# 4. The intercultural turn in Europe: process of policy paradigm change and formation

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## Introduction: continuities and change in diversity management

The question of 'how to focus diversity policy' is more easily accepted today when the answer is 'interculturalism'. This policy is gaining attention mainly among policy-makers working at the local level, as demonstrated by the Intercultural Cities programme (ICC) of the Council of Europe, with more than 100 cities working together, sharing practical knowledge, and involved in policy experimentation and policy failure processes. This allows me to assert that we are presently in a process of policy paradigm formation: an *intercultural turn in Europe*.

The main purpose of this chapter is to enter into the recent debate around multiculturalism vs interculturalism policy (see Barret ed., 2013; Meer and Modood, 2012; Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero, 2015; Zapata-Barrero ed., 2015, and others quoted throughout the text) and show that we are likely witnessing a process of policy paradigm change in Europe. The intercultural policy paradigm (IPP) of diversity management claims to fill what the multicultural policy paradigm (MPP) seems to have underestimated: contact and dialogue, and interpersonal relations between people from different backgrounds, including nationals and citizens. This *descriptive sense* of IPP is being promoted by the Council of Europe (2008, 2011) and has been penetrating key European Union documents and programmes (e.g. European Commission 2008a, 2008b, 2015). In the first instance, IPP has appeared in some seminal urban, business and social management literature (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998; Bloomfield and Bianchini, 2004; Clarijs et al., 2011; Sandercock, 2004; Sze and Powell, 2004; Wood, 2004; Wood and Landry, 2008; Zachary, 2003), and now is making an appearance in current normative policy debates on diversity and migration studies (Zapata-Barrero ed., 2015; Barrett, 2013; Cantle, 2012; Lüken-Klaßen

and Heckmann, 2010; Taylor, 2012; Zapata-Meer et al. ed., 2016). It arises in a context in which multiculturalism is experiencing a drop in popularity (Lewis, 2014). Multiculturalism is under suspicion of having promoted segregation rather than union, of giving rise to ethnic conflicts rather than a common public culture, of having difficulties in grounding community cohesion and trust (Cantle, 2012), and even of founding affirmative actions without enough public legitimization. Following Peter Hall's (1993) seminal analysis on policy paradigm change, we will call these *policy anomalies*. These unintended outcomes of multicultural policies have been the main source of information for many political leaders, such as Angela Merkel in Germany in October 2010 and David Cameron in the United Kingdom in February 2011 – with even Nicolas Sarkozy in France joining this view. This has promoted a crisis, backlash or even the 'death' of the multicultural paradigm, initiating a great European public discussion (*Daily Mail Reporter,* 2011; Joppke, 2004; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). At the same time, there is growing concern in Europe at the rise of populist parties and anti-immigrant narratives that have passed through different waves during recent decades (Yilmaz, 2012), nurtured by most of the contradictions within the politics of immigration of the liberal states (Hampshire, 2013).

Interculturalism as a particular policy paradigm takes its normative background from many areas of public policy. From urban studies, this approach emphasizes the view that diversity is a community asset and a collective resource, since it is assumed that optimizing diversity increases social and political benefits (Wood and Landry, 2008). The managerial economist Scott E. Page (2007) is often quoted from this emerging literature, as he shows that in a problem-solving situation, diverse groups have better tools and resources to give a variety of perspectives than a homogeneous group. But this 'diversity advantage' approach also comes from global business studies (Zachary, 2003), which focus on the economic benefits of managing diversity. This 'diversity advantage' assumption functions as the epicentre of the *normative sense* of interculturalism and constitutes the core of my focus.

In presenting this theory, I place policy paradigm change literature at the centre of my discussion. Understanding that continuity and change in policy-making constitute a fundamental challenge to social scientists, policy-makers and everyday citizens, I argue that within this emerging debate on intercultural policy formation, such change is occurring within a specific context (of multicultural backlash) and place (interculturalism is firstly an urban policy initiative).

Following the presentation of this theory, I structure my chapter as follows: first, I outline the interpretative framework to follow the multiculturalism/interculturalism debate, taking into account the current debate on policy paradigms. I then enter into the current narrative context that is directly influencing policy paradigm formation, and the current normative framework based on the diversity-advantage assumption, namely the view that diversity is a resource and an opportunity. I speak of the intercultural turn in Europe, taking the ICC of the Council Europe as a main source of information (and inspiration), which involves more than 100 cities, alongside national networks in Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Ukraine (Council of Europe, 2011). I end by providing a critical assessment identifying shortcomings of this IPP expansion in Europe, arguing that the consolidation of this current policy paradigm will occur only when the main assumed pillar (diversity-advantages) is tested at economic and mainly social levels.

