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Chapter 5

Political and Civic Participation of Immigrants in Host Countries. An Interpretative Framework from the Perspective of the Origin Countries and Societies

Lorenzo Gabrielli, Sonia Gsir, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero

Introduction: The Role of Countries of Origin in Political and Civic Participation of Immigrants

The focus of this chapter is the role of origin countries in influencing immigrants' political and civic participation in their host societies. It is our aim to understand how these processes can affect immigrant integration in destination countries. More specifically, our objective is to explore the following questions: first, whether and how emigration countries can influence immigrants' political and civic participation in destination countries; and second, whether links between origin countries, civil societies and migrants have an impact on the political and civic participation of the latter in the receiving countries. We also propose to analyse origin countries' possible influence on political and civic participation through a very specific approach based on the identification of different actors intervening in these processes. In this framework, we distinguish between state and non-state (or civil society) actors and we look at how they can play a role in the political and civic participation of immigrants at destination. The rationale behind this differentiation is that these two categories of actors do not generally use the same tools, and often they may not share the same goals (Gabrielli and Zapata-Barrero 2015).

Following the main framework of this volume, the present chapter contributes to a deeper understanding of immigrants' political and civic participation by considering not only the host country framework but also that of the origin countries. We consider the political participation of migrants in a broad sense, which includes civic participa-

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tion. As both forms of participation constitute important dimensions of integration, they have to be considered jointly for several reasons which are outlined below.

The frontier between political and civic participation is, in conceptual terms, blurred, even if both political and civic participation have been distinguished by some scholars (e.g. Ekman and Amnå 2009). Moreover, analysing the existing definitions of political participation, Martiniello (2009) proposed a typology based on the agency of immigrants and their descendants, in which he clearly distinguished between participation in state politics and participation in non-state politics. Accordingly, *state political participation* includes electoral policy, parliamentary policy and consultative policy while *non-state political participation* embraces political party involvement, union politics, other pressure groups, ethnic and communitarian mobilisations, etc. This distinction is analytically useful even if sometimes state and non-state politics can and do overlap.

The political integration of immigrants has been assessed in terms of their ability to use a repertoire of political actions that can allow them to influence decision-making (Morales 2011). However, they can meet many obstacles when they wish to participate in conventional forms of political life in the destination countries, such as voting or running for elections, voting on referenda, becoming members of political parties, sitting on advisory councils or contributing to other arenas of political dialogue. Therefore, we consider it necessary not to restrict the analysis solely to these *conventional forms* of political participation. It seems necessary to also take into consideration the *non-conventional and extra-parliamentary forms* of migrants' political participation, such as protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, political strikes, hunger strikes, civil disobedience and boycotts.

Rather than engaging directly in the politics of the new country of residence, migrants can be involved in civic matters without even realizing that they are taking part in politics, for instance when they are active in parent-teacher associations (DeSipio 2011). It is therefore necessary to also consider immigrants' civic participation – in terms of their involvement in informal politics such as pressure groups and NGOs, and in organising lobbying activities – in the same framework. As Ekman and Amnå (2009: 291) explain, “[c]ivic engagement refers to activities by ordinary citizens that are intended to influence circumstances in society that are of relevance to others, outside their own family and circle of close friends”. Here we address civic participation in the active dimension and more precisely, in the collective and public dimension. Civic participation concerns the way immigrants act as citizens, even though they may not have the nationality or citizenship of their new residence country and consequently cannot participate in formal politics (Ekman and Amnå 2009). Civic participation is considered the first form of politics among immigrants, and is also an opportunity for integration because immigrants can participate regardless of their status (DeSipio 2011). It concerns the inclusion of immigrants in the civic institutions of the receiving country and the way in which foreign citizens become an accepted part of society in civic terms. Civic integration thus means becoming a citizen of the receiving society, but not necessarily a full citizen with nationality and full political rights, which in turn leads to political integration.

What is important in our framework is that immigrants' participation at the political and civic level depends not only on the country of destination, and on the specific

characteristics of the migrant, but also on the country of origin. Currently it is widely recognised that immigrants' participation in politics or society depends to some extent on the context of the country of destination, immigration policy (borders and the accommodation of diversity) and the integration framework. In other words, the political participation of immigrants depends on changes in the political opportunity structure that arise from a specific host society. As Morales and Giugni (2011) point out, it is not only the political but also the discursive opportunity structure in receiving countries that is a decisive factor which permits the political inclusion of immigrants. More specifically, these authors refer to local policies towards immigrant associations, the openness of public authorities and formal institutions, the configuration of local power, general policies towards immigrants and the prevailing discourse on immigration and immigrants. With regard to destination, access to naturalisation gives foreigners the opportunity to vote and to stand for election, giving the same legal protection and political rights to immigrants as to nationals. Citizenship has been repeatedly identified as the primary measure of immigrants' integration in democratic societies. Once naturalised, citizens can further their political incorporation through voting. The vote is the pathway through which immigrant groups become political communities who can alter the political system through their elected representatives (Fennema and Tillie 1999). In fact, some authors point out that the vote is a better indicator of political incorporation than naturalisation (Simpson Bueker 2005). The idea that political participation is a clear indicator of integration can be applied to both 'conventional' and 'non-conventional' political participation.

Within the already existing literature on political and civic participation, the novelty of the interpretative framework that we propose here is its focus on the country of origin, and on the role it plays in fostering the "active immigrant" (Zapata-Barrero and Gropas 2012; see also Vogel 2007). We understand active immigrants to be immigrants who are not passive individuals, workers, or merely receivers of social services, but rather agents who can participate as citizens in the societies of both destination and origin countries.

In order to understand the role of origin countries, we identify the main driving factors behind the choices made by immigrants about whether and how to participate in the political and civic life of a country. And we use three concepts to grasp their influence. First, the **country-of-origin effect** refers to the political and civic capital that migrants have acquired in the country of origin, such as political and civic education and culture, but also refers to language, in which case the effect is endogenous. But the effect can be also exogenous when it refers to a set of beliefs about the political system of the country of origin, or in other words, the "country label". For instance, a migrant coming from a country labelled as a dictatorship could be perceived as lacking of democratic experience. Whether the migrant left a democratic system or a dictatorship may also influence the political and civic participation in the new residence country through both an **endogenous effect** (his/her agency as citizen) and an **exogenous effect** (the way the migrant is perceived). Secondly, through emigration and diaspora policies, countries of origin may also influence the civic and political participation of migrants in the host country. We call this factor the **country impact**; it assesses the influence of the country-of-origin

policies that target nationals abroad. Given the effects and impact of the country's actions beyond its physical borders, the country of origin can be conceptualized as a **trans-border state**. This state has three main characteristics: first, it has policies in place that are effectively building the nation (and a sense of belonging) beyond its physical borders (i.e. across them); second, it supports emigrants beyond its physical borders; and finally, it is represented by at least two levels of governance: the government and a civil society, both of which work across borders.

To analyse the 'country-of-origin effect', we consider the main methodological approaches to researching political participation at the micro level – where the term is used, even if only in a marginal way. These approaches allow us to identify the extent to which the countries and societies of origin influence migrants' political and civic capital.

