

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324035666>

Transnationalism and Interculturalism: Overlapping Affinities

Chapter · March 2018

DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-58987-3_4

CITATIONS

7

READS

339

1 author:



Ricard Zapata-Barrero
University Pompeu Fabra

130 PUBLICATIONS 1,425 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE



4

Transnationalism and Interculturalism: Overlapping Affinities

Ricard Zapata-Barrero

1 Introduction

The fact that migratory dynamics provoke new ways of thinking about national identities and territorial settlement has been at the core of the transnational field of research and, from the very beginning, was associated with the globalisation of cross-state human mobility.¹ The nuclear definition of transnationalism describes the reality that people can simultaneously have different national ties. This framework of thought, as it is defined in terms of transcending traditional national-state boundaries, has logically been the first to detect the national iron cage governing migration studies. As Stephen Castles (2003: 20–21) rightly asserted a decade ago, the logic of multiple national identities “questions the dominance of the nation-state as the focus of social belonging”. The argument that the national-state is not necessarily the unique reference framework for assessing migration dynamics will allow us to define this post-national-state era. This shows us that there is a logical link between transnationalism

R. Zapata-Barrero (✉)
Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain

and complex diversity, as stated in the Introduction to this volume, which recognises that people can live with multiple co-existing national identities. In fact, at the heart of the concept of diversity as expressed today, there is always an assumption that people maintain some ties with their national origin, either through permanent social relations with families and friends living in their home countries or through other social, political, economical and cultural ties (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). If strict assimilation were the norm, diversity would be considered as a transitory process, rather than a new permanent feature of our societies. “Complex diversity” will be considered here as a by-product of transnationalism.

The recent entrance of interculturalism into migration and ethnic studies, on the other hand, has also provoked some initial signs of disconformity against the master narrative that has dominated diversity management, namely, multiculturalism. The simplest way to define an intercultural policy is that it focuses on the commonalities between people with different national backgrounds, instead of the differences, as the multicultural policy does, and that these common bonds among people are the basic ways to bridge them. This basically means that interculturalism tries to present itself as a policy that fills what multiculturalism has set aside: contact between people from different backgrounds, including national citizens (Zapata-Barrero 2015a).² One statement that signals the difference of emphasis involved in interculturalism is to be found in the European Union’s seventh principle in the list of “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration” (European Commission 2004):

Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration.

In most EU and Council of Europe documents, interculturalism is always linked to European values such as human rights, democracy and a culture of peace and dialogue.³ In this policy approach to diversity management, there is a trend of research that links interculturalism with integration strategies, asserting that bringing people together through different ties is a successful strategy of inclusion (Guidikova 2015) and even a new unexplored path of focusing on citizenship, as a strategy of socialisation into a diversity culture and a policy seeking to foster intercultural citizenship (Zapata-Barrero 2016b).

The pressing contextual situation today that is directly challenging the core agenda of migration studies is also clear: there is a lack of support for diversity management in the current climate of the backlash against multiculturalism (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). The new context of complex diversity and transnationalism, together with the securitisation framework that has penetrated most diversity-management thinking, preventing more open, cosmopolitan and humanistic policies towards both newcomers and those who have already been living in host countries for some time, highlights the very volatile situation in which Europe finds itself. On the other hand, the revival of the nationalistic narrative takes the form of an offence against what it considers to be an attack against its integrity and the only form of legitimising the state: protective nationalistic discourses against the new external “threatening” factor called migration-related diversity. The last European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) report, for instance, signals a growing anti-immigrant sentiment and Islamophobia as being among the key trends in 2015 (ECRI 2016). The recent terrorist attacks in Paris, Copenhagen, Nice, Berlin, Manchester, London and Barcelona further add to the Islamophobic sentiment being misused by populist political parties to stir up prejudice and hatred against Muslims in general. Likewise, the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union in June 2016 (Brexit) is also connected to anti-immigrant sentiments, allegiances and feelings of “Englishness” and national welfare protectionism. Key questions arise today that cannot be answered with old-style policy paradigms: can the policy narrative of multiculturalism counter the extremist narrative and/or the nationalist narrative invading most mainstreaming political ideologies? Can multiculturalism today be a marker for policies without creating more political cleavages? Are the “nationals-first” narratives of most countries (American-first, French-first, English-first) the last signals of a past governed by the idea that nationalism is the only resource to legitimise state power? Today, most states are complex-diverse, and any claim to speak on behalf of an ideal national-state becomes more and more difficult to sustain. Transnational migrants are the key example that these national narratives are somehow disconnected from the growing reality, which says that people can have two or more national affiliations and can construct their social spaces at the crossroads where they find themselves, creating some sort of, what

Riva Kastoryano in her chapter calls, a “new imagined community”, in which national identities are de-territorialised. The analytical framework contrasting unity and diversity that has dominated migration-related diversity studies from the very beginning is certainly being challenged by these transnational patterns.

It is within this current post-national-state (post-NS) and post-multicultural (post-M) scholarly debate on the best way to accommodate complex-diverse societies, and within this contextual pressing scenario, that I will frame my contribution. What interests me in trying to link the already consolidated transnationalism literature and the most recent interculturalism literature in migration studies is to identify their overlapping affinities in two ways: first, in the way in which they deal with multiple national identities (or complex diversity) and the value that they agree to regarding the importance of relations among identities to promote social cohesion and even trust; second, in the way in which they both share a broader view of diversity that is not necessarily separated from the so-called unity concept. In other words, what both transnationalism and interculturalism share today is that they take on the function of counter-forces against the hegemonic theoretical frameworks governing migration studies, namely, national-state-based and multicultural-based approaches to diversity.

Given this background debate, the main purpose of this chapter is to assess theoretically the relation between transnationalism (announcing the post-NS period) and interculturalism (announcing the post-M era). The seminal idea that I would like to articulate is that if the rough notion of transnationalism is to live with at least two national identities, to have a binational or multinational mind, then the intrapersonal dialogue of transnational people about how to deal with their own complex identities is, in itself, an intercultural dialogue. The embeddedness in more than one national culture fosters the development of intercultural skills, namely the capacity to enter into contact with other people with different backgrounds on equality terms. This dimension of complex diversity has already been noted in the Introduction to this volume, when the editors signalled that one of the markers of complex identity is that it is inclusive and imbued with a strong norm of tolerance. That is to say, the notion of transnationalism necessarily contains intercultural practice,

and interculturalism is a way to understand transnational behaviour. These premises bridging transnational minds and intercultural minds need to be examined theoretically as a first step to conducting empirical studies. Formulating the argument in terms of a hypothesis, what I want to assess theoretically is *whether transnational people have a predisposition to be more intercultural*, and whether the growing importance of people with multiple national identity affiliations (the basis of transnationalism) is a favourable context for promoting contact between people of different backgrounds, including national citizens (the basis of interculturalism). In order to enter this discussion framework, the rationale of this chapter will follow two steps: first, I will show how transnationalism can be understood as a new context that helps us to illustrate our complex-diverse societies and, second, that this transnational context is the appropriate condition that can help the widespread expansion of the intercultural policy paradigm, given that interculturalism and transnationalism present some “overlapping affinities”. By this last notion, and in the absence of a better notion, I want to emphasise that there is not just a juxtaposition between transnationalism and interculturalism, but that each one necessarily contains the other in order to define its main conceptual dimensions and functional characteristics. But let me first contextualise this interface in the current post-NS and post-M debates.