## 1. Policy paradigm change and formation: an interpretative framework to analyse the intercultural turn

Following the emerging literature on policy paradigm change, inspired by the path-breaking work of Hall (1993), I propose an interpretative framework to better define what I term the 'intercultural turn' in diversity policy-making.

The focus here on policy paradigms begins with the recognition that ideas are not only important, but are key to identifying patterns and processes of policy dynamics (Hogan and Howlett, 2015a, p. 6). Some even label this debate as an 'ideational turn' aimed at understanding the ideas that cause policies (Béland, 2009). A policy paradigm constitutes a theoretical tool with which to understand the guiding principles or ideas for creating public policy, and to ascertain which actors are involved and why they pursue the strategies that they do (Hogan and Howlett, 2015a, p. 3). Applying Hall's (1993) views to describe the intercultural approach to public policies dealing with diversity, and taking into account the Intercultural Cities programme of the Council of Europe, we can say that we are facing a new paradigm, since this an approach is becoming institutionalized by policy-makers and politicians, and academically legitimized among expert scholarship. It is also agreed that a paradigm must not only be adopted by an inner policy-making circle, but also legitimized by outside actors including in academia, media and civil society. This is the case with the media and the network of

associations endorsing the intercultural policies initiatives, and even the constitution of a network of intercultural centres (Bloomfield, 2013).

A paradigm is defined by Hall as follows: 'policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing' (1993, p. 279). We then have to identify the main ideas and standards of the intercultural approach, the kind of instruments proposed to attain these ideas, and of course the problems this approach is addressing. Ideas have recently gained ascendency in social research alongside the 'usual suspects' of interest, institutions and socio-economic factors. The fact that we say that a policy paradigm is made of ideas means that behind a policy are values, principles, beliefs and assumptions shared by a policy community (Daigneault, 2015, p. 50). In our particular case, the IPP is interpreted as an ideational construct (Hogan and Howlett, 2015a, p. 5) that provides some continuity/change in relation to a previous MPP. We know that one of the main 'business cards' of interculturalism is its character as a third way between assimilation and multiculturalism, which legitimizes its main ideas by filling the gaps of the MPP. The ideas legitimizing the policy paradigm also seek to be permanent in time. For us, this means 'resisting' ideological variations in political governments, and being colour-blind from an ideological point of view, as is the case for most intercultural cities participating in the ICC of the Council of Europe. This undoubtedly facilitates broader expansion and faster absorption by the whole policy and social community.

With the intercultural policy turn we are indeed faced with what Hall (1996) called a third-order policy change. Within this framework, I take some aspects of the framework proposed by Pierre-Marc Daigneault (2015) and also the focus on policy anomalies of Matt Wilder and Michael Howlett (2015). The third-order framework states that a change in a policy area affects objectives and means in a structural way, so that other policies must be reoriented according to the new paradigm. There is an assumed causal relationship between policy change at the normative level and changes at strategic and operational levels (Carson *et al.*, 2009). This interpretative framework provides then an explanation as to how policy change results from intertwined ideas and institutions at a micro level (through instrument settings), a meso level (through policy instruments selection) and a macro level (through the formulation of goals). Then, by considering the importance of context (how politics, society and particular actors

influence policy formation) and conceptual frameworks to understanding policy change, we can also define normative ideas as taken-for-granted assumptions about values, attitudes, identities and other 'collective shared expectations' (Campbell, 2002, p. 23). In the case of the intercultural policy turn, a core conceptual idea is the particular view of diversity as a resource and as an advantage and opportunity for community cohesion resulting from interaction among people from different backgrounds, including citizens and non-citizens.

Even if policy paradigm change does not produce the desired outcome, the clue to understanding this change is that normative ideas are viewed as constraining decision-making and limiting the range of alternatives that political elites are likely to perceive as legitimate. What interests me in this debate is not only how ideas influence policy-making, but how the normative ideas of interculturalism (community cohesion and common public culture) drive most of the decision-making processes in the cities, although, as I show, this needs to be tested empirically to consolidate and institutionalize this policy paradigm. Its fragility could demonstrate that instead of reaching their normative ideals, interculturalism also produces policy anomalies, as the MPP has demonstrated. Normative beliefs may be so strong that they override the self-interest of policy-makers (Campbell 2002, p. 24). It is at this ideational normative level, then, that I focus the intercultural turn, as a situation where the IPP fulfils most of the shortcomings of the MPP. Of course, there is some continuity within this policy change, in the fact that the respect and recognition of difference and diversity are the priority equality concerns, even ahead of the assimilationist approach, which tries to see diversity and difference as an anomaly. But the IPP and MPP differ in how diversity policy is focused and how this policy intervention is conducted. The multicultural approach tends to defend a rights-based and a group-based approach of difference, then devotes all its normative force to the recognition of this way of categorizing difference, having a nation-based view of culture (Zapata-Barrero, 2015a).