To understand the 'country impact', which is a new concept in the field, we are obliged to enlarge the focus of our literature review and to consider other fields of the literature on migrants' political participation vis-a-vis origin countries, namely diaspora policies and transnational politics, as well as immigrant and civic participation in mainstream, migrant and bi-national organisations.

An analysis of these specific fields of literature, which concern trans-border linkages more than migrants' characteristics and capital, can also help us to develop our actor-based approach, allowing us to map the state and non-state actors implicated in the countries of origin, their strategies, and their actions. We also specifically consider state actors' strategies and interactions with migrants, in terms of both conventional and unconventional forms of political participation. Subsequently, we look at non-state actors and their strategies to influence migrants' political participation, which can be directed at both destination and origin countries.

Thus, we analyse the relation between political and civic participation and integration, which is a key element in the field of immigration research as it allows to consider immigrants' multiple loyalties and country-of-origin perceptions of this issue in the integration debate. Finally, based on the findings (and shortcomings) of our research, we propose a new research agenda in order to develop a deeper understanding of the influence of origin countries and civil society actors on immigrants' political and civic participation.

The State of the Art: The Standpoints of the Literature on Migrants' Political and Civic Participation

In this section we review the existing literature in order to identify the different elements that origin countries and societies can use to influence the political and civic participation of migrants. We also consider the more 'classical' literature on the political participation of immigrants in destination countries, and the links between these issues and the integration debate. However, immigrants' political participation

is oriented not only towards the destination countries; it also takes place between migrants and their home countries.

Then, in a second part of this section, we focus on other research fields that explore the transnational political linkages and activities between home countries and societies on the one hand, and migrants on the other. We refer to studies which are focused on ‘diaspora policies’ and ‘diaspora engagement policies’ as well as on ‘transnational political practices’. Finally, in a third part, we focus more specifically on additional inputs coming from the literature on the civic participation of migrants. It has to be underlined that generally the literature on political participation in destination countries concentrates on the *micro level*, analysing the main factors influencing political behaviour, while the bibliography on diaspora policies and transnational political ties and interactions focuses more on the *macro level*, and is comprised of actors, strategies and tools. A review of both approaches, complemented by an examination of the literature on immigrant civic participation, is a necessary starting point in the analysis of the possible roles of origin countries and civil society in influencing the political and civic participation of immigrants.

A Micro Level Analysis: Individual Factors of Political Participation of Immigrants in the Host Countries

The key-question guiding the literature in the field of immigrant political participation is: is there a relationship between an effective political participation of immigrants and the integration process and if yes: what is it? The immigrants’ political integration has to do with, first, self-identification with the political system and if they feel represented by it; second, active political participation, through voting or participation in public sphere; and third, with perception of being heard by authorities (Kaldur et al. 2012). The general literature identifies a number of factors explaining various types of political participation, some of them general, others specific to immigrants. Through their action, origin states and societies can affect some of those elements and intervene then on the political participation of their expatriates. The main question we consider here is: which elements explaining political participation of immigrants at destination can be influenced by the action or origin states and societies?

On the one hand, more ‘traditional’ factors are useful to explain general political participation (valid for all population), independently from a previous migration experience or from the origin of the subject (i.e.: see Lipset 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba et al. 1995). More specifically, we must consider such factors as age/generational cohort, gender, beliefs and values, level of education, linguistic skills, place of residence, social capital, and socio-economic status. In the specific field of migration studies, socio-economic theories confirm also that to participate or not depends on issues such as incomes or education (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Smith

and Edmonston 1997), or demographic characteristics (Yang 1994). For one of those ‘traditional’ factors, namely gender, the framework is more complex, in the sense that it seems to be more connected to immigrants’ origin, and the literature on those specific issue is particularly limited (Wu and Wang 2007; Gidengil and Stolle 2009).

On the other hand, other explaining factors of political participation are ‘immigrant-specific’. Martiniello (2005), points out that the rational choice or the self-identification with or the feeling of belonging in host countries are the main reasons for immigrant political participation. Other researches underline the importance of the knowledge of the political system, the political socialisation and re-socialisation, previous involvement in politics, social capital and density of social networks (Jones-Correa 1998; Adamson 2007; White et al. 2008; Li and Jones 2011; De Rooij 2012; Prokic-Breuer et al. 2012). Some authors identified language competencies and access to reliable information as additional factors (Zapata-Barrero and Gropas 2012), while other scholars emphasise particularly the type and the causes of migration, the length of stay and the “structural” (or socio-economic) position in the receiving country (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Portes 1999). These three last elements are connected, more or less directly, with the origin of the immigrants.

If we look at countries and societies of origin, the ‘mode of migration’ is also linked to existing emigration policies and bilateral agreements on workers recruitment, and on familiar and home-societal strategies of migration. Referring to the ‘structural position’, this is linked also to homeland socio-economic conditions prior to departure, as well as to the mode of migration. Moreover, the length of stay can also depend on homeland situation, on return policy of home country, and on family and societal strategies.

Among all the factors influencing immigrants’ political participation, just some of them have a relation with origin country’s political and socio-economic framework, and also with eventual labour emigration policies and regulations. However, the majority of the latter relates specifically to migrants’ situation in the homeland before their departure. In some cases they may be targeted by origin countries and society only with large and general political measures, not directly linked with emigration, as in the case for the level of education, the socioeconomic status previous to migration or the political socialisation and the previous involvement in politics, particularly of women. Another part of those factors is independent from the action that origin countries’ and societies’ may develop towards emigrants already out of the country. Then, we have to consider the majority of all the micro-level factors explaining political participation as independent from the origin countries’ and societies’ action towards migrants after they leave their origin country.

Some scholars focused specifically on the existence of a source country effect which would explain differences in immigrants’ political participation depending on the country of origin. Following Simpson Bueker (2005), this source country effect is constituted on several hypotheses. The first one is the reversibility hypothesis: political participation of an immigrant is inversely related to the ease with which one can reverse his or her migratory course and return home. The clearest

examples are the case of migrants installed in the US from China, former Soviet Union, Cuba, the countries of the South-East Asia, Philippines and India; following this hypothesis, the opposite trend is predictable in the case of immigrants in the US from Mexico, Canada, Great Britain, and Italy. The second is the translation/trans-ferability hypothesis: political participation of an immigrant is directly related to the ability to apply prior political knowledge to a new political environment. This hypothesis is strictly connected with the political re-socialization of immigrants happening in the country of destination. The third is the mobilisation hypothesis: political participation of an immigrant is directly related to the level of mobilisation of the reference group or community. Following this hypothesis, the initial reception of immigrants, in terms of financial aid and assistance, would have implications for the following political incorporation in the country. The example is the case of Cuban community in the US. Settlement patterns seems to be also significant in this process, considering that immigrants' concentration would help integrating the latest arrivals in the political and economic systems, and also increase the 'voting bloc' effect, pushing the interest of major political parties. The fourth is the gender hypothesis: the place of women in the social and political life of the immigrants' countries of origin of immigrants can determine a different political incorporation processes.

We consider that those elements underlined by the source country effect constitute some valuable inspiration to analyse origin countries and societies role at the micro level of the political behaviour of immigrants.