2 The Post-national-State and Post-multicultural Emerging Period: Rebooting the Unity and Diversity Framework

The argument that I would like to put forward recognises the strengths of both the national-state-based framework of thinking about diverse societies and the multicultural policy paradigm in setting equality, power sharing and inclusion. There is nothing that I have said until now that suggests the disappearance of nationalism, since I am fully aware that, in the very deep notion of transnationalism, we assume the meaningfulness of the category of national identity as the unique founder of states, which is also the case for interculturalism, which cannot promote contact among

people from different backgrounds if it does not assume the pre-existence of different nationalities and cultures, and not just one. Instead, we are emphasising that, in both cases, the original function of national identity in legitimating the state and most of the by-products of the state's legitimacy (stability, use of power, protection, security, cohesion, etc.) is becoming weak, and even the link between the nation and the territory is somehow less solid today, as Riva Kastoryano (2007, 2016) has tried to warn us in her latest works.

This post-NS and post-M period also illustrates an increasing academic awareness that casts doubts about the way the debate has been conducted in the past in terms of the unity and diversity nexus. This reference framework, which tends to separate immigrants from national citizens in the process of formulating diversity policies is, in some way, old-fashioned in contexts of increasing complex diversity. This leads us to argue, given their intrinsic counter-force nature, that both transnationalism and interculturalism endorse the need to reassess the “immigrant/citizenship divide” that has dominated the diversity debate in migration studies (Zapata-Barrero 2017a: 179–180). What interests me in this divide is the consequence of always reproducing a certain discourse where an assumed “we-citizens” are not the subjects of diversity policies: “Diversity is the others” seems to be the defining focus. In the policy-making process of diversity management, this presumed division of the population has the effect of reproducing a certain power relation between a majority-citizen and a minority-ethnic individual, which fails to create bridges among these two sets of people. Behind this divide, there is a prenotion of diversity that shows that the concept is *not* set in stone and that it is *not* politically neutral. I have already written that there is something magical that happens when those who define diversity never include themselves inside the category (Zapata-Barrero 2013). That is to say, those who claim to have the monopoly on the definition of diversity never incorporate their own differential features within the semantics of diversity. There is, then, some sort of epistemological barrier that establishes the difficulty to be the *in* and *definens* of diversity at the same time. This epistemology propriety of the diversity concept was already assumed, for instance, by Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren (1998), when they stated that “the discourse on diversity is an instrument for the reproduction of social

problems, forms of inequality and majority power” (1998: 4), and that there is an ideological construction of a problem of diversity, since it seems that the definition is dominated and controlled by the majority and that even a tendency to “abnormalize the other” (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998: 19–20) can be observed.

Taking this epistemological perspective, the unity and diversity framework reinforces the idea of separate categories of people, just as diversity policies have been mainly destined towards one part of the population, be they immigrants, non-nationals, ethnic minorities or a range of other conceptualisations in different countries and contexts. Today, in a complex diversity context, in a scenario in which second and third generations of migrants live in Europe, in which the only attachment to their society of origin comes from their parents (see, for instance, Crul et al. 2012), most so-called legal citizens have an immigrant background, and, consequently, this division of the population that probably made sense in earlier stages of the migration process is now very difficult to sustain. This assumption, therefore, needs to be revised. There is, moreover, a new trend of debate that analyses the process of mainstreaming most migration policies (Scholten and Van Breugel 2018), which is one legitimating feature of the growing importance of the intercultural policy paradigm (Zapata-Barrero 2018), which places diversity *within* the unity and not against it.

This taken-for-granted separation between an assumed majority-unity-us and a minority-diversity-others analytical framework of conducting research has caused serious limits in developing knowledge in migration studies. Today, it becomes clear that two master national-state and multicultural paradigms have been on the ground for legitimating such a separation. I would even say more: these old-style policy paradigms, instead of solving issues, belong to the very problems that need to be solved today. New recognitions that we are in a complex-diverse society, governed by increasing transnationalism in all its facets—with complex multiple national (and de-territorialised) identities becoming more and more the norm—make it harder to encapsulate migration issues in such one-dimensional views of diversity.

The multicultural paradigm has dominated recent decades, essentially following the equality and human rights principles on diversity

management, with a normative conception of justice in the background. However, we know that there are different perspectives on how each scholar focuses on the diversity, equality and human rights interface (Kivisto 2005; Laden and Owen 2007; Bloemraad 2007, 2015; Triandafyllidou et al. 2011; Crowder 2013; Mansouri and Ebanda de B'beri 2014; Song 2016). To summarise its nuclear core, the main multicultural project has been the inclusion of immigrants into the mainstream by respecting their differences and recognising their distinctive cultural practices, religions and languages. Stephen Castles (2000: 5) correctly said that multiculturalism recognises “rights to cultural maintenance and community formation, and linking these to social equality and protection from discrimination”. Recently, some scholars have focused on the multicultural paradigm in terms of indicators, rather than principles (Levy 2000; Murphy 2012; Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Bloemraad and Wright 2014; and even Vertovec 2010), providing additional specific evidence-based structural and legal arrangements to ensure the non-alienation of specific groups. In such studies, multiculturalism has deployed most of its tools for the protection of rights, for the containment of exceptional cases within the mainstream public policy system, and has legitimated specific policies basically in terms of funding, recognition and affirmative action. In addition, a certain group-based approach has been dominant in the application of these principles, without incorporating a more critical view of what kinds of culture deserve recognition and under what terms.

Fully aware that times have changed, that multiculturalism has been theorised in a context where security was assumed, Will Kymlicka signals that some of the conditions of multiculturalism are eroding:

Liberal multiculturalism, I would argue, was theorized for situations in which immigrants were seen as legally authorized, permanently settled, and presumptively loyal. In an age of securitization and super-diversity, these assumptions are put into question. Early theories of multiculturalism now seem at best incomplete, and at worst out-dated, resting on assumptions and preconditions that may no longer apply. (Kymlicka 2015: 244)

As Will Kymlicka (2010) foresaw, the new historical phase in which we find ourselves now is characterised by the fact that most of the multicultural criticism comes not from a far-right, anti-immigrant and nationalist discourse, but from inside multiculturalism. I consider myself to be part of this trend.

The growing conviction that, in settings of complex diversity, tolerance needs to be limited also belongs to this pattern (Zapata-Barrero and Triandafyllidou 2012; Dobbernack and Modood 2013). Today, there is a growing awareness that multicultural policies have fuelled far-right xenophobic political parties. In Germany in October 2010, and in the United Kingdom in February 2011, political leaders also promoted this argument of state multicultural failure, a backlash against the multicultural paradigm, provoking deep public discussion across Europe (*Daily Mail Reporter* 2011).

This growing concern in Europe over the rise of populist anti-immigrant parties and anti-Islamification narratives cannot be disconnected from the disenchantment with multiculturalism. The recent general elections in France (in May 2017) also demonstrated that these parties, after an initial period of conquest, seem to have established themselves in the mainstream political system. This has even meant that governments have changed their courses of action, incorporating anti-immigration measures into their strategies for managing diversity (Ferruh 2012), a situation that has been aggravated by contradictions within the immigration politics of the liberal states forced by these contextual restraints (Hampshire 2013). What is specific to the debate on growing radicalism against diversity is that it uses most of the basic normative premises that legitimate the multicultural paradigm, and, in this sense, it is a scholarly forum that must be taken seriously by strong defenders of liberal democratic principles and human rights. It would be lacking in historical insight and academically irresponsible to misinterpret the elite discourses that have framed most of the public debate in Europe in recent years. The “muscular” defence of liberal democratic principles, to borrow the words of former British Prime Minister David Cameron, has provoked a vast amount of criticism; however, there is a clear purpose to address the multicultural question in terms of limits:

Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We've failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values. (Cameron 5 February 2011)

This means that immigrants must, at the very minimum, acquire the language of the host country and learn about its history, norms and institutions. And it entails the introduction of written citizenship tests and loyalty oaths. Implicitly, if not explicitly, civic national integration is presented as the only tool to limit what we may call *boundless multiculturalism* (Zapata-Barrero 2017b).