Applied to the intercultural turn, the normative drivers of interculturalism (community cohesion and common public culture) influence decision-making and the expansion of intercultural policies, even if there are not strongly tested empirical studies. For us, the focus is not merely on ideas, but on *normative* ideas, and how these normative assumptions influence the decision-making process, as well as the reaction between the policy-maker and the political elite in local contexts. This debate makes evident that the normative powers of ideas are strong enough that they do not

need empirical outcomes to be convincing and shared by a broad social and policy community.

## 2. Narrative context and normative drivers of the intercultural policy change

Policy paradigm change is of course a multifaceted process that must be understood in the context of larger societal and political contexts. For us, a paradigm is an interpretative framework in Hall's terms (1993, p. 279) and the definition is clear: there is a discursive change on how to approach diversity dynamics and this narrative has effects in policy and governance. The three levels (public discourse, policy and governance) need to remain interrelated, since it is their internal coherence that can engender a policy paradigm shift. *Public discourse* explicitly incorporates contact promotion and intercultural priorities within not only immigration policies, but all public policy narratives. This expansion of interculturalism as a principle of public policy in general is being carried out with some difficulties and restrictions in all the intercultural cities, as is shown in the ICC Index (Council of Europe, 2011). However, the central aim is that the intercultural discourse becomes both the city-project and the mainstream city focus on how to deal with diversity. Secondly, the *governance dimension* involves coordinating a range of public and civil society actors participating in the policy-making process, distributing an even burden of responsibility shared across multiple territorial levels of government, from the neighbourhood to the whole city and beyond. Finally, *the policy* dimension refers to adaptations of mainstreaming policies that incorporate intercultural priorities. This policy incorporation is designed to better serve the diverse populations that benefit from social policies by responding to their specific needs (Scholten *et al.*, 2016).

Following the main guidelines of the literature on policy paradigms (see Hogan and Howlett, 2015b), we can say that interculturalism is a set of coherent cognitive (how policy and social actors interpret diversity-related problems) and normative (how actors approach these problems in terms of goal setting) ideas shared by people in a given policy community about how to focus diversity management, the appropriate role of the local administration and the problem-solving that requires intervention. That is, interculturalism as a policy paradigm demonstrates that it has policy objectives that should be pursued and appropriate policy means to achieve these ends (Daigneault, 2015, p. 49).

The IPP also provides some continuity to policy content and discourse over time, and functions as a social learning process (Hogan and Howlet, 2015a). Inspired by Hall (1993, pp. 280–81), we can retain three main dimensions of policy paradigm change and focus on the differences between multiculturalism and interculturalism.

Firstly, IPP is a bottom-up process, namely a social and policy process beginning at the city level rather than the result or product of a top-down process or of academic reflections on diversity without clear contact with policy-making. The process to replace the MPP by the IPP is likely to be more sociological and policy oriented than an academic plan, as perhaps was the case with the MPP. It has been rightly argued that the MPP has shown little engagement with the reality it seeks to manage (Mansouri, 2015). That is to say, although the changing views of experts may play a role, their visions are likely to be controversial, and the choice between paradigms can rarely be made on academic grounds alone. Pragmatisms and local policy dynamics prevail most of the time. The movement from the MPP to the IPP ultimately entails a set of judgements that are more political in tone, and the outcome depends, not only on the arguments of competing factions, but on their positional advantages within the broader city institutional framework.

Secondly, it is a leadership process whereby experts provide authoritative arguments to policy-makers to influence political decision-making (the policy makes politics) and even help policy-makers to articulate their practices and 'intuitions'. The movement from one paradigm to another is likely to be preceded by significant shifts in the locus of authority over policy. Local politicians decide whom to regard as authoritative, especially on matters of technical complexity and electoral impact.