At this point, a key question is whether those main methodological approaches in researching immigrants' political participation allow us to identify the influence of the countries and societies of origin in this process. The existing literature on political participation of migrants in host countries permits only a limited identification of the influences that countries and societies of origin can have in this field. Consequently we need to enlarge the scope of the review and consider literature considering a large framework allowing the identification of actors, strategies and tools developing and sustaining trans-border ties with migrants in their destination countries.

A Macro-level Analysis: Diaspora Policies and Transnational Politics

Contemporary migrants, and their predecessors, have maintained, and still maintain, a variety of links with their origin countries; while at the same time, they are incorporated into the countries in which they are settled. Migration has never been a one-way process, but rather one in which migrants interact simultaneously in different spheres where they live. Most aspects of their lives occur and take place, frequently, across borders (Levitt and Jaworski 2007). The new sphere where the political activities occurred faces with the challenges of the currently nation-state,

both supra-national and regional dimension, and with the large flows caused by migration (Basch et al. 1994). Political and civic participation develop then at multiple sovereignty levels, as well as at transnational level (Bauböck and Faist 2010; Faist 1998).

In order to understand the transnational political and civic linkages between the societies and the countries of origin with their emigrants and state-actors influence on political participation, it is crucial to consider emigration policy of origin countries and their ‘diaspora policies’. The latter constitute a particularly new field of research that draws attention to state actors’ influence on emigrants’ political activities. Following Scheffer (2003: 9–10), an ethno-national diaspora can be defined as “a social-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries”. Gamlen (2008) identifies two broad frameworks of action through which the country of origin remains connected and interacts with his citizens abroad. The first mechanism is a diaspora building, addressed to recognise pre-existing diaspora communities or cultivate new ones. The second mechanism, called diaspora integration, looks for pull emigrants into a “web of rights and obligations” (Gamlen 2008: 842). The diaspora building mechanism is filled with capacity building policies that “aimed at discursively producing a state-centric transnational national society, and developing a set of corresponding state institutions” (Gamlen 2006: 5–6). The diaspora integration mechanism is composed by two different dimensions: the first one is aimed to extending rights to the diaspora, and then to build a legitimate transnational sovereignty; the second one is addressed to “extract obligations” from the diaspora, considering citizens abroad owe loyalty to this legitimate home country (ibid.).

The diaspora policies literature enlightens almost exclusively top down transnational political activities, namely those carried out by states and institutional actors, in connection with emigrants and diasporas. One of our goals is to understand how those non-state actors build up those linkages, which tools they use, which actions they carry on, and what motivations and interests drive those transnational activities in the political field. For understanding the role of non-state, or civil society actors we will need to focus also on bottom-up transnational dynamics, and transnational networks. For that purpose, it is necessary to consider the literature more specifically focused on transnational political practices.

Literature on immigrant integration and political participation aims, first of all, at understanding the conditions of integration from the perspective of the receiving country. And, in studies on immigrant transnationalism, the key factors are transnational practices and the conditions of emergence rather than consequences on integration, even though this issue is not completely absent (Snel et al. 2006; Délano 2010). But the transnational perspective seems to offer a relevant theoretical approach should we wish to grasp what occurs when immigration and emigration countries are simultaneously taken into account.

Some scholars concentrate their attention on the implications of transnational political practices at the international relation’s level. Koslowsky (2004), for example, details several kinds of emigrant political activity and its recent expansion through increased migrations and defines those activities as ‘the globalization of

domestic politics'. He also underlines how the democratization processes of home countries are linked with the participation of the emigrants, increasing their possibilities to influence the homeland politics (*ibid.*). Scheffer (2003) focuses his analysis specifically on diaspora groups that possibly are different from migrants group, due to their stronger structure and their more homogenous group identity. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003: 21), for example, underlines that for some authors, diaspora politics is a subset of transnational politics concerning groups "that are barred from direct political participation in the political system of their homeland – or who do not even have a homeland political regime to support/oppose", and is closer to the less common concept of *émigré* politics (Cohen 1997). Nevertheless, we think that some of his considerations on political activities of the diasporas, their objectives, their strategies and their tools represent a key feature for a broad understanding of the role that origin countries can play towards their emigrants' political participation.

Otherwise, some authors also bring their attention more specifically to transnational political practices. Østergaard-Nielsen (2001: 2–3), for example, notes that the 'proliferation of political ties, networks, and practices across borders', is a phenomenon strictly linked with "the sending countries' particular politico-economic incentives to mobilise their citizens and former citizens abroad", between others factors. About the definitions of the concept of transnational political practices, significant differences emerge regarding its range, varying from a narrow definition, considering only the actual membership of parties or hometown associations, up to a wide one, including all the political consequences of transnational ties between migrants and their countries of origin, and also the migration, as 'unintentional political action' affecting national and international level. Other scholars emphasise the identification of more durable patterns as a continuum of different practices. Itzigsohn (2000: 1130) gives the following definition of immigrants' political transnational field: "recurrent and institutionalized interactions and exchanges between, on the one hand, immigrants and their social and political organizations and, on the other hand, the political institutions and the state apparatus of the country of origin".

Østergaard-Nielsen concentrates on intentional transnational political practices, and focuses, as a main unit of her analysis, on the transnational political networks (2001: 5). She distinguishes different types of transnational political practices, depending on whether the political activities are directed towards host or home countries. She defines as immigrant politics the political action undertaken by immigrants and refugees to improve their situation in the host country. Some examples are the activities carried out to obtain more political, social and economic rights, or to fight discrimination. When the home country supports emigrants' activities, the immigrant politics becomes transnational. Otherwise, when political actions of immigrants and refugees are addresses to the domestic policy of their homeland, or to the foreign policy of the latter, they are defined as homeland politics. In this framework, activities of immigrants and refugees may take the form of opposition or support to the current political regime in the origin country or to its foreign policy.

External voting of migrants in another research field linked to transnational political and civic practices that can add useful elements to our analysis on the role that origin countries and societies can play in the political participation practices of migrants (Baubock 2007; Jaulin 2015; Lafleur 2013). External voting can be defined as “the active and passive voting rights of qualified individuals, independently of their professional status, to take part from outside the national territory in referenda or in supranational, national, subnational, or primary elections held in an country of which they hold citizenship but where they permanently or temporarily do not reside” (Lafleur 2013: 31).

A Meso-level Analysis: Immigrants and Civic Participation in Mainstream, Migrant and Bi-national Organizations

The integration process is gradual and civic integration is also an important part of it. It takes place at various levels and the question is through which channels it can be observed and furthermore the role of the origin country and of transnational links in this process. As mentioned above, temporary absence of citizenship or the limitations on political rights do not prevent migrants from engaging civically in the host country. One of collective forms of civic participation is to join or create an association. Migrants can engage in various types of associations such as migrant organizations, hometown associations, but also mainstream organizations namely non-migrant associations, consultative bodies or even bi-national associations. Even though other forms of civic participation exist, we focus on the involvement of migrants in organizations. They indeed offer a significant form of civic participation, with a collective dimension and with the potential empowerment dimension for all migrants, whatever their status.