This national civic turn belongs to this post-NS and post-M era.⁴ Why does this framework emphasise the view of considering national identity as a friend, rather than a foe? Because there is a certain shared view that the multicultural paradigm has exaggerated the rights-based approach to the detriment of duties. And these duties towards immigrants must also be placed at the same level of policy consideration, because they can help to regulate the excessive recognition of certain cultures and thereby limit illiberal practices which contravene human rights. In practical terms, the duty-based approach calls for the development of the means to ensure civic practices and citizenship, as well as a minimum level of competence in the national language and a minimum level of knowledge about the country's history and society. In normative terms, it seeks to ensure a minimum threshold for living together in a common public culture. It is true that this national civic turn can have many readings, depending on how one sets this minimum threshold, and whether one makes it voluntary or compulsory. In the conceptual terms in which we have framed the debate, this means taking care not to erode the national unity by being "too diverse", to use David Goodhart's (2004) expression, to re-evaluate national identity, language and democratic liberal values as the limiters—rather than the promoters—of multiculturalism. There is, however, a problem in this new civic national-state narrative, which was already visible in the multicultural approach: they both still consider diversity as "the other" that is separated from the mainstream, instead of placing

diversity *within* the mainstream. The question today is no longer how to live *with* diversity, but how to live *in* diversity (Antonsich 2016: 470). The growing diversity scenarios compounding our societies today are new for everybody, whether their origins are Filipino, Pakistani, Moroccan, Chinese, Ecuadorian, French, German, Hungarian or Italian. There is a general desire to build an alternative to the extremist narrative, and neither the multicultural nor the national-state civic narratives that have dominated this new period can provide us with sufficiently convincing arguments to reboot the unity and diversity framework.

This post-M and post-NS era also means that we are entering a post-racial period, as those who oppose multiculturalism see it as having ethicised social and economical problems under the auspices of having prioritised demands for cultural and national recognition over all other concerns. The unease surrounding multiculturalism, which has led governments across Europe not only to ban *hijabs* and *burkas* but also to install citizenship testing and to promote “national-state values” (Lentin 2014: 1272), has less to do with multicultural policies and more to do with fragmentation and the loss of a common public culture. It is a kind of fusing of the unity and diversity agendas or, as Desmond King described, a wide acknowledgement of group distinctions combined with a state struggle to ensure that government policies do not accentuate hierarchical divisions between groups based upon race, ethnicity and national background, a struggle rich in historical connotations that can no longer presume a teleological narrative towards melting-pot individualism (King 2005: 122). This claim that unity also needs to be respected and recognised within diversity is gaining support from a number of scholars.

The added value of this post-NS and post-M framework is that it not only officialises the need to limit the former *boundless multiculturalism* narrative, but it tries to disentangle the assumed interface of liberal/democratic values with national-state values, as if those espousing the national civic paradigm were assuming that people coming from other nationalities do not embrace democratic and liberal values. They build their narrative under the assumption that national-state values equal democratic and liberal state values, and then non-national people became suspicious as they were also seen as non-liberal and non-democratic. This national-state civic paradigm may be said to have the mythical dual faces of Janus,

since it cannot be interpreted solely as part of a more or less hidden nationalistic assimilation agenda, but must also be seen as a policy narrative ensuring equal opportunities and a minimum of cultural capital for the development of social capacities in the host society. It can also be seen as an instrument to facilitate a sense of mutual belonging, contact and interaction. My view is that, in spite of some multiculturalists claiming compatibility, the questions posed by one of the most constant critics of multiculturalism (Joppke 2004) remain unanswered. This is why the debate cannot dismiss the most radical approach of the civic turn, which fundamentally places duties as a condition for allocating rights. This argument exists in many policy-makers' and politicians' minds, and, in its radical form (i.e., "no rights without duties"), it not only attracts right-wing and populist anti-immigrant political parties but also social-democrat political parties which see that these policy narratives, together with the "welfare chauvinism" narratives, may help them to win over more of the electorate.

3 Transnationalism as a Context in Complex-Diverse Societies

As Alejandro Portes recently reminded us "the concept of transnationalism was coined to give theoretical form to the empirical observation that international migrants seldom leave their communities of origin behind, but instead engage in 'multi-stranded' activities and linkages with them" (2015: 7). Transnational studies then primarily invited researchers to transcend the current national-state paradigm that has dominated migration studies until now (Basch et al. 1992). This devaluation of the nation-state as the proper unit of social analysis is shared with globalisation studies (Breton and Reitz 2003; Sørensen and Guarnizo 2007; Hudson and Slaughter 2007; Adesina and Adebayo 2009) and a recent "local turn" debate, where cities are considered to be the central entities in which to analyse diversity policies (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2017). In terms of re-thinking the very notion of society, transnational studies contributed with the disarticulation of the taken-for-granted relation between

territorially bounded units and social analysis entities (Lazăr 2011), and have also been analysed in terms of the impact on countries of reception or how the fact that people co-exist with two national identities affects their lives wherever they presently reside (Levitt 2001). Transnational migrants are at least bilingual, move easily between different cultures, frequently maintain homes in two countries and also pursue economic, political and cultural interests with both their countries.

These patterns are becoming more and more the norm in our diverse societies, in part determined also by the facilities of communication, through skype, whatsapp and other social technological means, including low-cost travel. What both national methodology and multiculturalism share is that they have a view of culture in national homogeneous terms and place it in a power relationship within the basket of majority-nationals citizens. Kevin Robins and Asu Aksoy (2016: 13) reminded us recently when Will Kymlicka (1995: 118, 94) recognised that he was “using ‘a culture’ as synonymous with ‘a nation’ or ‘a people’”, claiming that “political life has an inescapably national dimension”. We know perfectly well that Will Kymlicka defines national community as “societal culture”, which includes the history, traditions and conventions that go along with the host society (Kymlicka 1995, Chap. 5), and then assume people’s national affiliations to one set of traditions and national values, including language, religion, and so on.

This illustrates the epistemological problem of most multiculturalists. They have a reading of diversity only in national-state terms. What is ultimately problematical is the conception of culture that is being mobilised within this research agenda, in which the apparently neutral term actually turns out to be national-state based. Thus, a culture is conceived as a unitary and a bounded state entity, as the property of a particular national group, as distinct from the cultures of other groups, and as fixed and constant through time. As is stressed in the Introduction of this volume, this reinforces the notion that the authentic way of conducting one’s life can only be assured through the national experience, that is, living within state-controlled and nationally defined and national-delineated borders.

