standard errors clustered by country of origin in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Alternative specifications, measures, and controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Transnational relations</u>				
Alliance	1.00** (0.27)	1.08** (0.27)		1.21** (0.37)
Colony	3.24** (0.42)	2.51** (0.43)		3.84** (0.53)
Trade interdependence	0.20** (0.059)	0.22** (0.058)		0.086 (0.080)
<u>Distance</u>				
Distance	-0.80** (0.11)	-0.74** (0.12)	-0.99** (0.087)	-0.82** (0.15)
<u>Destination characteristics</u>				
COW capabilities index	11.5** (2.45)			
Democracy	-0.53* (0.21)	-0.51** (0.20)	0.45** (0.17)	-1.09* (0.42)
Dictator previously hosted	0.44 (0.28)	0.62* (0.26)		0.94* (0.37)
ICC member	-0.56 (0.65)	-0.60 (0.48)		-0.75 (0.76)
Civil war	-0.66 ⁺ (0.35)	-1.33** (0.43)		-1.75** (0.55)
Interstate war	-0.17 (0.48)	-0.050 (0.46)		0.12 (0.61)
Major power		1.11** (0.36)		1.59** (0.46)
Unrest index		0.12 (0.13)		
Successful coup		0.15 (0.39)		
Domestic prosecutions				0.83 (0.67)
Constant	0.80 (0.90)	0.26 (0.95)	2.74** (0.67)	0.80 (1.12)
<i>N</i>	8652	8444	12989	5022
<i>AIC</i>	770.0	756.3	1009.5	372.8
<i>BIC</i>	847.7	847.8	1031.9	451.1

Standard errors clustered by country of origin in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: A regime dyads extension: Taking advantage of the dyadic nature of our data, these models explore whether the joint characteristics of a fleeing dictator’s regime and potential host states affects exile destinations. Specifically, we use Geddes et al.’s (2014) data on autocratic regime types to create a series of dyadic variables reflecting whether dyads share the same autocratic regime type. In Model 1, we only include joint dyads to test if rulers tend to seek refuge in regimes similar to those they previously ruled. In Model 2, we also include some mixed dyads to test if certain types of autocratic rulers are more likely to be granted asylum by democratic governments.

	(1)	(2)
<u>Transnational relations</u>		
Alliance	1.05** (0.26)	1.09** (0.25)
Colony	2.58** (0.43)	2.64** (0.44)
Trade interdependence	0.17** (0.056)	0.16** (0.059)
<u>Distance</u>		
Distance	-0.82** (0.11)	-0.82** (0.11)
<u>Destination characteristics</u>		
Major power	1.34** (0.32)	1.40** (0.31)
Dictator previously hosted	0.44 ⁺ (0.25)	0.46 ⁺ (0.25)
ICC member	-0.64 (0.49)	-0.46 (0.50)
Civil war	-0.86* (0.35)	-0.88* (0.36)
Interstate war	-0.099 (0.48)	-0.18 (0.51)
Joint single-party	0.30 (0.30)	0.20 (0.33)
Joint military	1.34** (0.38)	1.24** (0.40)
Joint personalist	-0.92 (0.64)	-1.04 (0.65)
Joint monarchy	0.046 (0.76)	-0.042 (0.77)
Personalist-democracy		-0.43 (0.35)
Single party-democracy		-0.16 (0.32)
Military-democracy		-0.14 (0.26)
Monarchy-democracy		0.36 (0.52)
Constant	0.86 (0.90)	0.90 (0.87)
<i>N</i>	7987	7987
<i>AIC</i>	768.4	774.0
<i>BIC</i>	866.2	899.7

Standard errors clustered by country of origin in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Rare events models: Models 1 and 2 use a rare events logit (Tomz, King, and Zeng 2003). Models 3 and 4 use a penalized maximum likelihood logit (Firth 1993).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>Transnational relations</u>				
Alliance	1.12** (0.27)	1.09** (0.25)	1.12** (0.26)	1.09** (0.26)
Colony	2.59** (0.41)	2.64** (0.43)	2.59** (0.40)	2.64** (0.42)
Trade interdependence	0.20** (0.056)	0.18** (0.056)	0.20** (0.060)	0.18** (0.062)
<u>Distance</u>				
Distance	-0.75** (0.11)	-0.79** (0.11)	-0.75** (0.12)	-0.79** (0.12)
<u>Destination characteristics</u>				
Major power	1.31** (0.33)	1.31** (0.33)	1.31** (0.34)	1.31** (0.35)
Democracy	-0.50* (0.21)		-0.50* (0.25)	
Dictator previously hosted	0.62* (0.26)	0.46+ (0.25)	0.61* (0.26)	0.46+ (0.26)
ICC member	-0.49 (0.48)	-0.47 (0.50)	-0.50 (0.59)	-0.48 (0.60)
Civil war	-0.82* (0.37)	-0.88* (0.35)	-0.82* (0.40)	-0.88* (0.40)
Interstate war	-0.029 (0.46)	-0.019 (0.47)	-0.036 (0.52)	-0.026 (0.51)
Personalist regime		-0.13 (0.45)		-0.13 (0.42)
Military regime		0.81* (0.37)		0.81* (0.37)
Party-based regime		0.41+ (0.23)		0.41 (0.29)
Monarchy		0.0050 (0.62)		-0.0073 (0.59)
Constant	0.40 (0.86)	0.55 (0.89)	0.39 (0.95)	0.54 (0.98)
<i>N</i>	8832	7987	8832	7987
<i>AIC</i>	.	.	757.8	735.1
<i>BIC</i>	.	.	835.7	832.9