Mainstream Organizations

Migrants can get involved in *local politics* over mainstream issues or neighbourhood issues such as housing, education, urban space, etc. issues that are not specific to migrants. Even though immigrant participation in mainstream organizations can be of the utmost importance for integration, in particular in countries with a strong civil society tradition, literature and case-studies are quite scarce on this, particularly in the case of Europe.¹

Mainstream organizations primarily serve the native population or more broadly the population without distinction of ethnicity (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2006). This participation is sometimes also called by some researchers “civic and community involvement” and can take a lot’s of forms from volunteerism to mem-

¹ See a comparative case-study is the INVOLVE project of involvement of third-country nationals as a means of integration (CEV 2006).

bership in different kinds of groups or associations in the community (Ready et al. 2006). Mainstream organizations are sometimes embedded in the receiving societies, e.g. civic clubs, or at a more local level, neighbourhoods or homeowners associations.

Participating in mainstream organizations favours interaction with natives (Ahokas 2010) even though these organizations do not have integration as an aim (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2006). Volunteering in mainstream organizations is thus a way for immigrants to engage in the civic affairs of the new country of residence. Nevertheless, it relies a great deal on the openness of mainstream organizations to immigrants (Ahokas 2010) and in some cases, even though they have joined these organizations, immigrants prefer to leave and to create their own associations in particular when they cannot take part in leadership (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2006).

The possibilities for origin countries' actors to directly influence civic participation through mainstream organization seem to be very limited. Meanwhile, association and participative culture in origin country can affect migrant involvement in organizations. This can be identified as country of origin effect endogenous first, but also exogenous as mainstream organizations gather both migrants and native population.

Migrant Organizations

Migrants set up all kinds of migrant associations, though these associations are not easy to define (Moya 2005). Migrant organizations are, indeed, very diverse: ethnic, cultural, regional, social, professional, religious, charitable organizations, sports (Brettel 2005). De Haas (2006: 7) considered a migrant organization as “any kind of organization consisting mainly of migrants and their descendants, irrespective of the specific activities of such organizations.” Migrants associations are also called “ethnic” associations and are oriented towards issues linked to the country of residence (Portes et al. 2008). Among the various migrant organizations, scholars distinguished diaspora organizations, which are also called (civic) hometown associations or even transnational organizations (Ramakrishnana and Viramontes 2006). Hometown associations are “organizations that allow immigrants from the same city or region to maintain ties with and materially support their places of origin” (Orozco and Rouse 2007). Hometown associations can also contribute to the integration of immigrants in the host countries as they are “organized points of contact and coordination between immigrants, the host governments, and other institutions” (Somerville et al. 2008: 2).

Migrant associations are considered as the locus of transnational political activities (Morales and Jorba 2010). Transnational political activities are the activities “conducted by migrants of the same national origin but residing in different destination countries or when the state authorities of the sending country interfere with their emigrants’ activities in the country of residence” (Martiniello and Lafleur 2008: 653). “Civil society actors – and, in particular, migrants’ organizations [...]

provide the networks and the infrastructure to facilitate and sustain various forms of transnational engagement by individuals and communities (...), most notably civic and political transnationalism” (Morales and Jorba 2010: 181). It is then necessary to focus also on literature specifically consecrated to civic participation through different types of organizations.

Migrant organizations are an important place for affirming attachment to the country of origin (Brettell 2005). They are considered as a means for gathering and creating links with immigrants from the same country of origin and also for promoting the culture and the language of the home country (ibid.). Their agenda is not necessarily focused on one society, but it can target both the homeland issues and the integration problems in the host society (Cordero-Guzmán 2005; Portes et al. 2008). If migrant associations can thus be orientated toward the country of origin like transnational associations or toward immigrant integration in the country of immigration, some of those also gradually present a mixed agenda (Faist et al. 2013).

Migrant organizations emerge often spontaneously as informal social networks but progressively they organise in more formal organizations with several objectives. Migrant associations are not exclusively initiated by migrants. Countries of origin can encourage their creation (Xiang 2003; Délano 2010; Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2006). In this case, we can then talk about country impact. Receiving countries or regional authorities can also foment migrant organizations especially in the framework of co-development policies (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Furthermore, migrant organizations can differ from one country or even from one city to another because “political or institutional opportunities in the host and sending societies strongly influence immigrant organizations” (Schrover and Vermeulen 2005: 828).

Bi-national and Multi-national Organizations

Some authors found that some associations are bi-national and serve as bridges between natives and migrants (Brettell 2005). In some cases, organizations with mainstream origin become rather hybrid organizations because if initially mainstream their membership diversified ethnically to a significant extent (Ramakrishnan and Veramontes 2006). Another kind of civic body characterized by bi or even multi-ethnic membership including migrants and natives are the local consultative councils for foreign residents. Some would argue that consultative bodies refer rather to formal political participation (Martiniello 2009), but they can also be seen as a place of civic participation as they, in some cases, were developed before allowing foreign residents to vote. Local consultative bodies for foreign residents are often set up by local authorities in the residing country and they bring together foreign residents and local elected representatives (Gsir and Martiniello 2004). These councils pursue two main objectives: first, integrating and encouraging the participation of foreign residents in local public life and second, improving or harmonising relations between foreign residents and other sectors of the community (authorities, administrative bodies, nationals) (ibid.). They, thus, represent a privileged place of civic participation.

According to Ramakrishnan and Viramontes (2006: 88), “[h]ybrid and ethnic civic organizations display a mode of assimilation characterized by a strong desire to integrate into the mainstream while maintaining allegiance to ethnic-specific issues and concerns.”

Following this analysis, we can state that migrant organizations and specifically hometowns associations but also bi-national organizations may be considered as places of civic participation where country of origin actors can have an impact.

The Focus: The Role of Actors in the Country of Origin and Their Strategies

As seen above, combining the findings of the literature produced in different fields (political participation of immigrants, diaspora and diaspora engagement policies, transnational political practices, external voting and civic participation) allows us to identify the different origin-country actors, and to better understand their specific interests, as well as the actions and tools they use to influence migrants’ political and civic participation. In this way, we are able to identify the different actors who are interacting with migrants in order to influence their political and civic participation, both in the homeland and the destination country. In a broad framework, the actors involved in migrants’ political participation belong to three main categories: the host-country actors, the migrants and the home-country actors. We focus on the state and non-state actors in the home countries in order to understand the interests that guide the way they operate, and the different tools they use to influence the political and civic participation of migrants.

Emigration countries’ interest in their nationals abroad is not new. In addition to emigration policies, countries of origin have developed diaspora engagement policies (Gamlen 2006). The emigration policies include the exit rules of the country and can vary from forbidding emigration to permitting free emigration (Weiner 1985). Diaspora policies are aimed at engaging the diaspora abroad, and at keeping links with emigrants living in a new country of residence. In various ways, “[...] emigration states attempt to maintain the umbilical cord between the homeland and emigrants” (Lafleur 2013: 7). Although they have accepted and even promoted emigration, emigration states view emigrants as resources that can be useful for the country’s interests. As noted by several scholars, countries of origin are mainly motivated by the potential for attracting emigrant remittances, opening markets and having a representation (and defence) of national interests in the host country (Portes 1999; Bauböck 2003; de Haas 2007). Diaspora policies consist of an array of measures such as ministerial or consular reforms; investment policies to attract remittances; the extension of political rights (dual citizenship, right to vote from abroad); the extension of state protection or services; and symbolic policies to reinforce a sense of belonging (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). These policies address emigrants in the receiving country but can also address them when they come back

“home” by offering them specific provisions: for example, advantageous conditions of investment or protection against rackets.