To my knowledge, the multicultural policy narrative and the current national-statist civic narrative (a societal-cultural reading of migrant-related diversity management) have never formulated a critical interpretative framework regarding the way homogeneous cultural and national-states categorise the dynamics of diversity. This is partly because both paradigms formulated their arguments within the same national-state homogenous way of thinking about cultural and national identities. Even if there is still no serious multicultural theory of transnationalism (Faist 2016, has tried to link both recently), we can say that transnational theorists have criticised multicultural theories for maintaining the expectation of exclusive attachments, belonging to one society and loyalty to the receiving state. Multiculturalism still thinks of nationality in statist and territorial terms. Transnational integration, therefore, involves contact among different national affiliations and identities. Immigrants become part of the receiving country and its institutions, and transform them, while simultaneously maintaining and strengthening their ties with their countries of origin (Levitt 2001; Morawska 2003). In this sense, transnational integration is quite different from multicultural integration. The latter acknowledges the presence of immigrants (and minorities) and tries to accommodate their specific cultural needs and differences in a largely ad hoc manner (Favell 2001); transnational integration means that migrants and citizens with migrant origin can only be included by having their multiple national affiliations (complex-diverse identities) recognised by the host society.

Thus, transnationalism challenges traditional theories of assimilation which assume that immigrants who are more fully integrated into their host societies are less likely to continue to involve themselves in the economic, social and political spheres of their countries of origin. If traditional assimilation theories treat transnationalism and integration as opposing processes, contemporary transnational theorists understand these processes in terms of multiple combinations (Morawska 2014). The fact that transnationalism becomes the norm and the new context of our complex-diverse societies necessarily forces migration studies to re-think assimilationist theories, which have been grounded, together with multiculturalism, in a framework of thought separating unity and diversity, while still linking national identity, territory and the state.

New understandings of assimilation recognise that complex diversity is here to stay.

There are many studies that have already demonstrated how transnational actions can foster the integration process in the places where migrants live (recent studies linking transnationalism and integration include Marini 2014, and Mügge 2016). That is to say, transnationalism and integration are simultaneous processes in which immigrants forge relationships with both the sending and the receiving countries, with integration reinforcing transnationalism and, transnationalism, thereby creating a basis for successful integration. It facilitates and is part of the process of integration; it is not a step prior to integration or total “assimilation”. In this context, we may assume that transnational people would have a tendency to be more open to having contact with other people from different backgrounds than people that have been socialised with a one-dimensional view of national culture.

Transnationalism is, therefore, a contextual framework that perfectly defines one of the main features of our diverse societies, and creates a social space in which many people with multiple national identities can relate to one another. The exception to this pattern is the idealistic view of national citizens, who still think of their country as though it were a territorial reality separated from the category of diversity. If romanticism can be characterised by its emphasis on emotion and individualism, as well as a glorification of all things past, then to continue to evaluate the state in national terms, as the container of a given majority that defines what is the unity necessary to insure cohesion, and what is diverse and what is not, is unquestionably a renovated version of romanticism. The process of re-nationalisation of societies, within given political discourses which claim to recover and/or restore the essence of Frenchness, Germanness or Englishness, for instance, are, in this transnational dynamic, a clear, updated signal of a new romanticism, in which an homogeneous “better past” is proclaimed in the face of the new diverse and transnational scenario in which we are living, surrounded, they believe, by “uncertainties”, “instability” and “conflict”. For what is now made more and more apparent is that “the notion of primary loyalty to one place is therefore misleading: it was an icon of old-style nationalism that has little relevance for migrants in a mobile world” (Castles 2017: 290).

This is how we consider transnationalism, as a given reality in complex-diverse societies, giving shape to new forms of social spaces in which people from different origins live, including national citizens. The fact that most of the cultural festivities in cities incorporate the national days of immigrants, the celebration of *iftar* (the evening meal when Muslims end their daily Ramadan fast at sunset), the Chinese New Year, and so on are evidence that cultural policies are beginning to incorporate in their programmes an understanding that diversity and transnationalism can be expressed through cultural festivities and are factors of inclusion, rather than exclusion (Zapata-Barrero 2016a). These transnational cultural activities in host countries promote encounters with others, and with different societies, and create what I have called elsewhere a *culture of diversity* (Zapata-Barrero 2014), which essentially means going beyond the simple fact that the current social contexts are diverse, in order to discuss *how* diversity is being incorporated into public and civic culture, at the level of both institutional structures and routines. This basically also means the emergence of a new public culture in which diversity becomes the norm, and thus declares the senselessness of framing the debate according to the “old-fashioned” unity/diversity framework, in which there is an assumed territorial national territory which legitimates the existence of the state and in which diversity is always considered as an external factor contravening the traditional ways of thinking about the state, the nation and the territory. The complex diversity we are now living, in which transnationalism becomes the norm, is one where unity is imbued with diversity. This *culture of diversity* can be seen as a by-product of what, in the recent work of Tatiana Matejskova and Marco Antonsich (2015), is called *governance through diversity* rather than *governance of diversity*. In this new context, this duty-based view of unity, as it has been approached by the national-state civic paradigm, needs to be de-nationalised, if I may use this term. Transnationalism de-nationalises the territory in which the state exercises its legitimate use of violence, to use Weberian terms. This basically means that the need to keep a common language and the democratic and liberal values may be right if these duty-based approaches also incorporate diversity as a value to be considered, and treat national symbols in the same way as those of other nations, in a more complex view of diversity. Unity is, of course, necessary to

ensure stability and cohesion, but it needs to be free from all national-state-based homogeneous views of culture.

In general terms, we can also say that the current transnational context considers the old assimilationist or the renovated national civic policy paradigms to be senseless, if these approaches assume the need to maintain nationalism as the main reference point to define the majority in a power relation with the so-called minority. However, if we withdraw the national dimension of the civic policy paradigm and keep the function of maintaining cohesion in diverse societies, then we need to re-think what cohesion could mean in complex diverse societies in which national citizens are no longer the sole guardians of liberal democratic values. This mixture between liberal democratic values, which we need to keep, and national values, which we need to conceive of as an additional category of diversity, is what we need to separate. This is a first way of identifying the overlapping affinities between transnationalism and interculturalism.

4 Transnationalism and Interculturalism: Overlapping Affinities in Diverse Societies

Transnationalism and interculturalism are concepts that inherently present overlapping affinities. In migration studies, both try to encapsulate new realities and policy practices, given the growing cross-state mobility of people and the consequent diversity dynamics that it entails in receiving countries. Both have been defined from the outset as being by nature counter-hegemonic forces. Transnationalism is a reaction against the essentialist view of the “one person/one national identity” assumption which has dominated migration studies and has been famously labelled as “national methodology”; and interculturalism has grown against the dominance of the multicultural approach and the renovated version of assimilationism (the national-state civic approach), which still juxtaposes duties with national-territorial identities, with historical national narratives. Given the main framework of this book, what I would like to assess theoretically is that the complex diversity contexts that we have drawn in

the above section is a favourable condition of interculturalism. Formulated at hypothetical and individual level, *transnational people are more prone to be intercultural*. So, the fact that transnational contexts in our societies are becoming the norm also means there is a growing favourable context for implementing intercultural policies.