Thirdly, it is an innovative process of policy experimentation and testing through which dynamic change policies and paradigm changes might be achieved. This is the method promoted at most of the city meetings organized by the Council of Europe. Hall (1993) shows that a policy paradigm can be threatened by the appearance of what he calls 'anomalies', namely by developments that are not fully comprehensible, even as puzzles, within the terms of the paradigm (Hall, 1993, p. 280). In the case of MPP, anomalies can take the form of segregation, discrimination and social relations among people from different backgrounds. As these accumulate, *ad hoc* attempts to stretch the terms of the paradigm to cover them are generally made, but this gradually undermines the intellectual coherence and precision of the original paradigm. Efforts to deal with such anomalies

may also entail experiments in the adjustment of existing lines of policy, but if the paradigm is genuinely incapable of dealing with anomalous developments, these experiments will result in policy failures that gradually undermine the authority of the existing paradigm and its advocates even further.

Finally, we can adapt the fourth-fold conceptualization proposed by Daigneault (2015, p. 50). The condition for a policy paradigm is coherence among these dimensions, as contradictions are not conducive to producing a paradigm. These four dimensions must, therefore, exhibit a significant number of actors in a given policy community (Baumgartner, 2014), most notably:

1. Nature of the reality and the role of administration: there is a shared view on diversity and its consequences if there is no policy intervention or if there is a 'wrong' intervention, as is the case in the MPP intervention.
2. Anomalies (of) power: that is, policy problems that cannot be solved by current policies and instead require a new public intervention. There is a shared view of what the unintended consequences of applying the MPP are: segregation and separation, lack of contact among different cultures and, even worse, a populist narrative nurtured by affirmative.
3. Policy objectives that should be pursued, as we see in section 4, when describing the normative drivers of interculturalism.
4. Appropriate policy tools to achieve these ends, including governance dimensions. The intercultural strategy focuses always on the promotion of contact, and always on what bonds people instead of what separates them. The differences are also taken as an opportunity to build bridges among people.

## 3. Framing the policy paradigm change: beating three multicultural idols

To frame this policy paradigm change, I would like to provocatively suggest – and following from the three dimensions of policy paradigm change presented in the previous section – that we are in a similar historical period to that which Nietzsche once termed the *Twilight of the Idols*. The IPP's change focus applied to migration and diversity debates acts against some policy assumptions in migration studies that recognize multiculturalism as the sole policy paradigm authority against the assimilationist policy answer to diversity. Francis Bacon famously identified what he considered the main

errors in the human attempt to gain knowledge as 'idols,' suggesting that ideas that are taken for granted influence the way we produce knowledge, and explain why so many minds hold so many false ideas for long periods of time. For our purposes, we might call them *idols of the multicultural policy paradigm*. These *idols* have framed a great part of the last decade's scholarly output on diversity management and are now being disputed by the IPP. I present them here in the form of policy narratives.

### *Multicultural idol 1: Beyond the national narrative domination: the local turn*

There is a common trend in Europe to move from a state-centred to a local-centred approach in diversity policies, whereby cities are increasingly recognized not only as implementers of policies, but also as new players (see Alexander, 2003; Borkert et al., 2007; Caponio and Borkert, 2010; Collet and Petrovic, 2014; Crane, 2003; Lüken-Klaßen and Heckmann, 2010; Penninx et al., 2004). There are many European institutional documents and initiatives that evidence this link. For instance, we can highlight the report from the Zaragoza Summit of the 4th Ministerial Conference on Integration of Immigrants, 'Integration as an Engine for Development and Social Cohesion' (April 2010), as one of the first to emphasize that local governments need to develop and obtain capacities to better manage diversity, and to combat racism, xenophobia and all forms of discrimination.

The local narrative taking shape within migration studies is doing so with a growing recognition that cities are becoming agents in a traditional governance framework dominated by states. Cities are managing their own policy agenda, giving local answers to local concerns with their own criteria and, definitively, developing their own policy philosophies on how to manage diversity. This 'local turn' contributes to a better understanding of why and how cities behave differently to similar challenges, and why/how these different policy answers can directly affect the dominance of the national-centric models of immigration management. This is why it is argued that the local turn produces poly-centric policy-making (Scholten et al., 2016) and can only be understood within the framework of multi-level governance (Zapata-Barrero *et al*., 2017).