Diaspora policies also depend on how emigrants are perceived by the country of origin. Are they considered traitors who fled their homelands or on the contrary, are they celebrated and perceived as heroes? In several countries, maintaining links with emigrant workers in anticipation of their eventual (and permanent) return home has been progressively replaced by simply maintaining links with all emigrants and their descendants abroad. This strategy takes into account possible pendular travels between the country of emigration and immigration (Portes 1999; de Haas 2007). Several studies have demonstrated how countries of origin such as Morocco, Mexico and China, among others, have shifted from an approach of controlling emigrants abroad to one of courting them (DeSipio 2002; Xiang 2003; de Haas 2007; Délano 2010; Gamlen 2012). Furthermore, emigrants do not constitute a homogeneous group, even if they come from the same country or region of origin; some may be in opposition to the regime or ruling authorities of the country of origin. Therefore, the government of the country of origin adopts actions depending on the different components of the diaspora. For example, the Turkish government may target Kurdish emigrants differently than other members of the Turkish diaspora (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).

State Actors in Home Countries: Their Strategies and Actions Towards Political Participation

Origin countries can have multiple state actors developing political activities towards emigrants. As Gamlen (2006) clearly explains, “diaspora engagement policies are more a ‘constellation’ of different institutional and legislative initiatives implemented at different times, at different state levels, and for different reasons, than a unitary and coordinated state strategy”. Based on a study of institutions in 30 developing countries, Agunias (2009) has mapped state actors that engage diasporas, distinguishing “government institutions at home”, “consular networks” and “quasi-government diaspora institutions”.

Fitzgerald (2006: 260) also argues that emigration policies “are best understood by a ‘neopluralist’ approach, disaggregating ‘the state’ into a multilevel organisation of distinct component units in which state incumbents and other political actors compete for their interests”. This author criticises the realist interpretation of the state as a unitary actor pursuing ‘national interests’ and competing with other states. He suggests that this description of states does not capture the internal, multilevel struggles to determine those interests, not only in the economic sense, but also in political and ideological terms (Fitzgerald 2006). Considering all these scholars’ remarks above, we can take into account whether initiatives carried out by origin countries are specific and *ad hoc*, or if they are part of an overarching strategic orientation.

In view of the multiplicity of state actors, it is also difficult to define ‘the interests’ of each country. Consequently, it is also challenging to define whether the interests of sending and receiving countries are diverging or converging. At the core of the question is the issue of migrants’ “loyalty” towards the origin and destination countries. The question at stake is whether double or multiple loyalties are possible, and whether or not migrants’ political participation is a zero-sum game. In some cases, as Scheffer (2003) clearly points out, host countries try to take advantage of emigrants’ opposition viewpoints towards the destination countries’ governments. On these occasions, destination countries can support migrants’ criticisms of the political regimes in their homeland, and at times even encourage migrant activities against their homeland governments, with the risk of creating a political confrontation between origin and destination countries. The activities of the Cuban diaspora in the US against their homeland is one of the clearest examples of this situation.

Gamlen (2006: 5–6) says that states, in the framework of their ‘capacity-building policies’, try to create a transnational ‘relationship of communication’, based upon the idea of the nation, which he defines as “a system of symbols and signs within which states can immerse the exercise of power”. A second step is the creation of the state’s “objective capacities for the realisation of power relations” (ibid.), namely the building of specific diaspora institutions. A third step of this transnational exercise of state power consists of what he calls the finalised activities, or specific effects: a kind of transnationalised citizenship (see also Vink, Chap. 9 in this volume) which is simultaneously comprised of the extension of rights to emigrants and the extraction of obligations from them.

As he explains, symbolic nation-building policies are used to create “a homogeneous national ‘diaspora’, with close ties of allegiance to the home state” (Gamlen 2006: 6), through initiatives that increase migrants’ sense of belonging to a transnational community and enhance the place of the state within the community. More specifically, Gamlen (2006) notes several initiatives that are encompassed in this group of policies: rhetorical or symbolic gestures celebrating emigrants as national heroes²; paternalistic claims that expatriates are an “offshore part” of the national population or an extra administrative district of the state’s territory³; programmes to teach the national language and history; national celebrations and cultural events within expatriate communities; expatriate-targeted media, communications and public relations, meant to “align” emigrants or to mobilise diasporas; and the organisation of large conferences and conventions, designed to show the home country’s “listening attitude”, gather diaspora ‘representatives’ and eventually establish a patronage relationship with them or convey the state’s position on various issues.

²As in the cases of Mexico, Morocco and China, among others, this stance very often represents an important shift for a state that previously denounced emigrants as deserters.

³The idea of emigrant communities as off-shore districts of the state is reflected in some specific electoral systems, as in the case of Ecuador and Italy, where external electoral constituencies are given special representation. Some other examples of these actions, but which have a more paternalistic approach, can be found in Mexico, Haiti and Ireland.

As the same author clearly explains, these policies share the states' interest in producing "a communal mentality amongst non-residents; a sense of common belonging to the home-state that renders expatriates governable" (Gamlen 2006: 7). This kind of state-actor activity towards emigrants is meant to (re)establish loyalty toward home countries among the citizens abroad. In this regard, Brubaker (2010: 77) talks about "new forms of external membership" that constitute forms of "trans-border nationalism". He also uses the concept of "external politics of belonging", which concerns those "who are long-term residents (and perhaps citizens) of other states, yet who can be represented as belonging, in some sense, to a "homeland" or "kin" state, or to "its" eponymous nation".

A further step in state actors' activities towards emigrants is what Gamlen (2006, 2008) defines as 'institution-building policies', which create bureaucratic instruments and systems that give home countries the capacity to promote their political and economic interests to emigrants. The most common initiatives highlighted in this field are:

- the implementation of surveillance, through the foreign service or the migration bureaucracy, to collect statistics on which to base strategic orientations towards emigrants and the strategic selection of emigrant actors with whom long-term relationships can be established;
- the creation by the home state of its own transnational migrant organisations, often acting as consultative institutions, in order to avoid existing political tensions and to eventually contain possible future conflicts with emigrants;
- the creation of specific government offices, sometimes at the ministerial level, when a critical mass of governmental activities addressing emigrants is reached and requires coordination.

In this regard, Itzigsohn (2000) suggests that home countries' engagement of emigrants is based on two main interests: on the one hand, politically containing emigrants, namely by controlling the impact of emigrants' political activities on homeland politics; and on the other hand, mobilising emigrants to be lobbyists in the destination countries. As Scheffer (2003) explains, when emigrant communities are better-organised and more affluent, they engage in advocacy activities intended to increase acceptance of the general diaspora phenomenon and tolerance of specific diasporas and their respective homelands at the political level.

In this sense, Argentina is a very interesting case. At the time of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands crisis in 2012, the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner sent letters to influential emigrants asking them to support the official state's position on that issue in their destination countries, as well at the international level. More specifically, leading expatriates received two letters, the first one inviting Argentineans abroad to mobilise and attend informational meetings at the embassies (including a briefing on the latest news about the issue, and the distribution of multimedia materials). The second letter was sent by the embassy and invited influential figures of the emigrant community to sign a statement and to send it to the UN's Special Committee of Decolonisation, as members of the "*Grupo de Apoyo a la Cuestión Malvinas*" (*Support group on the Malvinas issue*). This case represents

a clear example of the “selective mobilisation” of emigrants to create public opinion abroad and to push origin states’ interests at the international level.

