INTERACT – RESEARCHING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS' INTEGRATION AS A THREE-WAY PROCESS - IMMIGRANTS, COUNTRIES OF EMIGRATION AND COUNTRIES OF IMMIGRATION AS ACTORS OF INTEGRATION

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Ricard Zapata-Barrero

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Lorenzo Gabrielli *

Ricard Zapata-Barrero *

* GRITIM-UPF Barcelona

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In 2013 (Jan. 1st), around 34 million persons born in a third country (TCNs) were currently living in the European Union (EU), representing 7% of its total population. Integrating immigrants, i.e. allowing them to participate in the host society at the same level as natives, is an active, not a passive, process that involves two parties, the host society and the immigrants, working together to build a cohesive society.

Policy-making on integration is commonly regarded as primarily a matter of concern for the receiving state, with general disregard for the role of the sending state. However, migrants belong to two places: first, where they come and second, where they now live. While integration takes place in the latter, migrants maintain a variety of links with the former. New means of communication facilitating contact between migrants and their homes, globalisation bringing greater cultural diversity to host countries, and nation-building in source countries seeing expatriate nationals as a strategic resource have all transformed the way migrants interact with their home country.

INTERACT project looks at the ways governments and non-governmental institutions in origin countries, including the media, make transnational bonds a reality, and have developed tools that operate economically (to boost financial transfers and investments); culturally (to maintain or revive cultural heritage); politically (to expand the constituency); legally (to support their rights).

INTERACT project explores several important questions: To what extent do policies pursued by EU member states to integrate immigrants, and policies pursued by governments and non-state actors in origin countries regarding expatriates, complement or contradict each other? What effective contribution do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way?

A considerable amount of high-quality research on the integration of migrants has been produced in the EU. Building on existing research to investigate the impact of origin countries on the integration of migrants in the host country remains to be done.

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Abstract

In this article, we apply Hirschman's well-known distinction between *voice*, *exit*, and *loyalty* as an interpretative framework for looking at the political participation of immigrants in their origin countries and at their connections with state and non-state actors. Hirschman articulated these three options as mutually exclusive, but in our reappraisal of this scheme we consider these options overlapping and simultaneous. We can then distinguish immigrants' political actions as constituting a specific combination of these three options. Having already exercised their right to move, immigrants can steer their political activities towards the origin country, following two different options: "voice" or "loyalty". An *exit* may lead to the transnationalisation/internationalisation of the *voice* option or otherwise, to political activities inspired by loyalty towards the origin state.

We will also argue that these options are in the hands of immigrants, but can also be promoted by origin states and civil society actors, who may oppose each other on some points. The State of origin's interest is in maintaining their emigrants' *loyalty option*, in spite of the fact that they have used an *exit option*, or at least searching for a political containment of their citizen abroad. However, civil society groups at origin can try to develop the voice option, through the activities of emigrants, despite (lesser or stronger) opposition from state actors.

Finally, we will introduce the assumption that immigrants' political actions towards their country of origin are related to the interpretation of their *exit* reasons. When migration is perceived as a consequence of a political situation, the result is a voice option channelling protest jointly with origin societies. On the contrary, when the *exit* is perceived as more of an economic issue, immigrants maintain stronger links with the origin State and loyalty towards its institutions.

Key words: Hirschman, immigrant political participation, countries of origin/emigration countries, transnationalism, emigration policy, diaspora policy

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1. Concept definition: emigrants' political participation, their direction, and the classification of actors in the countries of origin

Transnational political practices of emigrants are a growing phenomenon, which increased in the last decades through the expansion of migration flows and the development of new technologies able to more easily link emigrants with their countries of origin. From a theoretical point of view, a branch of the existing literature on migrants' political participation focuses on migrants' transnational practices in this field and produces some very useful hints on the actions of migrants and non-state actors in origin countries (Faist and Bauböck 2010; Levitt 2003; Lyon and Uçarer 2004; Mügge 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001, 2003a, and 2003b; Wald 2008). Other scholars researching diaspora and emigration policies have conducted in-depth analyses of the actions of state actors towards the political activities of citizens abroad (Cohen 1997; De Haas 2007; Fitzgerald 2006; Itzigsohn 2000; Gamlen 2006, and 2008; Koslowsky 2004; Sheffer 2006). Nevertheless, an interpretative framework capable of relating the political participation of migrants with the actions of the different actors in the countries of origin is still missing.