Standard errors clustered by country of origin in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Selection model (see next page for details)

<i>Outcome Equation (Where to Flee)</i>				
Alliance	1.66**	1.34**	1.18**	1.14**
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.26)
Colony	4.12**	3.09**	2.66**	2.71**
	(0.38)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.43)
Trade interdependence		0.29**	0.19**	0.17**
		(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Distance	-0.68**	-0.55**	-0.73**	-0.78**
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Major power			1.33**	1.33**
			(0.33)	(0.33)
Democracy			-0.46*	
			(0.21)	
Dictator previously hosted			0.64*	0.49+
			(0.27)	(0.26)
ICC member			-0.61	-0.60
			(0.50)	(0.52)
Civil war			-0.85*	-0.91*
			(0.37)	(0.36)
Interstate war			-0.12	-0.11
			(0.47)	(0.47)
Personalist regime				-0.18
				(0.45)
Military regime				0.71+
				(0.38)
Party-based regime				0.35
				(0.23)
Monarchy				-0.12
				(0.62)
Inverse Mills Ratio	0.34+	0.39	0.27	0.25
	(0.21)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.26)
Constant	-0.99	-2.29	-0.47	-0.22
	(1.07)	(1.40)	(1.11)	(1.10)
<i>N</i>	12823	8849	8759	7915
<i>AIC</i>	893.0	794.3	774.8	758.0
<i>BIC</i>	930.3	836.8	859.7	862.7
<i>Selection Equation (Whether to Flee)</i>				
Civil war	0.40**			
	(0.10)			
Personalist	0.25**			
	(0.093)			
Legislature	-0.26**			
	(0.099)			
Time in office	0.0034			
	(0.033)			
Constant	-2.00**			
	(0.13)			
<i>N</i>	4374			
<i>AIC</i>	880.4			
<i>BIC</i>	925.1			

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ 10

Details on the Selection Model: In the main text, we argued that a selection model likely was not needed for two reasons. First, the decision on *whether* to go into exile is not necessarily prior to the decision on *where* to go. Second, the factors “pushing” leaders to consider exile (e.g., civil war in a leader’s home country or degree of regime institutionalization) are not the same factors “pulling” leaders to one destination rather than another (e.g., the variables identified in our theory). Nonetheless, we estimate a selection model because it remains possible that some omitted factor might bias the results.

The selection is complex since the two stages are observed at different units of analysis. Specifically, the first stage examines all leader years (did the leader go into exile or not?), whereas the second stage examines directed dyads for the subset of leaders who went into exile (where did the exiled leader go?).

For the first stage, the dependent variable is a dummy capturing whether or not each autocratic leader goes into exile in a given year (and thus whether the observation enters the second stage). We include four independent variables in this model. The first is whether there is an ongoing civil war in the leader’s home state (Gleditsch et al. 2002) since violence at home should generate incentives to seek the safety of exile abroad. The next three variables are meant to capture the ability of each ruler to reach some sort of credible domestic immunity deal, which could affect incentives to seek protection abroad. We include variables indicating whether the ruler’s regime is personalist (e.g., Geddes et al. 2014), whether there is a legislature (e.g., Albertus and Menaldo 2014), and the amount of time each leader has been in power (we also include but do not report the square and cube of this duration variable). Data for these variables are from Geddes et al. (2014), Cheibub et al. (2010), and Goemans et al. (2009), respectively. After estimating this first stage model, we use the predicted values to calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio, which proxies the conditional mean of a leader entering the sample in the second stage.

We then turn to the second stage. The models in the second stage are nearly identical to the models from Table 1 in the main text. However, there is one key difference: we include the Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage on the right-hand side of the second stage equation. This allows us to minimize bias from selection effects (to whatever extent they might exist). We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this technique.

The results suggest that there is little, if any, bias in the models reported in the main text. All of our major findings still hold. In short, dyadic connections, the monadic characteristics of host states, and geographic proximity help explain exile destinations.

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