This marks a turn away from the focus on so-called 'national models of integration' (Amelina and Faist, 2012) that has characterized research in this area in recent decades. The national models of integration were first criticized by transnational literature (Thränhardt and Bommes, 2010; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002) and by some preliminary multi-level and

local analyses of immigration (Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero, 2014). Scholars drawing attention to the local level have revealed that such 'national models' rarely provide an adequate understanding of how immigration policies develop (Scholten, 2013). The intercultural policy interest is directly related to this 'local turn'. The intercultural cities programme of the Council of Europe also contributes in this way to strengthening the importance of cities in developing intercultural policy projects.

### *Multicultural idol 2: Beyond ethnocentrism and group-based narrative hegemony: the return to the individual*

The multicultural policy narrative has been accused of being too right-centred and of being the main source of a normative machinery for legitimizing specific policies for specific ethnic differences that neglects interpersonal relations among people from different backgrounds. The assumption of this policy paradigm has always been that immigrants bear the culture of their own countries, and that these distinctions need to be recognized within liberal societies as the rights of individuals and cultural groups. The original focus of Will Kymlicka (1995) was the most powerful foundation of this narrative, which was followed by an explosion of literature within diversity, immigration and citizenship studies (see Barry, 2001; Carens, 2000; Crowder, 2013; Hesse, 2000; Isin and Turner, 2002; Modood, 2007; Modood et al., 2006; Parekh, 2000; Phillips, 2007; Stevenson, 2001; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2009). We already know that one of the main impacts of Kymlicka has been to reconcile group minority cultures with the national group majority, while offering a group-based perspective of culture, always taking for granted that culture has a political and social function that fosters feelings of belonging and loyalty.

The epicentre of the debate in Europe is that this multicultural narrative has neglected the social and political value of the contact hypothesis (Cantle, 2012), emphasizing the need for communication. This is why its primary normative force is that it is viewed as a set of arguments sharing one basic idea: that contact among people from different backgrounds matters.

Interculturalism also shares the premise that from a policy point of view we cannot condemn people to self-identify with a fixed category of cultural identity, because of their nationalities and culture of origin. Many people simply do not like to be singled out or held up as an example of their cultural group. This is the most flagrant evidence that the concept of diversity itself is a politically constructed category and far from neutral. The intercultural narrative expresses the challenge that we need to break this

epistemological barrier that was in part created by the former multicultural narrative. Taking this perspective, we can even say that the multicultural narrative has more in common with assimilationism and homogeneity, since it maintains the idea of a primarily belonging to one society with a loyalty to one nation state (Castles, 2000, p. 5).

Assimilationism and multiculturalism share an interpretative framework of diversity, apparent in the way attributes such as nationality, race, religion and cultural community are similarly categorized. The multicultural narrative, to my knowledge, has never formulated a critical interpretative framework regarding the way homogeneous cultural and national states categorize diversity dynamics. The intercultural argument is that we cannot impose the majoritarian understanding of diversity categories upon others. Ethnicity is self-ascribed, flexible and cannot be imposed by those with the power to define diversity categories. The intercultural narrative reacts against the process of political ethnicization of people. This substantial criticism of the multicultural narrative in the domains of ethnicity and nationalism is very close to what Rogers Brubaker calls 'groupism', namely, 'the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed' (2002, p. 164), or even 'solitarism' by Amartya Sen (2006, pp. xii–xiii), which criticizes this tendency to reduce people to singular, differentiated identity affiliations – to 'miniaturize' people into one dimension of their multiple identities.

### *Multicultural idol 3: Beyond the immigrant/citizenship divide of the population narrative framework: the mainstreaming turn*

The third and probably least-mentioned narrative is what I call the 'immigrant/citizenship divide', which has dominated the diversity debate in migration studies. What interests me in this divide is the consequence of always reproducing a certain discourse where 'we' citizens are not the subjects of diversity policies. In the policy-making process the population is divided into citizens and non-citizens, nationals and non-nationals, immigrants and citizens. This has the effect of reproducing a certain power relation between majority-citizen and a minority-ethnic that fails to create bridges among these two sets of people. Instead, this framework reinforces the idea of separate categories of people, just as diversity policies have mainly targeted one section of the population, whether they are called immigrants, non-nationals, ethnic minorities, or a range of other conceptualizations in different countries and contexts.