Considering this lack, our objective is to develop a new framework in order to interpret in depth the political participation of migrants towards their origin countries, taking a departure from the classic concept of "*exit, voice, and loyalty*" developed by Albert Hirschman. We think that there is a necessity for a more complex analytical scheme in order to understand the cooperation or competition of emigrants with the actors in the country of origin. In particular, we believe that an elaboration of this analytical tool can lead to the identification and classification of actors in the countries of origin. By doing this, it will be possible to produce a more extended understanding of the typology of inter-actor relations and to reappraise transnational political practices of emigrants.

Before approaching an explanation of this interpretative framework, it is necessary to highlight some of the previous definitions of the main concepts that we will use.

First of all, we have to define what we mean by immigrant political participation. Considering the existing limitations on emigrants' participation in conventional forms of political life, both in origin and destination countries, we will not limit the concept only to the more conventional forms of political participation, such as voting or standing for elections. We will then also consider political participation as a sum of the two following categories (Martiniello 2005):

> - *conventional forms of political participation*, namely voting or running for elections; voting for referenda; participation in advisory councils and arenas of dialogue; membership in and founding of political parties, pressure groups, and NGOs; lobbying activities;

> - *non-conventional and extra-parliamentary forms of political participation*, i.e. protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, political strikes, hunger strikes, civil disobedience, boycotts.

It is also necessary to point out that some of these forms of political participation are addressed to the origin State institutions (electoral policy, parliamentary policy and consultative policy), while others occur outside the State framework (the involvement in political parties, union politics, other pressure groups, ethnic and communitarian mobilisations, etc.).

A second necessary clarification concerns the different orientations of migrants' political participation. Even if we are concerned here with linkages between emigrants and actors in their country of origin, it is necessary to consider that the different political activities undertaken by emigrants can be directed towards three different political arenas: the country of origin, the country of destination, and the supra-national or international level (Figure 1). Koslowsky (2004), for example, in detailing several kinds of emigrant political activity, defines those activities as "the globalization of domestic politics".

In some cases, emigrants can act in their destination countries to promote the interests of their origin country, rather than promoting a change there. With respect to the international level, emigrants' political mobilisation can assume two different configurations. The first one is well-exemplified by the case of existing linkages between Kurdish mobilisations in these migrants' different European destination countries (Mügge 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). A second configuration is of political mobilisations and advocacy or lobbying activities addressing the supra-national organisation, as in the case of EU institutions, international institutions such as the United Nations, or international civil society organisations such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch. Moreover, the role of emigrants as lobbyists or influential spokespersons for their home countries can be also oriented towards economic multi-national actors, such as public institutions and private companies, in order to influence capitalist elites for the purpose of concluding new strategic alliances and attracting foreign direct investments and technology transfers (Gamlen 2006).

Figure 1. The three directions of migrants' political activities

A third analytical premise which we propose is related to the typologies of actors implicated in emigrants' political participation. We operate a key distinction between the State and Society of origin,[1] in other words between State actors and non-State actors (or civil society actors) (Table 1). On one hand, we consider the fact that these two categories of actors may not share the same goals concerning their linkages with emigrants' political participation. On the other hand, these two categories of actors do not generally use the same tools, due to their different institutional positions and their respective available means. Our purpose is to make these differences visible and to decrypt their relationships with emigrants. As we have pointed out in a previous work (Zapata-Barrero *et al.* 2013), the existing literature does not generally differentiate between those two main categories, and most of the time uses them interchangeably.

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[1] We use these two terms from a political science perspective. The term *State* does not exclude other sub-national governmental levels such as local authorities, whose policies may have quite important transnational effects. The term *Society* does not exclude local or close networks of migrants.

Table 1. Classification of State and Non-State actors

State actors	Different Ministries (Interior, Foreign Affairs, specific Ministries for emigrants or expatriate affairs), embassies, specific state-agencies for emigrants, local authorities, ruling parties in authoritarian states or in restricted democratic systems, state-owned transnational migrant institutions, consultative bodies, political parties.
Civil society actors	NGOs, national and transnational civil society groups, associations, private companies, trade unions, churches and religious groups.