It is true that this theory-driven hypothesis would need to be empirically tested and contrasted, since we also know that some national communities still keep their “transnational way of life” in a rather closed social space, in isolation from out-groups, and then the theoretical assumption which I am formulating could also be contradicted theoretically. I am fully aware of this potential counter-argument. It is only through empirical studies that we can test this hypothesis. But, theoretically speaking, I would underline that I am not formulating a direct relationship between transnational people, complex-diversity settings and intercultural practices (viz that all transnational people are intercultural), but rather that there is a predisposition of transnational people to be more intercultural, only, and only, if there is a policy that promotes contact. Contact between people from diverse national backgrounds is not self-evident. It is, in fact, the nuclear concept of interculturalism, directly related to the contact theory formulated by Gordon W. Allport (1954) half a century ago. The permanent premise of interculturalism is that contact between people can help to establish positive intergroup feelings when they take place in a cooperative environment among equals. In other words, the transnational context by itself does not necessarily promote contact between, let me say, a Chinese group and a Moroccan group. But if there is a policy that looks for common bonds and interests between these two groups, and uses this to bridge them into common views and projects, probably these groups, because they already have an intercultural logic of living their own transnational mind, would have a tendency to be more easily intercultural. It is here that we can justify intercultural policies as a strategy to promote positive contact among people that have different backgrounds, but many common bonds and interests which we simply need to identify. My theoretical assessment tries, then, not to demonstrate an empirical hypothesis which needs, of course, to be tested. My concrete theory-driven focus is to defend that there are conceptual grounds to believe

there are some overlapping affinities between transnationalism and interculturalism. This interlink needs to be explored from a policy point of view, that is, that interculturalism could work easily with people who have transnational minds.

I am aware that one may say that transnationalism and interculturalism are incomparable since one designates a fact and a practice, the reality of most migrants who live with at least two national allegiances and identities, while the other designates a policy strategy which promotes contact among people from different national origins, including national citizens. But the way I would like to compare them, is not only in descriptive terms but also in normative terms, that is, when one asks why the promotion of contact is important in diverse societies and what differentiated forms of social behaviour develop transnational minds. In both cases, there are some overlapping affinities, in the sense that both promote trust and social cohesion, community building and a sense of belonging, and even, a new public culture, a *culture of diversity*, where unity is no longer linked to the former national majority in a power relationship with the so-called minorities and representatives of diversity.

Following the preliminary ways to compare transnationalism and interculturalism, both share the idea that identity is one of the key concepts that defines their respective approaches to diversity and by which they describe their respective areas of action.⁵ The notion of identity is key to understanding the personal and social behaviour that transnationalism and interculturalism seek to de-limit as a research field in migration studies. Clearly, national identity is taken in its non-essentialist form, as a driver helping people to frame their lives and give meaning to their allegiances towards institutions. When this identity is transnational, this basically means that cross-national spaces are being shared (Faist 2015), that people are living with both virtual (home country) and real spaces, in an imagined community, as Riva Kastoryano argues in her chapter, thinking of their lives in two countries, or, as Peggy Levitt (2004) rightly assessed, “when ‘home’ means more than one country”. On the other hand, an intercultural identity is one that already has the predisposed attitude to enter into contact with people of other origins and cultural backgrounds, without being influenced by stereotypes and falsehoods relating to origin, racism and other feelings which restrict

contact, on equal terms, and trying to disconnect the diversity and power relationship.

The “overlapping affinities” between transnationalism and interculturalism can be examined when we focus on the notion of contact between multiple national identities. To begin with, conceptually, we have already stressed that, within the same notion of transnationalism, there is an assumed concept of interculturalism that needs to be uncovered: the fact that a transnational mind necessarily involves entering into contact with two national identities, first, personally (transnationalism is a form of dialogue with oneself, and requires one to rank, if necessary, personal national allegiances according to different contexts), and then as a form of behaviour, since this involves openly sharing different social spaces coming from different national frameworks. The large amount of literature about transnationalism points to the behavioural fact that transnational minds become evident only when people begin to enter into contact between two national spaces and build their expectations and life projects in two countries. Then, transnational action involves interculturalism, as a transnational space is, by definition, an intercultural space. It is at this juxtaposition that the overlapping affinity becomes obvious. It is this evidence that allows me to argue that transnational people are favourable candidates to become also intercultural minds, and then they are likely to be more open to intercultural contacts than those who only have a single national identity and live their sociability in a closed national-self context. This also involves a much more individualistic view of the category of diversity, in the sense that one decides what his or her identity actually is, without having it imposed from outside, be it socially or institutionally. This perspective is important. The intercultural argument is that we cannot impose the majoritarian understanding of diversity categories upon others. The intercultural policy narrative reacts against the process of ethnicisation of people, of what Roger Brubaker calls “groupism”, namely, “the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed” (Brubaker 2002: 164).

To summarise these arguments: the transnational realities in which most people live today, tells us that birthplace and/or nationality do not

determine most public identities, and that this de-territorialisation of national identity⁶ is what allows people to be more open to others and be favourable to intercultural contact and dialogue. To ask someone where he or she was born with the purpose of having an initial idea of what public identity he or she holds is not more self-evident than it was in the past. Some so-called second generations would have real difficulties in answering this question with a simplistic answer.⁷ Today, transnationalism appears to be a reality to most second generations of migrants, and the growing mobility of people is pluralising identities and self-national and culture ascriptions (Favell 2014). It is now the rule which needs to be incorporated into the current theoretical policy frameworks on migration studies.

If we look at transcultural activities in residence countries, such as the celebration of a national day, religious-cultural activities that keep people with their national and cultural home identities, we can say that these practices are transnational in the sense that people enter in relation with their home countries in the same territory in which they live. This can be an example of transnational nationalism or of the de-territorialisation of the national identity, as we have mentioned above. These activities are, by themselves, intercultural, since they promote encounters between people from different backgrounds in the public space, the main space of intercultural practices (Wood 2015). So, here, this overlapping affinity between transnationalism and interculturalism is again obvious.

For us, these transnational activities in the receiving or host countries, and the transnational character of a person entering into these practices, have some overlapping affinities with interculturalism in two ways: first, it involves intrapersonal dialogue with two national identities. Second, this binational identity gives rise to determinate practices under the form of maintaining regular contacts with relatives and friends, and the different social spaces left behind during the migratory process, or with the nationality of their own families, if they are second generation. This again involves interculturalism.

So, conceptually speaking, the very notion of transnationalism involves some sort of intercultural behaviour with oneself. And we may assume

that this premise can lead the person to be much more open to the idea of entering into intercultural contact, thereby establishing social ties with people from different national backgrounds. Transnational migrants inform us, then, that their interests cannot be served by any single nation-state, and so there is no longer a positive incentive to invest their interests and attachments in any one national community (Robins 2007). This bridge from the personal to the social has been the centre of attention of some leading social psychology studies and even some studies coming from business studies on multiple identities or complex identities. Here, again, the overlapping affinity between transnationalism and interculturalism can be normatively assessed at the level of what both are, socially speaking, able to produce.

The fact that people with more than one national identity are more prone to have social ties is at the core of most recent empirical research. For instance, the work of Lakshmi Ramarajan (2014) shows how multiple identities shape the action of people. Multiple identities foster intrapersonal identity networks, in which the nodes of the network are identities (which can vary in aspects such as number and importance) and in which the ties of the network are relationships, such as those of conflict, enhancement and integration. Scholars can then examine the various structures or patterns of relationships among multiple identities. Drawing on ideas of associative networks in psychology, as well as on networks of relations in sociology and social theory, Lakshmi Ramarajan (2014) makes the case that a network conceptualisation of multiple identities combines attention to specific identity content with a focus on the relationships between different identities. Such integration provides us with ways of understanding how identities operate as entire systems in which parts (identities) are connected (via relationships) to form a whole (a network of identities). Other researches coming from business studies also show how multiple identities shape important outcomes in organisations, such as intergroup tolerance (Roccas and Brewer 2002). Multiple intrapersonal identities also seem to influence interpersonal and intergroup relationships, although this research also suggests the potential for both positive and negative consequences. In the same line of analysis, some other empirical studies show that multiple identities are