In Turkey, we find another clear example of a state action aiming to mobilise citizens abroad to provide political support and lobbying assistance. Turkey tried to engage influential expatriates and emigrant associations in Europe, in order to push forward the state’s agenda on the issue of EU membership (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The state also sponsored academic exchanges and academic chairs as tools for promoting pro-Turkish ideologies abroad, having first screened the candidates for their views on the Armenian massacres (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001).

Looking at examples of state-actors at origin who co-opted influential expatriates by encouraging them to stand for elections in external constituencies, we can cite the cases of Ecuador and of Dora Aguirre, founder and former president of the Spanish-Ecuadorian association “Rumiñahui”, one of the most important migrant associations in Spain. In Ecuador’s 2009 legislative elections, Dora Aguirre ran as a candidate from the external constituency for the ruling party, namely the *Alianza PAIS (Patria Altiva y Soberana)*, the same party as the president Rafael Correa. She was finally elected as one of the representatives of Ecuadorians abroad in the Parliament and re-elected in 2013. During her electoral campaign abroad for the 2013 elections, the main points of Dora Aguirre’s programme were linked to the conditions of Ecuadorian emigrants and the protection of their rights.

In the case of Mexico, some scholars (Gamlen 2006) suggest that the Mexican state is seeking to extend its governance of Mexican nationals through urban and community-scale organisations, containing and co-opting migrant political activity by inserting state representatives into civic associations.

Another important issue which allows citizens abroad to push forward their home country’s interests is the promotion of cooperation between host and home countries and the liberalisation of tariffs and commercial flows. Finally, lobbying by emigrants can also be used to end economic boycotts and limitations on exportation and importation to and from origin countries (Scheffer 2003). One of the clearest examples in this sense is the action by the Jewish diaspora in the US, who lobbied for the end of the economic boycott of South Africa during apartheid in order to help the Jewish diaspora (a position which generated tensions not only within the diaspora, but also with communities lobbying for the boycott, such as African-Americans). A similar case is that of the Chinese diaspora lobbying in the US for more open political and economic approaches to China (Scheffer 2003).

In contrast, emigrants can also engage in lobbying activities to impose boycotts and sanctions on their home countries, and to gain more political influence on the international relations front, as in the case of certain groups in the Cuban and Iranian diasporas in the US, as well as the Iraqi diaspora in Europe, which mobilised against the regime of Saddam Hussein (Scheffer 2003).

Nevertheless, home countries’ efforts to co-opt emigrants as lobbyists or influential spokespeople are oriented not only towards host countries, but also towards transnational or international actors, namely public institutions and private companies. According to Gamlen (2006), origin countries thus seek to influence capitalist

elites for the purpose of concluding new strategic alliances and attracting foreign direct investments and technology transfers.

Lastly, home countries have a major impact on emigrants' formal political participation at destination by granting permission for double citizenship, as this action indirectly allows emigrants to acquire the citizenship of destination countries and participate in elections there.

Non-state Actors in the Sending Societies and Their Strategies

The role of origin countries cannot be reduced simply to state actors. Different kinds of non-state actors try to engage or maintain links with emigrants abroad. They come from the political sphere but also from the civil sphere. Establishing a complete and full-inclusive list of non-state actors in origin countries is complex. Nevertheless, it is possible to underline some of the main actors: political parties (specifically, opposition parties in the case of authoritarian regimes, and 'separatist' parties or ethnic-minority parties in multi-ethnic countries); trade unions; NGOs; different civil society groups and associations; churches and religious groups; media; etc. To assess the influence of these actors on the civic participation of emigrants abroad, it is necessary to examine their purpose and agenda. State and non-state actors do not necessarily have the same interests and the same agendas regarding diaspora members' civic participation in the host country, especially in the case of conflicts or contested political situations in the country of origin.

Regarding the non-state actors in origin countries and their interests, it is clear that voting and standing for election are the most obvious ways in which emigrants can influence policy in both their origin and destination countries. But other emigrant activities, fostered by sending societies, can also have impacts in the political arena. Koslowsky (2004: 14) suggests that "a less visible, but perhaps more influential, way may be through campaign contributions and other support for contending political parties". He points out the importance of the difference in the values of external currencies compared to home-country currencies during the election process. He suggests that in the first free election in the East European countries, for example, a 50 dollar donation coming from a Polish resident in the US equalled a third of the monthly wage of resident of Poland.⁴ Another example in this sense is the one of Franjo Tudjiman, leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), who started to raise funds from emigrants in the US and Canada even before non-communist parties were legalised in Yugoslavia. Apparently, around 80% of the

⁴Assuming a monthly average wage of 1,770,000 zloty in 1991 (http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_1630_ENG_HTML.htm), that is, around 160 dollars (at the exchange rate at this time: 11,100 Polish zloty/1 dollar [<http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/18/world/abortion-ban-sought-by-church-is-rejected-by-polish-parliament.html?pagewanted=2>]). Koslowsky (2004: 14) gives different figures, equating 50 dollars with a Polish monthly salary.

expenses of Croatian political parties in the 1990 election were covered with funds coming from Croatian emigrants and their descendants (Koslowsky 2004).

Another clear way to influence home-country politics is for emigrants to be appointed as ministers, and particularly as foreign affairs ministers, in newly democratised countries, as in the case of Armenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (*ibid.*).

Following the agenda of specific non-state actors in origin countries and supporting identity-groups' alternatives to the dominant actors is another way to influence homeland politics. Emigrants can inspire economic backing by leading movements which project national visions that transcend existing state boundaries and revive 'dormant' sub-national identities (*ibid.*). The challenges that these kinds of emigrant actions pose to multinational origin countries are evident. Furthermore, as Østergaard-Nielsen (2001) suggests, political organisations in the homeland can coordinate their campaigns with sister organisations elsewhere, pooling financial resources and drawing on their expertise and manpower, or with political counterparts in other countries, producing joint informational material or organising and coordinating confrontational activities (demonstrations/mass meetings).

The case of the Kurdish diaspora is particularly relevant: part of this diaspora has been a key actor in internationalising the politics of Kurdish separatism and bringing Turkey's treatment of the Kurdish minority to the attention of European countries through different activities (hunger strikes, protest marches and a terrorist bombing in Germany) (Koslowsky 2004). Again, the case of Croatian emigrants is particularly relevant to the issue of reviving 'dormant' sub-national identities. They played a key role as a lobbying group in the case of Germany's diplomatic recognition of their independence and contributed to mobilising the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) and to establishing back-channel contacts between Franjo Tudjman and the government of Helmut Kohl before Croatia declared its independence (*ibid.*).

A very fashionable debate since the 'Arab spring' is the role of diasporas in the democratisation process of their origin countries. The case of the Arab Spring countries suggests that the actions of home societies in the field of political participation have a greater impact when non-state actors at home have diverging interests vis-à-vis state institutions. Also, when there are fewer opportunities (or more difficulties) for emigrant communities to participate at home, it is possible that they will be more politically active outside the country to change the situation at home. It is important to underline that these activities are not exclusive of the Arab countries; for example, Chinese citizens abroad have supported movements for political change in their homeland.