Source: Zapata-Barrero *et al.* 2013.

Assigning these distinctions to a specific and central actor is not always clear. We refer to political parties, particularly in countries where the political regime is particularly closed, and where democratic rules are weak or absent. In these cases, the possible identification of interests between the ruling political party or coalition and State actors, in term of interests and means will be profound. At the same time, in some cases opposition political parties will be more easily classified as non-State actors, considering their interests, their strategies, the tools they use or the cooperation that they establish with emigrants.

Nevertheless, we are conscious that these two categories cannot be considered homogeneous in terms of both objectives and actions, and that a multiplicity of State and non-State actors can be implicated in the political participation and mobilisation of migrants.

Looking generally at the political actions developed for emigrants by origin countries, Gamlen (2006: 4) talks of a "constellation" of different initiatives, at different levels of the state, which are more or less institutionalised. Rejecting an interpretation of the state as a unitary actor coherently pursuing "national interests", for example, we will then consider the State a multi-level and multi-actor organization, with internal struggles fostered by competing interests, but also by different political, ideological, and economic views (Fitzgerald 2006: 260-261).

After classifying and detecting the different State and non-State actors in origin countries, which are implicated in different ways in building, structuring and sustaining political relations with emigrants and diaspora groups, we will focus on inter-actor relations. In particular, in the following sections, we will introduce our interpretative framework inspired by our reappraisal of Hirschman's scheme, and then we will analyse the different types of relations between the actors implicated in transnational political ties with emigrants. Following our scheme, emigrants' political participation will be structured according to two main axes, in which the relations between actors can be collaborative, competitive, or neutral.

2. A reappraisal of Hirschman's "exit, voice, and loyalty" as overlapping categories

Looking at strategies and actions of state and non-state actors in origin countries, we consider that Hirschman's (1970; 1978) well-known distinction between *voice*, *exit*, and *loyalty* constitutes a very useful interpretative framework.

As Hofmann (2008: 16) notes, a critical reappraisal of Hirschman's framework "can be of significant heuristic value to our understanding of the dynamics of present-day migration and its social and political implications".

In our view, two main reasons justify the need for a reappraisal of Hirschman's ideas in order to explain emigrants' political participation in their origin countries. The first reason is the development of communication channels and networks which allow emigrants to exercise their political participation in origin countries in different forms, to access an almost unlimited amount of real-time

information about political activities, debates and protest in origin countries, and to maintain or establish linkages with different political and social actors in and outside of their home countries.

A second element pushing for such a reappraisal of Hirschman's model is the growing tendency of origin countries to allow citizens abroad to have double or multiple citizenship, as well as the growing establishment of channels for their political participation from abroad (Lafleur 2012; Zapata-Barrero *et al.* 2013).

According to Hirschman's idea, exit, voice, and loyalty constitute different answers towards a situation of dissatisfaction. Regarding *exit*, Hirschman explains that if people don't agree with the existing situation in their countries, they can "vote with their feet" and emigrate to another country. He adds that "people who chose emigration were obviously dissatisfied in some way with the country and society they were leaving" (Hirschman 1978: 102).

The *voice* option is considered any action searching to produce a change in a dissatisfactory situation. Loyalty constitutes the third and most conservative option towards a state of affairs.

Hirschman articulated these options as mutually exclusive. In a re-actualization of this scheme, we believe that is necessary to conceive of the three options as overlapping and simultaneous.

For example, concerning the relation between exit and voice, the author states that when an exit option is readily available "[…] the contribution of voice – that is of the political process – to such matters is likely to be and to remain limited" (Hirschman 1978: 95). The author also stresses the idea that migration and mass-migration constitute a way to reduce protest in home countries. Nevertheless, this consideration does not seem still completely valid at present. From our point of view, after the exit, the contribution of voice towards origin societies and political systems do not seem to be as limited as outlined by Hirschman in the past. The combination of an exit with a subsequent voice is a growing reality.