It is likely that the multicultural-based diversity narrative has contributed to the reinforcement of a division among populations. We know from migration studies that there are three main migratory process stages specific to immigration: admission policies, reception policies and citizenship policies. Other policies that seek to manage the accommodation of diversity, and the settlement and incorporation of immigrants into the main public sectors, are incorporated within policies that also target citizens. Specific policies are given their justification when circumstances of discrimination due to religion, language, skin colour or whatever mark of cultural difference, become a factor of inequality and even power relation. The specificity centres on differences within diversity frameworks, and is not specifically related to the practical situations that an immigrant encounters in his or her process of incorporation. The fact the immigrant has no political rights is specific to immigrants and has nothing to do with diversity. The idea that diversity must be based on the competences of immigrants, and also on context, is what drives the concept of super-diversity, which is quite different from the concept of diversity as it has been understood within frameworks of multiculturalism (Vertovec, 2007, 2014). Mainstreaming policy dismantles this narrative framework, incorporating the entire population (immigrants and citizens) as the target of policy. This becomes so prominent that we need now to leave aside immigration policy as a policy directed only at migrants, and instead speak about mainstreaming an intercultural policy, which has the feature of including all citizens within the scope of diversity policies.

What contributes to the intercultural turn, then, is the interplay between these three reactions to the three *multicultural policy idols*: the local turn, the return to the individual and the mainstreaming turn. The coherence between all three frames IPP formation in cities. But as we have already mentioned, behind a policy paradigm there is a determinate cosmovision and a way of identifying what Hall termed as 'anomalies' (1993). It is towards this philosophy that we now turn.

## 4. Intercultural policy formation: main normative drivers

As tends to happen with the MPP (e.g. Crowder 2013), we cannot assume a generalized view of IPP. The internal intercultural debate is more complex than multiculturalists seem to admit. This can be seen in the work of Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood (2012) and also with Kymlicka (2003, 2016), all of whom present a plain conception of interculturalism, as simply a narrative

that promotes dialogue. In this second stage of my argument, I present the IPP as sharing, in its descriptive sense, a coherent set of three basic premises and, in its normative sense, as being grounded in two main hypotheses and following two main drivers.

As I have argued, at the core of the IPP lies one basic idea: that the interaction among people from different diversity groups matters, and that this has been overlooked by the MPP paradigm, which has mainly concentrated on securing the cultural practices of diverse groups in terms of rights and equal opportunities. Currently, the strategy based on the promotion of interaction, community-building and prejudice reduction is one of the approaches most widely recognized by international institutions, especially European ones.

The IPP offers a real change of focus with its lens placed on the contact of citizens with one another. This is perceived in gradual terms, from circumstantial and sporadic communication to inter-personal dialogue and even interaction, which implies the sharing of a common project. From this point of view, the IPP focuses on three basic premises:

1. *(Positive) contact promotion:* the concern here is not only the promotion of interpersonal contact, but also the resulting negation of stereotypes and reduction in prejudice towards 'others'. In this sense, it is a means to an end through an ongoing process intended to develop and maintain relational competences. In other words, this premise tries to ensure that the contact zones between people are areas of (positive) interaction rather than areas of conflict. Here, conflict is understood in a broad sense, encompassing racism, poverty and social exclusion (Cantle, 2012, p. 102). This premise is due to the IPP being a network-centric way of seeing relations rather than an agent-based way of thinking. This is why interrelations are at the centre of its focus.

2. *Anti-discrimination promotion:* this is a fundamental element of the IPP since it focuses on the factors that hinder or support intercultural relations. There are contextual, legal, institutional and structural factors that reduce the motivation of people to interact and even build walls of separation between people based on misinterpretations of differences. Here we take into account legal frameworks concerning voting rights for foreigners and naturalization policies, as well as socio-economic opportunity gaps among citizens, when differences become the explanatory factor in reducing contact. Anti-discrimination promotion also includes tackling disadvantage, since it is hard to see how IPP can

continue over time if one or more sectors of society are so unequal that people are led to believe they have no real stake in that society.

3. *Diversity advantage promotion:* this means re-designing institutions and policies in all fields to treat diversity as a potential resource and a public good and not as a nuisance to be contained. In practice, this diversity management is effective in terms of providing equal opportunities for education, employment, entrepreneurship, holding civil office, etc. (Guidikova, 2015; Wood and Landry, 2008).

These three premises cover different angles of intercultural practice, and their coherence contributes to the consolidation of the IPP. Going from the descriptive to the normative sense, we can identify two empirical hypotheses emerging from the literature that focus on the potential impacts of diversity and required IPP promotion. I assess here how each hypothesis develops a theory that informs the two main normative drivers.