positively related to intergroup cooperation (Brewer and Pierce 2005; Richter et al. 2006). Sonia Roccas and Marilynn B. Brewer (2002) have also predicted that social identity complexity is related to personal value priorities and to tolerance of out-group members. One thing that has not been previously taken into account in trying to explain these variations in the perceptions of others is the way in which the perceiver represents his or her own multiple category identities. For instance, how a person who is both white and Christian responds to another individual who is black and Christian may well depend on how the perceiver self-defines his or her own racial and religious identities. This also confirms one of the key features of interculturalism in contrast to multiculturalism. The latter focuses policies into preserving differences and protecting them through rights, as a way of implementing the principle of equality. In contrast, the intercultural approach focuses on commonalities (in the previous example, the fact that both are Christians facilitates communication between a black and a white person, for instance). The premise is obvious: you can only promote contact if there is something in common between two people in their multiple identities. This commonality does not necessarily need to be a category of diversity, as I have shown in the above example, but a common interest (cooking, for instance) or work (both are doctors, for instance). This is also the basis of the bridging principle driving interculturalism. For these studies, understanding the structure of multiple social identities is important because representations of one's in-groups have effects not only on the concept of self, but also on the nature of the relationships between the self and others (Roccas and Brewer 2002: 88). Social identity complexity is based upon chronic awareness of cross-categorisation in one's own social group memberships and in those of others. A simple social identity is likely to be accompanied by the perception that any individual who is an out-group member on one dimension is also an out-group member on all others. In sum, social psychology studies have shown that both cognitive and motivational factors lead us to predict that complex social identities will be associated with increased tolerance and positivity towards out-groups in general. Here, again, the connection between transnationalism and interculturalism is very clear. Transnational people, because they have

complex identities, will tend to be more prone to having social ties and contact with other people. The premise is always that transnational practices develop social networks, which is the basis of relations and interculturalism. People who embody transnationalism weave their multiple identities to multiple ties and attachments (Vertovec 2001).

Some of the key findings of the “Diversity and Contact” (DivCon) Project (Schönwälder et al. 2016)⁸ are of particular interest to us, strengthening the overlapping affinities between transnationalism and interculturalism. In particular, the argument that has been put forward is, in the context of diversities, only those who have social ties are less influenced by racism and other factors which threaten social cohesion. This is a strong argument for interculturalism, when we know these ties are among people from different backgrounds. Social ties, it appears, can effectively overcome the feeling of being threatened by diversity. Within this trend of research, there is also a similar argument which we have already highlighted from social psychology: namely, those people who have multiple and complex identities, such as those of transnationalism, have more propensity to maintain social ties with people of different backgrounds. The assumption that empirical studies have demonstrated is that such positive feelings might contribute to the development of generalised trust (Stolle et al. 2011), especially when strong ties occur in neighbourhood settings (Stolle et al. 2008). Clearly, there are also patterns of social interaction that are not necessarily linked to ethnicity and “race”, such as social status, age or education (Petermann and Schönwälder 2014), but this goes beyond the scope of our theoretical assessment.

5 Conclusions

Transnational spaces and activities occur in residence countries (home comes here), when people develop their national affiliations through cultural and national practices (e.g., religious, cultural, national celebrations and festivities). National and ethnic minority identities have been changing in response to more intense globalisation, and the proliferation of multiple identities has now been widely researched. The first and fore-

most reason why transnationalism deserves attention today is its sheer growth in recent years. Its existence is highly relevant to the modern workings of cities (Glick Schiller 2011), an area where interculturalism also develops its main policies (Zapata-Barrero 2015b). Thus, a transnational framework gives policy-makers a new lens through which to develop innovative public intercultural programmes inside their local communities and even beyond, promoting intercultural relations with the home cities of their proper transnational inhabitants.

This chapter also shows that there is a need for further empirical research to develop more specific links between transnationalism and interculturalism. Qualitative research interviewing transnational migrants is needed in order to know how migrants view and develop their own intercultural practices and social ties, and to show how transnational people are also more prone to developing a new public culture (*a culture of diversity*), in which diversity becomes the mainstream framework of their lives. In this case, the necessary “unity” to keep people together is not national-based but multinational-based, leaving aside the idealistic view of “one people/one nation/one territory”, mixed with a romantic view of a better homogeneous past that we need to recover. This follows the need to abandon this old-fashioned universalist view of diversity policies, as a uniquely comprehensive and integral way of managing the unity and diversity nexus. This link is also grounding old-style narratives that need to be reduced, probably in making explicit the overlapping affinities between transnationalism and interculturalism. This would certainly make evident that most arguments about these nationalistic narratives, these processes of re-nationalisation of our public spaces and institutions, are just the last movements of a past that will never come back.

Notes

1. Most of the literature on transnationalism will be mentioned in the text. But, for this matter, see some of the latest review literature and compelling works on transnationalism (Lazăr 2011; Boccagni 2012; Faist et al. 2013; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2015; Mügge 2016).

2. For the emerging multicultural and intercultural debate, see, among others, Levrau and Loobuyck (2013), Meer et al. (2016), and Mansouri (2017).
3. See Eurobarometer on Intercultural Dialogue in the EU (European Commission 2007) and the White Paper on interculturalism of the Council of Europe, 2008.
4. For national civic turn debate, a renovated and more integrative version of assimilation, see Joppke (2004, 2007), Zapata-Barrero (2009), Bauböck and Joppke (2010), Meer et al. (2015), and Mouritsen (2008, 2011).
5. See, for instance, the influent article of Vertovec (2001), linking transnationalism and identity, and many focusing the intercultural and multicultural divide in terms of different understandings of identity (openness versus closeness, respectively). See Wood (2004), and several contributions in Zapata-Barrero (2015b), and certainly Cantle (2012) and the critical note of Meer and Modood (2012), or the last publication of Mansouri (2017).
6. The idea of “deterritorialisation” has been from the very beginning a premise of the transnational literature; see, for instance, Basch et al. (1994). It has also been restated by R. Kastoryano, when she defines transnational nationalism as a type of nationalism without territory. She has recently emphasised that: “The transnational nation fits within the global space which does not *reflect* but *produces* an identity and generates a mode of participation beyond borders, as can be seen in the involvement of actors in strengthening transnational solidarities” (Kastoryano 2016).
7. See a recent report, based upon young second-generation biographical notes, pointing out this fact (Gebhardt et al. 2017).
8. See, also, website at: <http://www.mmg.mpg.de/research/all-projects/diversity-and-contact-divcon>

References

- Adesina, O. C. A., & Adebayo, A. G. (2009). Introduction: Globalization and Transnational Migrations: An Overview. In A. G. Adebayo & O. C. Adesina (Eds.), *Globalization and Transnational Migrations* (pp. 2–13). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge: Addison Wesley.