We can thus distinguish actions that lead towards a specific combination of these three options. Exit may lead to the internationalisation of voice option. The transnational action of origin societies towards emigrants can thus be considered a transnational *voice option*. We also consider the *exit option* as a participation action by itself. As Hofmann (2008: 10) explains, "if a citizen, by choosing the exit option, can free himself from the conditions that have impeded the articulation of voice domestically, he might raise his voice all the louder from the outside after emigration".

We consider that these three actions are options in the hands of migrants, but can also be constructed and managed by origin states and societies. We also assume that, in spite having used an *exit option*, the State of origin's interest is in keeping the *loyalty option* of its emigrants. For instance the origin state can develop specific policies, or even create dedicated structures to keep the loyalty of its emigrants. Origin State actors may also search for a political containment of citizens abroad, thus trying to stifle their voice option.

However, certain groups from the society of origin can be interested in developing a voice option outside the territory, through the activities of emigrants, in spite of strong (or less strong) opposition from state actors. This voice option can be directed to produce changes in the political landscape of the origin countries, as well as to promote and support sub-national or transnational forms of ethno-linguistic identities.

As a hypothesis, we also consider the fact that the perceived reasons for emigrants' departures play a key role in the formulation of these two forms of emigrants' political participation. As Hirschman (1978: 95) explains, an exit can be the result of the push of an internal dispute, or can result from the pull of "superior management". In other words, emigration can be pushed by a political conflict between the citizens and the State, or driven by a desire to improve a job situation, living standards, revenue, etc.

We consider the facts that:

- when exit is determined mainly by economic reasons, it is more probable that emigrants' political participation will take the form of *exit + loyalty*;

- when exit is determined more by political reasons (repression of political opposition or of ethno-linguistic minority groups), it is more probable that the political activities of emigrants will assume the form of *exit + voice*.

Following this reinterpretation of the "exit, voice, and loyalty" scheme regarding the political participation of emigrants, we consider the fact that Hirschman's elements can combine in the two following main forms:

- *exit* and *voice*

- *exit* and *loyalty*

The different combinations of exit with voice or loyalty are thus defined with respect to the effect that migrants' political actions will produce on the existing political situation in origin countries. In the next sections, we will analyse some possible configurations of these two combinations in more detail. As explanatory examples, we will explore different existing political practices developed by emigrants in the transnational space in connection with the different origin-country actors, as outlined by the existing literature.

3. *Exit* and *loyalty*: state-actors in their home countries, their strategies and actions towards emigrants

In order to analyse the combination of *exit* and *loyalty*, we believe that it is necessary to understand the strategies of State actors in origin countries. This will not mean that we are underestimating the weight of emigrant behaviour, which surely can play a role in maintaining a migrant's loyalty towards his country of origin without the intervention of State actors.

In general terms, Itzigsohn (2000) suggests that the engagement of home countries towards emigrants is based on two main interests: on the one hand, the political containment of emigrants, namely controlling the impact of emigrants' political activities on homeland politics; on the other hand, mobilizing emigrants' support as lobbyists in the destination countries.

Looking more deeply at state strategies and tools, Gamlen (2008: 842) identifies a broad framework of action through which the country of origin remains connected to and interacts with its citizens abroad. This author posits that States try to create a transnational "relationship of communication", based upon the idea of the nation, which he defines as "a system of symbols and signs within which states can immerse the exercise of power" (Gamlen 2006: 5ff.). A second step is the creation of the state's "objective capacities for the realization of power relations", namely building specific diaspora institutions. A third step of this "transnational exercise of state power" consists of what he calls "finalized activities", or "specific effects", a kind of "transnationalized citizenship" simultaneously comprised of the extension of rights to emigrants and the extraction of obligations from them. As the same author explains, symbolic nation-building policies are meant to create "a homogeneous national 'diaspora', with close ties of allegiance to the home-state", through initiatives that increase migrants' sense of belonging to a transnational community and enhance the place of the State within the community.[2]

As in the cases of Mexico, Morocco, and China, among others, State actors can aim to re-include emigrants within the national population through high-level rhetoric or symbolic gestures, prizes, or

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[2] For a more extended systematisation of tools used by States of origin, see Zapata-Barrero *et al.*, 2013.

even by celebrating emigrants as national heroes. Often this stance represents an important shift, considering that previously, various states denounced emigrants as deserters.