Understood from the beginning as positive interaction, anti-discrimination and diversity advantage (the three dimensions defining descriptively the IPP), the first key question is how to justify these promotions. At least two hypotheses underlie the IPP normative drivers (see Zapata-Barrero, 2015a, 2016a):

- The social hypothesis says that diversity without policy intervention tends to provoke segregation and exclusion, reducing social capital and the sense of societal belonging, either through social inequality or through differing flows of information and knowledge between immigrants and citizens (see Putnam, 2007). The IPP seeks to restore social cohesion, trust and feelings of belonging through social equality policies together with policies that seek to promote knowledge formation and prejudice reduction.

- The political hypothesis argues that diversity tends to alter the traditional expression and function of national identities, threatening traditional values and systems of rights and duties, which guarantee a common sense of loyalty and stability between citizens and the basic structure of society. In this case, the three basic premises of the IPP seek to maintain control of any justified change in national traditional values, protecting equilibrium between the loyalty of citizens and the rights of immigrants (see Bouchard, 2015).

Each hypothesis reflects a theory that informs a normative driver. Answering the social hypothesis requires the development of a *social*

*theory of diversity*, grounded in Gordon W. Allport's (1954) well-known contact theory, which posits the idea that contact reduces prejudice and promotes knowledge formation; and based on Ted Cantle's (2008) view of IPP as effecting community cohesion and community-building. We must also take into account the relationship between class and interculturalism, whereby the physical segregation of particular areas often occurs (Zapata-Barrero, 2015a).

Hence, supporting positive interaction involves transforming initial conflict zones into areas of positive contact, in order to ensure optimal peaceful coexistence and social inclusion. The basic aim here is social conflict reduction, as diversity has become an explanatory factor in social disturbances. The incorporation of the IPP into the main social networks of a society is also a priority in fostering cohesion.

To react to the political hypothesis we need to develop a *political theory of diversity*. The most recent illustration of this view is the work of Gérard Bouchard (2015). Bouchard focuses on managing the relationship between the immigrant and the society that they have entered into, ensuring what he formulates as an equilibrated relation between the majority and minority groups, thereby avoiding dualism in society between traditional values and those that are introduced through immigration. This theory seeks to provide the most appropriate spaces for motivating agreements between traditions, accepting unavoidable changes together with the context of diversity, through participative policy channels and other means of vertical communication. Its purposes are to manage the potential impact that any change can have on tradition, to regulate the behaviour of nationals, and to minimize impacts on the loyalty of citizens and the rights, duties and access to equal opportunities of immigrants.

Comparatively speaking, each theory brings about its own mode of justifying the need to promote IPP, to pursue specific goals and to establish its own limits to diversity. The social theory of diversity shapes a cohesive strand of IPP and has a normative driver of social inclusion and trust, with social conflict as its basic 'diversity limit'. The political theory of diversity seeks to legitimate a contractual strand of IPP, with stability (of tradition and rights/duties) as its normative driver and the loss of national identity as its basic 'diversity limit'.

## Concluding considerations: IPP as the main driver to xenophobia reduction?

There is a lack of support for diversity management in the current atmosphere of anti-multiculturalism (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010) and the increase in support for xenophobic and Euro-sceptic political parties with populist narratives against migrants (Chopin, 2015; Hartleb, 2011; Leconte, 2015). The new context of super-diversity (Vertovec, 2007) together with the embracing of radicalization by second-generation migrants poses a highly volatile situation for Europe. The last European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) report, for instance, signals growth in anti-immigrant sentiment and Islamophobia as being among the key trends in 2015 (ECRI, 2016). The recent terrorist attacks in Copenhagen, Nice and Paris further add to the Islamophobic sentiment being misused by populist political parties to stir up prejudice and hatred against Muslims in general. Likewise, the decision of the UK to leave the European Union in June 2016 (Brexit) is also connected to anti-immigrant sentiments. In most EU and Council of Europe documents, interculturalism is linked to European values such as human rights, democracy, a culture of peace and dialogue, and European identity (Bekemans, 2012; Council of Europe 2008; European Commission, 2008b; Ksenija Vidmar-Horvat, 2012). The ten-year strategy 'Working Together Towards 2025' of the Anna Lindh Foundation (2015), an inter-governmental institution bringing together civil society and citizens across the Mediterranean, also argues for interculturalism as an alternative to the extremist narrative.

While interculturalism in this context of crisis of ideas is manifesting in some local policy and academic circles and in many European programmes, it still faces challenges in being considered as a consolidated policy paradigm. This is because it has not yet tested its normative arguments, which are based on assumptions of diversity advantages.