- Antonsich, M. (2016). Interculturalism Versus Multiculturalism: The Cantele-Modood Debate. *Ethnicities*, 16(3), 470–493.
- Banting, K., & Kymlicka, W. (2013). Is There Really a Retreat from Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index. *Comparative European Politics*, 11(5), 577–598.
- Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1992). Transnationalism: A New Analytical Framework for Understanding Migration. In L. Basch, N. Glick Schiller, & C. Szanton Blanc (Eds.), *Toward a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity and Nationalism Reconsidered* (pp. 1–24). New York: New York Academy of Sciences.
- Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1994). *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach.
- Bauböck, R., & Joppke, C. (Eds.). (2010). *How Liberal Are Citizenship Tests?* (EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/41). Florence, Italy: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, European University Institute.
- Bloemraad, I. (2007). Unity in Diversity? Bridging Models of Multiculturalism and Immigrant Integration. *Du Bois Review*, 4(2), 317–336.
- Bloemraad, I. (2015). Theorizing and Analyzing Citizenship in Multicultural Societies. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 56(4), 591–606.
- Bloemraad, I., & Wright, M. (2014). Utter Failure or Unity out of Diversity? Debating and Evaluating Policies of Multiculturalism. *International Migration Review*, 48(Issue Supplement s1), 292–334.
- Blommaert, J., & Verschueren, J. (1998). *Debating Diversity: Analyzing the Discourse of Tolerance*. London: Routledge.
- Boccagni, P. (2012). Rethinking Transnational Studies: Transnational Ties and the Transnationalism of Everyday Life. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 15(1), 117–132.
- Breton, R., & Reitz, J. G. (2003). *Globalization and Society: Processes of Differentiation Examined*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Brewer, M. B., & Pierce, K. P. (2005). Social Identity Complexity and Outgroup Tolerance. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31(3), 428–437.
- Brubaker, R. (2002). Ethnicity Without Groups. *European Journal of Sociology*, 43(2), 163–189.
- Cameron, D. (2011). Full Transcript: David Cameron Speech on Radicalisation and Islamic Extremism, Munich, 5 February. *New Statesman*. Retrieved from <http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/02/terrorism-islam-ideology>

- Cantle, T. (2012). *Interculturalism: The New Era of Cohesion and Diversity*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Castles, S. (2000). *Ethnicity and Globalisation: From Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen*. London: Sage Publications.
- Castles, S. (2003). Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation. *Sociology*, 37(1), 13–34.
- Castles, S. (2017). Migration and Community Formation Under Conditions of Globalisation. In S. Castles (Ed.), *Migration, Citizenship and Identity: Selected Essays* (pp. 335–351). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Council of Europe. (2008). *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue “Living Together As Equals in Dignity”*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- Crowder, G. (2013). *Theories of Multiculturalism: An Introduction*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Crul, M., Schneider, J., & Lelie, F. (2012). *The European Second Generation Compared Does the Integration Context Matter?* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Dobbernack, J., & Modood, T. (Eds.). (2013). *Tolerance, Intolerance and Respect: Hard to Accept?* London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- European Commission. (2004). The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU. *Justice and Home Affairs Council*, November. Retrieved from http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/common-basic-principles_en.pdf
- European Commission. (2007). *Intercultural Dialogue in Europe*. Analytical Report, Flash Eurobarometer 217, November. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/flash/fl_217_en.pdf
- European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). (2016). Annual Report 2015, 28. Retrieved from http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Library/PressReleases/217-26_05_2016_AnnualReport2015_en.asp
- Faist, T. (2015). *Making and Remaking the Transnational: Of Boundaries, Social Spaces and Social Mechanisms*. Bielefeld: COMCAD, Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development, No. 132. Retrieved from http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/tdrc/ag_comcad/downloads/WP_132.pdf
- Faist, T. (2016). *Both Class and Culture? Multiculturalism in Light of the Transnational Social Question*. Bielefeld: COMCAD, Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development, No. 145. Retrieved from <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-50665-4>
- Faist, T., Fauser, M., & Reisenauer, E. (2013). *Transnational Migration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Favell, A. (2001). Multicultural Nation-Building: 'Integration' as Public Philosophy and Research Paradigm in Western Europe. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 7(2), 116–124.
- Favell, A. (2014). *Immigration, Integration and Mobility: New Agendas in Migration Studies*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Ferruh, Y. (2012). Right-Wing Hegemony and Immigration: How the Populist Far-Right Achieved Hegemony Through the Immigration Debate in Europe. *Current Sociology*, 60(3), 368–381.
- Gebhardt, D., Zapata-Barrero, R., & Bria, V. (2017). *Trayectorias de jóvenes de origen diverso en Barcelona. Explorando tendencias y patrones*. GRITIM-UPF Policy Series, No. 5. Retrieved from http://www.upf.edu/gritim/_pdf/ps5.pdf
- Glick Schiller, N. (2011). Transnationality and the City. In G. Bridge & S. Watson (Eds.), *The New Blackwell Companion to the City* (pp. 179–192). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Goodhart, D. (2004, February 20). Too Diverse. *Prospects Magazine*. Retrieved from <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk>
- Guidikova, I. (2015). Intercultural Integration: A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity as an Advantage, Chapter 8. In R. Zapata-Barrero (Ed.), *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation* (pp. 136–151). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Hampshire, J. (2013). *The Politics of Immigration: Contradictions of the Liberal State*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hudson, W., & Slaughter, S. (Eds.). (2007). *Globalisation and Citizenship: The Transnational Challenge*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Joppke, C. (2004). The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. *British Journal of Sociology*, 55(2), 237–257.
- Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 30(1), 1–22.
- Kastoryano, R. (2007). Transnational Nationalism: Redefining Nation and Territory. In S. Benhabib & I. Shapiro (Eds.), *Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances* (pp. 159–181). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kastoryano, R. (2016). Toward a Transnational Nationalism: Nation, Nationalism, and Territory Redefined. *Revue française de science politique*, 56(4), 533–553.
- King, D. (2005). Facing the Future: America's Post-multiculturalist Trajectory. *Social Policy and Administration*, 39(2), 116–129.
- Kivisto, P. (2005). Social Spaces, Transnational Immigrant Communities, and the Politics of Incorporation. In P. Kivisto (Ed.), *Incorporating Diversity:*

- Rethinking Assimilation in a Multicultural Age* (pp. 299–319). Boulder, CO and London: Paradigm.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (2010). The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies. *International Social Science Journal*, 61(199), 97–112.
- Kymlicka, W. (2015). The Essentialist Critique of Multiculturalism: Theories, Policies, Ethos. In V. Uberoi & T. Modood (Eds.), *Multiculturalism Rethought: Interpretations, Dilemmas and New Directions* (pp. 209–249). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Laden, A., & Owen, D. (Eds.). (2007). *Multiculturalism and Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lazăr, A. (2011). Transnational Migration Studies: Reframing Sociological Imagination and Research. *Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology*, 2, 69–83.
- Lentin, A. (2014). Post-race, Post Politics: The Paradoxical Rise of Culture After Multiculturalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 37(8), 1268–1285.
- Levitt, P. (2001). *The Transnational Villagers*. London and Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Levitt, P. (2004). Transnational Migrants: When ‘Home’ Means More Than One Country. *Migration Information Source, Migration Policy Institute on-line Journal*, 1 October. Retrieved from <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/transnational-migrants-when-home-means-more-one-country>
- Levitt, P., & Jaworsky, B. N. (2007). Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33(1), 129–156.
- Levrau, F., & Loobuyck, P. (2013). Should Interculturalism Replace Multiculturalism? *Ethical Perspectives*, 20(4), 605–630.
- Levy, J. T. (2000). *The Multiculturalism of Fear*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mansouri, F. (Ed.). (2017). *Interculturalism at Crossroads: Comparative Perspectives on Concepts, Policies and Practices*. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
- Mansouri, F., & Ebanda de B’beri, B. (Eds.). (2014). *Global Perspectives on the Politics of Multiculturalism in the 21st Century: A Case Study Analysis* (pp. 230–240). Abingdon: Taylor & Francis.
- Marini, F. (2014). Transnationalism and Integration: What Kind of Relationship? Empirical Evidence from the Analysis of Co-development’s Dynamics. *Migration and Development*, 3(2), 306–320.