As another tool, emigrants' off-shore district of the state can be materially recovered in certain electoral systems, as in the case of Ecuador, where external electoral constituencies are created as special representations for emigrants, which can be considered a paternalistic (or materialistic) claim that expatriates are an "offshore part" of the national population.

These policies share the state's interest in producing "a communal mentality" for emigrants and "a sense of common belonging to the home-state that renders expatriates governable" (Gamlen 2006: 7). This kind of state actor's activity towards emigrants is meant to maintain or (re)establish loyalty among its citizens abroad.

Another action used by the state to avoid the voice option and to keep the loyalty of emigrants is that of implementing surveillance, through the foreign service or the migration bureaucracy, which select strategic actors among the emigrants to establish a long-term relationship with them.

In some cases, the home State creates its own transnational migrant organizations, often also acting as consultative institutions, in order to avoid existing political tensions and to eventually contain possible future conflicts with emigrants. State-founded associations such as the "*Amicales*", in the case of Morocco, are a well-known example of these practices (De Haas 2007). Another example of this is in Ecuador where, from the beginning of 2000, the state began to open "*casas ecuatorianas*" (Ecuadorian homes) abroad, in order to maintain a strict link to the diaspora; these were one of the strong axes of Rafael Correa's political actions. One of the objectives was to ensure that representatives of the diaspora were not dissident voices; another goal was to use this voice in the destination countries of Ecuadorian emigrants (Sànchez-Montijano 2012).

Similarly, some scholars (Gamlen 2006: 5) suggest that the Mexican state seeks to extend its governance of Mexican nationals into the urban and community scale of organizations, containing and co-opting migrant political activity by inserting state representatives into civic associations.

3.1 *Exit* and *loyalty*: lobbying for the origin country

Some origin countries' actions have aimed to co-opt influential expatriates in order to realise lobbying activities towards destination countries and also at international level.

A very interesting case of this is Argentina, where, at the time of the crisis on the Malvinas Islands in 2012, the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner sent letters to influential emigrants to support the state's official position on this issue in their destination countries, as well at the international level (Zapata-Barrero *et al.* 2013). This case represents a clear example of "selective mobilisation" of emigrants to create public opinion abroad and to promote the state's interests at the international level.

The case of Turkey is another clear example of a state's action which targets citizens abroad as providers of political support and lobbying. Turkey has also tried to engage influential expatriates and emigrant associations in Europe, in order to push forward the state's agenda on the issue of EU membership (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). This state has also sponsored academic exchanges and academic chairs, as a tool for pushing pro-Turkish ideologies, screening the candidates according to their views on the Armenian massacres (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001).

In the case of Turkey, it is always interesting to note the efforts of the American Turkish community at different stages of the Cyprus crisis in the 1970s, and also the countermeasures taken by the much larger American Greek communities (Sheffer 2006). This case represents a good example of emigrant groups' lobbying of the host-state to promote home-state interests on a very specific issue of international relations. In this case, the lobbying activities were conducted by diaspora groups of both implicated states.

Citizens abroad can push forward their home country's interests in order to promote cooperation with host countries in different areas: stopping or releasing existing economic boycotts, restraining limitations on exportation and importation to and from origin countries, or fostering the liberalisation of tariffs and commercial flows (Sheffer 2006).

As we have mentioned earlier, another area where emigrants' lobbying activities can be particularly useful for home countries is influencing host country policymakers with respect to tariffs and commercial regimes. For example, the Mexican diaspora in the United States has successfully influenced policymakers to agree to moratoriums on loans to their homeland (Sheffer 2006).

Regarding the case of lobbying to end economic boycotts and commercial limitations, one of the clearest examples is the action of the Jewish diaspora in the US, which lobbied for the end to the economic boycott of South Africa during the apartheid in order to help the Jewish diaspora leaving in this country (generating tensions not only within the diaspora, but also with other communities lobbying for the boycott, such as African-Americans). An analogue case is that of the Chinese diaspora lobbying in the US for a political and economic opening of China (Sheffer 2006).