Many empirical studies generally present normative assumptions, while normative arguments often tend to presuppose empirical evidences. As the debate on the IPP illustrates, the question of how to reconcile normative and empirical thinking presents a crucial challenge for innovation and a real imperative to influence societal processes of change and political decisions in Europe. Kseniya Khovanova-Rubicondo and Dino Pinelli (2012) undertook a review of the literature on diversity to understand whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ICC. Given that an intercultural approach is relatively new, it has not been widely analysed within the literature. Yet, as Khovanova-Rubicondo and Pinelli (2012) show, a number of studies

focusing on the key elements, concepts and settings of the intercultural approach have been conducted. These studies include discussions of the growth, productivity and employment impact of diversity; of governance structures and processes (see, for instance, Zapata-Barrero, 2016b); of urban space planning (see, for instance, Wood, 2015); of housing and neighbourhood policies; and of security and policing policies.

The diversity-advantage approach to interculturalism (Wood and Landry, 2008) is embedded within an *economic development hypothesis*. This is likely due to the necessary translation of this approach from economics and business studies. This line of discussion connects with other studies that follow the traditional view of the economic benefits of immigration (Borjas, 1995). The link between diversity and economic performance is already producing interesting work and contributing to consolidation of the formation of the IPP (see Alesina and Ferrara, 2005; Bakbasel, 2011; Bellini et al., 2009; Janssens et al., 2009; Khovanova-Rubicondo and Pinelli, 2012; Wagner, 2015). But the argument that the IPP contributes to the economic development of cities still requires more empirical evidence through case studies and comparative research.

There is also a need for further exploration of the *xenophobia-reduction hypothesis*. The argument that interculturalism can contribute to reducing the popularity of anti-immigration sentiments and can be a tool informing anti-racism policies is yet to be tested. The key idea here is that the two normative drivers (social and political) of the IPP can contribute not only to the process of policy change from multiculturalism to interculturalism, but can also reinforce the *xenophobia-reduction hypothesis*. Through this they would work to reduce ethno-national narratives, racism, prejudice, false stereotypes and negative public opinions, which limit the reasons for contact between people from different backgrounds.

This hypothesis is related to efforts seeking to reduce the conditions and spaces that make xenophobia and racism possible. This policy is strengthened by its non-ideological focus, alongside its potential for neutrality (see Zapata-Barrero, 2015b). We can also say that even if interculturalism is a strategic non-neutral decision to diversity management, as it does not seek to favour any specific ethnic group on equality grounds, it is impartial. This particular function of IPP has still not been examined, either theoretically or empirically, and could be analysed at different levels. From a political party point of view, the hypothesis can mean that the application of IPP in cities tends to leave no place for political parties with clear xenophobic narratives. From a public opinion perspective, it can also mean that once

the intercultural policy has been put in place, the negative attitudes towards diversity tend to reduce.

Xenophobia, racism, and intolerant discourses and practices are increasing their presence in all spheres of European societies from political parties to social discourses, and among citizens (Triandafyllidou et al., 2011; Zapata-Barrero and Triandafyllidou, 2012). They are currently gaining primacy in several national governments and are an emerging headache for European institutional discourse and practices. Xenophobia, racism and intolerance are becoming a new 'political ideology' in Europe and, as such, they are framing political opinion and legitimizing politics and policies. Scholarly work demonstrates that while this trend originates in cultural anxiety, it also emerges from approaches to welfare, entrenched inequalities and emerging insecurity, all of which are also nurtured by the inconsistencies arising from the management of complex issues such as access into European territory and diversity (Hampshire, 2013).

Populism and neo-conservatism are the main forms that this new ideology takes. Most of the public debate around migration and diversity is basically focused at the explanatory level, seeking to identify the main factors provoking such an emergence, as well as strategies seeking to invade political power and governments, and less on the political and policy instruments we have to prevent and reduce the conditions that make it possible. The specific argument of this chapter was to consider that the normative drivers of interculturalism could also be drivers for reducing xenophobia. For the IPP approach, xenophobia is seen as an ideology and as a factor threatening the conditions of setting the three basic premises of the descriptive dimension of the IPP (positive interaction, anti-discrimination and diversity advantages) and the two normative drivers (social and political). It is at this point that the connection becomes meaningful both theoretically and empirically. The question of how to explain, measure and prevent xenophobia is not new in Europe. We can mention here the report of the European Commission (area of Justice) on coding and measurements of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (see Cea D'Ancona, 2014). However, there still remains work to be done on treating the nexus between xenophobia-reduction and interculturalism. This would certainly respond to the gap between normative assumptions and policy outcomes.

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