The Afghanistan conflict. Towards an Understanding of the Twenty-Year(s of) Afghan War (1989-2009) and America's ‘Unipolar Moment'
Dimarts 3 de març
Marc W. Herold, professor del Departament d'Economia i d'Estudis de les Dones de la Universitat de New Hampshire.
Presenta: Caterina García, professora de Relacions Internacionals de la UPF. Hi haurà traducció simultània.
Per preparar la sessió, el professor Herold ha recomanat la lectura dels següents articles:
- Cox, Michael, "American Power before and after 11 September: Dizzy with Success?", International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs) 78, 2 (April 2002): 261 - 76.
- Boot, Max, "The Case for American Empire. The Most Realistic Response to Terrorism is for America to embrace its Imperial Role", The Weekly Standard 7, 5 (October 15, 2001).
- Foster, John Bellamy, "Imperial America and War", Monthly Review 55, 1 (May 2003): 1 - 10.
- Viner, Katherine. "Feminism as Imperialism", The Guardian (September 21, 2002).
- Herold, Marc W., "Nuevo dossier sobre la (im)precisión de los bombardeos estadounidenses y el (menos)precio por una vida afgana. La matriz de la muerte", Global Research (Canada) (October 24, 2008).
D'altra banda, per a aquells que estigueu interessats en el tema, us adjuntem altres articles del ponent que poden ser del vostre interès:
Abstract de la conferència:
The exit of Russia in 1989 removed a major Great Game player from the area for the next twenty years; this was a major change as before 1989, Afghanistan was always part of the Cold War dynamics. This fact is reflected in the title of my talk: the twenty year war, 1989-2009. What appeared for many at the turn of the twenty-first century as unchallenged, unbridled U.S. power - some even spoke of the U.S being in a more dominant position than ever before- had all but dissipated by 2008. Indeed, a strong case about American imperial overstretch seems now more relevant than ever. The unipolar moment turned out to be short-lived, a mere "imperial episode". My approach is lay out those long-run elements necessary to understanding the U.S Afghan war and then to introduce more short-run elements. Having set out a two-level framework to understanding why this war, I'll critically examine some of the interesting, competing explanations advanced by other scholars and commentators. I'll conclude with my own preferred synthesis. I eschew from examining the actual conduct and consequences of the U.S and NATO war in Afghanistan which I have written about in great detail elsewhere. Neither do I delve into the vast literature analyzing and debating the new, post-Cold War structure of world power, but rather focus upon the view dominant in the White House before 9/11.