4. *Exit* and *voice*: competition with state-actors in home countries and cooperation with non-State actors

The second configuration of emigrants' political participation in origin countries combines exit and voice. The emigrant's unconformity with the origin country's situation thus takes the form of *voice* action in order to change the political situation in the country of origin. This option can take different forms, depending on the activities carried out by emigrants.

The linkages and networks between home societies and emigrant groups in different destination countries to carry out political activities pertaining to origin and destination countries represent a complex but fundamental matter that deserves more in-depth analysis. The new analytical framework, as well as the distinction between State and non-State actors, can be useful to developing a deeper understanding of these linkages.

In general terms, some authors have pointed out that the democratization processes of home countries are linked with the participation of emigrants, thereby increasing their opportunities to influence homeland politics (Koslowsky 2004: 5). A very fashionable debate, particularly after the 'Arab spring', concerns the role of diasporas in the democratization process of their origin countries. The 'Arab Spring' case suggests that the actions of home societies in the field of political participation are more visible when non-state actors at home have diverging interests vis-à-vis state institutions. Also, when emigrant communities have fewer opportunities to participate at home, it is possible that they will be politically more active outside the country to change the situation at home. It is also important to note that these activities are not exclusive to the Arab countries. For example, Chinese citizens outside the country have supported movements for political change in their homeland.

It appears particularly important to consider the centrality of new communication technologies in the case of interactions between emigrants and home societies (or parts of those societies), when the home-government or some majority or dominant social groups are unfriendly or unsympathetic to the specific group of emigrants (Sheffer 2006: 184). This can be the case of ethno-linguistic minority groups in the home country, linked with their specific diaspora – and of emigrants' activities, linked with opposition homeland groups – against totalitarian or authoritarian regimes in the origin countries. Sheffer (2006: 182) points out that diaspora activities "[…] now include […] the mobilisation and transfer of economic, cultural, and political resources to homelands and other diaspora communities, the creation of trans-state political communities, and communication with local and global NGOs and IGOs". Thus, the technological changes and the large diffusion of this new means of communication permit more and more emigrant groups to galvanize public opinion and to access policymakers, regardless of their economic and political resources and irrespective of their location.

5. *Exit* and *voice*: transnational links with the country of origin and other immigrant destinations

Østergaard-Nielsen (2001: 13), for instance, suggests that homeland political organizations can coordinate their campaigns with sister organisations elsewhere, pooling financial resources and drawing on their expertise and manpower, or with political counterparts in other countries, producing joint informational material or organizing and coordinating confrontational activities (demonstrations/mass meetings).

In some cases, as Sheffer (2006: 201) has clearly pointed out, host countries try to take advantage of emigrants' contrast conflicts with their origin countries' governments. In these instances, destination countries can support the criticisms of migrants towards political regimes in their homelands, and, at times, even encourage migrant activities against homeland governments, with the risk of creating a political confrontation between origin and destination countries. One of the clearest examples of this situation is the activities of the Cuban diaspora in the US against the political regime in their homeland.

Another way in which exit and voice can combine in the political activities of emigrants that are meant to bring about a change in origin countries can be through channelling campaign contributions and other form of material support to opposition political parties. Koslowsky (2004: 14) suggests that the importance of this "less visible but perhaps more influential way" can be also linked to the different weight of external currencies, compared to those of home countries, in the election process. In the first free election in East European countries, for example, a 50 dollar donation coming from a Polish resident in the US equalled a third of the monthly wage of a Pole residing in the country (Zapata-Barrero *et al.* 2013). Another example in this sense is the campaign of Franjo Tudjiman, leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which started to raise funds from emigrants in the US, even before non-communist parties were legalized in Yugoslavia. Apparently, around 80% of the expenses of Croatian political parties in the 1990 election were covered with funds coming from Croatian emigrants and their descendents (Koslowsky 2004).

Another case in which the political actions of emigrants can influence the homeland political situation, following the agenda of some specific non-state actors in origin countries, is supporting identity-groups that are alternatives to the dominant groups. Emigrants' economic backing can inspire and also lead movements projecting national visions that transcend existing state boundaries, as well as revive 'dormant' sub-national identities (Koslowsky 2004: 21). In this case, the challenges posed by these kinds of emigrant actions for multi-national origin countries are evident.