- Matejskova, T., & Antonsich, M. (Eds.). (2015). *Governing Through Diversity: Migration Societies in the Post-multiculturalist Age*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Meer, N., & Modood, T. (2012). How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism? *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 33(2), 175–196.
- Meer, N., Mouritsen, P., Faas, D., & de Witte, N. (2015). Examining ‘Postmulticultural’ and Civic Turns in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, and Denmark. *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 59(6), 702–726.
- Meer, N., Modood, T., & Zapata-Barrero, R. (Eds.). (2016). *Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Morawska, E. (2003). Disciplinary Agenda and Analytic Strategies of Research on Immigrant Transnationalism. *International Migration Review*, 37(3), 611–140.
- Morawska, E. (2014). Immigrant Transnationalism and Assimilation: A Variety of Combinations and the Analytic Strategy It Suggests, Chapter 6. In C. Joppke & E. Morawska (Eds.), *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. Migration, Minorities and Citizenship* (pp. 133–176). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mouritsen, P. (2008). Political Responses to Cultural Conflict: Reflections on the Ambiguities of the Civic Turn. In P. Mouritsen & K. E. Jørgensen (Eds.), *Constituting Communities: Political Solutions to Cultural Conflict* (pp. 1–30). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mouritsen, P. (2011). Beyond Post-national Citizenship: Access, Consequence, Conditionality. In A. Triandafyllidou, T. Modood, & N. Meer (Eds.), *European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges* (pp. 88–115). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Mügge, L. (2016). Transnationalism as a Research Paradigm and Its Relevance for Integration. In B. Garcés-Masareñas & R. Penninx (Eds.), *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe: Contexts, Levels and Actors* (pp. 109–125). London: Springer (IMISCOE Research Series).
- Murphy, M. (2012). *Multiculturalism: A Critical Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Petermann, S., & Schönwälder, K. (2014). European Social Contexts Immigration and Social Interaction. Do Diverse Environments Matter? *European Societies*, 16(4), 500–521.
- Portes, A. (2015). Introduction: Immigration, Transnationalism, and Development: The State of the Question. In A. Portes & P. Fernández-Kelly (Eds.), *The State and the Grassroots: Immigrant Transnational Organizations in Four Continents* (pp. 1–24). New York: Berghahn Books.

- Portes, A., & Fernández-Kelly, P. (Eds.). (2015). *The State and the Grassroots: Immigrant Transnational Organizations in Four Continents*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Ramarajan, L. (2014). Past, Present and Future Research on Multiple Identities: Toward an Intrapersonal Network Approach. *Academy of Management Annals*, 8(1), 589–659.
- Richter, A. W., West, M. A., Van Dick, R., & Dawson, J. F. (2006). Boundary Spanners' Identification, Intergroup Contact, and Effective Intergroup Relations. *Academy of Management Journal*, 49(6), 1252–1269.
- Robins, K. (2007). Transnational Cultural Policy and European Cosmopolitanism. *Cultural Politics*, 3(2), 147–174.
- Robins, K., & Aksoy, A. (2016). *Transnationalism, Migration and the Challenge to Europe: The Enlargement of Meaning*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Roccas, S., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social Identity Complexity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 6(2), 88–109.
- Scholten, P., & Van Breugel, I. (Eds.). (2018). *Mainstreaming in Integration Governance: New Trends in Migration Integration Policies in Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schönwälder, K., Petermann, S., Hüttermann, J., Vertovec, S., Hewstone, M., Stolle, D., et al. (2016). *Diversity and Contact: Immigration and Social Interaction in German Cities*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Song, S. (2016). Multiculturalism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition). Retrieved from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/multiculturalism>
- Sørensen, N. N., & Guarnizo, L. E. (2007). Transnational Family Life Across the Atlantic: The Experience of Colombian and Dominican Migrants in Europe. In N. N. Sørensen (Ed.), *Living Across Worlds: Diaspora, Development and Transnational Engagement* (pp. 151–176). Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- Stolle, D., Soroka, S., & Johnston, R. (2008). When Does Diversity Erode Trust? Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust and the Mediating Effect of Social Interactions. *Political Studies*, 56(1), 57–75.
- Stolle, D., Petermann, S., Schoenwaelder, K., Schmitt, T., & Heywood, J. (2011). *Consequences of Immigration-Related Diversity on Social Integration and Social Cohesion – Bringing Contact Back*. In Paper prepared for the General ECPR Conferences in Reykjavik 2011 for Section 45 – The Civic Culture Revisited: Challenges, Changes and Innovations in Studies of Participation and Trust; Panel 504: Immigration-Related Diversity, Social

- Cohesion and the Civic Culture. Retrieved from <https://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/943eb53c-0241-4ebd-8e6d-aeadb65e918f.pdf>
- Triandafyllidou, A., Modood, T., & Meer, N. (Eds.). (2011). *European Multiculturalisms*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Vertovec, S. (2001). Transnationalism and Identity. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27(4), 573–582.
- Vertovec, S. (2010). Towards Post-multiculturalism? Changing Communities, Conditions and Contexts of Diversity. *International Social Science Journal*, 61(199), 83–95.
- Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (2010). *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices*. London: Routledge.
- Wood, P. (2004). *The Intercultural City Reader*. Stroud: Comedia.
- Wood, P. (2015). Meet Me on the Corner? Shaping the Conditions for Cross-cultural Interaction in Urban Public Space. In R. Zapata-Barrero (Ed.), *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation* (pp. 53–75). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (Ed.). (2009). *Citizenship Policies in the Age of Diversity: Europe at the Crossroads*. Barcelona: CIDOB Edicions.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2013). *Diversity Management in Spain*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2014). The Limits to Shaping Diversity as Public Culture: Permanent Festivities in Barcelona. *Cities*, 37, 66–72.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2015a). Interculturalism: Main Hypothesis, Theories and Strands. In R. Zapata-Barrero (Ed.), *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation* (pp. 3–19). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (Ed.). (2015b). *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2016a). Diversity and Cultural Policy: Cultural Citizenship as a Tool for Inclusion. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 22(4), 534–552.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2016b). Theorising Intercultural Citizenship, Chapter 3. In N. Meer, T. Modood, & R. Zapata-Barrero (Eds.), *Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines* (pp. 53–76). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2017a). The Intercultural Turn in Europe: Process of Policy Paradigm Change and Formation, Chapter 4. In F. Mansouri (Ed.), *The Promise and Challenge of Intercultural Dialogue: From Theory to Policy and Practice* (pp. 169–193). Paris: Unesco Publishers.

- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2017b). Interculturalism in the Post-multicultural Debate: A Defence. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 5(14). Key article of a Special Issue on Multiculturalism and Interculturalism, Guest Editors: Patrick Loobuyck and François Levrau.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2018). Mainstreaming and Interculturalism's Elective Affinities. In P. Scholten & I. Van Breugel (Eds.), *Mainstreaming in Integration Governance: New Trends in Migration Integration Policies in Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. chap. 9, 191–214.
- Zapata-Barrero, R., & Triandafyllidou, A. (Eds.). (2012). *Addressing Tolerance and Diversity Discourses in Europe: A Comparative Overview of 16 European Countries*. Barcelona: Fundació CIDOB.
- Zapata-Barrero, R., Caponio, T., & Scholten, P. (Eds.). (2017). Symposium on Theorizing 'The Local Turn' in the Governance of Immigrant Policies: A Multi-level Approach, Special Issue. *International Review of Administrative Sciences (IRAS)*, 83(2).