In this sense, two types of actions can help non-state actors in home societies to push forward their agendas, allowing emigrant groups to express criticism of their home government or transmit demands concerning the expected behaviour of the latter. The first is the use of global institutional structures to facilitate transnational political practices. In particular, international organisations, under the umbrella of human rights, can provide an essential framework for negotiations between transnational political networks and home countries. As Østergaard-Nielsen (2001: 15) has pointed out, "transnational political networks who oppose a state that has strong

allies in their host-states or is simply too powerful for other states to meddle with, may turn to international organisations such as the UN, OSCE, European Council, and the like”. In this framework, the role of NGOs in ‘trans-state advocacy’ can be very useful to facilitating contacts between those transnational political networks and a level of policymaking that would probably otherwise be unreachable for emigrant groups (ibid.). An example of this strategy is the case of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation), which has long been lobbying for Palestine to be recognised as a member state of the UN. Similarly, the Tibetan diaspora has engaged in international advocacy to build support for Tibetan independence and to promote respect for human rights in the Tibet.

New technologies are another option for non-state actors who are using transnational political activities to involve the diaspora and push their agendas forward. Internet connections especially, as well as satellite broadcasting and new electronic media, are of utmost importance for diaspora activities (Scheffer 2003). These changes substantially transform the nature and size of interactions between diaspora groups and both governmental and non-governmental organisations in origin and destination countries (ibid.). Scheffer (2003) underlines that the low cost, the reach and the interactivity of the internet has increased the range, quality and impact of several kinds of diaspora activities, as well as the mobilisation and transfer of economic, cultural and political resources, and the creation of trans-state political communities. Thus technological changes and the large diffusion of this new means of communication give more and more emigrant groups access to public opinion and policymakers, regardless of their economic and political resources, and irrespective of their locations.

It appears particularly important to consider the centrality of new communication technologies in the case of interactions between emigrants and home societies where the government or a majority or dominant social group is unfriendly or unsympathetic to the specific group of emigrants (Scheffer 2003). Links can easily be made between ethno-linguistic minority groups in the home country and their specific diaspora, and between emigrant activities and opposition groups in the homeland, against totalitarian or authoritarian regimes in the origin countries.

Participating Here and There: The Issue of Multiple Loyalties and the Integration Debate

Maintaining active civic ties with one place (emigration country), while residing and developing civic links with another (immigration country) raises the question of multiple membership and allegiance as regards political ties. There is an emergent literature on the role of migrants’ transnational ties in their integration into the receiving country (Levitt 1999; Pantoja 2005; Snel et al. 2006; Portes et al. 2008; Morales and Morariu 2011).

At destination countries, not all the actors are comfortable with the political participation of immigrants on host societies, with their relationship with origin communities or with maintaining double political link or affiliation. In European receiving countries, states seem to not welcome particularly transnational political practices of immigrants, independently from their exclusive or inclusive political systems (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001). Even if this situation is progressively changing, as underlined by the growing admittance to double or multiple citizenship (Kivisto and Faist 2010), the issue of “double loyalty” linked to immigrants’ political participation in both host and home-countries is still at the centre of the debate.

The political and academic debates consider whether immigrants’ political relations with their origin countries, and their persistence over time, could be or not a facilitating factor for the integration of immigrants at destination. In the early years of the century, the academic literature explores whether this link with the countries of origin is an obstacle to the integration of immigrants (Nieswand 2011; Snel et al. 2006); if the relationship between integration and transnational relations is positive or negative (Guarnizo et al. 2003, Portes 2003); or if the positive or negative relation depends, for example, on which social class migrants belong to (Levitt 2003; Morawska 2003b). Although there is a relationship between transnationalism and integration of immigrants in the host countries, the mainstream discourses have been kept separate.

At the core of research debate it is the question of which is the relation between immigrants political participation in host-countries and towards their homeland. Two positions are particularly relevant in the case of transnational politics and political activities and of the recognition of dual citizenship or nationality. When migrants engage politically in two different societies, this can raise the question of his/her loyalty to each nation-state. Moreover, the question is whether political and civic activities oriented towards the country of origin reduce the political and civic participation of the immigrant in the new residence country and thus limit integration. What is at stake is the possibility to being faithful to more than one nation-state on with, beyond this, the question of the development of civic commitment independently of the nation-state and of the citizenship acquisition.

On the one hand, some scholars argue that we would be in presence of a ‘zero-sum game’, in which migrants’ political implication toward homelands is precluding involvement in receiving countries politics. Some suggest that maintaining links with homeland countries, particular identities and ethnic enclaves hinder a full assimilation and integration into ‘mainstream’ society and politics (Huntington 2004). In the first position, political participation is oriented and linked to one nation-state, namely the country of origin. Portes (1999) pointed out that in some cases diaspora policies can provoke conflicts in the migrant community because not all immigrants necessarily agree with homeland politics or with the political regime. According to him, the efforts of emigration countries can break the solidarity among immigrants, politicise their civic organisations and jeopardise integration (Portes 1999). As DeSipio (2011) underlines, critics to transnational engagement ranges from a moderate concern of this activity on immigrant adaptation to the new society, to a more extreme fear “that transnationally engaged immigrants will act as a desta-

bilizing force on the politics of the new home and act as an agent of the sending country's government". Furthermore, since 9/11, there is even more suspicion towards emigrants political activities and especially remittances to conflict areas (Kleist 2008). Transnational networks are, thus, perceived as challenging single allegiance (Kastoryano 2000) and civic activities impeding integration.

On the other hand, some other authors disagree with this 'zero-sum' interpretation of the relation between linkages and transnational practices with migrants' home countries and integration/assimilation in host countries. An extensive literature has shown that transnational practices represents more an alternative path of immigrant incorporation and adaptation than an obstacle (Basch et al. 1994; Morawska 2003a), and that also foster immigrants' engagement in receiving-country politics (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Vertovec 2003; Morales and Morariu 2011). Eva Morawska (2003a), for example, challenges the idea that transnational involvements of migrants and their children and their assimilation as concurrent processes. Following Kivisto and Faist (2010), "simultaneity" is the characteristic relationship between assimilation and transnationalism. Some scholars underline how transnationalism provide alternative resources facilitating social mobility in the host countries, and how transnational practices create skills that migrants can transfer to their lives in destination countries (Portes 1999). Levitt (2003: 178), for example, speaks of a "false dichotomy between assimilation and transnationalism"; Morales and Morariu (2011: 143) considers that transnational practices foster political integration "when they generate transferable skills that are useful for engaging in receiving-country politics". Fibbi and D'Amato (2008) realised a study based on a quantitative methodology, comparing different immigrants groups in the same countries, and the same group in several countries, and underline fact that integration and transnational engagement are not zero-sum game.