The case of the Kurdish diaspora is particularly emblematic of the role that emigrants can play in movements pursuing a national project, in this case trespassing the existing state boundaries of several nation-states (Koslowsky 2004). Some parts of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe have been instrumental in internationalizing the politics of Kurdish separatism and bringing Turkey's treatment of its Kurdish minority to the attention of European countries through different activities (hunger strikes, protest marches and terrorist bombings in Germany) (Lyon and Uçarer 2004).

Again, the case of Croatian emigrants is particularly relevant on the issue of reviving 'dormant' sub-national identities. We are referring to the role that they play as a lobbying group for German diplomatic recognition of their independence. Very similarly, Croatian emigrants in the US helped to establish Croatian diplomatic offices in Washington and have also used lobbying activities to push the US to adopt a diplomatic recognition of Croatia, as they did in Germany (Koslowsky 2004: 16).

Similar cases have occurred in other parts of former Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, where emigrants supported nationalist revivals, which led to the dismantling of multi-ethnic states. Kosovo-Albanian emigrants, for example, played this role in the Kosovar self-determination movement.

5.1 *Exit* and *voice*: lobbying against the origin State

In this sense, two types of actions can be profitable for non-state actors in home societies to push forward their agendas, permitting emigrant groups to express criticism of their home government, or transmit demands concerning its expected behaviour.

The first way that origin countries' non-state actors can choose to strengthen their actions is to use global institutional structures to facilitate transnational political practices. We are referring particularly to international organizations that, under the umbrella of human rights, can provide an essential framework to negotiation between transnational political networks and home countries. As Østergaard-Nielsen (2001: 15) has pointed out, "transnational political networks who oppose a state, which has strong allies in their host-states or simply is too powerful for other states to meddle with, may turn to international organizations such as the UN, OSCE, European Council, and the like". As the same author suggests, in this framework, the role of NGOs in 'trans-state advocacy' can be very useful to facilitating contacts between those transnational political networks and the level of policymakers that would otherwise be unlikely to reach emigrant groups.

Emigrants can also engage in lobbying activities to impose boycotts and sanctions on their home countries, as well as establish specific political positions in international relations, as demonstrated in the case of certain groups in the Cuban and Iranian diasporas in the United States, as well as by the Iraqi diaspora in Europe, which mobilised against the regime of Saddam Hussein (Sheffer 2006). Another example of these strategies is the case of the PLO's (Palestinian Liberation Organization) longstanding lobbying activities for recognition of Palestine as a member of the UN. Similarly, the Tibetan diaspora has conducted international advocacy to support independent claims and respect for human rights in the region by the Chinese state. Another similar example is the Kurdish expatriates' action, mentioned earlier.

The second option that non-state actors have to push forward their agenda through transnational political activities involving the diaspora is through new technologies. Sheffer (2006) underlines the importance of these new technologies, which are mainly internet connections but also satellite broadcasting and new electronic media for diaspora activities. As the same author explains, these changes have substantially transformed the nature of interactions between diaspora groups and governmental and non-governmental organizations in origin and destination countries (Sheffer 2006). Considering the explosive increase in the use of the internet in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, it is necessary to take these changes into account in order to understand the influence of home societies towards emigrants' political participation in both homelands and host countries. Nevertheless, we figure that this is a very complex area to explore, due to the multiple potential interactions at this level, and also due to their fast changing nature.

6. Conclusions

This work represents a first step of conceptualisation of Hirschman's inspired conceptual framework. Our objective here is to formulate a framework that is useful to analyse and interpret the transnational political participation of immigrants, while also considering their relations with the different actors and stakeholders at origin.

We are conscious that a deeper conceptual development is needed on some specific aspects, and that more intensive testing at the empirical level is necessary. The application of this conceptual framework to different empirical case studies will also constitute a more conclusive test to verify our preliminary hypothesis regarding the weight of the reasons behind the emigration process when orienting the political activity of migrants to voice or loyalty towards the origin country. In theoretical terms, the difference between the two categories of emigration drivers is relatively clear. Meanwhile, in empirical terms, this difference becomes less clear; an important amount of the migration process is

driven by mixed elements. At the moment, considering the information drawn from the existing literature, this hypothesis seems to have some value.

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