This second position assumes the compatibility of transnational political activities oriented to the emigration country and political integration in the destination country (Portes et al. 2008). It views civic and political participation coming from the belief in democracy and democratic values and possibly developing within more than one nation-state (beyond methodological nationalism). Certainly, countries of origin intend to preserve loyalty of emigrants through their diaspora policies (Portes et al. 2007) but, "[t]ransnational practices, and in particular political transnationalism, are viewed as leading to the political incorporation of migrants because they enable them to forge political coalitions and organisations that will allow them first to engage in 'ethnic' politics and, later, to become active in receiving-country politics" (Morales and Morariu 2011). Even in the case of conflict in the country of origin, the INFOCON project – which looked at the portability of conflicts in countries of immigration – revealed that transnational civic participation increased civic participation in host societies (Perrin and Martiniello 2010). Furthermore, political participation in the country of origin (political orientation or identification) can differ according to countries of destination (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Turner (2008) showed that parts of the Burundian diaspora adopted political positions radically different from the country of origin, relying on the security and the distance provided by the host country. According to Portes (1999), civic activities oriented

towards the country of origin can thus be seen as a means to increase the level of migrant political awareness, and thus as a first step in a civic integration process.

The experience of hometown associations is a way for emigrants to be engaged by participating in homeland politics. They can sometimes gain power in particular in the country of origin, but they can also develop interest in becoming engaged in civic activities in their new country of residence. In some cases, transnational civic engagement creates frustration and become negative: so much so that emigrants will prefer to give up civic actions concerning the country of origin and they will focus on the receiving country, instead. The Intipucá organization was disbanded due to criticism from the country of origin (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). Other cases with Moroccan or Turkish associations in Europe revealed other reasons such as unsatisfactory implementation of policy or conflicting relations with local authorities in the origin country (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009). Potential conflicts between hometown associations and communities of origin can indeed deter civic participation in homeland politics when “the transnationalisation of political participation creates tensions between mobile and relatively immobile people and associations” (Faist 2007: 10).

Nevertheless, Morales and Morariu (2011) highlighted the role of transferable political skills and capital and the mobilizing capacity of transnationally-engaged emigrants in their comparative study on the impact of transnational activities of three ethnic groups in European cities on the political integration in receiving countries. Then, the expertise that migrants acquire through their political activities towards their home countries promotes their capabilities for political involvement in other political arenas (in host countries, but also at international level) at the same time.

Finally, through their activities in hometown associations (e.g. in terms of increasing numbers) and thus through transnational civic engagement, emigrants became more visible in the receiving society. And, public visibility is undoubtedly an important step for civic integration. Hometown associations can thus serve migrants and help them to be collectively represented in the public and political spheres in both origin and receiving countries. And as Brettell (2005: 878) pointed out “[i]ncorporation involves gaining some sort of public recognition”. Transnational civic engagement can thus have a positive impact on civic participation in the destination country and influence political and civic integration.

Towards a New Research Agenda Incorporating Origin Countries’ Influence and Impact

This chapter aimed to better understand how countries of origin can influence the political and civic participation of migrants once they are settled in a new country of residence. In particular, it questioned the effects – both endogenous and exogenous – and the impact that countries of origin can have on migrants’ civic and political participation and integration.

With regard to the endogenous country-of-origin effect, literature focused on the micro level has shown that it can directly or indirectly play a role in the political and civic socialisation of emigrants, mainly with respect to ‘political socialisation’, the place of women in civic and political life in the country of origin, as well as the mode of migration and the possibility of return. Nevertheless, immigrants’ re-socialisation in the country of destination can often change the framework of these dimensions. For instance, immigrants coming from an origin country where political and civic participation is limited by a non- or semi-democratic system may discover new avenues of political and civic participation in the destination country, through different types of associations. More indirectly, this endogenous country-of-origin effect can also play a role in other factors, such as education level and socio-economic class, that influence the political and civic participation of migrants.

As regards the endogenous country-of-origin effect, the “country label” in destination countries’ perceptions can also play a role in political and civic participation, even if at a lower level than in other integration dimensions. This label can affect the acceptance of immigrants in political parties and mainstream organisations. If we consider the historical relations between countries of destination and origin to be a country label as well, the latter can play a major role in formal political participation. As underlined above, bilateral agreements on political participation and citizenship, as well as pragmatic cooperation on external voting can favour migrants’ integration.

In the field of political and civic participation, the idea of the trans-border state, with two levels of governance working across borders via the government and civil society, has to be clearly considered and analysed in detail. When applied to state actors, this concept can be univocal, if we consider that different actors connected with the state administrations of origin countries share the same objectives. By contrast, if we consider country-of-origin non-state actors’ influence on emigrants’ political and civic participation we have to consider that at times their interests can diverge substantially from those of state actors, as well as from other non-state actors with different political orientations (Gabrielli and Zapata 2015).

The case of Turkish immigrants – in which as we mentioned before, the state co-optation of emigrants co-occurs with the Kurdish diaspora’s effort to defend their rights in Turkey – is clearly representative of one of the possible materialisations of the divergence of interests between state and non-state actors at origin.

A deeper look at state-of-origin role in the political and civic participation of their emigrants reveals that sometimes the two axes of their actions, maintaining a sense of belonging to the nation across border and supporting emigrant integration in the destination country, can be conflictive. Here, as we previously underlined, the issue of multiple state loyalties is at stake; and even if some evolution occurs, in the end states may still covet the supposed monolithic and exclusive loyalty of their citizens.

Depending on which is the prevailing model in the political and civic participation of a group of immigrants, the country-of-origin effect or impact, several indications emerge from our analysis. Firstly, in the specific field of political participation, and particularly in the formal one, the main filter is clearly the country-of-origin impact. The existence of bilateral agreements between origin and destination countries concerning political participation or double citizenship clearly affects immi-

grants' possibilities for formal political participation at destination. Concerning formal political participation at origin, specific rules allowing emigrants' active and passive participation also constitute a key element. In this domain, the dominant actors are clearly the state institutions. Meanwhile, in the field of civic participation and informal political participation, the country-of-origin impact is a less limiting factor than in formal political participation. Avenues of participation are more open in these two dimensions: state actors in the country of origin have less power to control or limit participation; and sometimes they may also have more interest in curtailing emigrants and using them as a pressure group in the destination society. Moreover, civil society actors surely play a larger role in civic participation and in these less formal modes of political participation.

If we try to evaluate whether origin and destination state policies towards integration in the field of political and civic participation are complementary or contradictory, some considerations emerge from the analysis. Once more, in the field of formal political participation there are more competing interests between origin and destination state actors. These potential tensions are connected with a shared and still dominant conception that migrants should have an exclusive loyalty to one nation-state, even if this perception of emigrants is progressively changing and the acceptance of multiple loyalties is growing. In the field of civic participation these tensions are lower.

Concerning tools, bilateral agreements allowing migrants to vote in their destination countries (even if still rare) and dispositions allowing emigrants to vote externally will facilitate political participation as well as integration in this specific dimension. Also, the cooperation of destination countries in external voting procedures can facilitate the formal political participation of migrants, thereby supporting their integration. The entire process of external voting (negotiations, organisation and realisation) can give immigrants the opportunity to establish contacts with destination country institutions, thereby developing political and civic capital that can be very useful to larger integration patterns.

Thus in the field of civic and non-formal political participation, we once again see that the actions and tools of country-of-origin actors are more favourable to the development of participatory patterns, even when oriented to civic participation in the countries of origin.

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